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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is aimed at clarifying the concept of moral responsibility 
within Anglophone, analytic ethics broadly defined, as well as looking at the 
concept of character to inquire about its role embedded within these 
theories. In this work, it is claimed that considerations of character matter 
when moral responsibility is assessed. 
Two families of theories of moral responsibility are compared with each 
other starting with Peter F. Strawson’s sentimentalist theory, originated in 
his influential article “Freedom and Resentment” (Strawson, 1962) and 
followed by work of others including R. Jay Wallace (1994). Scholarship on 
Aristotle's theory provides the basis for a similar framework of responsibility 
for action (NE III.1).  
Other aspects of Aristotle’s work provide additional depth to his concept 
of moral responsibility however. Character differs greatly in emphasis in 
Aristotle's theory from that of Strawson. It is claimed here that character is 
an essential part of human agency, and is thus a defining factor for actions 
taken. It is also claimed since that character is not a precise concept, taking it 
fully into account presents a formidable challenge to all theories attempting 
to explain responsibility exhaustively. 
In Strawson’s case, the further claim is made that what is traditionally 
discussed in terms of character is rephrased in terms of pleas and special 
conditions, which amount together into excuses instead. One common 
concept that both of these doctrines utilize is blame. Blame (usually 
accompanied with praise) is identified as a crucial component of 
responsibility by a majority of thinkers writing on the subject, and this 
reasoning is followed here as well.  
An aporetic conclusion supporting critical sources is reached in terms of a 
common understanding of moral responsibility in Part I. The Aristotelian 
notion of character and the Strawsonian notion of excuse will be re-visited as 
examples of blame mitigation within the context of these theories in the 
systematic section of Part II. Analysis is conducted based on Bernard 
Williams’s (1993 & 1997) explication of elements of responsibility, where a 
comparison is done between character and excuses appearing in the two 
families of theories of responsibility. Based on the findings it is concluded 
that the two theoretical families share similarity of structure regardless of the 
difference in their age, in a way that no matter whether character or excuses 
are used to describe the alteration of initial judgment, in terms of the end 
results blame mitigation appears to happen identically in all cases.  
Examination of character in the context of philosophy of responsibility 
shows that there is room for expansion in the narrower attempts to define 
the concept. Comparisons of both of these theoretical alternatives are 
illustrated with examples and further discussion is called for. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Difficulties in defining moral responsibility 
 
The purpose of this work is to look at a concept embedded in the theories of 
moral responsibility that is seldom at the forefront of discussion. In this 
work, it is claimed that considerations of character matter when moral 
responsibility is assessed. It is also claimed since that character is not a 
precise concept, taking it fully into account presents a formidable challenge 
to all theories attempting to explain responsibility exhaustively.  
Philosophy, at least in its Anglophone, analytical context, has been for the 
majority of the previous century occupied with the problem of determinism 
while trying to define responsibility. The effort put into the free will vs. 
determinism debate has been monumental and, with all due respect to the 
scholars devoting their time to the subject, it seems that the nature of 
professional academic philosophical conduct with different agendas and 
starting premises makes any satisfactory conclusion to the debate even 
undesirable. These troubles considered, an attempt to bring clarity to the 
concept of moral responsibility is made by examining contemporary 
academic discussion in context of moral philosophy and by comparing 
current understanding of the topic with historical sources. 
The thesis is divided into two main parts: “I Two Theories of 
Responsibility” and “II Character and Excuses in Theories of Responsibility”. 
The first part, consisting of two different takes on moral responsibility, will 
frame the research area. As responsibility itself is a very broad topic, almost 
all-inclusive by definition, a further distinction is needed between moral 
responsibility, which is the topic here, and other forms of responsibility such 
as collective, legal and political responsibilities etc., which are not. The 
general principle followed is that since these related concepts cannot fully be 
separated from each other, even the forms of responsibility outside the 
narrower definitions of moral responsibility are taken into account if they 
provide relevant information. Later in the work, the specific concepts of 
moral responsibility will be further analyzed in terms of their component 
elements, of which the most significant is blame, which has received a lot of 
attention from philosophers in recent times.  
The primary philosophical method used here is comparative conceptual 
analysis, supported by the history of philosophy. The study contrasts two 
traditions in the history of philosophy: that of philosophical sentimentalism, 
focusing on Strawsonian concepts of responsibility and blame and that of 
Aristotelianism, or more accurately the recent scholarship on Aristotle. The 
concept of responsibility and its nature in Anglophone analytic ethics as well 
as political philosophy form the background of this study. It will be analyzed 
in depth particularly the more specific, yet still very broad topic of moral 
12 
responsibility. The philosophy of responsibility has recently seen a shift from 
the more ontological questions of free will vs. determinism toward more 
naturalistic and pragmatic questions concerning moral psychology and 
society. Peter Strawson and his article "Freedom and Resentment” 
(2008/[1962]), the most influential contribution to this shift, serve as an 
anchor point for the other interpretations and developments that concern the 
concept.1  
Strawson's article has established the context of most attempts to define 
responsibility since. It distinguishes reactive sentiments (blame in terms of 
emotions such as resentment, indignation and guilt) as the quintessential 
element of inquiries into responsible action, an element which had not been 
debated for more than two centuries since the time of David Hume and 
classical sentimentalism, which was a different approach than the dominant, 
mainly utilitarian interpretations of responsibility. Yet the definition itself 
was not at all precise, with the disentangling of free will and determinism 
taking most of the effort. Throughout history, the topic of responsibility has 
attracted various considerations, including those of causal action and its 
response. Analysis of the concept is possible when these diverse facets are 
taken into account. Responsibility, conceived as the act and feedback coming 
back to the agent based on the act is thought of here as the default view on 
the subject.  
Some alternate viewpoints following Strawson's theory are discussed as 
well as some direct criticism. Many think that this particular focus is not 
sufficient for it to satisfy everything a satisfactory conception of 
responsibility needs to encompass.2 Strawson's critics, some of whom are 
looked at here, have very illuminating ideas on the subject. The short-
comings of this Strawsonian “default-view” of responsibility can be pointed 
out through these critical takes. Throughout the work of his followers such as 
R. Jay Wallace (esp. 1994), it is possible to question some aspects of the 
Strawsonian position. The main conceptions of responsibility, along with 
related critical discussions, are considered. How are the other viewpoints 
pursued here? The natural way to identify a settled discourse and its long-
established principles is to ask how things were before. The history of 
philosophy is discussed here in order to see what has been omitted from the 
most common way of defining responsibility. Having something in common 
with each other, these criticisms look back at how responsibility was used in 
the past in different sets of theories. For example, Gary Watson (1987) makes 
valuable contributions to the subject, with the help of an empirical example 
in which the knowledge of the developmental history changes the way a 
                                                
1 “Freedom and Resentment” (Strawson 2008/[1962]) is referred to with the abbreviation FR in 
the text. 
2 See, among others, Fingarette 1966, Smiley 1992, B. Williams 1993 & 1997, G. Williams 2010.  
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clearly responsible criminal is viewed.3 Another one, a more pragmatic take 
on the concept by Marion Smiley (1992), implies that there have been two 
historical alternatives to the way that the concept of responsibility is 
discussed now. Her approach divides responsibility into two questions: that 
about causal responsibility and that about blameworthiness. Bernard 
Williams’s list of the elements of responsibility is utilized here in order to 
compare the theories.4 The criticisms, along with other alternative 
viewpoints, together highlight a factor that has not been present in 
Strawsonian theories. The question is how differently has the topic been 
discussed in history of philosophy? These three criticisms along with their 
supporting statements will be looked at in the section following discussion of 
the Strawsonian conception of responsibility.  
The study is complemented here by the consideration offered in the 
classic works of Aristotle.5 Aristotle, who is viewed here as the original 
theorist of responsibility, deals with the same subject matter in the 
Nicomachean Ethics (and to a lesser extent in the Eudemian Ethics, Rhetoric 
and Politics).  
 
Core Components of Moral Responsibility 
 
Aristotle's scholarship has produced an alternative to the concept of 
responsibility that is now very popular. This Aristotelian conception of 
responsibility relies partly on interpretation, as the concept and the 
philosophical discourse itself have been formulated much later.6 
Nevertheless, there is common ground between these historically very far 
removed schools of thought.7  
One common concept that both of these doctrines utilize is blame. Blame 
is identified, along with praise, as a crucial component of responsibility by a 
majority of thinkers writing on the subject of responsibility, and this 
reasoning is followed here as well. In the case of Strawson and his followers, 
                                                
3 According to many Strawson commentators, his theory lacks what Gary Watson briefly illustrates 
as "historical responsibility". This is discussed in chapter 4.3.4. (Watson 1987, 279-280. See also 
McKenna & Russell 2007, 13.) 
4 Bernard Williams’s elements of responsibility, based on ideas in Williams 1993 & 1997, are 
discussed in chapter 4.3.3. The analysis in chapter 7 owes its framework to these elements. 
5 The reason for this conscious oversight is also discussed: the concepts of character, historical 
responsibility and their variations have traditionally been part of the incompatibilist arguments for 
freedom of the will. Watson (1987), for example, tries to take these subjects into account separately, in 
order to produce novel approaches to the concept.  
6 This is done through the works of commentators including Irwin 1980, B. Williams 1993, Broadie 
1991, and Meyer 2011 et.al. 
7 The Strawsonian conception of responsibility has been so influential, that it has also in part 
affected the Aristotelian conception that contemporary scholars maintain. I attempt to note these cases 
where there is potential for mix-ups. 
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responsibility is identified through blame as a response to some form of 
misconduct carried out by another (see McNamara, 141). Thus responsibility 
is strongly linked to the action of individuals and to how the reactive 
sentiments are experienced in their context.  
Discussion on praise and blame, sentiments that are directed back toward 
the voluntary actions of an individual, goes all the way back to Aristotle. The 
groundwork for all subsequent discussions on responsibility is undertaken in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, primarily in book III. Aristotle's actor is equally 
subject to the praise and resentment that is bestowed upon him/her because 
of his/her actions, but in his case the community apportioning the praise or 
blame is more directly involved in the process. After all, Aristotle was not 
concerned with an instrument of ethical analysis, but rather with describing 
an ideal society. One element that is still connected with the discussion of 
responsibility and is directly followed by the talk on responsibility for action 
in the Nicomachean Ethics is the way that action reveals the character of the 
actor to the society. These considerations of character make determining 
responsibility a deeper effort than that simply checking the boxes of 
voluntariness, consciousness and self-control. 
Aristotle's theory provides the basis for a similar framework of 
responsibility for action (NE III.1) to Strawson's. Other aspects of his work 
provide additional depth to his concept however. The concept of character 
differs greatly in emphasis in Aristotle's theory from that of Strawson. 
Character can have an effect on responsibility assessments that lead to 
different outcomes when an otherwise identical action is evaluated morally. 
This kind of alteration of judgment is present in Strawson's work too, but it is 
discussed under the guise of the excuse,8 which does not necessarily have to 
be in contact with actual actions or events in the way that Aristotle’s 
character does.9 
It appears that concerns about character have been left out of modern 
considerations of responsibility, or that it has received considerably less 
attention. As will be claimed later, the concept of responsibility has of 
                                                
8 The key terms of excuse and exemption that are used here were coined by Strawson’s 
commentator Gary Watson (1987, 259-261). Strawson uses the terms “special considerations” and 
“pleas” to demonstrate the cases in which concerns about the moral status of the agent can affect the 
response to the act. These phrases are interchangeable with the excuses and exemptions, which are 
introduced in part I, chapter 3.1.3. In a nutshell, the definitive concept of a Strawsonian excuse is 
found chapter four of FR (Strawson 2008/[1962], 7-10), despite the fact that Strawson writes about the 
subject using different (yet synonymous) phrases such as special considerations and pleas. The 
reasoning behind the use of these concepts is explained in the closer analysis in chapter 6.2 of part II. 
9 Character, on the other hand, was still a part of the subject area of responsibility-related theories 
discussed in David Hume's time, but has received less attention apart from the theories of 
responsibility originating from the resurgence of virtue ethics by Anscombe (see 1958), MacIntyre, 
Foot et.al.  
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necessity had to be made lighter or thinner,10 so that a viable tool of analysis 
could have been utilized. Bernard Williams, one of the most famous 
historically minded critics of the Strawsonian conception of responsibility 
offers an intricate classification of the aggregate term, responsibility, into its 
constitutive components.  
 
Character and Excuses as Blame Mitigation 
 
Finally, after the work by the philosophers concerned has been discussed in 
the substantive section of Part I, the Aristotelian notion of character and the 
Strawsonian notion of excuse will be re-visited as examples of blame 
mitigation within the context of these theories in the systematic section of 
Part II. While the complete dissertation provides a unique viewpoint on the 
subject, as a distinctly new contribution is presented in the way Williams’s 
elements of responsibility are used to compare the two theories. The 
comparison committed in the analysis chapter will help to allay concerns 
related to the difficulty in defining moral responsibility. Blame mitigation is 
considered here as the natural outcome of re-evaluating the initial reactive 
sentiment of blame that occurs in connection with the observed act requiring 
moral evaluation, resulting in lesser or even completely removed emotional 
reaction compared to the original event. These two traditions of moral 
philosophy appear to have something in common in considering these forms 
of blame mitigation. The “special considerations [which] might be expected 
to modify or mollify [the initial] feeling or remove it altogether”, which are 
discussed relation to excuses and exemptions, where the former describe 
more closely the cases where the effect of the reactive sentiment is somewhat 
lessened, and exemptions where the sentiment is canceled outright (FR, 7), 
or in terms of character and its various stages of development. Keeping in 
mind that the classical idea of character itself is not without problems, it 
should not be advisable to reinstate it in some out-dated form. Rather, 
further discussion is called for and possible avenues of development will be 
considered by asking how the various means of blame mitigation within the 
theories of responsibility explain the concept.  
I claim that character is an essential part of human agency, and is thus a 
defining factor for actions taken. It is accounted for, although insufficiently, 
in Strawson (see FR, 25-26). Strawson implies however that: (1.) character is 
important, but (2.) is left out of his inquiry. Nevertheless (3.) it is possible to 
reconstruct the concept through the moral sentiment, or, in his case, the 
reactive sentiments. It seems that this commitment has not been shared by 
the majority of Strawson's followers, who seem to share the emphasis on 
excusing practices. In Strawson’s case, the further claim is made that what is 
traditionally discussed in terms of character is rephrased in terms of excuses 
instead. Further on, I argue that in Aristotle’s texts and the work of his 
                                                
10 To use the terms thick and thin concepts made popular by Bernard Williams (1985). 
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scholars, the discussion related to blame mitigation is related to his idea of 
character. The virtues that are supposed to be attained when the actor 
reaches adulthood determine whether the proper level of responsibility is 
achieved by the individual. Blame as an element of responsibility in Aristotle 
functions very similarly to that used in the later counterparts.   
Based on the analysis conducted in chapter 7, I conclude that no matter 
whether character or excuses are used to describe the phenomenon, in terms 
of the end results blame mitigation appears to happen identically in all cases. 
Comparisons of both of these theoretical alternatives are illustrated with 
examples. Especially interesting comparisons are provided by the recent 
debates in the philosophy of responsibility, both in the Strawsonian and the 
Aristotelian camp. A child, for example, can be either excused on the grounds 
of a Strawsonian exemption, according to which being “only a child” 
suspends our “ordinary reactive attitudes toward the subject” (FR, 8-9). 
Alternatively, in the Aristotelian sense we might forgo condemnation of 
the agent on grounds of the knowledge we have about the character of the 
child. It would be irrational and unfair to expect similar action from him/her. 
Another example that provides interesting questions about the nature of 
agency is the psychopath.11 The interesting part that the psychopath 
illustrates is that of someone who can cognitively understand moral 
principles and the consequences of actions related to them full well but, in 
the words of Watson, “they just do not care about that.” This case is 
interesting as it puts the theories of responsibility into the paradoxical 
position that on the one hand the person is exempted from responsibility, but 
on the other he can consciously and uninhibitedly cause harm to fellow 
human beings. Watson provides an interesting distinction between different 
“faces of responsibility” that help to understand these difficult cases 
conceptually (Watson 2011, 308-309; see also Watson 2004/[1996].) 
The way of looking at the theories of responsibility here is related to the 
means by which they discuss the common element of blame. Blame 
mitigation is at the heart of each of the accounts examined. The thesis is that 
blame mitigation is a concern shared by different philosophical traditions, 
and as such is associated with the core ideas of philosophy of responsibility in 
general. A basic level of comparability between the main theories of 
responsibility is assumed, since a better understanding of the phenomenon 
and its implications can be gained by looking into the initial Strawsonian 
position as well as its criticism, and contrasting this position with 
Aristotelian history through commentary on it. This, by itself, is argued to 
contribute to the current debate on the naturalistic foundations of blame and 
moral responsibility as its extension.  
                                                
11 There has been some interesting debate on the subject by authors such as Thomas Scanlon and 
Gary Watson, to mention a few. 
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2 METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE  
Throughout the history of Western philosophy, the subject of responsibility 
has been discussed about among many different schools of thought, with 
different aims and fundamental rules extending from classical Greece, 
Aristotle being the most important figure, to the moral sense theorists 
including David Hume and Adam Smith, as well as from the more modern 
schools of utilitarianism to Kantianism, to cover all major disciplines of 
philosophy, with whomever has had an interest in ethical theory. An 
encompassing account of the subject would effectively be a lifetime’s work, 
and is naturally not pursued here as such. As responsibility in philosophy is a 
very broad topic, and it would be impossible to accommodate all viewpoints 
on the subject at least within the limitations of a single study, this chapter 
outlines what is included within this dissertation.  
Basically, what is attempted here is a diverse look at the contemporary 
discussion on moral responsibility within Anglophone philosophy, situated in 
analytic ethics broadly conceived. Since the research area would still be too 
large defined as such, measures have been taken to keep the subject 
manageable. A number of important insights and points of view will certainly 
be lost in the process, but to minimize this risk these short-comings are 
alleviated somewhat with the help of work done by Garrath Williams’s 
bibliography, "Moral Responsibility: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research 
Guide" (G. Williams 2010), which provides a sufficiently broad and 
comprehensive list of important monographs and articles. Needless to say, 
the present research is indebted to Williams’ effort.12 The bibliography 
                                                
12 Garrath Williams has done admirable work on cataloguing the theories of responsibility in 
recent years, while making his own contribution to the discussion as well. Most importantly his 
“Oxford Bibliography on Moral Responsibility” (2010) is fairly comprehensive and is used as a point of 
comparison for this literature review (ch. 2). William’s stance, using Strawson’s reactive sentiments 
approach (see ch. 3) to anchor responsibility theories, is seconded here. In addition to his introductory 
review, Williams has also published “Responsibility as a Virtue” (2008), “Responsibility” (2009) and 
“Sharing and Holding Responsible” (2013). Williams (2008) highlights an important interpretation of 
the concept, which is different from the usual definitions. His internet article “Responsibility” (2009) 
contains some valuable distinctions, including that between retrospective and prospective 
responsibilities. “Sharing and Holding Responsible” (2013) is an interesting article that distinguishes 
two themes in the discussion of moral responsibility: the usual questions of blameworthiness and 
retribution as well as the further question of standing to respond or reproach (see G. Williams 2013, 
360, ch. 4.3). Since Williams's bibliography was published, there have been a couple of additional 
published works on moral responsibility that will be referred to here, including Coates & Tognazzini 
2013 & 2014, as well as Shoemaker (ed.) 2013 & 2015; Shoemaker & Tognazzini (eds.) 2014; Clarke, 
McKenna & Smith (2015) can also be read as a continuation of this debate. Second, there are emphases 
in the bibliography that will differ from the preferred view-point of this work. Regarding the first 
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mentioned covers more areas than this study will, and it is recommended for 
further information and reference. The bibliography is also helpful in 
providing an introduction to those areas that are left out of this dissertation 
by necessity. There is, naturally, an enormous amount of scholarship on 
moral responsibility, too large to survey within the confines of this study. 
These omissions are regrettable, but unavoidable due to the breadth of 
alternative foundations from which moral responsibility has been 
approached throughout recent history. 13 
                                                                                                                                     
objection, the general philosophical debate on moral responsibility is one of the most extensively 
discussed. Nevertheless, there are still works being published annually on the subject, some of which 
fall into established disciplines (e.g., Wallace 1994, 2013), while others go for intentionally fresh 
attempts to tackle the subject from a novel point of view (Smiley 1992, B. Williams 1993, 1997).  
13 Notable omissions include: Hume’s theory of responsibility: While not discussed extensively, 
Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (THN, 2000/[1739–40]) and Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding (2000/[1748]) are referenced here only in two important ways: first as a historical 
background for Strawson’s work, as THN is the most renowned statement of the classical 
sentimentalist position. Second, Hume has a unique outlook on the role of character in relation to 
responsibility.  
Kantianism: While Kant’s influence cannot be escaped in modern philosophy, and indeed while 
many of the authors cited here show Kantian influences, specific works by Immanuel Kant and pure 
Kantianism in general are not in focus here. If Kantian responsibility had been included, in addition to 
his works, Christine Korsgaard’s Creating the Kingdom of Ends (1996) would have been one of the key 
sources that would have been used to study Kantian moral responsibility.  
Utilitarianism/“The Economy of Threats”: As an early example, the utilitarian theory economy of 
threats limited the role of responsibility to the practice of avoidance. For utilitarian instrumentalism, 
also known as the Schlickean approach, referring to its founder Moritz Schlick (Schlick 1966/[1939]), 
responsibility is essentially something of a limit on liberty to act. At the time, Strawson was debating 
against P. H. Nowell-Smith (1948). More recent contributors have been J.J.C. Smart (1961 & 1963), D. 
Dennett (e.g., 2011) and R. Arneson.  
Contractualism: H. L. A. Hart (1968) is noted in connection with retribution among other concepts 
for its wide-reaching influence. Similarly, the early work of Thomas Scanlon (1998), who is briefly 
discussed in connection with the concept of blame (4.2), can be read as belonging to this group.  
Incompatibilism, Hard Determinism and Skepticism: The incompatibilist concept of responsibility 
is an alternative approach to responsibility, include C. A. Campbell (1951), R. Kane (1996), J. M. 
Fischer (1987, 1998 with M. Ravizza), D. Pereboom (2001), M. McKenna (1998, 2005, 2009), S. 
Smilansky (2000, 2001), S. Wolf (2011, 1990, 1987), A. Mele (see 2009), D. Dennett (2011) and Clarke 
& Capes (2013). Ginet, Chisholm, as well as P. Todd (2012). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
also has an article on the subject (“Incompatibilism”). An example of a moral responsibility skeptic is 
Bruce Waller (2011).   
Harry Frankfurt’s moral philosophy: Being the originator of the so-called “Frankfurt-style 
examples”, Frankfurt’s theory relies on a specific psychological mindset, according to which our desires 
and wants are hierarchically ordered. Frankfurt's theory is really more to do with questions about 
moral agency as a requirement for responsibility than about an actual concept of responsibility as such. 
Secondary sources referred to here that support Frankfurt’s view include Doris (2002). 
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2.1 METHODOLOGY  
Two Research Questions  
 
The original motivation for this work stemmed from the fact that it has been 
seemingly impossible to find identical definitions of the concept of 
responsibility among the different theories of the concept. This doctoral 
dissertation starts from this problem, and will ultimately culminate in a 
comparative analysis in which the two important historical theories of 
responsibility, Strawsonian and Aristotelian, are compared. The 
chronological order, in terms of the chapters, is reversed. This is because the 
Strawsonian, broadly naturalistic perspective is used here as a point of 
reference, or a “lens” for both of the theoretical wholes. 
Two main concepts, responsibility and character, will be closely 
examined. Both are notoriously vague and difficult to define. Both have been 
studied extensively from many different sources.14 Neither has received a 
conclusively and unanimously accepted definition, and as such they have 
remained continuing subjects of academic debate. While responsibility is the 
primary concept here for scholarly discussions, to which the thesis is 
connected, character is the one of what is learned more about.  
During the research process, a more specific problem than the definition 
of responsibility presented itself. What is the role of character in the theories 
of moral responsibility? Character in relation to responsibility, it is argued 
here, while receiving some attention in philosophy, is insufficiently 
understood. Character is an important and even an inalienable concept 
within the theories attempting to define responsibility and moral agency in 
particular. The relation between character and moral responsibility is 
                                                                                                                                     
Philosophy of Law, Collective Responsibility and CSR: Christopher Kutz’s article “Responsibility” 
(2002) in Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law has gained a lot of popularity, 
and along with Scanlon, the more relational aspects of responsibility have been brought back into the 
discussion. The work of Michael S. Moore (incl. 1990) is also noted for his contribution in this area. 
There is a very vibrant discussion going on related to collective responsibility as well as corporate social 
responsibility that deserves attention. See Mäkelä (2013) which emphasizes Marina Oshana’s theory of 
responsibility. Another gateway to the subject is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article 
“Collective Responsibility” by Marion Smiley (2010).  
14 David Shoemaker captures the elusiveness of the themes of agency and moral responsibility at 
the beginning of his edited series Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility by referring to the wide 
variety of disciplines considered in connection with questions on the topic (including, for example, the 
relation between responsibility and determinism and free will): “Work on these questions, while more 
or less having an uneasy home base in the world of moral philosophy, draws from a diverse range of 
cross-disciplinary sources, including moral psychology, psychology proper (experimental, 
developmental etc.), philosophy of psychology, communicative disorders, philosophy of law, legal 
theory, metaphysics, neuroscience, neuroethics, political philosophy, and more.” (Shoemaker 2013, 1-
2.) The same can be said about the nature of character. 
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fortuitously a subject that is manageable within the bounds of a single book. 
This conceptual relationship is the object of this study, and its clarification is 
the goal. The relatively slow turn toward the second main question should be 
adequately reflected with a switch between the two research questions and 
the two parts of the thesis that they in turn reflect. The first question is a 
prerequisite to proper analysis of the second, and any advances and 
clarifications related to the second help to further define the ones related to 
the first as well. The different ways that the two theories of responsibility 
treat the concept of character compels the articulation and careful 
consideration of the related concepts and the relation between them.  
It is thought impossible here to be able to offer comprehensive accounts 
of either of the two extensive historical accounts of responsibility. For this 
reason, an approach resembling a heuristic is taken toward these two 
accounts at the end of part I. Once the examination of the two approaches is 
sufficiently executed, part II will concentrate on the relevant concepts and 
their analysis. This book has been guided by two main research questions, 
which are represented by the two main parts (Part I & Part II) of the 
dissertation. The first research question is as follows: 
 
Q1. How is responsibility understood by philosophers today?  
 
The purpose of this work is to highlight an aspect of the debate on moral 
responsibility that is seldom at the forefront of the discussion. It is among 
the goals of this work to examine the most common definitions of moral 
responsibility in contemporary academic philosophical discussion. A 
comparison is made with historical sources on the study of the subject area, 
and an attempt made to upset the status quo based on the findings, so to 
speak.  
In this work, the basis for the answer to Q1 is Strawson’s theory of 
reactive sentiments, which is discussed in chapter three. Following 
Strawson's theory, his followers work on the same topic and some alternative 
viewpoints are discussed, including direct criticism. Chapter five consists of 
an examination of Aristotle's work under the same subject matter. These 
alternative accounts reveal aspects of the concept that have not been present 
in Strawsonian theories as much as they probably should have: on the one 
hand, the dimensions of historical and social implications of the concept, as 
well as the concept of character, into which the considerations of the former 
are often condensed. On the other hand, it is acknowledged that the idea of 
character itself is not without problems, and it is not wise to be reinstate it at 
least in its original Aristotelian form. 
The works of the classics have been helpful in showing how the influence 
of character has been unproblematic in them, but, for various reasons, has 
since been left out of theories of responsibility, as Smiley, for example, points 
out. Q1 is ultimately answered in the form of heuristic in the end of part I. As 
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this conclusion leads to partial aporia, the omissions lead to the second 
question of this thesis: 
 
Q2. How should character be understood in the context of the philosophy of 
responsibility? 
 
Questions about the role of character and its related concepts are discussed 
in the second part of this work. The start of the redefinition process in 
character’s case is to go back in history, and for this purpose the second 
method, that of historical scholarly study, is needed. The reason historical 
scholarship is relied on here is because, while conceptual analysis provides 
the main tool for identifying and comparing the central, contemporary 
theories that are relevant to the subject, a backdrop for these modern 
theories is needed in order for the topics to be presented intelligibly. 
Part of the problem is that what philosophy discusses under the topic of 
character is now mostly considered to be of concern to the empirical sciences 
of psychology, sociology, and so on, and not necessarily a philosophical 
concern at all. Despite this, in theories of responsibility, concerns about 
character are almost always taken into account in some form or another. This 
is usually done in an arbitrary fashion, and rarely is its effect examined in 
sufficient depth. Whether this oversight is due to a need to distinguish one’s 
position in the various classifications, or whether it is due to the so-called “is-
ought gap”, the options are brought up for discussion.  
When the character-related instances are discussed in terms of new 
theory, without the original concept in place, the result can be quite 
convoluted, as is the case with Wallace and "blameworthiness inhibitors" 
(Wallace 1994). Inspired by Schoeman’s question15 and by Wallace’s wording, 
a unifying concept is referred to: blame mitigation is used here in order to 
describe the subject that is alternately dealt with in terms of character (as a 
philosophical concept) or excuses. Q2 is answered with the help of chapter 7’s 
analysis. As a result, it is claimed that character or the concepts used in its 
place, such as the excuse, serve as necessary shorthand for the empirical 
data, or the aspect of historical responsibility16 needed in order to determine 
the fairness, blameworthiness and moral status of the wrong-doing agents in 
cases where there is possible variation between types of agent.  
Strawson’s choice to leave character-related concerns out of his theory of 
responsibility is recognized at this stage, his discussion of special 
considerations and pleas replacing the substantive content of the character-
related discussion. Watson and Wallace expand the categories of these to 
excuses and exemptions. A revision of the concept of character is called for. 
                                                
15  “How do our theories of character and our theories of excuses inform one another?” (Schoeman 
1987, 8-9). 
16 As discussed by Gary Watson in his 1987 article “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil” in 
Schoeman’s Responsibility, Character and the Emotions (1987). 
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More specific character traits could help to formulate responsibility 
assessments with more descriptive power. As Doris (2002) points out, the 
old Aristotelian psychological concepts should not be reinstated, at least not 
without substantial revision. Clarity might come through for example the 
new findings of psychology and neuroscience, but the specific definition of 
these is left for another occasion. Further discussion is called for. 
 
Structure 
 
The concepts themselves and their examination will proceed as follows: 
Chapters 3 through 5 in Part I are focused on moral responsibility as a 
concept and how it is relevant for philosophical discussion. No claim is made 
that these chapters are comprehensive, nor that it would be possible to 
discuss everything related to moral responsibility. Rather, a selection of 
theories is discussed in order to sample the larger field of close or related 
theories; in other words, the study is presented in the form of a heuristic. 
Strawson’s naturalistic, reactive sentiments-based conception of 
responsibility is selected as the point of comparison for the other theories. As 
the examination of the concepts becomes multidisciplinary, this first theory 
takes precedence, as the other theories are mainly discussed in terms of 
commentators from the naturalistic, Strawsonian discipline.17 The historical 
study of Aristotle is scholarly in that the relevant parts of his theory related to 
the modern concept of responsibility are compared with each other. This 
includes looking into Aristotle studies in ethics and political philosophy 
conducted in relatively recent years. The important ideas of Aristotle’s theory 
will be examined in chapter 5 in order to describe an alternative conception 
of moral responsibility. Naturalistic interpretation of Aristotle is favored with 
a view to keeping the multi-disciplinary effort manageable.  
Part II is structured around the analysis of the important concepts found 
in the theories described in Part I. The systematic discussion of the two key 
concepts, character and excuse will take place in chapters 6.1 and 6.2 
respectively. Chapter six also includes two examples of extraordinary moral 
agents that have an effect on the responsibility assessments. Once the 
sections on the substance and the systematic exposition of the concepts in 
chapter 6 are done, the analysis based on Bernard Williams’s explication of 
elements of responsibility is undertaken in chapter 7, wherein the 
comparative analysis between character and excuses in Strawsonian and 
Aristotelian theories of responsibility will be conducted. The argument 
leading to the thesis is summarized in chapter 8 along with discussion. 
Figure 1 below illustrates the structure of the dissertation: 
                                                
17 A couple of examples: Aristotle’s work is discussed here primarily through the naturalistic 
interpretation of Susan S. Meyer’s Aristotle on Moral Responsibility (2011), which relies on Strawson. 
The most cited author on Hume is Paul Russell, whose Freedom and Moral Sentiment (1995) primarily 
compares Strawsonian and Humean theories of moral responsibility. 
 23 
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2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introductory texts on Moral Responsibility 
 
In the “Oxford Bibliography on Moral Responsibility” (2010), Garrath 
Williams lists four general overviews on the topic, which are: A. Duff's 
"Responsibility" (1998), A. Eshleman's "Moral Responsibility" 
(2014/[2001]), M. McKenna's "Compatibilism" (2004) and C. Kutz's 
"Responsibility" (2002). Of these four, I have used Eshleman’s article, since 
that text’s emphases on Strawson and Aristotle are mirrored here. Strawson’s 
philosophy is further described in M. McKenna & P. Russell’s “Introduction” 
to Free Will and Reactive Attitudes Perspectives on P.F. Strawson’s 
“Freedom and Resentment” (2007). 
Herbert Fingarette poses some seldom asked questions about the concept 
of responsibility in his article “Responsibility” (1967), declaring that the 
current understanding of the concept is not the only possible one, as 
discussed briefly in chapter 3.4.1. Even though Fingarette’s account lacks a 
specific definition of what responsibility actually is or what it should be, it 
holds up the example of an imperfect agent or even one with fundamentally 
different moralities (e.g., of a psychopath, which is an example that is 
discussed further on). Fingarette very straightforwardly offers an example 
that bears on the central issue of the most common theories of responsibility. 
Why are some agents excluded from even a basic assessment of whether or 
not they are morally responsible?18 Is responsibility a topic such that those 
incapable of understanding it are completely beyond its bounds? Fingarette 
leaves the issue open, but few after him have been as willing to question the 
basic premises of the topic. B. Williams, Smiley and Watson are examined 
here because of the diverging ideas that they bring to the discussion. In this 
chapter some of the most important alternative opinions on the nature of 
moral responsibility are looked at.  
 
Strawsonian responsibility: “Freedom and Resentment” (2008/[1962]) 
 
The theory of reactive sentiments of Peter F. Strawson (1919 – 2006) is 
understood here to be something of a common denominator for writings on 
responsibility today at least in English (see Eshleman 2014, G. Williams 
2010, ch.2).19 What this means is that when a student of philosophy gets 
                                                
18 The debate surrounding the concepts of excuses and exemptions can be read as addressing these 
concerns (see ch. 6.2). 
19 Ted Honderich, who is a key proponent of theories of determinism, gives the following 
description of Strawson’s importance: 
The doyen of living English philosophers, by these reflections, took hold of and changed 
the outlook of a good many other philosophers, if not quite enough. He did so, essentially, by 
assuming that talk of freedom and responsibility is talk not of facts or truths, in a certain 
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interested in responsibility, the first work on the subject he or she most likely 
grabs is Peter Strawson's article "Freedom and Resentment"(2008/[1962] or 
alternately a work that it has directly influenced (and probably cited on the 
first page). This influential talk has functioned as the basis of the debates on 
responsibility within philosophy for the better part of a century now. Even 
when taking into account dissenting voices that were heard at the time — for 
example, Herbert Fingarette's psychologically minded essay, (see 4.3.1), 
which highlights the problem of applying philosophical responsibility to 
unconventional minds such as those of the psychopath — Strawson’s success 
has been unprecedented.  
His important “Freedom and Resentment” (2008/[1962], henceforth FR, 
examined in chapter 3.1), which Garrath Williams claims is the most 
influential article on moral responsibility, actually mentions concepts such as 
“moral responsibility”, “blame” and “excuses” surprisingly sparsely (G. 
Williams 2010, 8). Not attempting to define moral responsibility explicitly, 
Strawson’s initial goal was to solve the problem of determinism by 
reconciling the opposing viewpoints of compatibilists20 (or optimists in 
Strawson’s terms) and incompatibilists (pessimists). He was successful in 
that discussion of the concept of responsibility is no longer associated with 
them as often. It might have been even more successful if his article had 
actually brought the free will vs. determinism debate to a close. This, 
however, was not the case, as there still are incompatibilists doing a lot of 
work using the assumption of a merit-based conception of responsibility. 
There have also been new developments by theorists who have explored 
merit-based versions of compatibilism.21  
Reactive emotions, like resentment, indignation and guilt are essential in 
determining these attitudes, which ultimately result in the act of holding 
someone morally responsible. The more important question should be about 
how the person is held morally responsible (Eshleman 2014), instead of 
asking whether responsibility assessments might depend on an actual 
theoretical judgment of one’s being responsible. Additionally, Strawson 
                                                                                                                                     
sense, but of our attitudes. His more explicit concern was to look again at the question of 
whether determinism and freedom are consistent with one another -- by shifting attention to 
certain personal rather than moral attitudes, first of all gratitude and resentment. In the end, 
he arrived at a kind of Compatibilist or, as he says, Optimist conclusion. That is no doubt a 
recommendation but not the largest recommendation of this splendidly rich piece of 
philosophy. (Ted Honderich on his website The Determinism and Freedom Philosophy 
Website <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwstrawson1.htm>.) 
See also Gary Watson’s latest article “Peter Strawson on Responsibility and Sociality”, in which he 
writes: “In the past twenty years, it has become routine to characterize responsibility in terms of the 
propriety conditions of what Strawson calls the reactive attitudes” (Watson 2014, 15). 
20 For more about the topic of compatibilism see McKenna’s article on the subject at the The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy –website (McKenna 2009). 
21 Eshleman mentions Fischer & Ravizza 1998 and McKenna 2012 as sources in this matter. 
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attaches “special considerations” to resentment (a moral sentiment 
epitomizing directed blame), which can “modify or mollify” the sentiment. 
The “special considerations” are divided into two subcategories, the first of 
which could be described in Humean terms as “out-of-character” 22 actions 
such as acting under the influence of excessive fatigue, alcohol, or some other 
temporary impairment to thought. The other category is more significant, 
containing both the undeveloped agency of children, as well as the 
“incapacitated agency” of mental illnesses and similar states. Albeit Strawson 
himself recognizes that his classification is “facile” (FR, 12), his followers 
have continued to elaborate on it. As a result, the group called “Strawsonian” 
here refers to Strawson as well as the group of followers he has inspired.23 
He concludes his essay by claiming that “It is a pity that talk of the moral 
sentiments has fallen out of favour. The phrase would be quite a good name 
for that network of human attitudes in acknowledging the character and 
place of which we find, I suggest, the only possibility of reconciling these 
disputants to each other and the facts.” (Ibid. 25-26. My emphasis.) As for 
the objections about different cultures, Strawson anticipated the critique that 
is also discussed in this study.  
Strawson’s follower and critic Gary Watson explains that, while the 
connection between the reactive attitudes and the act of holding one 
responsible is not exclusive to Strawson’s theory, the original contribution of 
his work was that instead of being extraneous or a product of any 
metaphysical account of responsibility, the reactive attitudes themselves 
were constitutive of moral responsibility. The Strawsonian account of 
responsibility thus considers the reactive attitudes as the definitive signifiers 
of responsibility relations in all their forms. These reactions that occur as we 
regard ourselves and others responsible are inherent in our common 
practices as human beings. (See Watson 1987, 256-257.) 
A significant virtue of the Strawsonian, revised compatibilist position is 
that it is an attempt to tone down the whole problem of determinism. 
Whether free will or determinism is true, at the end of the day it does not 
make any difference to how we judge behavior in our lives. Despite the 
opinions of whether Strawson’s refocus succeeded or not, the effort has had 
the positive effect of giving new wind to the philosophy of responsibility by 
                                                
22 Hume considers character important in determining responsibility, writing that "We are never to 
consider any single action in our enquiries concerning the origin of morals; but only the quality or 
character from which the action proceeded. These alone are durable enough to affect our sentiments 
concerning the person" (Hume THN, as quoted by Russell 1995, 95). These "durable qualities of 
character" (see also THN, 398) have a major resemblance to Aristotle's guiding virtues. 
23 The “Strawsonian” group refers here to Strawson himself as well as R. J. Wallace, who has 
developed Strawson’s theory of responsibility further (Wallace 1994). Other writers considered such, 
but referred to less here, include S. Darwall and S. Wolf (see Macnamara 2013, 141). G. Watson (see 
1987) is also considered to belong to this group because of his extensive commentary on Strawson’s 
work. 
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giving the topic new tools to talk about the issue (incl. reactive attitudes and 
sentiments as well as the conceptual areas related to excuses and exemptions. 
etc.) The Strawsonian position on responsibility is not, however, by all 
accounts an ideal description of what responsibility is about. Therefore, as 
the common starting-point in discussion on responsibility it calls for 
arguments about the role of the concept, especially as it was never the 
writer’s intention to give an exact definition of the concept of moral 
responsibility. Differing opinions about the concept have been advanced but, 
as a common point of reference, the Strawsonian position has remained 
influential, at times limiting the philosophical discussion of responsibility to 
a limited, act-based relationship between individuals. Yet it can be claimed 
that without the publication of FR, it is uncertain whether the subject of 
moral responsibility would be as discussed, or whether the naturalistic turn 
in ethics would have happened. 
 
Aristotelian responsibility: Nicomachean Ethics and Politics 
 
The works of Aristotle are considered to be the origin of the western 
philosophy of responsibility. As will be noted in case of the commentators 
(esp. Smiley 1992), the classical concept of responsibility differs from the 
modern one, and something has been lost in translation. The Nicomachean 
Ethics and Politics together form the corpus of Aristotle’s political theory. 
They also contain writing on the topic of responsibility. Chapter III of the 
Nicomachean Ethics is particularly significant, because of its description of 
moral responsibility.24 Aristotle’s responsibility for action is looked at in 
chapter 5.1.1 of this thesis, while 5.1.2 focuses on responsibility for character. 
Chapter 5.1.3 considers an alternative perspective, by framing responsibility 
in terms of political as presented in the Politics. It could be argued that the 
entire history of the philosophy of responsibility is initiated in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, at least when the concept of responsibility is based on 
the dual concepts of praise and blame. These two classics by Aristotle will be 
used here ultimately to outline his concept of character as part of his theory 
of responsibility, which is the topic of chapter 6.1.. The Eudemian Ethics and 
Rhetoric are referred to to a lesser extent. The same goes for the 
commentaries mentioned by G. Williams (2010), which are S. Broadie (1991) 
& S.S. Meyer (2011). Broadie and Meyer are referred to a lot in terms of 
ethics. Additional commentaries on the political side of Aristotle are 
provided by D. Winthrop (1975) and M. P. Nichols (1992). 
Even though the work of Aristotle predates the modern theory of 
Strawson by quite a stretch, the different theories will appear in an inverse 
chronological order so as to give more weight to the current philosophical 
theory that receives the most attention as well as grounding the multi-
                                                
24 Aristotle’s responsibility is challenging to define, as he did not use a directly translatable term. 
Chapter 5 contains an account of the subject. 
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disciplinary study in the broadly naturalistic school of ethics. This is possible 
through various philosophers who study the Aristotelian subject in terms of 
the Strawsonian theory of responsibility (especially Meyer 2011; see also 
Irwin 1980). 
Aristotle and his writings on responsibility are of great significance to this 
thesis. A previously published, peer-reviewed article (and a translation 
presented at the XXIII World Conference of Philosophy) written by the 
author is used as a basis for chapter 5. 
 
Responses to Strawson 
 
R. Jay Wallace’s version of Strawsonian moral responsibility will be 
discussed as an extension to the theory with a normative goal. As these are 
distinct parts of Wallace’s own theory of responsibility, they are looked at in 
chapters 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 respectively.  These ideas are compared to the 
character-based approaches in chapter 6. Regarding the concept of 
responsibility, both Strawson and Wallace are considered as members of the 
Strawsonian theories, which is subject to criticism from alternative 
viewpoints.  
Since the debate on the concept of responsibility has been going on for the 
more than five decades since FR, it is naturally understandable that the topic 
takes new forms in order to keep the interest of scholars. Thus the 
philosophical discussion has focused in recent years on the concept of blame, 
which is a significant component of every theory of responsibility. The work 
of Coates & Tognazzini (2013 & 2014) is used primarily to explore this topic. 
The group of philosophers focusing on the subject are those who have been of 
recent interest for the author but, at the time of completing this thesis, they 
have been deemed too much to fully accommodate. These topics will very 
likely influence any further forays into the subject of responsibility.25 
 
General Criticisms on Moral Responsibility 
 
While Michael McKenna & Paul Russell’s Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: 
Perspectives on P.F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (2007) is the 
first critical source that is used here to pinpoint the most obvious difficulty 
with Strawson’s theory, Herbert Fingarette’s “Responsibility” (1966) works as 
a contrasting example of how the concept could be defined differently than is 
currently considered customary. Continuing the critical section, Marion 
Smiley effortlessly demonstrates in her Moral Responsibility and the 
Boundaries of Community (1992) that responsibility has not always been as 
narrowly defined; that there are problems with this definition, and that what 
                                                
25 Following Victoria McGeer’s list: Nomy Arpaly, Pamela Hieronymi, Gideon Rosen, T. M. 
Scanlon, George Sher, Angela Smith, Gary Watson and Susan Wolf, among others, have written on the 
topic of blame (McGeer 2013, 162-163.)  
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is left out of the modern definition contains some interesting things worth 
reconsidering. Finally, Bernard Williams argues that there can never even be 
a proper, comprehensive definition of responsibility. This is because all 
attempts to formulate a theory of responsibility must incorporate of four 
elements of the concept (1. cause, 2. intention 3. state and 4. response), 
which are often given different weight or left ill-defined. In the 1997 article, 
these are stated more explicitly, are of tremendous help in clarifying the 
concept as such, and are scrutinized in chapter 3.4.3. The elements are 
derived through a historical analysis in his Shame and Necessity (B. 
Williams 1993), where Williams examines the case of responsibility in 
ancient Greece. Aristotle’s theory appears in that analysis. The classification 
might oversimplify the related issues, but it is a very apt one, and it is 
important that Williams pinpoints the element of “state”26, which is 
insufficiently addressed in most accounts of responsibility in contemporary 
philosophy. (See ch.5.) The classification is further utilized in the analysis 
section in chapter 6. 
 
Direct Criticism on Strawson 
 
Gary Watson’s “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil” (1987) published in 
Ferdinand Schoeman’s equally interesting book (1987)27 is very important in 
introducing the division into excuses and exemptions, which Wallace adopts 
as a basis for his typology of excuses and exemptions (Watson 1987, 259- 
261). This subject is discussed extensively in chapter 6.2. Others of 
Strawson’s critics referred to here include Fischer & Ravizza (1998) and Paul 
Russell28 (2013). 
                                                
26 Bernard Williams uses the element of state to denote mental states that are affecting the act and 
that are relevant in terms of moral responsibility for that act. 
27 Ferdinand Schoeman’s 1987 anthology Responsibility, Character and the Emotions is a very 
important book not only because of its inclusion of Gary Watson’s article, which was the first to 
distinguish the concepts of excuses and exemptions, but the book is also worth a read for the 
introduction itself. Schoemann posits some very interesting questions, one of which has influenced the 
topic of this dissertation itself, Schoeman’s question “How do our theories of character and our 
theories of excuses inform one another?” being an important inspiration (Schoeman 1987, 8-9). 
Responsibility, Character and the Emotions is from its outset very close in its goals to this work and is 
thus very useful and interesting. The only disadvantage of this collection is that it dates back to 1987, so 
that most of the commentaries that form the structure for this work did not exist then.  
28 Paul Russell is primarily an accomplished Hume scholar whose works have compared Hume’s 
and Strawson’s ideas. Most relevant of these works is the impressive Freedom and Moral Sentiment 
(1995), which discusses both the similarities of Hume’s and Strawson’s theories as well as the specific 
writings on responsibility by Hume. Russell objects to Hume on character, labeling Hume’s musings on 
character in the context of responsibility essentially a mistake. While Hume is not under direct 
investigation here, overall Russell’s book is a considerable asset in charting Hume’s influence on 
Strawson’s philosophy.  
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Commentators on Aristotle 
 
Since introductions to Aristotle’s thought are numerous, the most recent of 
these, by Susanne Bobzien (2014), is mentioned here. This article describes 
the area of moral responsibility within Aristotle’s texts quite clearly. In order 
to make the broad multi-disciplinary study possible in which current theories 
are contrasted with their historical counterparts, priorities need to be clear. 
Therefore most emphasis is given to the explicitly Strawsonian, naturalistic 
interpretation by Susan S. Meyer in her Aristotle on Moral Responsibility 
(2011). The relevant debate on Aristotle’s moral responsibility, discussed in 
chapter 5.2, revolves around the proposed effect that moral character has on 
moral responsibility. Interlocutors of this discussion who are mentioned here 
include Terence H. Irwin (1980), Jean Roberts (1989), Sarah Broadie (1991) 
and Randall Curren (1989). 
 
Specific sources on individual concepts 
 
As was the case with blame and the works of Justin Coates & Neal A. 
Tognazzini, several sources have been consulted, especially in part II, 
because of their contribution toward particular individual concepts. Marcia 
Homiak (2015) is discussed in chapter 6.1 as a primer for study on moral 
character. Likewise, the critical notes by John Doris (2002) are looked at as 
being the most pressing criticism on the subject. Although Doris hails from 
social psychology, his criticism is so encompassing that philosophers have 
had to answer it. Mark Alfano (2013a) has grouped the answers to the “attack 
on character” topic in the three categories of dodge, retreat and 
counterattack, where the “dodgers” deny the threat that situationism poses 
for virtue ethics;29 the “retreaters” claim that even though situationism is 
correct, there is a weakened core to the virtue ethics that may be salvaged; as 
well as the position of the “counterattackers”, according to which the 
situationist challenge fails outright (Alfano 2013, 244-246). 
Similarly excuse is looked at in chapter 6.2 as its own topic. Starting with 
J. L. Austin’s ideas in his article (1956/7), the description of the concept of 
excuse is clarified by looking at a couple of more modern texts on the subject. 
The first of these is by Strawson himself, who is succeeded by his 
commentators Watson (1987) & Wallace (1994). Holly M. Smith’s alternative  
                                                
29 For example, Christian B. Miller has recently done a lot of work in defense of the philosophical 
notion of virtue, relying on original Aristotelian ideas (see Miller 2013 & Miller, Furr, Knobel & Fleeson 
(eds.) 2015). 
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PART I: TWO THEORIES OF 
RESPONSIBILITY 
  
32 
3 STRAWSONIAN RESPONSIBILITY 
 
What is compelling about responsibility is that there has never been a single 
unified, unanimously accepted understanding about it. The concept has been 
a subject of philosophical inquiry since the very beginning of Western 
philosophy and it has remained a regular staple of the field to the extent that 
it has gained great diversity as a subject. It is not uncommon that the various 
schools of thought, making the effort to make the concept clear, are baffled 
about whether they are talking about the same subject at all.  
The word “responsibility” entered the English language philosophy in the 
17th century from the arena of political debate.30 Relying only on its origin 
would produce a very limited definition of the concept, for the area of 
research that the word “responsibility” signifies has been a subject of vibrant 
debate now for millennia. The disputes have returned from time to time to 
the question of blame and causal responsibility, as well as moral agency that 
are now commonly understood as being part of the responsibility debate (see 
G. Williams, 2010). To accommodate all theories and opinions and to be able 
to address them here would be impossible. The works concerning the subject 
are now so numerous that this study will be offered in the form of a heuristic, 
with two major, significant approaches to the subject that are taken as 
representing the subject area. These approaches are: (1.) the reactive 
sentiments based, Strawsonian approach, discussed in this chapter, and (2.) 
Aristotle’s responsibility according to contemporary scholars, which is looked 
at in chapter 5. These two approaches will then be subjected to comparative 
analysis, focusing on moral responsibility, blame and its mitigation through 
the concepts of character and excuses, examples and criticism. The analysis 
concentrates on the different concepts of character and excuse. This will be 
undertaken in the second part “Character and Excuses in Theories of 
Responsibility”. For now, the focus will be on the more general presentation 
of the subject. 
Responsibility itself has proven to be an elusive concept to define. 
Surprisingly (or perhaps precisely because of this fact) fully formulated 
                                                
30 Garrath Williams writes in his “Responsibility as a Virtue” relying on the Oxford English 
Dictionary: “Its most important original use was in political thought and debate; for instance, in the 
Federalist Papers (Hamilton et al. 1787, no. 63) and Edmund Burke (1796, p. 508)” (G. Williams 2008, 
457). However, Marion Smiley notes in Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community 
(1992) that “Albert Jonsen writes in Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics  (Washington, 1968) 
that the term appeared somewhat earlier in French, most notably in Pascal’s Lettres Provenciales 
(1656), although Jonsen fails to point out that Pascal’s words are ‘responsibility and blame’, rather 
than ‘moral responsibility’.” (Smiley 1992, 35-36, n9.) The adjective seems to date back even further. 
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theories of responsibility31 can be difficult to identify as such.32 Even as moral 
responsibility is the main concept that frames the thesis here, the notion of 
moral responsibility is formidably diverse, and in order to focus the issue 
some cuts and further explication of concepts have been made. 
Responsibility at the most general level can mean, among other things, moral 
responsibility, legal responsibility, political responsibility, the property of 
being responsible (a virtue or an excellence), etc. Moral responsibility, in this 
case the category from these options, is that which gets the most attention 
here. Moral responsibility is closely related to such concepts as moral agency 
(which is a common requirement for being responsible), accountability 
(mostly through blame) and blameworthiness (an element of moral 
responsibility distinct from causal responsibility, which will be examined 
below), among other things. Moral responsibility, following Bernard 
Williams’s writings, is examined through its elements of cause, intention, 
state and response. The last of these is a common feature in theories of 
responsibility, and has been divided into praise and blame since Aristotle. 
Since blame is a popular topic for study today, it will be featured with the two 
main theories of responsibility considered in this work. Finally, the different 
types of excuse in the case of Strawsonian responsibility and character in 
Aristotle’s counterpart are discussed as forms of blame mitigation.  
As a point of departure, Andrew Eshleman’s article on “Moral 
Responsibility” (2014/[2001]) in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
presents a selection of criteria, according to which theories of responsibility 
can be identified.33 It provides an account of theories of moral responsibility, 
                                                
31 The word “theory” here is used in the broadest possible sense. “Accounts of responsibility” is 
used here interchangeably with the previous term. The phrase “conception of responsibility” is used 
below to refer to the identical subject matter with less need for validation. Accuracy typical of the 
natural sciences is not the aim here, as Strawson’s example is followed here in: “my language, like that 
of commonplaces generally, will be quite unscientific and imprecise” (FR, 5). Further, even with 
Eshleman’s criteria, locating or pinning down the exact theory in these cases would be difficult. 
Criterion 1 in Aristotle’s case is arguable. Aitia, meaning cause, is probably the Aristotelean concept 
that comes closest to a translation of the modern word. A lot of his responsibility-related content is 
discussed on the other hand through telos. These are some of the considerations that have been taken 
into account throughout this study. (See Eshleman 2014/[2001].) 
32 The same seems to be true in cases of theories of blame. (See Coates & Tognazzini 2014.) 
33 Eshleman’s Stanford Encyclopedia overview of “Moral Responsibility” (2014/[2001]) is 
structured around FR, the article by Peter F. Strawson in question, which has had a tremendous 
influence on the subject. Published on one of today’s premiere internet sources, in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Andrew Eshleman’s “Moral Responsibility” article is a fine introduction to 
the subject, in which the Strawsonian, or the reactive sentiments approach to responsibility is 
discussed thoroughly (see ch. 3.1). Historically speaking, Strawson’s article, according to Eshleman, 
has enabled the continuation of the debate about the concept of responsibility, as it has since the 
defined the limits of most work on the subject. 
 
34 
focusing on Peter F. Strawson’s reactive sentiments based view of 
responsibility. Eshleman outlines requirements for theories of moral 
responsibility that can cover this sufficiently to be called such. He includes 
the following elements in his list of what theories of responsibility should 
contain: first an idea or a concept of moral responsibility itself; second, the 
criteria of moral agency or what is required from a moral agent; third, the 
conditions of application of moral responsibility and, finally, the possible 
objects of responsibility ascriptions, including actions, omissions 
consequences and character traits. (Eshleman 2014/[2001].) 
To begin with, Eshleman discusses two different theorists of responsibility 
in his article, Aristotle and Strawson; neither of whom explicitly built a 
definition of responsibility as the word is understood now, but who 
nevertheless have both become exemplary for the following discussion. His 
focus is on the distinction between compatibilist consequentialism and 
merit-based incompatibilism.  
Discussing FR, Strawson’s “landmark essay” further, Eshleman describes 
how Strawson sought to end the disagreement between the consequentialist 
compatibilists (or optimists, in Strawson’s words) and the incompatibilists 
(pessimists), who defined responsibility as being merit-based. The other 
division in Eshleman, along with the compatibilist/incompatibilist one, is 
between the merit-based view, which considers praise and blame 
appropriate according to the deserts of the agent’s actions, and the 
consequentialist view that states that praise and blame are appropriate if and 
only if the response instigates a desired change in the behavior of the agent. 
(Eshleman 2014/[2001].) Following this elaboration, Eshleman concludes 
that “Strawson's [theory of moral responsibility] is a merit-based form of 
compatibilism.” (Ibid.) As Eshleman writes, however, his position is 
compatibilist only by default, Strawson’s ultimate intention being to leave the 
free will vs. determinism debate behind. 34  
In addition to the distinctions of responsibility utilized by Eshleman, 
there are many other possible conceptual distinctions that can help to situate 
the relevant content of theories as well as decipher one’s views on 
responsibility. The following distinctions are discussed throughout this work:  
 
• Optimism and pessimism 
 
Optimism and pessimism in this context correspond to Strawson’s words for 
compatibilism and incompatibilism respectively. For the first half of the 20th 
                                                
34 While the division between consequentialist compatibilists and merit-based incompatibilists is 
interesting and works well as the backdrop for Eshleman’s argument, it is not pursued further here. 
The same goes for Strawson’s optimist/pessimist pair of descriptors. The classifications make sense in 
the context of the problem of determinism, but they can be misleading otherwise. Incompatibilism, for 
instance, contains both hard determinists and metaphysical libertarians. While it has been noted, the 
free will vs. determinism debate is not the main concern here.  
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century, the complete Anglophone school of ethics seemed basically to be 
mired in unresolvable debates. The really hard problem, however, that 
endures to this day, is the problem of determinism. If determinism were 
accepted, moral responsibility would be outright impossible. The proponents 
of the principle of determinism, hard determinists, have sought to 
reformulate ethical practices from the ground up in order to mirror this 
principle, while those who deny determinism and emphasize free will (or 
libertarians) have frequently run into trouble in basing their theories 
satisfactorily in the face of contradictory evidence. In the debate on 
responsibility, the camps are usually divided into compatibilist and 
incompatibilist. This notion of compatibilism refers to the possibility of 
reconciliation between determinism and morality, or essentially the answer 
to the question of how morality possible is if reality is causally determined. 
This distinction is used here only in connection with Strawson’s article. As 
the emotional reaction based classification has not caught on since, and since 
writers still refer to the concept pair as compatibilist/incompatibilism, the 
latter form is returned to once the section on FR is at an end. 
 
• Causal responsibility and blameworthiness  
 
According to Smiley, the ideas of causal responsibility and blameworthiness 
overlap in the aggregate concept of moral responsibility (1992).35 Causal 
responsibility is what happens when someone causes something by acting. In 
the case of pure causal responsibility, it is irrelevant what the intentions of 
the actor or the circumstances were.36 Since Aristotle, blameworthiness has 
been used as a requirement for the more imprecise concept of responsibility. 
If one is blameworthy, one can be considered morally responsible. If one is 
not, being morally responsible is also out of the question. As a more 
pragmatic clarification, Smiley’s point about the conflation of the concept of 
                                                
35 Marion Smiley’s 1992 book Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community is an 
important departure from the mainstream conceptualizations of responsibility as it separates three 
varieties  of responsibility (classical, Christian and modern) on a historical scale. Additionally Smiley 
emphasizes the issue about the philosophy of responsibility conflating questions of causal 
responsibility and blameworthiness. These distinctions are examined in this thesis starting at chapter 
4.3.2. According to Smiley there are three important versions of responsibility throughout the history 
of Western philosophy (Smiley 1992). The modern concept of responsibility is distinct from two other 
historical concepts: the classical and the Christian. The modern concept is basically the same as the 
latter but, according to Smiley, merely removed to a secular context. Smiley describes the modern 
concept as not much more than a “secularized version of Christian sinfulness” (Smiley 1992, 73, note 
4). 
36 Coates & Tognazzini (2014) also use the synonymous term of explanatory responsibility with 
causal responsibility. Their article “Blame” notes that when discussing moral responsibility most 
philosophers ignore causal responsibility altogether, since it does not necessarily take a moral agent to 
cause something to happen. (Coates & Tognazzini, 2014.) 
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moral responsibility is supported here. Blameworthiness is a key concept that 
is used universally here to denote actual moral responsibility. (See also Praise 
& Blame below.) 
 
• Being responsible and holding responsible  
 
A sometimes unnoticed mix-up is pointed out by Fischer & Ravizza (1998) 
and even more explicitly by Angela M. Smith (2007) is that between being 
responsible and holding responsible.37 Most of the writings discussed below 
deal with the “holding responsible” side, because determining whether one 
“is” actually responsible is difficult if the context is not in a set, legal 
environment. The remaining area of the “being responsible” side, while not 
actively dismissed, reaches toward the metaphysical, which for obvious 
reasons is an aspect not pursued in this limited-length dissertation. Strawson 
is said to distinguish between the two insufficiently, while Wallace explicitly 
leans toward the holding side. 
 
• Cause, intention, state and response (four elements of responsibility, 
according to Bernard Williams) 
 
Bernard Williams’s (1993 & 1997) explicates the elements present in full 
theories of responsibility.38 These are cause, intention, state and response. 
More detail on this can be found in his texts (see also chapter 4.3.3). His 
distinction of four elements of responsibility is an important tool that is used 
in analyzing the current form of the concept of responsibility (chapter 7). The 
final element, response, is discussed in all of the theories discussed here in 
terms of praise and blame, the latter having become the topic of recent 
interest. 
  
                                                
37 Angela M. Smith provides one of the most recent, useful classifications of responsibility in her 
“On Being and and Holding Responsible” (2007). For example, Wallace devotes his research explicitly 
to the “holding responsible” side of the split. How this is problematic is examined in chapter 4.1.4. Her 
article “Moral Blame and Moral Protest” in Coates & Tognazzini (2013) is also noteworthy for offering a 
defense of an account of blame, which continues Scanlon’s and Sher’s work on this concept (see Smith 
2013, 47). 
38 The work of Bernard Williams throughout the last decades of the 20th century is without peer. 
He devoted some attention to the concept of responsibility in the 1993 Shame and Necessity as well as 
the article “Moral Responsibility and Political Freedom” from 1997,, in which he discusses the 
differences between the concepts of responsibility held by the ancient Greek philosophers and their 
current counterparts.   
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• Praise and blame  
 
Present in theories of responsibility since Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 
praise and blame are the distinct forms of reacting to morally relevant 
actions, be it wrong-doing or right. The interest of the philosophers seems 
lately to have gravitated toward the latter at the expense of the former. The 
most recent discussion on blame is briefly summarized in chapter 4.2. 
 
 
• Responsibility for action and responsibility for character  
 
A specific distinction helping to point out the special role for his addendum is 
the theory of responsibility for action presented in Nicomachean Ethics III.1. 
Passages on the distinct topic of responsibility for character are found in 
book III.5 of NE. The examination of these concepts is the subject of chapter 
5 of this dissertation and the curious role of the latter idea is elaborated on in 
the discussion section of that chapter. The more concrete concept of political 
responsibility is part of the continuation of Aristotle’s writings on 
responsibility. While mentioned, this specific social idea is not in the main 
interest here.  
 
• Accountability and attributability 
 
Gary Watson’s distinction between accountability and attributability39 is an 
interesting division. Watson expresses the idea that focusing only on one side 
of the responsibility “coin” leaves out something important, since being 
accountable is more retrospective40 by nature but, viewed without 
attributability, which is a prospective form of responsibility, might produce 
overly mechanical systems of fact-checking. Eshlemann states that the 
clearest example of the accountability-based accounts of responsibility are 
the Strawsonian theories based on reactive attitudes (incl. Wallace 1994; 
Watson 1996; Fischer & Ravizza 1998; and Darwall 2006), Accounts making 
no reference to the reactive attitudes however include the “ledger” views of 
                                                
39 Creation of this division is credited to Gary Watson (1996, 271-272, 273-274, also 
reprinted in Watson 2004), although similar divisions have been made as early as Frankena 
(1973), who described three possible types of responsibility: 1. X could have responsible 
moral character (character-based responsibility, responsibility as a virtue); 2. X could be 
responsible for Y, where Y is a past crime (retrospective accountability); and 3. X is 
responsible for Y, where Y is something still to be done (prospective attributability) 
(Frankena 1973, 71). Also of note is Watson’s proposed hybrid concept of answerability, 
which would be quite close in meaning to the Finnish language equivalent, “vastuullisuus”. 
40 For illustration of the temporal distinctions between responsibility, retrospective responsibility 
and prospective responsibility, see Garrath Williams’s internet article “Responsibility” (G. Williams 
2009). 
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moral responsibility, which consider responsibility in terms of credit and 
debit on a metaphorical ledger of conduct associated with each moral agent. 
(See Feinberg’s work as an example.) (Eshlemann 2014/[2001].) On the 
other hand, looking just at the attributability side is not enough either. 
According to David O. Brink and Dana K. Nelkin “[a]ttributability is 
necessary but not sufficient for accountability” (Brink & Nelkin 2013, 286).41 
This is compounded by Eshleman’s note stating the questionable status of 
attributability as a form of responsibility (Eshleman 2014). 
As Strawson’s influential contribution depends solely on the relatively 
short article FR, originally delivered as a lecture to the British Academy in 
1962, the details of his theory have proved to be contested (see Strawson 
2008, xii). After all, the article itself never aimed to explicitly define 
responsibility. As the debate on the concept has since advanced to refine its 
more minute details, an attempt to define Strawsonian responsibility based 
on the article alone, would not produce an accurate description of the 
subject. As support, the popular, “contemporary Strawsonian” R. Jay Wallace 
is looked at in chapter 4.1, as his book Responsibility and the Moral 
Sentiments (1994) provides perhaps the most fleshed-out theory, which is 
mostly expanded directly from the Strawsonian position outlined in the 
article. Wallace’s Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments has in turn 
become a staple of moral theory and is often returned to when the 
Strawsonian position is adduced. This is also the case in the currently 
popular academic discussion on the concept of blame. These discussions, and 
how they frame the Strawsonian position in relation to the more recent 
attempts at defining blame are examined as the final viewpoint on the 
Strawsonian concept of responsibility (4.2).42 
Selected criticisms of the Strawsonian conception will conclude this 
chapter (4.3). These criticisms will highlight the delineation of the concept of 
moral responsibility relative to the more general topic of responsibility 
(4.3.1); offer additional distinctions that help locate the important issues 
                                                
41 David O. Brink & Dana K. Nelkin cover a lot of common ground that is looked at here in their 
“Fairness and Architecture of Responsibility” in Shoemaker (ed.) 2013. What is interesting about their 
article is the claim that Strawson (2008/[1962]) can be interpreted in two ways: first in a response-
dependent way and second in a realist way. The writers consider the response-independent 
interpretation of Strawson, which is a different goal than what is pursued here. I argue that the 
response (mostly blame) is integral to the Strawsonian conception of responsibility, i.e., the “response-
dependent” interpretation is followed. Other interesting contrasts that Brink and Nelkin make include 
a note on the justifications and excuses in the context of moral responsibility. It is implied that this 
concept-pair originates from the domain of criminal law. Generally Brink and Nelkin’s article is 
situated between moral responsibility and criminal law in terms of discipline, and would be a very 
useful bridge between the subjects (see Brink & Nelkin 2013, 285-90). 
42 The Strawsonian conception of responsibility discussed here is based on its subsequent 
development by works including (but not limited to) Watson 1987; Russell 1995; Fischer and Ravizza 
1998; Wallace 1994; McKenna & Russell, (eds.) 2007; and Russell 2013. 
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related to the concept as well as contrast the historical alternative 
conceptualizations of responsibility with the current one (4.3.2); question the 
project of attempting to force the subject area under one concept in the first 
place, as well as providing a framework for elements of all theories of 
responsibility (4.3.3); and finally question the stances that the Strawsonian 
position takes toward the role of historical responsibility as well as the 
relatedness of moral responsibility and blame (4.3.4).  
Before proceeding to these specific areas, the original article, “Freedom 
and Resentment" is discussed next. The problem that Strawson set out to 
solve is explained first in 3.1.1, the reactive sentiments and blame are 
discussed second in 3.1.2, special considerations and pleas are the subject of 
chapter 3.1.3 and finally Strawson’s theory’s social dimension is described in 
chapter 3.1.4. 
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3.1 RESPONSIBILITY IN “FREEDOM AND 
RESENTMENT” 
Paul Snowdon describes the naturalistic turn achieved by Strawson’s essay in 
the following way in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article (2009) 
on Strawson’s philosophy: 
Strawson's purpose is to dissolve the so called problem of 
determinism and responsibility. His argument is that our ‘reactive 
attitudes’ towards others and ourselves, such attitudes as gratitude, 
anger, sympathy and resentment, are natural and irrevocable. Their 
presence, therefore, needs no abstract entitlement from philosophy, 
which is simply irrelevant to their existence or justification. There 
cannot be abstract a priori principles locating general metaphysical 
conditions for such attitudes. His claim is that our practice of holding 
ourselves and each other responsible for actions is similarly natural 
and not dependent on general metaphysical requirements. Between 
determinism and responsibility there can be no conflict. (Snowdon, 
2009). 
 
Peter Strawson’s philosophy is considered to reside within the tradition of 
broadly analytical ethics, as well as the school of ordinary language 
philosophy (see Parker-Ryan 2012). And while his contribution to moral 
philosophy is small in quantity, his influence is greater than most others.  His 
essay “Freedom and Resentment” (Strawson 2008/[1962], abbr. FR), which 
can be read as a response to emotivists, utilitarian instrumentalists (such as 
Nowell-Smith 1948 & 1960) and moral skeptics, was originally presented as a 
lecture to the British Academy in 1962. Strawson tries to address an impasse 
that moral philosophy in general had arrived at. The debate in question is 
between the groups of philosophers now known as compatibilists and 
incompatibilists, who held opposing views in the determinism vs. free will 
debate. Strawson’s essay is constitutive to the position that accepts both, that 
the natural world, which we inhabit is deterministic by nature and that moral 
responsibility is possible to attain for human beings, i.e., compatibilism. As 
stated in Snowdon’s foreword of the collection: “It would […] be highly 
inconvenient should it be true that falling under the idea of responsibility 
requires something that we lack” (FR, xiv).  
Strawson's most influential contributions to ethics within FR are, first his 
attempt to resolve the free will vs. determinism impasse by a redefinition of 
the compatibilist position, and second, related to the first, his grounding of 
responsibility directly on a naturalistic view of human psychology by 
attaching more relevance to emotions. What was more important was not 
whether moral statements have truth-values, e.g., that “Stealing is bad” is 
true or false, but reactive sentiments, such as resentment and gratitude, 
praise and blame. 
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Strawson’s article is often mentioned by scholars on responsibility, but his 
ideas are seldom examined in great detail.43 In any case, he and his article 
seem to be the person and the text that are associated most often with 
philosophical moral responsibility. While this is a claim that needs to be 
made with caution, there are entries supporting it: Garrath Williams calls FR 
“The single most influential essay in the literature on moral responsibility”.44 
Williams describes the function of the article as one moving the debate on 
responsibility away from whether we are discussing moral facts or values to 
the very personal moral attitudes such as resentment or gratitude. (G. 
Williams 2010.)  
                                                
43 Referring directly to FR risks the misconception that the article could contain a definitive 
account or theory of the concept of moral responsibility. It of course does not attempt to be 
comprehensive in this sense; for example, in the passage above, Strawson states that the tone of his 
text will be “unscientific and imprecise” in the early pages of the article (FR, 5). 
44 FR is widely cited in the literature referred to here. Examples include: Wallace (1994, 
throughout), P. Russell (1995, pp.5, 75, […] chapter 5), Smiley (1992, pp. 15, 77, 79, 242-243, 253), 
Doris (2002, p. 129, incl. a chapter on responsibility), Waller (2011, pp. 1, 15, 180, 190, […]), G. 
Williams (2008, p. 461), (2010, p. 8.). On the other hand, Aristotle scholars refer to it infrequently, 
with Meyer (2011) as a notable exception. She has written explicitly from the perspective of broadly 
naturalistic ethics and is thus influenced by the article (see Meyer 2011, 161).  
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3.1.1 THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINISM 
 
Strawson’s renowned article does not set out just to define a concept of moral 
responsibility explicitly. At the beginning of FR he wonders what the true 
concern of the thesis of determinism might be. He admits up front that he 
does not have a clear idea about what determinism actually is.45 He continues 
however: “perhaps we shall see that the question can be answered without 
knowing exactly what the thesis of determinism is” (FR, 11). It is a comment 
on the discussion of the determinism vs. free will debate and how it relates to 
moral responsibility in general at a time when it was thought that conceptual 
analysis could solve the apparent contradictions between the phrases in the 
supposed ordinary language (see ibid., 1).  
The reason for Strawson's success is in part to do with the free will 
problem or, more accurately, that Strawson's article provides the keys to 
circumvent it. Before Strawson, questions about responsibility were focused 
on the sort of fact-value discussions that were favored by the logical 
positivists for one. The proponents of determinism focus on the seemingly 
impossible nature of responsibility assessments as facts as these were 
considered to be moral statements with values at their heart (moral 
statements, according to the logical positivists, who were emotivists by 
default, do not have logically determinable truth-values).  
Strawson follows this initial formulation with his classification of the 
disputants into optimists and pessimists depending on the attitudes that the 
writers hold toward the acknowledged possibility of the veracity of the 
determinism thesis (ibid. 2-3). The issue between the “optimist” and 
“pessimist” stances is the most striking, as Strawson writes, in cases of 
retribution as well as moral condemnation and approval. For the pessimist in 
particular, the schism between the determinists and libertarians is crucial. 
While the division concerns the age-old question about the origin of actions, 
he diverts attention toward emotions such as “resentment, forgiveness, [and] 
love”.46 (Ibid. 5.) According to Strawson it's not important to discuss whether 
                                                
45 A possible distinction that Strawson alludes to could be that between physical determination and 
theological determination. Beginning from Campbell 1951 and onwards, a growing number of 
commentators feel that the whole debate on free will and determinism is misleading, and that it really 
does not contribute at all to the philosophical investigation into the nature of responsibility (see Smiley 
1992). The theme is however so pervasive that it has to be acknowledged in connection with 
responsibility and it should be noted, especially if a writer has a specific stance on the issue. Therefore, 
when relevant and clear, the position of the author on the compatibilism-incompatibilism divide will 
be stated, but a more extensive analysis of what the division implies is left to another occasion. 
46 For examples of philosophy of emotions from the pre-Strawson era, see Schlick 1966, Nowell-
Smith 1948, Campbell, C.A. 1951 & Austin 1956-7. Strawson also refers to La Rochefoucauld, whose 
ideas are discussed in Christopher Tilmouth’s Passion’s Triumph over Reason, which is a very 
interesting intellectual history on the rise of the philosophical interest in the emotions. (Tilmouth 
2010, 273, 300, 304-305.) 
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the statements above are facts or not, but rather what motivates the claims 
based on the sentiments that we have in connection with responsibility 
assessments. These motivations consist, according to Strawson, of emotions 
such as resentment, anger, gratitude and praise, etc. He explains that these 
attitudes are crucial to our capacity to distinguish between those who qualify 
as responsible persons and those who do not, and are non-responsible 
agents. 
Michael McKenna and Paul Russell’s book Free Will and Reactive 
Attitudes: Perspectives on P.F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” 
(2007) contains articles related to the influential essay by Strawson.47 The 
introductory essay describes “Freedom and Resentment”, originally 
published in 1962, as being: 
among the most important and influential of the contributions 
produced during this period. [- -] On one side, it must be viewed from 
the perspective of the “classical” free will debate as it was generally 
understood around the middle of the twentieth century. On the other 
side, we need to consider “Freedom and Resentment” in terms of the 
critical responses and debates that it has generated. (McKenna & 
Russell 2007, 1.) 
 
Strawson’s goal was ambitious in aiming to resolve the problem of 
determinism. The classical free will debate, he argues, can be described in 
terms of this problem. Determinism in this context is usually as thought 
about as follows: “everything that happens in the world—including all human 
thought and action—is subject to causal laws and this involves the 
necessitation of effects by antecedent causal conditions.” (McKenna & 
Russell 2007, 1.)  
If this is true, and all of our actions are necessitated causally, free will and 
moral responsibility appear to be impossible. The trouble is that free will and 
moral responsibility require causally necessitated actions. This leads to the 
situation in which no matter what our interpretation of the condition of 
determinism is – true or false – the ideas of free will and moral responsibility 
become logically untenable. (McKenna & Russell 2007, 2.)  
The conflicting state for free will and moral responsibility in connection 
with determinism leads to the skeptical conclusion that there is no room for 
this concept. The two rival points of view are borne out of this situation. The 
classical compatibilist position and the variations of incompatibilism refer to 
this dilemma: compatibilism states that causal necessitation can co-exist 
with determinism. Classical incompatibilists vary in the strategy they use to 
                                                
47 In addition to these, their co-authored introduction is one of the best introductions to Strawson’s 
best-known article as well as his thought. The essay is divided into three parts titled: “I. The Classical 
Debate and the Dilemma of Determinism”, “II. Strawson’s “Reconciling Project” and the Naturalistic 
Turn” and “III. Critical Themes Concerning “Freedom and Resentment”. This structure is also followed 
loosely here. 
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advance their arguments.48 The idea of forward-looking, utilitarian moral 
responsibility is dismissed by the incompatibilist, but accepted by the 
compatibilist. Campbell, for example, who McKenna & Russell refer to, noted 
that while our conduct can be altered by means of punishments and rewards, 
responsibility itself is not limited only to these (see Campbell, C.A. 1951). 
This is because animals and children can be observed to react similarly to 
punishment and reward, without them qualifying as moral agents.   
The incompatibilists take hold of this, as they criticize the compatibilists 
for not having a sufficiently “deep account of moral responsibility”49. 
Strawson adds the considerations of desert and identification of the “will 
with the act”, and the observation that the emphasis expressed in these 
viewpoints can lead to attempts to disprove the thesis of determinism. The 
                                                
48 As a group, incompatibilism includes the polar opposites of the metaphysical libertarians as well 
as hard determinists. Cross-referencing the stances on determinism and free will reveals a possible 
explanation for this : 
 Free will is true Free will is false 
Determinism is true Soft determinism / compatibilism Hard determinism 
Determinism is false Libertarianism Soft incompatibilism  
The debate has mostly to do with underlying worldviews of the authors and mostly these do not 
directly influence the actual events that need moral consideration. Thus, the incompabilists are a group 
consisting of both libertarians and hard determinists: Metaphysical libertarians claim that 
determinism is false, and that free will is an actuality and is at the heart of morality. Thus any moral 
decisions are ultimately connected to the agent or the person who decides to act. The libertarian stance 
runs into trouble when confronted by empirical evidence against the capacity for these rational 
decisions. Hard determinists on the other hand adhere to determinism and absolve all the potential for 
moral responsibility of an individual. According to libertarians, moral responsibility requires that the 
choice between alternate courses of action be made by the agent herself. This would mean the falsity of 
the condition of determinism. On the other hand, the hard determinists maintain that the reality is 
completely determined, and as such even the practice of blaming is questionable on the grounds that 
the agents are unable to affect anything (See McKenna & Russell 2007, 3 & Waller 2011). Most people 
find the resulting demands made by the hard determinists, such as abolishing moral responsibility, 
difficult to accept (see Waller 2011). Finally there is the group of moral skeptics and “agnostics”, who 
do not consider the question to be relevant. (FR; see also the Stanford encyclopedia article 
"Compatibilism" by M. McKenna 2004). 
49 The optimist account according to Strawson is defined by an objectifying attitude toward action 
within societies. He continues that they tend to point to the evidence about their function and to the 
fact that there is no evidence in punishment practices that would imply that the thesis of determinism 
is false, and that as a result they are content to accept the circumstances. He also sketches out one of 
the common arguments made by the pessimists, i.e., incompatibilists, against the point above in the 
following steps: 1. Just punishment and moral condemnation are practiced in any given society; 2. This 
implies truth of moral guilt. 3. Moral guilt implies moral responsibility. 4. Moral responsibility implies 
free will. 5. Free will implies the falsity of the thesis of determinism. 6. Thus, the thesis of determinism 
is false. (FR, 2.) When all of these arguments are taken together, the result is uncomfortable, as the 
pessimist stance depends on the truth of 6. 
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incompatibilists (of the libertarian variety) thus tend to emphasize the 
control aspect of the moral agent that, as the originator of the action and that 
the moral desert of the agent, needs to be more prudentially accounted for. 
The incompatibilist claims that the agent must have the capacity to choose 
between alternative actions. This, on the other hand, would mean that 
determinism could not be true. (McKenna & Russell 2007, 2-3.)  
McKenna & Russell claim that a key motivation for the incompatibilists is 
that compatibilists lose something vital, or “deep” from the concept of agency 
and responsibility (Ibid. 3). This relates mainly to the demand for a 
capability of control, meaning that the agent is the one who can select one 
out of possible courses of action. There is however a danger of simplification 
here. The stance here is that, while the “deeper” role of agency may be a 
motivation for an incompatibilist position, this desire for or tendency toward 
a more complex picture of agency does not necessarily lead to 
incompatibilism.50 There are examples of “deeper” statements that do not fall 
under incompatibilist accounts. The main example of these is Aristotle. For 
example, according to Sarah Broadie, it would be mistake to call Aristotle a 
“libertarian”, but she notes that his philosophy can be described as a “proto-
indeterminist” philosophy (Broadie 1991, 158). Susan S. Meyer goes a step 
further, arguing that Aristotle’s view of responsibility,51 like Strawson’s, is 
independent of the factual status of determinism, but is not incompatibilist 
by nature (Meyer 2011). Aristotle’s thought can thus be considered on 
compatibilist standards. 
Strawson discusses his answer to the optimist vs. pessimist debate in FR. 
The argument between the sides is considered further with the help of 
additional points of disagreement, concluding in the realization by Strawson 
that both parties fail to see that the disputants are not exactly talking about 
the same problem: the optimist stops inquiring at a certain point that logic 
                                                
50 See the work of Bernard Williams on this topic (1985, 1993, 1997) and John Fischer and Mark 
Ravizza’s book (1998), which are discussed here in ch. 4.3.3. Neither, as Eshleman writes, is the 
division between the two camps necessarily directly indicative of specific views on the concept of moral 
responsibility any longer: “This general trend of linking the consequentialist conception of moral 
responsibility with compatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility and the merit-
based conception with incompatibilism continued to persist through the first half of the twentieth 
century” (Eshleman 2014). 
51 Perhaps the most cited work on Aristotle within this thesis is Susan S. Meyer’s Aristotle on 
Moral Responsibility originally from 1993, reprinted in 2011, which is used first in chapter 5.1.2 to 
pinpoint the responsibility for the character side of Aristotle’s moral responsibility.  However, as it is 
discussed in the criticism part of chapter 5.2, it is possible that Aristotle never meant to include the 
responsibility for character discussion within his theory of moral responsibility; rather it seems that 
side of the concept would only actually matter for moral education, not responsibility. Aristotle’s theory 
of responsibility is the topic of chapter 5, where Meyer’s argument that Aristotle’s conception does not 
conflict with determinism, although she also writes that his character-based view would not be a part 
of that, is discussed. 
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allows about the effect of freedom, while the pessimist tries to convince 
others that what is beyond this point has significance. (FR, 4.) According to 
Strawson the whole dilemma is based on a misunderstanding: 
Both seek, in different ways, to over-intellectualize the facts. Inside 
the general structure or web of human attitudes and feelings of which 
I have been speaking, there is endless room for modification, 
redirection, criticism, and justification. But questions of justification 
are internal to the structure or relate to modifications internal to it. 
The existence of the general framework of attitudes itself is something 
we are given with the fact of human society. As a whole, it neither 
calls for, nor permits, an external ‘rational’ justification. Pessimist 
and optimist alike show themselves, in different ways, unable to 
accept this. (FR, 25, see also McKenna & Russell 2007, 7-8.) 
 
Strawson labels the traditional competing viewpoints as optimistic and 
pessimistic depending on their attitudes toward the possibility of moral 
considerations in cases where both states of being are considered.52 
Optimists claim that whether determinism affects us or not, it makes no 
difference to the moral choices we make. Pessimists, as Strawson declares, 
include hard determinists and libertarians alike. These two contradictory 
positions share, he argues, the negative expectation of morality, as hard 
determinists deny the possibility of having an effect on one’s action, while the 
latter group resorts to “obscure and panicky metaphysics”, including 
conditions in which moral condemnation or punishment is inappropriate 
(FR, 1-4).  
The pessimist relates to experiencing a negative emotion or a shock, 
which comes from an assessment made not about the factuality of 
determinism by itself, but of the perceived callousness of the attitude that the 
consequentialist (esp. of the economy of threats variety) harbors toward the 
issue.53 In response, the pessimist seeks a relevant insight, which is the 
realization that moral condemnation and moral responsibility as its 
extension is impossible with a fully objective attitude (without emotion) 
                                                
52 McKenna & Russell’s assessment of the motivation of the incompatibilist is that the proponents 
of the stance find the possibility of determinism “depressing or dispiriting”. This motivation is 
mirrored in Strawson’s description of “pessimists”, the other group he is arguing against, in an 
analogous way as “optimists”, hold a corresponding attitude toward the thesis of determinism. 
(McKenna & Russell 2007, 4.)  
53 Samuel Scheffler (1992) writes on Strawson’s contribution in his article “Responsibility, Reactive 
Attitudes and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics” that the consequentialist compatibilist forgoes the 
reactive attitudes and thus bases the entire concept of moral responsibility on clinical, objective 
attitudes, which in turn shocks the pessimist, who relies more on praise and blame. (Scheffler 1992, 
312.) 
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about the agent and the acts, but also that the incompatibilist fumbles by 
placing her bets against determinism.  
Strawson’s contribution to the problem of determinism is found at the 
end of FR by siding (with conditions) with the compatibilists: 
Only by attending to this range of attitudes can we recover from the 
facts as we know them a sense of what we mean, i.e. of all we mean, 
when, speaking the language of morals, we speak of desert, 
responsibility, guilt, condemnation, and justice. But we do recover it 
from the facts as we know them. We do not have to go beyond them. 
Because the optimist neglects or misconstrues these attitudes, the 
pessimist rightly claims to find a lacuna in his account. We can fill the 
lacuna for him. But in return we must demand of the pessimist a 
surrender of his metaphysics. […] The optimist’s style of over-
intellectualizing the facts is that of a characteristically incomplete 
empiricism, a one-eyed utilitarianism. He seeks to find an adequate 
basis for certain social practices in calculated consequences, and loses 
sight (perhaps wishes to lose sight) of the human attitudes of which 
these practices are, in part, the expression. The pessimist does not 
lose sight of these attitudes, but is unable to accept the fact that it is 
just these attitudes themselves which fill the gap in the optimist’s 
account. Because of this, he thinks the gap can be filled only if some 
general metaphysical proposition is repeatedly verified, verified in all 
cases where it is appropriate to attribute moral responsibility. […] If 
we sufficiently, that is radically, modify the view of the optimist, his 
view is the right one. […] When we do remember this, and modify the 
optimist’s position accordingly, we simultaneously correct its 
conceptual deficiencies and ward off the dangers it seems to entail, 
without recourse to the obscure and panicky metaphysics of 
libertarianism. (FR, 24-25; 27, my emphasis). 
 
Strawson’s concluding answer is that the compatibilist is right, but his 
position is unacceptable as such. It has to be appended with Strawson’s 
account of the reactive emotions. (FR, 27.) The skeptical conclusion (i.e., the 
rejection of both optimist and pessimist positions), according to which the 
contradiction of free will and determinism making moral responsibility 
existing in any form impossible, is counter-intuitive. Strawson argues that 
the moral skeptic only focuses on the “one-eyed utilitarianism” of the 
optimist and the “inanity” of the libertarian position. He argues that blame is 
not a pure metaphysical entity, but an actual psychological feature of human 
beings as well, and rejecting these facts based on the faults of the viewpoints 
above would be wrong.54 (See ibid. 25.)  
                                                
54 “Even if we had some theoretical reason to abandon or suspend these reactive attitudes it would 
be psychologically impossible for us to do this. To do this would involve “adopting a thoroughgoing 
objectivity of attitude to others” which is something we are incapable of (FR, 27–8/69–70).” 
(McKenna & Russell 2007, 6, compare also with Prinz 2007.) 
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The problem of determinism comes to a close in Strawson’s context: the 
problem appears “irrelevant” after the focus of responsibility has been shifted 
toward the reactive attitudes (ibid. 21). As stated, this particular conclusion 
by Strawson has provoked unprecedented discussion on the topic and its 
effect on the philosophy of responsibility.55 However, not everyone has been 
persuaded by his result. Strawson’s conclusion concerning the problem of 
determinism is followed at this point of the present work, at least for the sake 
of the argument. This means that even with its problems, Strawson’s solution 
to the problem is preferable to the continuation of the deadlock. What 
follows is a detailed, even if not comprehensive presentation of the key 
concepts in the theory of responsibility found in FR.   
                                                
55 Eshleman writes about the continuing debate that Strawson’s argument that responsibility 
ascriptions are oblivious to independent theoretical considerations has not persuaded all of the 
compatibilists. New versions of so-called “merit-based compatibilism” have been presented by authors 
such as Fischer and Ravizza 1998 and McKenna 2012. (Eshleman 2014/[2001].) 
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3.1.2 REACTIVE SENTIMENTS AND BLAME 
  
One of Strawson’s most important commentators, Gary Watson, writes of 
Strawson’s emphasis on the reactive sentiments as follows: 
All traditional theories of moral responsibility acknowledge 
connections between [reactive] attitudes and holding one responsible. 
What is original to Strawson is the way in which they are linked. 
Whereas traditional views have taken these attitudes to be secondary 
to seeing others as responsible, to be practical corollaries or 
emotional side-effects of some independently comprehensible belief in 
responsibility, Strawson’s radical claim is that these “reactive 
attitudes” (as he calls them) are constitutive of moral responsibility; 
to regard oneself or another as responsible just is the proneness to 
react to them in these kinds of ways under certain conditions. […] 
There is no more basic belief which provides the justification or 
rationale for these reactions. The practice does not rest on a theory at 
all, but rather on certain needs and aversions that are basic to our 
conception of being human. The idea that there is or needs to be such 
an independent basis is where traditional views, in Strawson’s 
opinion, have gone badly astray. (Watson 1987, 256-257)  
 
Strawson’s refocus treats the entire dilemma as a “pseudo-problem”56. The 
change of focus at which Strawson aimed his work, was the shift from looking 
at concepts of “freedom” and “responsibility” as analytically definable wholes 
or solvable problems, toward evaluation of what is happening when we hold 
someone responsible. This takes the philosophical inquiry away from 
methodological tools of conceptual analysis toward more a descriptive 
account of human psychology.57 (McKenna & Russell 2007, 4-5 & n9.) The 
results of this refocus have probably been Strawson’s strongest influence on 
the whole field of ethics. In this way, his “naturalistic turn” involves not just a 
methodological turn away from conceptual analysis toward moral psychology 
but also an added emphasis on the importance of emotion in moral and 
social life in general. (Ibid. 5.) 
Strawson’s attempt to redirect the discussion of ethics depends especially 
on the concept of reactive attitude. He distinguishes two types of attitude 
that people hold toward one another: objective attitudes and participant 
reactive attitudes. According to Strawson, these are essential in our dealings 
with other people, and the personal emotions we experience when we 
confront each other depend greatly on them. (FR, 4-5; 13-15.) 
                                                
56 Following Moritz Schlick’s “When Is a Man Responsible?” (Schlick 1966/[1939]). 
57 McKenna & Russell refer to Strawson’s phrase “that complicated web of attitudes and feelings 
which form an essential part of moral life as we know it”, a phrase which highlights the importance of 
social interaction to responsibility (FR, 24). 
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He describes the participant reactive attitudes as “essentially natural human 
reactions to the good or ill will or indifference of others towards us” (FR, 10-
11). These reactions are found in the general attitudes and actions that we 
may take toward each other. The full list of reactive attitudes include 
personal reactive attitudes regarding others’ treatment of one (including 
resentment and gratitude), as well as vicarious analogues of these 
(indignation and approbation), and finally self-reactive attitudes (guilt, 
shame, moral self-esteem, feeling obligated) (FR, 15-16; see also Watson 
1987, 259, n4). 
The participant reactive attitudes are separate from objective attitudes, 
which we can take toward actors or objects, which we do not qualify as 
functioning on the same level as we do in terms of moral agency. Participant 
reactive attitudes are those that are in use when we deal with others who we 
consider to be of equal standing in terms of cognitive decision-making and 
consideration. These attitudes appear naturally in that their origin is 
internal, but the way that they affect our actions becomes refined as we gain 
more experience. The participant reactive attitudes thus describe our 
attitudes in interpersonal relationships, first in how they indicate fully 
developed agents,58 or members of the moral community; second in that they 
adjust the relationships by means of the moral sentiments, among other 
things, resulting in responsibility relations between agents. This happens for 
instance through the moral sentiments. In this way, the participant reactive 
attitudes as well as their vicarious variations appear as emergent phenomena 
for the demand for the social interactions that are typical of human societies 
(see FR, 16-17). 
Participant reactive attitudes solve the problem of determinism, at least 
for Strawson. What exactly determinism means is left unanswered by him. 
He tells the reader that an exact answer to the question cannot be attained. 
This does not, however, he claims, prevent us from focusing our 
philosophical efforts on the more relevant discussions about “ordinary inter-
personal attitudes”. Achieving a clean solution would thus be counter-
productive in terms of philosophically interesting issues of morality. The 
apparent fact that the reactive attitudes are unconnected to the thesis of 
determinism is the key to circumventing the impasse of the debate. (FR, 14.) 
Summing up Strawson’s definitions of the key concepts of reactive 
attitudes and resentment, he writes that the reactive attitudes are: 
“essentially reactions to the quality of others’ wills towards us, as manifested 
in their behaviour: to their good or ill will or indifference or lack of concern.” 
He then argues that resentment is, in his terms, “a reaction to injury or 
indifference”. (FR, 15.) The examination of the excuses results in the 
distinctions that Strawson makes into the participant reactive attitudes and 
the objective attitudes that we assume toward each other. (FR, 7-13.) The 
                                                
58 Eshleman considers Strawson’s position further, by offering one condition for qualifying as a 
person: “namely, only they can be proper recipients of the reactive attitudes” (Eshleman 2014). 
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group of attitudes that is assumed toward the other signifies whether the 
agent in question is viewed as a full member of the moral community, or 
whether she is ruled externally, on a decision based for instance on the 
excuses discussed above.59  
In the fifth passage of FR Strawson describes in greater detail what 
amount to the most important moral sentiments in his theory: resentment, 
indignation60 and guilt. All of these sentiments, connected to our moral 
considerations, can attest to the web of relations that involve human beings 
with each other and, as Strawson claims, they are not subject to the problem 
of determinism. Strawson considers guilt especially to belong to the group of 
“vicarious” forms of the sentiments, these emotions being directed at the 
agent himself or herself. While the other emotions listed might be more 
relevant in social contexts, both types are equally important for behavior of 
the agent. The participant reactive attitudes as well as their vicarious 
variations appear as emergent phenomena from the demands of social 
interaction. They are common, according to Strawson, irrespective of 
culture.61 (FR, 14-17.)  
Along with the personal and vicarious reactive attitudes, Strawson 
discusses their counterparts that are described as “self-reactive attitudes 
associated with demands on others for others.” Feeling bound or obliged is 
one of these socially oriented attitudes. Others include “feeling compunction; 
feeling guilty or remorseful or at least responsible, and the more complicated 
phenomenon of shame” (FR, 16). The feelings related to moral responsibility 
can thus motivate the agent herself to action. What is interesting regarding 
the reactive sentiments and their classifications is a certain “class of 
considerations” which reveals some demands for inter-personal retributive 
measures to be “mere appearances” which Strawson explains works as 
                                                
59 Treating the reactive attitudes as a group of concepts is not a strategy originating with  Strawson. 
He pays homage to the thinkers belonging to the school of thought called moral sense theories, the 
classical sentimentalists, whose members included David Hume and Adam Smith. Also of note are the 
writings on “Resentment” by a fellow moral sense theorist, Bishop Joseph Butler (see Butler 1849). 
60 Strawson indirectly equates indignation with a more forceful form of moral disapprobation (FR, 
15). This is somewhat comparable with Hume’s idea of blame (see THN, 467-468). 
61 In the final passage of “Freedom and Resentment” Strawson voices some doubts about this. He 
writes that discussing other cultures might provide criticism of the concept of responsibility used by 
analytical, Anglophone ethics. For example: “One factor of comparatively minor importance is an 
increased historical and anthropological awareness of the great variety of forms which these human 
attitudes may take at different times and in different cultures.” (FR, 26.) According to Russell (2013) 
this is especially true with Wallace’s reading of Strawson, as his way of limiting the concept of 
responsibility to consist only of negative reactive sentiments makes a concept distinctly biased in favor 
of “Western, Christianized culture” (Russell 2013, 191). 
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something that, when applicable to the situation, inhibits resentment. 62 (FR, 
17.) 
Despite its current reputation as the definitive text on moral 
responsibility, the exact phrase of “moral responsibility “is actually 
mentioned at only a few locations in the article, the passage illustrating the 
considerations leading to resentment inhibition being one of them. Strawson 
writes: “We may say, stressing the moral, the generalized aspect of the 
demand: considerations of this group have no tendency to make us see the 
agent as other than a morally responsible agent; they simply make us see the 
injury as one for which he was not morally responsible.” (FR, 17.) Here 
Strawson mentions moral responsibility; the next time “moral responsibility” 
is mentioned is in the final passage, numbered six. 
The conditions requiring resentment inhibition involve situations in 
which the agent is experiencing hallucinatory delusions, or as Strawson puts 
it:  
But suppose we see the agent in a different light: as one whose 
picture of the world is an insane delusion; […] Seeing an agent in 
such a light as this tends, I said, to inhibit resentment in a wholly 
different way. It tends to inhibit resentment because it tends to inhibit 
ordinary interpersonal attitudes in general, and the kind of demand 
and expectation which those attitudes involve; and tends to promote 
instead the purely objective view of the agent as one posing problems 
simply of intellectual understanding, management, treatment, and 
control. […] We may say: to the extent to which the agent is seen in 
this light, he is not seen as one on whom demands and expectations 
lie in that particular way in which we think of them as lying when we 
speak of moral obligation; he is not, to that extent, seen as a morally 
responsible agent, as a term of moral relationships, as a member of 
the moral community. (FR, 17-18.)  
 
Strawson’s comment contains an explanation of how the agent can be 
granted an excuse from responsibility because of psychological 
abnormalities.63 This kind of suspension from regular inter-personal 
attitudes is possible according to Strawson even without any particular 
reasons, including cases in which the reactive attitudes are distinctly moral 
by nature. As for the situations in which these moral reactive attitudes are 
completely suspended, the number of motives is limited.64 Strawson claims 
                                                
62 This refers to the origin of the idea of the excuses and exemption in Strawson’s context, that 
some trait or traits of the agent, or a detail or the circumstance can render the blame directed at an 
offender invalid. Compare further with Wallace’s “blameworthiness inhibitors”, which are discussed 
below in chapter 4.1. 
63 The classifications for these cases are the topic of the next chapter (3.1.2). 
64 Strawson refers to the considerations that the later authors such as Watson and Wallace call 
exemptions. See ch. 4.1.2 & 4.3.4. 
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that these total suspensions from the moral reactive attitudes are motivated 
by weaker motives than those in which the excuses do not lead to a complete 
shift of perspective toward the other person. This happens in the former 
cases, in that the agent is no longer treated as a “member of the moral 
community”, but with objective attitudes instead. While the strain of 
adversities toward the relationship might be so strong that it would compel a 
shift of attitude, the benefits of viewing the other with participant attitudes 
are evident, and this is something that is not nor should be given up easily. 
Strawson leaves this issue open, claiming that for his purposes the question 
is not that important; that describing the specific factors affecting the 
changes of attitude would not need further effort. (FR, 18-19.) 
Instead, Strawson reinforces his argument that the reactive emotions of 
resentment, indignation and guilt are constitutive of moral responsibility:  
The concepts we are concerned with are those of responsibility and 
guilt, qualified as ‘moral’, on the one hand—together with that of 
membership of a moral community; of demand, indignation, 
disapprobation and condemnation, qualified as ‘moral’, on the other 
hand—together with that of punishment. Indignation, 
disapprobation, like resentment, tend to inhibit or at least to limit our 
goodwill towards the object of these attitudes, tend to promote an at 
least partial and temporary withdrawal of goodwill; they do so in 
proportion as they are strong; and their strength is in general 
proportioned to what is felt to be the magnitude of the injury and to 
the degree to which the agent’s will is identified with or indifferent to 
it. (These, of course, are not contingent connections.) But these 
attitudes of disapprobation and indignation are precisely the 
correlates of the moral demand in the case where the demand is felt 
to be disregarded. The making of the demand is the proneness to such 
attitudes. Holding them does not, as the holding of objective attitude 
does, involve as a part of itself viewing their object other than as a 
member of the moral community. (FR, 23.) 
 
According to Strawson, even the moral skeptic should take note of his 
position. The usual position of the skeptic,65 from where (for instance) the 
claim “blame is metaphysical” is advanced, is opposed to the optimists’ 
account.66 This is argued against by the former as inadequate, or as leaving 
something essential about responsibility out. The skeptic is also against the 
                                                
65 The group of alternatives to the skeptical conclusion include: a) that blame is a cognitive 
judgment, b) an affective notion, which is advocated here by Strawson and c) that it is a conative 
“operation”. (See Coates & Tognazzini 2014 & ch. 4.2.) 
66 Eshleman calls optimists referred to by Strawson consequentialist compatibilists (see Eshleman 
2014/[2001]). 
54 
pessimist.67 The incompatibilists are labeled by the skeptic as merely “inane”. 
Strawson additionally notes the tendency of the moral skeptic to emphasize 
the inherent confusion of “moral responsibility, guilt and blame”. (FR, 25.) 
Strawson’s pessimist says:  
that the man who is the subject of justified punishment, blame or 
moral condemnation must really deserve it; and then add, perhaps, 
that, in the case at least where he is blamed for a positive act rather 
than an omission, the condition of his really deserving blame is 
something that goes beyond the negative freedoms that the optimist 
concedes. It is, say, a genuinely free identification of the will with the 
act. And this is the condition that is incompatible with the truth of 
determinism. (FR, 3. My emphasis.) 
 
The refocusing of the debate from the retributive approaches of responsibility 
toward the theme of holding responsible happens with Strawson pointing out 
a distinction between “practices or attitudes” regarding punishment and 
moral condemnation from the agents and the acts that they undertake. While 
Strawson discusses retribution such that the practices related to it permit 
(but do not imply) detachment from the agents or actions, which in other 
words are their objects, he is more interested in “non-detached attitudes”, or 
the reactive attitudes that people have toward one another. These include 
attitudes and reactions of people as members of a society, as well as “such 
things as gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love and hurt feelings.” (FR, 4-
5.) The concepts of attitudes, emotions and sentiments become the essential 
vocabulary of the further attempts to tackle moral responsibility.68 Using 
these, Strawson gathers the confidence to attempt to “fill in the lacuna which 
the pessimist finds in the optimist’s account of the concept of moral 
responsibility” (FR, 22). Strawson’s answer is that the optimist’s account of 
moral responsibility – appended to his conceptualization of the reactive 
sentiments – is the way out of the paradoxical situation, in which the 
philosophy of his time was stuck (see Watson 1987).  
Strawson makes note about two possible sources of criticism to his 
understanding of reactive sentiments, the first of which is related to other 
cultures and the second to disruptive, new knowledge introduced by 
empirical research: 1. Strawson writes that increased awareness of historical 
and anthropological nature may pose problems for his proposed scheme. The 
                                                
67 Eshleman calls pessimists referred to by Strawson merit-based incompatibilists (see Eshleman 
2014/[2001]). 
68 Strawson calls for a return to the ideas upheld by the moral sense theorists: “It is a pity that talk 
of the moral sentiments has fallen out of favour. The phrase would be quite a good name for that 
network of human attitudes in acknowledging the character and place of which we find, I suggest, the 
only possibility of reconciling these disputants to each other and the facts.” (FR, 25-26). This is widely 
read as a direct reference to the philosophy of David Hume and other philosophers belonging to the 
group of moral sense theorists, or the classical sentimentalists.  
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obvious example is the shame-cultures, which instead of guilt and blame 
emphasize the emotion which Strawson only remarked on as the “more 
complicated phenomenon of shame” (FR, 16). Otherwise, as here, the 
historical perspective provides an abundance of interesting comparisons (See 
FR, 26).69 2. The other “threat” which Strawson foresees, depending on one’s 
stance, is the implications that the more empirical sciences can pose for 
philosophy. While Strawson values the theoretical approach, he expresses the 
need to address the growing understanding of the human mind that the 
natural sciences offer. 70 As for science making the philosophical theories of 
responsibility redundant, Strawson considers that it is a possibility that can 
certainly happen, even to the extent that it is a goal for some philosophers to 
make the related questions disappear, so to speak. (See ibid.)  
                                                
69 The Aristotelian theory is further compared below with the Strawsonian example. Notably, 
Marion Smiley does so with her distinction between classical and modern concepts of responsibility 
(see ch. 4.3.2). 
70 Regarding this second type of possible criticism, in the second part of this dissertation the recent 
advances of the psychological sciences and their effect on moral philosophy are discussed, although 
briefly, related to the criticism of John Doris (2002) as examined in ch. 6.1. 
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3.1.3 SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS OR PLEAS 
  
In the fourth part of FR Strawson discusses the extraordinary conditions that 
affect some of the cases requiring moral assessment. The discussion begins 
with a reference to “occasions for resentment”, which might mean anything 
from being harmed intentionally to being hurt by another by accident: 
Let us consider, then, occasions for resentment: situations in which 
one person is offended or injured by the action of another and in 
which — in the absence of special considerations — the offended 
person might naturally or normally be expected to feel resentment. 
Then let us consider what sorts of special considerations might be 
expected to modify or mollify this feeling or remove it altogether. (FR, 
7. My emphasis.) 
 
A significant feature of the reactive attitudes here is their property of being 
modified or even completely negated by certain circumstances. In other 
words, these special considerations that modify, mollify, or even cancel out 
reactive sentiments are studied here.71 There are two ways that this 
mitigation might happen: the first is that the person may be excused in terms 
of her behavior; for instance, if it is determined that the act committed was 
unintentional, i.e., it was coerced or uninformed. In the other case, the 
participant attitude may be given up entirely by it being switched to the 
objective standpoint. In the latter case, the individual in question is no longer 
viewed as a fully capable member of the moral community and thus not 
morally responsible. 
As we saw in the quote starting this chapter, the occasions when 
resentment is felt can be affected by special considerations that can “modify 
or mollify the feeling or remove it altogether” (FR, 7). The first group of these 
that Strawson considers are those that can be discussed with expressions 
such as “He didn’t mean to”, “He hadn’t realized”, “He didn’t know”, as well 
as “He couldn’t help it” enforced by claims such as “He was pushed”, “He had 
to do it”, “It was the only way”, or “They left him no alternative”.72 These 
expressions have in common the feature that they do not ask us to question 
the “membership of the moral community” or, in other words, the moral 
status of an adult person that these agents ordinarily have. Rather, they 
suggest the particular injury as something that is not part of the normal 
behavior of that agent, but they do not question the agent’s capacity for 
moral responsibility. (FR, 7-8.) 
The second group contains two sub-groups, the first being acts that are 
affected by somehow altered circumstances which diminished the agent’s 
                                                
71 The words excuse and exemption are used in connection with these forms of partial and “full 
pardon” respectively below following Watson (1987, 259-261) and Wallace (1994, 118, chs 5 & 6). These 
concepts are returned to in chapter 6.2., where a more detailed exposition is undertaken. 
72 The acts related to these type-1 pleas are referred here as “coerced or unintended acts”. 
 57 
capacity to act “normally”. The situations in this subgroup are denoted by 
descriptions such as “He wasn’t himself”, “He has been under very great 
strain recently” and “He was acting under post-hypnotic suggestion”. 
According to Strawson, the first subgroup is of less philosophical interest 
than the second is. (FR, 8.) 
The second sub-group is (in this case) more interesting, as it is varied by 
statements such as “He’s only a child”, “He’s a hopeless schizophrenic”, “His 
mind has been systematically perverted” and “That’s purely compulsive 
behavior on his part”.  These situations are also ones in which the moral 
agency or status of the agent comes into question. In these exceptional cases, 
the circumstances do not deviate from the norm, but the psychology or the 
moral developmental state of the agent does. Thus, what separates the 
second sub-group from the first is that the source of this doubt comes not 
from the environment, but the actor himself or herself. Belonging to this 
class of actions, our reactive attitudes are a drastically altered. It’s 
noteworthy that these considerations come into question when the agent 
belongs to one of the following groups: children,73 the childlike, or the 
mentally ill: this group in Strawson’s words “allows that the circumstances 
were normal, but presents the agent as psychologically abnormal – or as 
morally undeveloped. The agent was himself; but he is warped or deranged, 
neurotic or just a child. When we see someone in such a light as this, all our 
reactive attitudes tend to be profoundly modified.” (FR, 9.) Strawson uses the 
example of someone stepping on someone else’s hand: “If someone treads on 
my hand accidentally, while trying to help me, the pain may be no less acute 
than if he treads on it in contemptuous disregard of my existence or with a 
malevolent wish to injure me. But I shall generally feel in the second case a 
kind and degree of resentment that I shall not feel in the first” (FR, 6). In the 
situation where someone treads on his hand,74 Strawson recounts, how we 
react to the act carries a lot of meaning: if the act was done on purpose we are 
likely to get angrier than if it was an accident. Strawson notes forgiveness 
briefly75 as a subject, this has received less attention than the more negative 
reactive emotions of resentment, indignation and guilt. (See FR, 6.) 
Throughout this work, there are two examples that highlight the 
phenomenon of blame mitigation and are thus examined from the viewpoint 
of each author. These are children and  the psychopath. Not all writers not 
take a stand on both of them, but as they do so, it will be noted. Emphasizing 
his conclusion, Strawson gives an example concerning upbringing: children 
are increasingly more capable in the sense of being full members of the moral 
                                                
73 It is perhaps unusual that children and people with psychological abnormalities are discussed 
side-by-side. Strawson however remains cautious in that he keeps the two groups separated using 
disjunctions. 
74 This example is also adopted by Wallace, whose version is looked at in chapter 6.2. 
75 Garrath Williams has returned to the subject of forgiveness in responsibility in his latest article 
Sharing Responsibility and Holding Responsible (G. Williams 2013). 
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community, with age, but until they are that, they cannot be fully considered 
as such. This leads to a suspension of the reactive attitudes as was described 
above. Examples of children are thus of interest. Eshleman writes on the 
situation in which the child is initially exempted from reactive attitudes and 
thus does not qualify for responsibility assessments, but increasingly 
becomes so through development with age (Eshleman 2014). As another 
example, Williams also notes on Strawson that “our relations with children 
occupy a crucial in-between place” (Williams 2010, 8). This example of an 
ambiguous area of morality poses difficulties for any theory of responsibility.  
Strawson says of children:  
Thus parents and others concerned with the care and upbringing of 
young children cannot have to their charges either kinds of attitude in 
a pure or unqualified form. They are dealing with creatures who are 
potentially and increasingly capable both of holding, and being 
objects of, the full range of human and moral attitudes, but are not 
yet truly capable of either. The treatment of such creatures must 
therefore represent a kind of compromise, constantly shifting in one 
direction, between objectivity of attitude and developed human 
attitudes. […] The punishment of a child is both like and unlike the 
punishment of an adult. (FR, 20). 
 
Additionally some problems arise with the Strawsonian default model of 
responsibility with those agents who recognize the criterion of “qualifying as 
a responsible person” even when they could in fact have a radically different 
set of morals.76 This refers to the case of the psychopaths. (G. Williams 
2010.) Strawson doesn’t devote much thought to the examples. He does 
however touch upon the subject of someone whose “picture of the world is an 
insane delusion, (FR, 17-18). 
  
                                                
76 This example is discussed below in ch. 6.3. 
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3.1.4 THE WEB OF HUMAN ATTITUDES AND FEELINGS  
  
Strawson’s attempt to re-adjust the discussion on freedom and responsibility 
can also be read as an attempt to bring moral philosophy back closer to 
reality, away from “armchair” metaphysics.77 Concluding his call for 
improved emphasis on emotions as crucial to responsibility, he presents a 
succinct evaluation of the philosophical practice of his time:  
The object of these commonplaces is to try to keep before our minds 
something it is easy to forget when we are engaged in philosophy, 
especially in our cool, contemporary style, viz. what it is actually like 
to be involved in ordinary inter-personal relationships, ranging from 
the most intimate to the most casual.78 (FR, 7.)  
 
Adoption of reactive attitudes as the effective mediator of responsibility 
relations compels a change in the way the relations themselves are perceived. 
Suddenly, instead of visualizing abstract projections about some 
transcendent qualities, the sentimentalist inclinations of Strawson’s thought 
suggest another course of action. The evaluations of people about each other 
carry more weight than, say, thinking about which moral obligations are at 
work at any particular moment. Instead of asking whether the agent has 
some property that would positively indicate his or her responsibility, 
Strawson’s way of thinking looks at whether that agent is “a member of the 
moral community” (see FR, 18). Concluding his elaboration of the ways that 
reactive attitudes constitute the connections which are relevant to the social 
appearances of responsibility, Strawson insists that even if we try to ignore 
our natural reactive attitudes or their import, we would not be able to. (See 
FR, 19-20.) 
Contrasting the objecting attitudes that the traditional compatibilist 
would have used, Strawson asks us to consider “the web of attitudes and 
feelings” (FR, 24). The attitudes that we adopt toward each other determines 
our assessment of their moral status: participant, if the evaluated person is a 
member of the moral community, objective if not (FR, 9-13). Being a 
participant in the moral community implies the capability for moral 
responsibility, for blameworthiness in Strawson’s context. 
                                                
77 Strawson seems to be a realist, at least if Ted Honderich is to be believed: “Strawson's common-
sense realism, is taken by him to be a real realism, something of which scientific realism is a 
distortion.”(http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/THRIPStrawsonIntro.html, 20.8.2014) 
78 It is of course another matter whether Strawson is considered to have succeeded in this. What is 
thought here is that Strawson was on the right track in terms of refocusing the debate toward more 
naturalistic terms, but now that the naturalistic turn in ethics he inspire has taken place, he himself 
appears a little too “cool” and detached for today’s standards, but this of course is entirely dependent 
on one’s metaphilosophical inclinations. 
60 
Gary Watson has been known since “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil” 
for coining the term moral address, which defined Strawsonian reactive 
attitudes as a concept that points out an address for blame. He advances 
similar ideas in his contribution to Coates & Tognazzini (2013) “Standing in 
Judgment”, but this time from a society’s point of view. His sketch of the idea 
of “judgmental nonacceptance” describes the social functions of blame and 
its consequent punishment. He writes about how blaming precedes 
punishment in a legal context and how it signifies “turning one’s back” on a 
person who as a result of that punishment is in some way being ostracized 
from the lives of the others (Watson 2013, 295).  Watson’s examples go into 
very specific details illustrating the trend in how the traditional theories of 
responsibility (including Strawson’s) have been perhaps too limited in their 
scope to satisfy philosophers. Thus such details are interesting and more 
likely than not they will influence the further developments of our theories of 
responsibility. Whether Strawson was reaching out toward similar points as 
Watson was is difficult to say. The debates on these contexts have received 
increasing attention, and they are interesting to follow.  
An intriguing subject in the article is the discussion about the role of 
society as it relates to Strawsonian conception of responsibility. There are 
differing opinions about whether Strawson’s theory is really embedded in 
actual social interactions, or whether the theory is insufficiently designed to 
address these settings. According to Gary Watson, the sociality of Strawson’s 
theory is embedded in his conception of the “participant attitudes”, in that 
the participant perspective is “inescapable”, since “we […] could not be led to 
abandon that framework, whether or not it is correct” (Watson 2014, 21, 25). 
Strawson rekindled the sentimentalist perspective in moral philosophy, 
emphasizing judgments based on conduct, and even states that responsibility 
qualifies as moral on the basis of its being a signifier of “membership of a 
moral community”,79 yet the theory leaves the feeling that the agent is 
observed somewhat in a vacuum. It is argued here that this unconnected 
feeling comes from the brevity of the paper. According to Watson, who is 
advancing a similar point: “Strawson misconstrues the space that the [the 
reactive attitudes] occupy” (ibid. 27). 
The sentiment brought forward by McKenna and Russell is also seconded 
here (see introduction to 3.1). The considerations concerning the social 
context also lead to a sustained unease about the conception of moral 
responsibility based solely on FR. A way to explain these trepidations is 
through Strawson’s attempt to bring back responsibility to the social context 
and away from the theoretical, metaphysical contentions. This creates the 
sense that he embeds the responsibility evaluations within the “web of 
human attitudes and feelings” as constitutive of responsibility instead of, say, 
there being a giant, external, metaphysical red light, rapidly blinking 
whenever an action committed amounts to wrong-doing. In this sense he 
                                                
79 Strawson 2008, 23. The other property is the retributive role of punishments. 
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succeeds, but as noted the context is limited. For example, the mechanisms 
of determining who gets to be considered as part of the “web” (as a node in 
the web?) is left out of the account. Granted, Strawson briefly acknowledges 
the difficult cases requiring excuses, children and the mentally ill, and he 
leaves an opening for criticism in terms of different cultures having an effect 
the stubborn grip on the perspective of a single subject (or object in case of 
the excuses) is also notable in his theory. This aspect leads to questions of 
what emotions affect the agent? What responses face him or her?80 And from 
where do these responses originate?81 These questions prevent the full 
picture from forming about the complex society around the agent. Not 
minding the wild speculation of these concerns, the Strawsonian conception 
is further bolstered below by the more extensive (but, according to Russell 
(2013) in some ways narrower82) theory by R. Jay Wallace as well as of some 
critics. 
                                                
80 If looked at in terms of Bernard Williams’s elements, as is done in more detail in chapter 4.3.4 
and in the analysis of chapter 7, all four of his elements of responsibility are firmly anchored to the 
agent in Strawson’s theory, in which the agent’s causal action is considered (wrong-doing), as well as 
her intentionality and state of mind (whether she qualifies to be excused), as well as the response 
(resentment, indignation or guilt, but also blame). The last of these is the crucial part: whether the 
agent is praised or blamed is considered only from the perspective of the agent in Strawson. 
81 A good summary of the currently popular topic of standing to blame is provided in Macalester 
Bell’s article “Standing to Blame: A Critique”, in which he writes that “a would-be blamer must have 
standing to blame” (Bell 2013, 263.) This adds a distinctively social dimension to the requirements for 
responsibility as well. For example, Bell uses the term “contemporary condition”, which requires that 
the blamer be a part of the same moral community as the agent doing wrong (Bell 2013, 271). Bell 
highlights a feature that at least Sher and Scanlon, (discussed in more detail in 4.2) have neglected: the 
standing to blame, that blame is positional and even hostile. As a result, it might be difficult to blame 
others where one’s own standing is inappropriate for the task. What the origin of the response is is 
much less discussed. For more information on the recent “standing to blame” discussion, see articles 
by Cohen (2006), Macalester Bell (2013), Watson (2013) as well as G. Williams (2013). An 
incompatibilist example on the subject has recently been published by Patrick Todd (2012), in which 
the topic is approached from the perspective of an omnipotent being.  
Additionally Garrath Williams connects “Freedom and Responsibility” to the current discussion 
about the standing to responsibility or reproach, by writing that the questions of responsibility brought 
about by personal relationships was “a crucial plank of Peter Strawson’s seminal paper, ‘Freedom and 
Resentment.’ However, while Strawson distinguishes the resentment that an injured party might feel 
from the indignation that another might feel on the injured party’s behalf,[n4] he does not explore 
further questions of standing to respond or reproach. For the most part, the literature on responsibility 
also sets aside this question. Perhaps the most sustained discussion to raise questions of standing is T. 
M. Scanlon’s.” (G. Williams 2013, 352.) Scanlon’s more socially connected take on blame is discussed 
briefly in chapter 4.2. “Contemporary debate on blame”. 
82 Paul Russell’s article “Responsibility, Naturalism and “The Morality System”” in Oxford Studies 
in Agency and Responsibility Vol. 1 (2013) focuses on criticism of the Kantian-influenced “Morality 
system” aspect found in Wallace’s influential Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. G. E. M. 
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3.2 SUMMARY 
 
A brief introduction to the theories of responsibility, was presented at the 
beginning of this chapter, with the cautionary note that in these matters 
strict scientific precision and conceptual accuracy would be impossible to 
attain. However, relevant theories of responsibility were identified and 
Strawsonian and Aristotelian theories on the subject were selected for 
comparative conceptual analysis. Again, it was noted that the type of 
comparative analysis here has been done in rather imprecise manner, at least 
compared to the analyses conducted by the logical positivists and 
philosophers of language of the early 20th century.  
As the most popular theory of moral responsibility is ostensibly based on 
Peter F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (2008/[1962]), this article 
was selected as the starting-point, with which Aristotelian theory as well as 
the criticisms of the former would be compared. After the brief introduction 
to Strawson’s work, the article itself was discussed, focusing on reactive 
sentiments and blame, types of excuses and the social context of the theory.  
Reactive attitudes and more specifically reactive sentiments were the 
underlying web of social interaction that constitutes moral responsibility in 
Strawson’s theory. Compared to previous writings on moral responsibility, 
his perspective differed from the previous attempts to define the concept, 
which commonly claimed that responsibility required a separate, factual 
judgment independent of the acts being evaluated. Blame as a concept is not 
explicitly defined in Strawson’s article although it is constantly referred to as 
part of the important reactive attitudes relevant to moral responsibility.  
As a particular case demanding special interest, Strawson devotes a 
passage to the instances of responsibility ascription, which would under 
normal circumstances lead to blaming the agent, but a crucial difference in 
agency or circumstance meant that these initial reactive attitudes would 
require re-evaluation. These situations requiring excusing include 
unintentional and coerced acts, as well as cases in whích the circumstances 
or the psychology of the agent are altered. These cases will be subject to 
further examination in the systematic section of chapter 6.  
                                                                                                                                     
Anscombe and Bernard Williams originally claimed that philosophical writings relying on the sort of 
morality systems that Kantianism relies on cannot be sufficiently distinguished from the theological 
roots of such systems. Therefore, something essential is lacking from the theories making claims based 
on such systems based on secular principles. Wallace is aware of this, arguing that the concern is 
uncalled for, that using Kantianism as a foundation is possible in his case. The construction of his 
argument involves a strict limitation of the conception of responsibility in a way that rejects a separate 
realm of historical, responsibility-related facts. His narrow interpretation of reactive sentiments proves 
especially problematic according to Russell Wallace’s limitations (see Russell 2013, 190).  
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A question on the social context of Strawson’s theory was posed based on 
the insufficiently defined subjects of moral address and standing to blame or 
reproach. More recent research on the subject of responsibility has raised the 
issues about the standing of the blamer, separate from the status of moral 
agency. The explanation of what the relation between the blamer and the 
agent is, as well as who has the right, or the standing to blame are not yet 
directly addressed in FR.  
64 
4 RESPONSES TO STRAWSON 
The fourth section continues the elaboration of the Strawsonian position.83 
While the previous chapter was concerned with Strawson’s own text, the 
following chapters are devoted to the current field of philosophy occupied in 
interpreting and critiquing Strawson’s work and its derivations. First R. Jay 
Wallace’s book Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Wallace 1994) is 
considered for its careful elaboration of the notions originally appearing in 
Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (2008/[1962]). We should be clear 
that Wallace’s interpretation of some of the central concepts and theoretical 
structures of Strawson are his own, and in some cases are fiercely debated.  
While Wallace’s book is currently gaining in popularity as the most extensive 
rendition of the Strawsonian position, it is not a collection of ideas that have 
been unanimously accepted. On the contrary, the field of philosophy 
concentrating on a crucial component of moral responsibility – the concept 
of blame – has received a great deal of attention from top-class philosophers 
recently. A brief report on this debate appears in chapter 4.2. While it seems 
that the jury is still out on the details of what blame is exactly (judgment, 
emotion, practice or more?), the volume of spirited articles on the subject 
ensure that important contributions are bound to influence the entire 
question of moral responsibility in philosophy. 
After examining Wallace’s important book and summarizing current 
research on blame, a selection of the most important critical writers on 
responsibility, almost always in a contending relationship with Strawson’s 
work, are then introduced. As a statement, in this chapter there is not any 
hierarchy of importance between the authors that would correspond with the 
order of presentation within this chapter. For example, even though 
Wallace’s work offers the most material on Strawsonian responsibility, its 
details are not meant to carry more argumentative weight than the briefer 
criticisms discussed in the later chapters (4.3). Indeed, chapter 4.3.3 
specifically, describing Bernard Williams elements of responsibility, is very 
important here, as the analysis in the latter part of this work relies on them 
as a framework for the theories of responsibility. 
  
                                                
83 The use of the descriptor “Strawsonian” here is in accordance with that of Watson (1987): “My 
interpretation of Strawson’s essay will be in many places very conjectural; and I will sometimes signal 
this fact by speaking of a “Strawsonian” theory.” (Watson 1987, 257, n2.) 
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4.1 R. JAY WALLACE’S RESPONSIBILITY AND THE 
MORAL SENTIMENTS. 
 
The premier contemporary Strawsonian,84 R. Jay Wallace, expands 
Strawson’s reactive sentiments-based view of responsibility in his 1994 book 
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, which is one of the most widely 
cited Strawsonian works on responsibility currently available.85 This section 
(4.1) sets out to describe Wallace’s version of the Strawsonian reactive 
sentiments based conception of moral responsibility. Without repeating what 
was stated in the previous chapter, the most important similarities and 
differences between these two versions are noted. The three main points are 
the reactive-sentiments-based conception of responsibility, excuses and 
exemptions and reflective self-control, the two first being fairly direct 
extensions of Strawson’s thought, while the last deals with Wallace’s own 
addition, which is influenced by Kantianism.   
                                                
84 Wallace has been called Strawson’s main modern follower according to Paul Russell (Russell 
2013, 185). Garrath Williams also labels his book a “[h]ighly regarded study indebted to Strawson” 
(2010). Further support for Wallace’s status as the premier follower of Strawson; see, for example, 
Watson (2014), where Watson comments on Wallace’s interpretation in concluding a general 
assessment of Strawson’s influence. (Watson 2014, 27-31.)  
85 For example, Garrath Williams calls Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments “the most well-
known and systematic development of Strawson”, describing it as a “[h]ighly regarded study indebted 
to Strawson”. Wallace asks when is it fair to hold someone responsible and thus to expose them to 
reactive emotions such as blame or other sanctions. The response is fair, according to Wallace, if the 
person has actually done wrong (meaning that he is not excused) and if the person has sufficient 
mental faculties to comprehend moral reasons. Otherwise the person is exempted from responsibility 
completely. (See G. Williams 2010.) Wallace’s book (1994) is examined here as a direct follower of 
Strawson’s theory on moral responsibility. In addition, his explication of excuses and exemptions 
(which is borrowed from Watson 1987) is of particular interest here as well, as are the concluding 
remarks on the concept of reflective self-control. 
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4.1.1 WALLACE’S STRAWSONIAN RESPONSIBILITY  
 
Wallace’s formulation of the concept of moral responsibility as well as its 
closely related concepts (blame, agent, etc.) and selection of the topics follow 
the examples in FR. Defining moral responsibility in terms of reactive 
emotions is one of the most important ideas carried over from the earlier 
work.86 The three basic reactive attitudes that Wallace incorporates into his 
theory are resentment, indignation and guilt (Wallace 1994, 33). The reactive 
emotions and their relation to responsibility are described in more detail in 
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, chapter 3.2, which is titled 
“Responsibility and the Reactive Emotions”. The Strawsonian reactive 
sentiments are tied to expectations, about which Wallace gives the following 
description: 
[I have] argued that the reactive emotions of resentment, guilt, and 
indignation should be understood in terms of the quasi-evaluative 
stance of holding people to expectations. I now want to suggest that 
this stance provides the key to understanding what we are doing 
when we hold people morally responsible.  
Holding someone to an expectation has been characterized in terms 
of the reactive emotions: to hold someone to an expectation is to be 
susceptible to the reactive emotions, or to believe that it would be 
appropriate for one to feel the reactive emotions, in the case that the 
expectation is violated. […] Now it would seem that when we hold 
people morally responsible we are similarly susceptible to the 
reactive emotions, if those held responsible breach our expectations, 
and that we believe it would be appropriate for us to feel the reactive 
emotions in those cases. This suggests that moral responsibility might 
be analyzed in terms of the quasi-evaluative stance of holding people 
to expectations. To hold a person responsible, we might suppose, is 
simply to hold the person to expectations in the way that is connected 
with the reactive emotions. (Wallace 1994, 62.) 
 
While other interpretations of Strawson’s expectations might have followed a 
more cognitive or a conative route, Wallace explicitly sticks with the 
sentimentalist interpretation of reactions to the violations of expectations.87 
This means the reactive sentiment is at least initially conceived as pure 
emotion, without cognitive judgment. How Wallace interprets Strawson’s 
                                                
86 On reactive sentiments (and a description of the Strawsonian position) see Wallace 1994, ch. 2. 
“one characteristic that is essential to the reactive emotions, and that may be taken to distinguish them 
as a class from other types of attitudes […is] the connection I have described in terms of the quasi-
evaluative stance of holding someone to an expectation.” (Wallace 1994, 25). 
87 For comparison, see Coates & Tognazzini (2014), where the authors explicate cognitive, affective 
and conative varities of blame. The same tripartite distinction can be utilized with the broader category 
of reactive sentiments. 
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guilt in turn is that it is almost invariably directed at the agent himself by 
himself.88 “This [experiencing irrational guilt] suggests the following revision 
of the initial account: to hold someone morally responsible is to hold the 
person to moral expectations that one accepts.” (Wallace 1994, 63.)  
Even as the distinction between holding responsible and being 
responsible is better realized in the recent literature (see A. Smith 2007), 
Strawson can be read as the initial account of moving the debate on 
responsibility toward the former. However, as is the case with many other 
distinctions discussed in the article, he does not explain the distinction 
between holding and being responsible very clearly. In response, Wallace sets 
out to find, more clearly than Strawson, what it is to hold someone 
responsible (Wallace 1994, 1-2). Furthermore, he wants to keep the question 
more at the normative level, in practice by inquiring about when it is fair to 
hold someone responsible.89 (See Wallace 1994, 5.) 
Even as Wallace is skeptical about the prospects for an understanding on 
a definite view, labelled “the Strawsonian account of responsibility”, he takes 
up the challenge of spelling said view out. In writing about Strawson’s direct 
influence on him, Wallace explains that the sentimentalist nature of his idea 
of responsibility is more important than Strawson’s theory: 
Thus there is no fixed and stable view that might be labeled the 
Strawsonian account of responsibility. Strawson’s original lecture 
contains a wealth of ideas, and the many philosophers who have been 
influenced by the lecture have naturally chosen to develop and defend 
different ones among them, and to develop them in different ways. 
For my part, what I find promising in Strawson’s position are not so 
much the official answers he provides to the question of the 
compatibility of responsibility with determinism, as the suggestions 
he makes about the connection between responsibility and the moral 
sentiments. (Wallace 1994, 10.) 
 
Chapter 3 of Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, titled “Responsibility” 
begins with a description of the situation of the conversations on freedom 
and responsibility in philosophy. According to Wallace, holding people 
responsible has not been adequately explored in the history of the field. The 
main feature of accounts of moral responsibility includes the understanding 
that the concept primarily refers to the ideas of blame and moral sanction 
and the practice of holding one another morally responsible. In other words, 
the idea of holding morally responsible is often interpreted as preparedness 
to blame or sanction based on moral offenses and the attempts to limit them. 
                                                
88 Strawson implied this kind of self-blame by using the phrase “vicarious” alternatives to the 
reactive attitudes (see Strawson 2008, 15-16). 
89 Thanks to Teemu Toppinen for kindly pointing out the difference between holding responsible 
and the idea of the fairness of holding responsible, the latter of which Wallace is trying to define in his 
book (1994).  
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As specific as Wallace’s description is, and despite leaving something 
important out, this account seems to be a popular way to define moral 
responsibility,90 but he notes that “philosophers have not yet given us a 
satisfactory interpretation of [the subject of holding one responsible].” 
(Wallace 1994, 51.) 
The core of Wallace’s theory is the claim that: 
To hold someone morally responsible is to view the person as the 
potential target of a special kind of moral appraisal. People who are 
morally responsible are not seen merely as acting in ways that 
happen to be good or bad; they are not just causally responsible for 
certain welcome or unwelcome happenings […] Rather, the actions of 
morally responsible people are thought to reflect specially on them as 
agents, opening them to a kind of moral appraisal that does more 
than record a causal connection between them and the consequences 
of their actions. (Wallace 1994, 52.) 
 
In general, Wallace is careful in keeping his account firmly in the realm of the 
normative (i.e., “the normative interpretation”). His use of holding 
responsible exemplifies tactics used in the book to avoid the confusion that 
Fischer and Ravizza (1993, 18) and Angela M. Smith (2005) mention. 
Another level of detail in Wallace (1994) is what Paul Russell describes as 
following: “Wallace is well aware that his narrow construal of the reactive 
attitudes commits him to an interpretation of moral responsibility 
understood entirely in terms of the conceptual resources of “the morality 
system”91 (Russell 2013, 189, referring to Wallace 1994, 39-40 & 64-66.) 
These delineations fix Wallace’s focus on causal responsibility, such as 
responsibility for action and accountability approaches to the subject; 
however, the moral sentiments and the special nature of interaction in their 
terms are kept in mind throughout the book. (See Wallace 1994, 53.) 
Equating moral responsibility with moral sanctions can lead to 
behavioristic positions. According to Wallace, moral responsibility tied to 
moral emotions improves the concept from the bare bones of the “economy 
of threats” approach. As he writes: “[the reactive sentiments account] treats 
the stance of holding people responsible essentially in terms of attitudinal 
conditions, and so avoids the behavioristic danger of associating 
responsibility too exclusively with moral sanctions.” (Wallace 1994, 66-67.) 
The way that the economy of threats approach views responsibility leaves a 
lot to be desired, a point on which all the later compatibilists agree. To this, 
Wallace adds that this view could also explain the hard determinist account 
                                                
90 Compare this statement, for example, with T. H. Irwin (1980), which includes a rendition of 
Aristotle’s moral responsibility formulated in similar terms. 
91 ”The Morality System” in Russell’s article refers to Bernard Williams’ criticism of the (Western, 
Christian in origin) idea of any kind of system of external morality in his book Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy. (See Bernard Williams 1985.) 
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of why people should not be retributively blamed or punished, because they 
do not have a choice in the matter.92 
Instead Wallace proposes the schema: “(N) S is morally responsible (for 
action x) if and only if it would be appropriate to hold s morally responsible 
(for action x)” (Wallace 1994, 91). Following up, Wallace elaborates on the 
requirements of holding responsible: 
First, we need to know what it is to hold someone morally 
responsible, what is involved in taking up this stance. Second, we 
need to specify the norms by reference to which the appropriateness 
of that stance is to be gauged. We already have an answer to the first 
of these questions in hand, as the reactive account […] tells us what it 
is to take up the stance of holding someone morally responsible. […] 
To render the normative interpretation more determinate, it will be 
necessary to specify particular substantive norms by reference to 
which the question of the appropriateness of holding people might be 
answered. (Wallace 1994, 92.) 
 
In his 2014 article published in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 
vol. 2, titled “Emotions and Relationships: On a Theme from Strawson”, 
Wallace continues to build on the Strawsonian theme, discussing among 
other subjects the concepts of resentment and injury in further detail. 
Wallace separates three aspects of resentment: injury, quality of will and 
demand. (Wallace 2014, 126.) Injury can be interpreted according to Wallace 
in two ways: 1. injury can be taken to mean simply harm. 2. injury can be 
constituted, and Wallace thinks that the second interpretation is closer to 
Strawson’s original meaning. (Wallace 2014, 128-129.) Injury,as a cause of 
resentment and harm is a result of action and the avoidance of it can be 
rationalized as a function of responsibility. How an agent is evaluated as 
responsible is a big question that Wallace works on in Responsibility and the 
Moral Sentiments. One particular, yet important result of this evaluation is 
excusing. How the excuses are described by Wallace is explained in the next 
section. 
  
                                                
92 See also appendix 2 “Alternate Possibilities”, where Wallace argues that incompatibilists usually 
present an argument with two stages: First, that responsibility depends on the possibility of having 
alternate possible actions to choose from. Second: that as this is not the case, when determinism is 
true, responsibility is invalid. 
70 
4.1.2 EXCUSES AND EXEMPTIONS 
  
In talking about excusing, Wallace refers specifically to excusing acts that 
would evoke moral responses in an ordinary situation. At the most 
immediate emotional level, this means excusing from blame. As quoted 
before, Wallace describes the act of holding one responsible as amounting to 
“view[ing] the person as the potential target of a special kind of moral 
appraisal” (Wallace 1994, 52). This entails more than just a direct, causal 
responsibility for acts that “happen to be good or bad” (ibid.). Actions of 
these fully responsible agents display a property of that agent that allows for 
the sort of evaluation that moral responsibility requires. In other words, 
responsibility involves a disposition belonging to the agent, which is 
necessary for moral sanctioning. (See Ibid. 56.)  
Following H. L. A. Hart,93 Wallace seems to think that “People who are 
morally responsible may be made to answer for their actions, in the sense 
that their actions render them liable to certain kind of distinctively moral 
responses” (ibid. 54; see also 124). What this means is that acts committed by 
the agent are required for the responses such as praise or blame, or of those 
signifying other reactive attitudes.94 Regarding the responses, where 
Strawson was reticent about blame, Wallace ascribes more importance to the 
word. He holds blame to be the “most salient” of the moral responses, as they 
indicate situations in which the agent has actually done wrong. Only the 
agents capable of a morally responsible status are viable recipients of the 
appraisal of this sort. (Wallace 1994, 54.) 
The implications of applying Wallace’s schema to action provoke thought. 
What are emphasized are excuses, referring specifically to Austin’s 
distinction between justifications and excuses.95 Wallace states that: 
“[E]xcuses are unlike justifications in blocking or inhibiting responsibility for 
whatever action was performed.” (Wallace 1994, 120.) While justification can 
apply to both right or wrong action, excuses seem to apply solely to the cases 
of presumed wrong-doing. Excuses, then, are a counter to this initial 
judgment or reaction, as Wallace explains: “Excuses, by contrast, aim 
                                                
93 Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart has worked mainly in the 60’s on the retributive side of the 
concept of moral responsibility. Hart offered his own distinction of moral responsibility, which 
discussed the concepts of liability, accountability and the effect of roles in society. (See esp. Hart 1968.) 
According to Garrath Williams, Hart’s “rule-utilitarian account of excusing conditions in the law has 
been influential to contractualist accounts of responsibility, especially T. M. Scanlon’s.” (G. Williams 
2010, 11). It is a regret that Hart’s writings are unable to be referred to any further extent here because 
of their different focus. 
94 This response can then work to drive the actual sanction through in the social context. At this 
stage, however, the theory is not concerned about the succeeding events. 
95 Austin’s remarks on the excuses, which are found in his article “A Plea for Excuses” (Austin 
1956/57), are returned to briefly in chapter 6.2. 
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precisely to challenge the claim (or suspicion) that s was morally responsible 
for x” (Wallace 1994, 121). 
In order to “work up Austin’s hypothesis [against the incompatibilists] 
into an account of excuses, therefore, we need an explanation of the 
normative force of the excuses, as he characterizes them.” (Wallace 1994, 
122.) The excuse in Wallace’s case acts as a “blameworthiness inhibitor”.96 
Some account of why the initial moral response, consisting of blame, needs to 
be re-evaluated and principles of resulting annulling of moral sanctions is 
required. Following Austin, “there is a connection between doing x 
intentionally and being morally responsible.” So “doing x intentionally is 
ordinarily a condition for responsibility for x, such that if s has not done x 
intentionally, then it is unfair to hold s morally responsible for x.” Wallace 
asks “Why would it be unfair to hold s responsible for x if s has not 
intentionally done x in the first place?” 97 (Ibid.) 
Wallace describes further the notion of blameworthiness inhibitors by 
referring to the influence of Austin and Strawson in that “excuses serve to 
show that an agent has not really done anything wrong“ (Wallace 1994, 127). 
Wallace argues that excuses show “[i]n Strawson’s terms, […] that s’s action, 
though it may have appeared to violate our moral demands, did not really 
violate any moral demand that we accept.” (Ibid.) Thus Wallace describes 
excuses as a concept that distinguishes the causal responsibility from 
blameworthiness by accepting the former and calling the latter into question. 
Wallace expands Strawson’s two categories into four distinct groups of 
excuses, to which chapter 5 of the book is devoted. These categories, which 
are listed as the headings of the sections of the chapter, include the following: 
“Inadvertence, mistake or accident”; “Unintended bodily movement”; 
“Physical constraint” and “Coercion, necessity and duress”. He adapts the 
“someone treading on my hand” example from Strawson in giving a 
description of each. (Ibid. 136-147.) “Inadvertence, mistake or an accident” 
are descriptive of situations in which the agent is uninformed, at least in 
advance of the consequences of his or her action. Wallace writes briefly notes 
that in such cases the “blameworthiness will be highly localized”. As an 
example, Wallace gives the case in which there is a fire next door, but the 
agent doesn’t know it, so he omits the act of extinguishing the flames (ibid, 
137). “Unintended bodily movement” is a pretty self-explanatory category. 
Nevertheless, Wallace describes the group of excuses with some examples 
and a statement that “in these cases it seems quite clear that there is no 
intentional action at all” (Ibid. 140). “Physical constraint” refers to those 
cases in which one is unable to control or restrain oneself from acting 
because of force applied to the agent from an external or internal origin. In 
                                                
96 Wallace’s blameworthiness inhibititors resembles the idea of resentment inhibition, presented 
by Strawson. (See ch. 3.1.2.) 
97 In this context, Wallace indicates Hume’s conception in THN 2.ii, containing a sketch of 
responsibility, which accepts character based concerns. 
72 
the case of physical constraint, writes Wallace, that omission to act cannot be 
considered a violation of one’s moral obligations. (Ibid. 142-143.) “Coercion, 
necessity and duress” are a group of excusing conditions in which harm is 
caused by the agent because of avoidance of another (imposed) instance of 
harm;98 the example Wallace gives is a bank teller who gives the money to 
the robber to avoid being shot (ibid. 143). In concluding, Wallace writes the 
“whenever people are genuinely excused from responsibility for their actions, 
those actions will not have been morally wrong” (ibid. 147). Strawson 
described excuses in terms of special conditions or pleas that could have the 
effect of “modifying or mollifying” the reactive sentiments, but he also 
mentioned pleas that could, in circumstances which were certain, eliminate 
the reactive sentiments entirely. To help distinguish this group of excuses 
with maximal effect, Wallace adopts the distinction of excuses and 
exemptions, the latter referring to these strong cases of adjustment of the 
reactive sentiments, from Watson’s article “Responsibility and the Limits of 
Evil”. Wallace describes the key difference between the excuses and the 
exemptions as follows:  
Exemptions are like excuses – and unlike justifications – in granting 
that doing x intentionally is not morally impermissible. By contrast 
to excuses, however, exemptions do not inhibit responsibility for a 
particular action x by providing grounds for doubting that s did x 
intentionally. [… W]hereas excuses inhibit responsibility for a 
particular act by showing that a morally accountable agent has not 
done anything morally impermissible in the first place, exemptions 
block responsibility for a particular act by showing that an 
impermissible act has been done by someone who is not, in general, a 
morally accountable agent. (Wallace 1994, 156.) 
 
A particular feature that carries over from FR to Responsibility and the 
Moral Sentiments is that the exemptions are discussed as specific groups 
that (by belonging to that group) are exempted. While Strawson was careful 
to keep the groups of children and the other agents who were subject to the 
“special considerations” separate, Wallace puts children in with five other 
groups of exempted agents. (Ibid. 166-180.) Wallace describes the groups 
receiving exemptions in chapter 6: children (ibid. 166-167), the insane or 
mentally ill (ibid. 167-171), addicts (ibid. 171-175), the hypnotized or 
otherwise controlled (ibid. 175-176), psychopaths (ibid. 177-178) and the 
extremely stressed (ibid. 179-180).99 
                                                
98 The topic has been recently demonstrated quite clearly (albeit in a consequentialist 
environment) in an article titled “Moral Coercion” by Saba Bazargan (Bazargan 2014). 
99 Wallace’s groups are fairly straightforward derivations for Strawson’s examples in FR. Watson 
(1987, 260) describes Strawson’s examples as: “being psychotic, being a child, being under great strain, 
being hypnotized, being a sociopath (“moral idiot”), and being “unfortunate in formative 
circumstances”. 
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Without giving an exact description of what “insane or mentally ill” means, 
Wallace refers to the main quality of these conditions which he condisers the 
cause of the exemption. He argues that the members of this group lack the 
means for reflective self-control (ibid, 167). What reflective self-control 
means is looked at in the next section. Addicts include all types of people 
with uncontrollable desires, but especially “willing” addicts (ibid, 171). The 
fourth exempted group is a bit surprising, albeit with a precedent in 
Strawson: the hypnotized or otherwise mind-controlled. Wallace states that 
these cases involve desires “implanted” by other agents, meaning that the 
desires which are not one’s own can lead to the intentionality of the act being 
questioned. However, as Wallace admits, implanted desires cannot be 
grounds by themselves for exemption, as people are constantly “put under 
the spell” of advertising. This group of exemptions is also subject to the loss 
of reflective self-control. (See ibid. 175.) On psychopaths, Wallace begins by 
describing problems that are not necessarily the results of psychopathy. 
Nevertheless, Wallace suggests, again, that psychopaths could be exempted 
because of disabled reflective self-control (Ibid. 177). Finally, Wallace writes 
that the extremely stressed might alternate between the excuses and 
exemptions, but what decides the outcome is the effect of reflective self-
control (ibid. 179). What is this reflective self-control? This final point of 
interest in Wallace’s theory will be discussed in the next section.  
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4.1.3 REFLECTIVE SELF-CONTROL AND THE MORALITY SYSTEM 
 
In Wallace’s book (1994) reflective self-control is something that agents 
belonging to the exempted groups lack. Presented as his own version of the 
Strawsonian solution to the problem of determinism, acts without excuses 
that are accompanied by reflective self-control are thought by Wallace to be 
immune to concerns raised by determinism. He sees reflective self-control as 
“the rational power to grasp moral reasons and to control one’s behavior by 
the light of them” (Wallace 1994, 2). It’s a strong definition of the concept 
therefore, close to moral agency.  
Wallace’s account of reflective self-control, which is based on a synthesis 
of Kantian and compatibilist philosophy, is fairly general overall and not 
specific.. He writes that: “powers of reflective self-control are to be construed 
as forms of broadly psychological competence or capacity, like the general 
ability to speak a language, or to read musical notation and reproduce the 
music read on an instrument” (ibid.186). According to Wallace, in terms of 
moral responsibility these general powers (which are unfortunately not 
detailed at much greater length) are required from agents100 in order for 
them to be able to meet moral obligations; however, the opportunity to 
exercise these obligations is not needed (ibid.186-187). He describes the 
concept through the example of young children, who by definition lack 
reflective self-control, as they have not been able to develop it yet: 
Young children to begin with, are clearly not taken to have developed 
fully the powers of reflective self-control. Cognitively, they are at the 
stage where they are learning how to apply moral principles and the 
often very complicated concepts (such as harm or reciprocity) that 
the principles incorporate. Affectively, they have not yet acquired the 
ability to control their behavior reliably in accordance with such 
moral principles. […] Reflective self-governance requires the capacity 
to comply with moral obligations, and young children may not yet 
have the ability to act from motives of this sort. In that event their 
                                                
100 Wallace takes precautions to secure his position somewhat by leaving the exact substance of 
“general powers of self-control” undefined (see Wallace 1994, 192). One example of what these powers 
might actually consist of is given from the perspective of psychology by Kotabe and Hofmann, who 
write in their article “On Integrating the Components of Self-Control” (2015) that: “self control can be 
understood as an evolutionary adaptive function that has emerged from the need to coordinate 
motivations resulting from multiple dedicated subsystems in the brain.” The authors focus on desire, 
higher order goal, desire-goal conflict, control motivation, control capacity, control effort and 
enactment constraints as seven distinct components of self-control. (Kotabe & Hofmann 2015, 621; 
Kotabe and Hofmann refer to Livnat and Pippenger (2006).) Thanks to the “Self-control and Moral 
Enhancement” workshop organized by Susanne Uusitalo and Polaris Koi in Turku for this reference.  
Most of these components have analogues in philosophical theories of responsibility as well (compare 
with Aristotle’s boulesis, telos, prohairesis, dunamis, etc.) and it would be a very interesting project to 
compare these historical contexts with each other. 
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compliance with moral obligations will be due to quite different sorts 
of motives: the wish to avoid punishment, say, or the desire for 
parental approval. […] Because children lack these abilities, or are 
still in the process of acquiring them, it would be unreasonable to 
hold them fully accountable with respect to the moral obligations that 
we accept. (Wallace 1994, 166-167.) 
 
The conception clearly occupies a central position in Wallace’s theory, as all 
of his examples of exempting relate to the theme of reflective self-control 
(ibid.). Are all Wallace’s exemptions based on lack of reflective self-control? 
Wallace explicitly claims that each of these groups is exempted because 
conditions related to an insufficient or diminished amount of reflective self-
control (see ibid. 167- 179). In addition to children, exempted groups include 
agents such as the mentally ill who, according to Wallace, suffer from 
conditions affecting reflective self-control (ibid. 167-170). Addicts, who 
consist of all types of people with uncontrollable desires, are treated in a 
similar way throughout his examination: while alluding to the debate on 
whether there is a difference between willing and unwilling addicts, he 
“brackets” the issue and notes relatively simply that addicts lack the capacity 
for reflective self-control (ibid. 170-171). The hypnotized have this property 
manipulated for them, and even the problematic state that moral philosophy 
has trouble getting grips with, which the psychopath inhabits, is explained by 
Wallace as having a “disabled” faculty of reflective self-control (ibid. 175-177). 
The fourth exempted group, while a bit surprising, has a precedent in 
Strawson (1962): the hypnotized or otherwise mind-controlled.101 Wallace 
states that these cases involve desires “implanted” by other agents, meaning 
that desires not being one’s own can lead to the intentionality of the act being 
questioned. However, as Wallace admits, implanted desires themselves 
cannot be grounds for exempting, as people are constantly “put under the 
spell” of advertising. The fourth group of exemptions is also subject to the 
loss of reflective self-control. (See ibid. 175.) On psychopaths, Wallace begins 
by describing some problems that do not necessarily represent the result 
from psychopathy. In this case Wallace suggests, again, that psychopaths 
could be exempted as a result of disabled reflective self-control (ibid. 177). 
Finally, Wallace writes that the extremely stressed might alternate between 
the excuses and exemptions, but what decides the outcome is the effect of 
reflective self-control (ibid. 179).  
Wallace seems to imply that this distinctive quality related to these 
conditions is the cause of the exemption. For example, without saying exactly 
what “insane or mentally ill” means, he claims that the members of this 
                                                
101 Wallace’s groups are fairly straightforward derivations for Strawson’s examples, which are given 
in FR. Strawson’s examples are described by Watson as: "being psychotic, being a child, being under 
great strain, being hypnotized, being a sociopath ("moral idiot"), and being "unfortunate in formative 
circumstances". (FR; Watson 1987, 260.) 
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group lack the means for reflective self-control (ibid, 167). The main problem 
with his way of presenting the groups of exempted agents is that it is simply a 
limit imposed on the application of the theory of moral responsibility in the 
form of a list. It can be argued that this practice of shutting off the entire 
assessment of responsibility is too strict when it is apparent that the agent is 
not capable of self-regulating to a full adult degree.102 This instrument of 
exclusion might have to be appended. 
The importance of reflective self-control is further emphasized by Wallace 
in instances such as him writing in response to Fischer & Ravizza (1993) that:  
On my view, by contrast, responsibility for an action or omission 
requires that the action or omission reflect some quality of choice […] 
But so long as an agent retains the general powers of reflective self-
control, it is not required that the choice for which the agent is held 
responsible is actually the result of deliberation on the basis of 
reasons at all. [...I]t would be unreasonable to hold people to 
obligations that are supported by reasons in this way [which 
promotes compliance] unless they possess the general powers of 
reflective self-control: the power to grasp and apply moral reasons, 
and to control their behavior in accordance with them. (Wallace 
1994, 190-192.)  
 
Instead of relying on classic compatibilist conditional analysis, according to 
which the agent must have chosen in order to be held morally responsible, 
Wallace considers “the general powers of reflective self-control, and the 
absence of specific excusing conditions” as the decisive conditions of 
responsibility (Ibid. 194.) The requirement for reflective self-control 
indicates that none of its contradictory exemptions exist. Instead of choices 
and the result of the conditional analysis, Wallace states that:  
What makes it fair to hold s responsible are the different kinds of facts 
that I have tried to characterize […] about the content of the choices 
expressed in s’s general powers of reflective self-control” (ibid.) and again: 
“the fundamental condition of accountable moral responsibility is not 
freedom of the will, but possession of the powers of reflective self-control.” 
(Ibid. 230). 
The selection of these exempted cases seems just to cater to the need to 
highlight the desired properties of reflective self-control. The explanation for 
exempting is limited in the case of mental illnesses to declaring the lack of 
that feature, by which in relating the concept to “defective reason” Wallace 
avoids details on the subject with a disclaimer about “complexities [being] 
beyond the scope of [his] discussion”. (Wallace 1994, 167.) 
 
 
                                                
102 Critics such as Kelly (2013) take this viewpoint. Her suggestion of adopting a more gradual 
understanding of the excuses is discussed at the end of chapter 6.2. 
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Criticism of Wallace 
 
The details of Wallace’s theory are many, and are not examined here in any 
further detail. Suffice it to state that Wallace’s responsibility consists of (a) 
the subject having the powers of reflective self-control as well as (b) a lack of 
excuses (see Wallace 1994, 154-155). Whether excuses in this case include the 
exemptions is unclear. Since Wallace seems to indicate that the exemptions 
are more related to (a), the highlighted groups of exempted agents 
categorically lack reflective self-control in his context (see ibid. 166-180.) 
By emphasizing the realization that reflective self-control is a significant 
contributor to the cause for most exemptions, Wallace implies that the lack of 
reflective self-control could be the causal reason for every exemption. On the 
one hand, Wallace writes: “Possession of these powers [of reflective self-
control] is thus a basic condition of the fairness of holding people 
accountable, […] I try to show that all the standard exemptions can be 
construed as impairing or depriving a person of these conditions of 
accountability.” (Ibid. 155.) Wallace starts out with reflective self-control as 
his goal, arguing that reflective self-control is a key component of 
accountability, with the counter-examples of the exempted groups enforcing 
his point. 
Later on, diverging from his initial position, Wallace appeals to the 
“conventional understanding”, as he also writes: “the most important 
exempting conditions as they are conventionally understood, seem to impair 
the powers of reflective self-control.” (Ibid. 180.) Thus, having presented the 
exempted groups, he seems to be advocating historical facts according to 
which the exempting conditions that define the members of the groups of 
exempted agents and said membership are causing the lack of reflective self-
control. 
By emphasizing the realization that reflective self-control is a significant 
contributor causing most exemptions, Wallace seems at least to imply that 
reflective self-control could be the causal reason, or at the very least a 
necessary requirement, for every exemption discussed. If this implication is 
valid, it is suggested here that Wallace is affirming the consequent. 103 The 
                                                
103 Affirming the consequent: a → b , b → a 
 
En (sx): s is exempted (based on n) from a response to having done x.  
R(s): s has powers of reflective self-control. 
 
E1 (sx): s is exempted based on being a child from a response to having done x. 
E2 (sx): s is exempted based on suffering from mental illness from a response to having done x. 
etc. 
 
∃s∀x(En(sx) → ⌐R(s) , ⌐R(s) → En(sx)) 
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lack of reflective self-control might be a sufficient condition for exemption, 
but it is questionable whether lack of self-control is a necessary requirement 
for it. Lack of self-control is a feature related to these groups, but it does not 
precede them. The exempted groups themselves just happen to have a family 
resemblance by which lack of self-control can appear related to them 
independently, but where reasons and type of feature vary. Thus, in the case 
where exemptions explain lack of reflective self-control, implying obstacles to 
holding an agent morally responsible, the original context in which the 
exemptions were described as reasons for mitigated reactive sentiments, can 
be read as fallacious in the sense above.   
Wallace remains careful regarding the topic of historical responsibility 
(discussed more below in chapter 4.3.4). He labels the concerns of historical 
responsibility under the “conditions of autonomy”, which he claims “should 
not be confused with moral responsibility” (Wallace 1994, 53). In other 
words, in Wallace’s view the concept of moral responsibility does not include 
the sort of historical concern that Aristotle, for example, deals with in terms 
of character in the Nicomachean Ethics III.5 (see chapter 5.1.2). This non-
historicism seems to relate to the argument based on choices made in the 
past by the incompatibilists.  
Wallace also writes on the effect of previous events:  
I cannot see how to make sense of the idea of a prior and independent 
realm of moral responsibility facts […] the practice of holding people 
responsible is characterized by a highly structured set of emotions 
and actions, namely the reactive emotions and the blaming and 
sanctioning behavior that expresses them. But it seems incredible to 
suppose that there is a prior and independent realm of facts about 
responsibility to which such emotions and actions should have to 
answer. (Wallace 1994, 88.) 
 
Instead of assuming a “prior and independent realm of facts” Wallace opts 
for an internalist position, according to which moral facts are considered 
dispositional, or as parts of their relevant actions and events. The 
dispositional stance on morality leads to an emphasis on a “current-time-
slice”104 understanding of responsibility, meaning that prior events leading to 
the assessment of moral facts are dismissed as non-existent. In this way, 
Wallace’s more in-depth sketch of the Strawsonian conception of 
responsibility also sharpens the shortcomings of the position. Wallace 
alleviates these problems by allowing for “facts about responsibility” to 
manifest internally, just without the separate layer of a “prior and 
independent realm” (ibid. 92). Compared to Strawson’s more 
                                                                                                                                     
 
104 Fischer and Ravizza (1998) utilize the phrase “current-time-slice notions”, which is originally 
derived from Michael Bratman’s and Robert Nozick’s work (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 178-181, see also 
chapter 4.3.3). 
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intersubjectively defined “web of human attitudes”, Wallace’s dispositional 
internalism seems even more atomist by nature. 
Further detail to Wallace’s position appears in his more recent 
publications. In Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, Wallace touched 
on the notion of the internalism vs. externalism of morality, which he 
continues in his 2013 article “Rightness and Responsibility”. In the former, 
Wallace notes that Strawson’s attempts to reconcile the pessimists and 
optimists rely on external argumentation (Wallace 1994, 101). In the article, 
Wallace elaborates the positions and defends internalist accounts of 
morality. According to the internalists “there is a nonaccidental connection 
between [moral rightness and motivation].” The internalists claim that a 
judgment about rightness is required to motivate a person to act the rightly, 
while the externalists deny this. Wallace advances the claim that the 
internalist position is also relevant in the case of responsibility in that 
“rightness and responsibility are noncontingently connected” (Wallace 2013, 
224).  
Others have noted Wallace's uneasy mix of Strawsonian and Kantian 
influences. A notion that received only (3) passing mentions by Strawson and 
that Wallace devotes more time to flesh out is moral obligation, including 
the sibling concepts of moral right and moral wrong. This notion related to 
responsibility is of course criticized by authors such as Elizabeth Anscombe 
and Bernard Williams as being dependent on “the morality system” (Wallace 
1994, 64). Wallace argues against Williams’s claim, that moral obligations 
would be based on “a distinctively theological conception of ethics”. Instead, 
according to Wallace the moral emotions are independent of such 
obligations, or more accurately, free of the need of being held to such 
obligations (ibid. 64-66; see also B. Williams 1985).  
Paul Russell’s description in his critical 2013 article “Responsibility, 
Naturalism, and “The Morality System”” published in Oxford Studies in 
Agency and Responsibility Vol.1 touches on two of these points:  
Wallace’s compatibilist account weaves together two distinct strands 
of thought. The first is a broadly Strawsonian description of holding 
people responsible, interpreted in terms of our reactive attitudes 
(Wallace 1994: 8-12). The other strand is his Kantian theory of 
reflective self-control or moral agency (1994:12-15.) [...] Taken 
together, these two strands constitute what Wallace calls his 
“normative interpretation” of responsibility, which maintains that the 
correct way to understand what it is to be a morally responsible 
agent is by way of describing those conditions under which it is fair 
to hold an agent responsible (1994: 5, 15,64). […] While these moves 
are generally consistent with Strawson’s original approach, Wallace 
aims to substantially modify and amend this approach by providing 
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a narrower and more fine-grained account of moral reactive 
attitudes.105 (P. Russell 2013, 187-188.) 
 
The term “morality system” is derived from Bernard Williams’s Ethics and 
the Limits of Philosophy (see Williams 1985). In chapters two and three, 
Wallace describes the concept of morality system, generally positively. He 
discusses less how this compares with the “prior and independent realm of 
moral responsibility facts” that he rejects (see Wallace 1994, 88). Generally 
his view is in accordance with the original Strawsonian position that moral 
responsibility is not dependent on an objective judgment as a requirement 
for the moral responsibility assessments. It could be argued that within the 
idea of the morality system there is room for a prior, but connected realm of 
moral responsibility facts (i.e., Watsonian historical responsibility) in his 
theory. 106 
These last two points about reflective self-control and the morality system 
can be looked at as Wallace’s own expansion of his replicated, but expanded 
Strawsonian position to that point. The Kantian influences in particular have 
provoked criticism. For example, Russell (2013) writes that Wallace takes a 
narrower path with the reactive sentiments than Strawson. This leads 
Wallace’s Strawsonian/ Kantian position insufficiently107 sensitive to cultural 
variations in reactive sentiments (see Russell 2013, 197-199).  
Michael McKenna (1996) zeroes in on the contrast between Wallace’s 
efforts to put the Strawsonian schema clearly on the normative level and his 
                                                
105 Russell’s article is determined to show why this “narrowing” of the reactive attitudes divorces 
Wallace’s version of the concept from the reality. Russell’s argument is supported here in terms of the 
outcome; his subject of criticism in itself is not commented on here, but other factors indicate the same 
conclusion. 
106 In his article ”Responsibility and the Limits of Evil” (1987) Gary Watson advances a number of 
very good questions that criticize the Strawsonian conception of responsibility. He points out the lack 
of historical or biographical information related to the reactive attitudes as assessments of 
responsibility. Such demands on moral responsibility are usually delivered from the direction of the 
incompatibilists, but as Watson opens up the question, he brings up Aristotle as well as leading to a 
sort of denial of Strawson’s claim that moral responsibility would not be affected by determinism. 
There is no resolution to the problem within his article, but the issues he raises are still relevant 
(Watson 1987, 274-280). Another good example demonstrates that responsibility and blame are not 
always intertwined: “if one shares a moral fault with another, one may feel it inappropriate to blame 
the other. Here the point is not that the other is not responsible or blameworthy, but that it is not one’s 
business to blame.” (Watson 1987, 283). Watson’s article is discussed in section 4.3.4. 
107 Russell points out that “Given that [Wallace's] narrow construal insists that moral responsibility 
be understood in terms of the concepts of the morality system, and that this interpretation alone 
constitutes genuine or real moral responsibility, it is compelled to exclude all other understandings 
(i.e., as based on a broader construal of ethical reactive attitudes) as falling outside the parameters of 
moral responsibility.” (Ibid. 199.) 
 
 81 
more general tendency toward moral agency (in the naturalist context) not 
having any metaphysical extensions/implications:  
Perhaps the most interesting and controversial aspect of Wallace's 
book is the link he builds between the normative interpretation of the 
free will debate and his rejection of the metaphysical picture of moral 
agency. Wallace rejects a conception of the debate as an attempt to 
ascertain the metaphysical facts about moral agency that obtain 
"prior to and independent of our practice of holding people morally 
responsible" (87). This complements his normative interpretation of 
the debate, in which he accounts for moral agency by appeal to the 
conditions that make it fair to hold an agent morally responsible. 
Some might remain uneasy about giving up the plausible picture 
provided by the metaphysical view. On this view, the practice of 
holding morally responsible is to be tempered by the conceptually 
prior question of what makes a person a moral agent. One wonders 
whether Wallace's normative interpretation of the debate depends 
upon his rejection of the metaphysical picture. If it does, Wallace's 
position might seem to some more controversial, but yet less 
plausible. (McKenna, 1996.) 
 
The contradiction described by McKenna is most apparent where Wallace 
denies the existence of any separate realm of moral facts in explaining how 
facts can be conceived either as metaphysically prior entities or as fixed 
dispositions (Wallace 1994, 88-9). Furthermore, Scanlon and Nagel have 
criticized Wallace’s theory of moral responsibility as being only agency- and 
character-based, as opposed to the more complex theories that the 
philosophers have advanced for their own part, which are relevant and 
interesting in their own right, but are not looked at here. 
What Wallace’s refinement of the Strawsonian position does is that the 
previous authors explication of the various situations leading to the excuses, 
and the various agents qualifying for the exempt positions clarifies the 
concept of the excuse, about which Strawson initiated discussion (by 
following Austin). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments is certainly an 
ambitious and arguably hitherto unsurpassed formalization of Strawson’s 
theory. As observed, the viewpoint is not without its problems. As Russell 
criticizes Wallace, the theory propounded in the book contains a few drastic 
delineations that alter the course set by Strawson’s original paper (Russell 
2013, 187-188 & 203-204). 
The limitations of being concerned only with normal adults, generic 
mental states, and giving up on the praise-side of responsibility, not to 
mention the contradictory claims about the metaphysical layers of the theory 
of responsibility, present their own challenges. Compared to Strawson and 
the relatively brief sketch of moral responsibility in FR, Wallace’s theory in 
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments has attracted much more 
systematic effort to articulate the sentimentalist, normative account. The cost 
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of this refinement however has been an even narrower group of applicable 
moral agents, and a distinct reliance on the functions of reflective self-control 
as well as the Kantian notion of the morality system. All in all, while the 
themes discussed in this chapter are the substance of Wallace’s contribution, 
they are difficult to assess thoroughly here. The main reason for this is the 
admitted omission related to Kantianism (discussed in chapter 2.) meaning 
that these features fall outside of the scope of this effort.  
Resolving to read Wallace (1994) as a realization of the Strawsonian 
position while leaving out the Kantian-influenced advances, which are very 
impressive in their own right, is a choice taken here. Especially important as 
a topic that is much more fleshed out in Wallace (1994) than it is in FR is the 
nature of the concept of blame and its interplay with the questions of 
responsibility in general. Perhaps through Wallace’s input, the theme of 
blame has now been “promoted” to be the main topic of the philosophy of 
responsibility. This topic, blame, is the subject of the next section. 
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4.2 DISCUSSION: THE CURRENT DEBATE ON BLAME 
  
Blame has been a popular topic in Anglophone moral philosophy for quite a 
while, and the revival of naturalistic philosophy, led by Strawson’s example, 
has inspired some of the most prominent philosophers, such as T. M. 
Scanlon and George Sher, to take part in the discussion. As has been 
mentioned previously, Coates & Tognazzini present an essential selection of 
articles on the topic in Blame: It’s Nature and Norms. (2013).108 Emphasis 
on these authors is reinforced by Coleen Macnamara’s 2013 article in the 
same book. According to her, there are “multiple accounts of blame”, the 
currently influential ones including: 
 
1. Sher’s blame: “blame is a set of behavioral and attitudinal dispositions 
that have their source in a belief-desire pair: the belief that someone 
has acted badly and the desire that the one blamed not have done 
what she did or not have the character traits she has.”  
 
2. Scanlon’s blame: “to blame is to change one’s comportment toward 
another in acknowledgement of the fact that she has done something 
to impair your relationship with her.”  
 
3. Strawsonian blame (incl. Wallace, Wolf and Darwall): “I blame 
another when I respond to her conduct with resentment, indignation 
or disapprobation, that is I blame another when I respond to her 
wrong-doing with a negative reactive emotion.”  
(Macnamara 2013, 141.) 
 
Further refinement is found in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
article “Blame”, also by Coates and Tognazzini (2014). For example, the 
authors distinguish the conception of blame as discussed in the context of 
theories of moral responsibility from “causal or explanatory blame”, which is 
not interesting as a philosophical question.109 Both of these sources (2013 & 
2014) give an overview of the currently on-going discussion about blame. In 
                                                
108 Coates & Tognazzini’s 2013 compilation Blame is a collection of high-quality articles, written by 
the most important thinkers on the subject. It includes texts by Wallace, Scanlon and Sher, to name a 
few. Darwall’s work is in the curious position of being usually grouped together with the Strawsonsian 
approach (see Macnamara 2013, 141), but in terms of blame mitigation he advocates the use of 
character. George Sher, T. S. Scanlon and Angela Smith, also listed in the latter group, are referenced 
below. Based on this book, the editors have also produced the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
article “Blame” (2014). 
109 The example used to describe causal blame goes as follows: “It is this notion of blame that is at 
stake when we say that Hurricane Hugo is to blame for the destruction of Charleston's harbor, or that 
the cat is to blame for knocking over the vase.” (Coates & Tognazzini 2014.) 
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the book (Coates & Tognazzini 2013), the authors go through various 
interpretations of what the concept is actually about and where it matters. 
They have noted that, indeed, most researchers working on blame approach 
the concept from some larger perspective such as theories of moral 
responsibility, as is the case with Wallace (1994). The article makes more 
general claims such as that blame is taken to be as “a common feature of our 
shared moral experience” (Coates & Tognazzini 2014). In both publications 
by Coates and Tognazzini, a division of the theories of blame into three 
categories is based on the common three-part separation of the mind in 
psychology.110 These groups that distinguish the dominant features of each of 
the theories best are called “cognitive”, “emotional” and “conative” theories 
of blame. Cognitive theories of blame emphasize blame’s primary role as a 
judgment or an evaluation. Emotional theories on the other hand see blame 
as primarily having an affective quality. Finally, the conative group of blame-
theories view blame more as a directing force such as desires or expectations 
that people hold. (Coates & Tognazzini 2014 & 2013, 8-15.)  
Strawson, who defines the group of emotional theories of blame, is the 
starting-point, but alongside him, the important theories of other 
philosophers are discussed, especially those mentioned above. This aside, it 
would be a mistake to claim that this is the first time in history that the 
concept of blame has been discussed within Anglophone analytic philosophy. 
In fact, as early as 1956 Austin noted (literally, in a footnote) that the topic of 
blame has been examined thoroughly in a way that does not call for 
continuity. His exact words referred to blame as a “well-flogged horse” 
(Austin 1956/57, 7, n2). Of course, Austin’s notice comes from a different 
age, when the main concern of the professional philosophers was to 
determine the relations between natural and formal languages, and it is thus 
taken in that context. In this instance, Austin contrasted the conflating use of 
blame at once as causal blame and other times as the key component of 
responsibility, as is discussed here. 
Something of the opposite is the case with the concept of praise. 
According to Wallace especially, praise is not genuinely related to blame, but 
is rather a disanalogous counterpart used in the same contexts. While 
traditionally paired with praise (since Aristotle), philosophers who have been 
previously working on moral responsibility have more recently concentrated 
on the concept of blame at the expense of the former. Wallace is the first 
writer examined here who explicitly claims that “praise does not seem to 
have the central, defining role that blame and moral sanction occupy on the 
practice of assigning moral responsibility.” (Wallace 1994, 62). This coincides 
with the general sentiment that the interest of the responsibility theorists has 
                                                
110 Technically Coates and Tognazzini gather additional theorists under a fourth category of 
“functional theories”, such as Hieronymi (2001), Matthew Talbert (2012), Victoria McGeer (2013) as 
well as Michael McKenna (2012, 2013). As these form quite a broad selection of theories from different 
angles, the study of these contributions is left to another occasion. 
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increasingly centered on the negative repercussions of wrong-doing, 
sanctioning and even retributive punishment in some cases.111  This is not to 
say that praise has been satisfactorily explained away. On the contrary, 
Coates and Tognazzini predict that praise will be the next big topic of 
philosophical inquiries in the coming years.112 
Today, however, the Strawsonian naturalistic revival and the 
developments that followed it have taken an interest in blame. The fresh 
perspectives on the subject, based on the writings of the notable philosophers 
working particularly in ethics rather than the linguistic analyses of past is 
pursued here. Some of these recent contributions are discussed, including 
Wallace, Scanlon113 and Sher. The contributions of these three seem to be 
crucial to the current efforts to establish a common understanding about 
nature of blame. 
                                                
111 See, for example, Gary Watson (2004/[1996], 283), who writes that “We seem to have a richer 
vocabulary of blame than of praise”. 
112 E.g., “[Macnamara’s article (2013)] suggests that a full understanding of praise will require an 
independent inquiry, which is something very few philosophers have undertaken.” (Coates & 
Tognazzini 2013, 26.) While Wallace excludes praise, the concept is present in at least the 
interpretations of Michael S. Pritchard, who emphasizes the ideas of moral development and education 
in his book On Becoming Responsible (1991). Similarly to the way Dennett classifies the “plateau” of 
moral agency, Pritchard quotes Thomas Reid, who held that there is a certain threshold of 
development that is reached at some point in life, after which the agent becomes a full-fledged moral 
agent. Blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are mentioned in this context as being important to the 
status of moral agency. (See Pritchard 1991, 33.) Another recent attempt at focusing attention on the 
praiseworthiness-aspect of responsibility is by Andrew Eshleman in his article “Worthy of Praise” 
(Eshleman 2014b). Praise is also part of Doris’s characterization of moral responsibility, also related to 
the context of moral education. His version is very critical, despite being about the whole idea of 
character-based moral education (Doris 2002, 121-127). Nevertheless, he includes consideration of 
moral education within his sketch of the subject, a context in which praise has an important role. Doris 
laments the lack of evidence regarding the benefits or efficacy of the character-based educational 
efforts, but one of the scarce actual findings of empirical research is Grusec and Redler (1980), 
according to whom attributional praise is more effective than unattributed praise when prosocial 
behavior is encouraged in children (Doris 2002, 126). Thus, at least in this way both Doris and 
Pritchard acknowledge praise as an element of accounts of moral responsibility. Granted that as Doris 
begins his evaluation of the character-based systems of moral education, he explicitly links the topic 
with a contemporary American “character education movement”, which is not known internationally, 
but does nevertheless sound unpleasant (see Doris 2002, 121). This movement might provide one 
reason or motivation for Doris to criticize character in the first place.  
Wallace has recently been criticized by Paul Russell (2013) for framing his conception of 
responsibility too narrowly. This includes the overall emphasis of Wallace’s theory on the negative 
reactive attitudes.  
See also Andrew Eshleman’s “Worthy of Praise” (2014b) as an example of a recent publication on 
the subject. 
113 Thanks to Simo Kyllönen for drawing attention to Scanlon’s relation to Strawson’s philosophy. 
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Coates and Tognazzini (2013 & 2014) present cognitive theories of blame as 
the point of comparison with all other types of theory that are discussed here. 
These relying on the idea that blame is primarily a judgment. They write of 
cognitive accounts that they “all capture something deep and important: 
blaming involves evaluating.[n22] When we blame others, we see them as 
having dropped below some standard that we accept (or perhaps that we 
think they should accept, whether of excellence, morality or respectful 
relationships.” (Coates & Tognazzini, 2013, 9.) 
Some adherents of cognitive theories of blame go as far as to claim that 
the concept can be reduced solely to its cognitive aspects, as the mid 20th 
century utilitarian J. J. C. Smart did (1961 & 1963). Blame would then 
fundamentally be conceived as “a judgment or evaluation that we make about 
an agent in light of her attitudes or her actions.” Smart, however, represents 
the “ledger view” type of responsibility theory which, according to Watson 
and Eshleman (discussed above in chapter 3), forgoes the social side of 
responsibility including notions of aretaic appraisal and reactive sentiments 
as constituents of responsibility. For this reason, his point of view is not 
considered as interesting in this case. (See Coates & Tognazzini 2014.) 
Necessarily, as Coates & Tognazzini state, supporting a cognitive theory of 
blame does not result in a position that advocates the “ledger view” (ibid.). 
Another cognitively aligned blame theory, which they offer as an example is 
that of Pamela Hieronymi (2004), whose approach is appealing in stating 
that blame is primarily a judgment. The other theory discussed, emphasizing 
the cognitive aspect, is T. M. Scanlon’s earlier work (1986)114. Both 
Hieronymi’ article and Scanlon’s earlier theory locate blame within the realm 
of judgments, and more specifically judgments about the dispositions of 
others toward us; for example, the judgments that are made of another where 
that person is acting out malice toward us.    
Hieronymi’s cognitive account of blame builds on Gary Watson’s 
attributability/accountability division.115 She does this by emphasizing the 
attributability “face of responsibility” (in Watson’s words), according to 
which our moral assessments of each other, including those leading to blame, 
involve an evaluation of that person and the action he or she takes based on 
what we consider important. Watson calls this practice the aretaic appraisal 
(see Watson 2004/[1996], 271), and Hieronymi goes as far as to claim that 
the reactive attitudes cannot be separated from this notion of aretaic 
appraisal (Hieronymi 2004, 39). 
                                                
114 It is interesting to note that Scanlon’s early theory differs from his latter work. According to 
Coates and Tognazzini’s article, in his work Scanlon’s early view of blame (1986) is conceived as 
primarily being cognitive by nature and that in his later work (2008 & 2013), his views shift toward a 
conative position.  
115 See introduction to chapter 3 in this work. 
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Some of Gary Watson’s criticism of the Strawsonian position is concerned 
with blame.116 Coates & Tognazzini take his writings to belong within the 
cognitive theories. They highlight his use of the term “aretaic appraisal”117 
which, in addition to the determination of the blameworthiness of the agent, 
is included in responsibility assessments: not only do people decide whether 
to blame one another or not, we compare our conduct in comparison with the 
ideals that we would wish to uphold. Watson is critical of the emotional 
theories of blame, such as those advanced by Strawson and Wallace, but he 
does not dismiss the importance of the reactive sentiments. Rather he seeks 
to expand the quite limited core of the Strawsonian outlook by calling out its 
deficits, which need appending.  
In his well-known article “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil”, Watson 
mentions Gandhi and Martin Luther King as examples of people who act 
against harmful practices essentially by blaming these practices in order to 
eliminate them. The example shows that the basic functionality of blame as 
proposed by Strawson as “a retributive act[,] one that involves a withdrawal 
of good will”, is not the only way to utilize the concept. This demonstrates 
that blaming is not valuable for its own sake, but just as a negative attitude. 
(Schoeman (ed.) 1987, 22 quoting Watson 1987, 286.) 
If these theories were applied to an actual case, each one would emphasize 
a different way to react to wrong-doing. Say that A runs over a dog, which is 
owned by B. The way that B would blame A for the incident would depend on 
the theory. If cognitive, the act of blame would be interpreted as a judgment, 
i.e., B would cognitively make the judgment or the evaluation that "A ran 
over my dog. That's reprehensible. The person, A, is to blame for this." 
The Strawsonian theories offer the emotional interpretation instead, 
according to which blame is primarily an emotional response to wrong-
doing. Strawson’s additions, which have been discussed above, concern 
equally blame-focused theories (when compared with theories of 
responsibility). Coates & Tognazzini explicitly mention Strawson as the key 
figure of the emotional theories of blame as his ““Freedom and Resentment” 
is the founding document of contemporary work on blame” (Coates & 
Tognazzini 2013, 5). In fact, in the introduction to their book, the same group 
is labeled “The Strawsonian Account” (3, 13), while in Coates & Tognazzini 
(2014) it is designated “Emotional Theories of Blame”. In these theories, 
blame and the capacity to receive it are the main constitutive elements of 
responsibility in the Strawsonian sense. 
Strawson is equally credited as a reviver of the discussion but, as was the 
case with responsibility, he did not provide a specific definition of blame in 
“Freedom and Resentment” (see Coates & Tognazzini 2014). In this work 
however, the main proponent of Strawsonian blame is considered to be R. 
                                                
116 Watson’s contribution to discussion on responsibility is considered more closely below in 
chapter 4.3.4. 
117 See also Watson 2004/[1996], 266-267 on aretaic appraisal. 
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Jay Wallace, whose theory is focused on blame as an emotional response or a 
reactive emotion. This is a natural reaction to observed wrong-doing, 
wherein the acts do not carry a separate metaphysical (binary) condition,118 
these responses, as well as the attitudes related to them defining or being 
interpreted as moral responsibility. 
Macnamara’s article “Taking Demands out of Blame” describes the 
Strawsonian group as including Strawson, as well as Wallace, Wolf and 
Darwall (Macnamara 2013).119 Describing how blame works according to the 
Strawsonians, she writes: “I blame another when I respond to her conduct 
with resentment, indignation or disapprobation, that is I blame another 
when I respond to her wrong-doing with a negative reactive emotion. 
(Macnamara 2013, 141.)  
If based on an emotion-based theory of blame, such as Wallace’s for 
instance, A in the example above would instantly react instinctively, non-
cognitively. For example, in a Strawsonian context the observation and the 
realization of what A 's action had brought about would fill B with 
resentment, making B proverbially “sick to his/her stomach”, and would 
provoke a reactive emotion toward the transgressor A in a forceful act of 
condemnation.  
The conative accounts according to Coates and Tognazzini are those that 
“emphasize motivational elements, like desires and intentions, as essential to 
blame.” George Sher (2006) and Thomas M. Scanlon (2008, 2013) are 
mentioned in the article as showing the most developed conative theories of 
blame. Sher’s criticism is aimed at both of the other types of theory, in that 
he does not believe that emotion is required for blame. Instead, he agues, it 
should be equally based on a cognitive element as well as a conative element, 
resulting in an account by which blame is ultimately conceived as a belief-
desire pair. Scanlon’s theory equally disposes of the emotional, and offers 
instead a cool, rational account of social relations and appraisals that occur. 
(Coates & Tognazzini 2014.) 
Sher’s blame is interesting,120 as the concept in his theory necessarily 
contains both a cognitive and a conative aspect. Blame, in his theory as 
                                                
118 For the sake of the argument here, it is assumed that Wallace’s reliance on the normative level is 
not considered as such. However the notion is questioned elsewhere in this work (ch. 4.1.3). 
119 Victoria McGeer also argues for a psychologically informed account of blame in her article 
“Civilising Blame” (McGeer 2013). 
120 The other recent contribution to the topic of blame is by George Sher as he discusses in In 
Praise of Blame (2006) and “Wrongdoing and Relationships: The Problem of the Stranger” (2013). His 
version criticizes Scanlon’s blame, proposing instead that blame is actually a belief-desire pair, a 
concept that brings together cognitive and conative aspects of the phenomenon. However Sher’s 
account is accused by Victoria McGeer (in 2013’s “Civilizing Blame”) and Christopher Franklin of being 
too “sanitized” (Coates & Tognazzini 11). Whether or not these two accounts of blame gain a permanent 
place alongside Strawson’s version, these contributions have ensured that the topic is alive and well in 
the current academic discussions.  
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described in his book In Praise of Blame (2006), is conceived as a belief-
desire pair. Blame in his account consists of both an understanding that a 
wrongdoer has committed an offence and how, as well as an idea of how this 
person has failed to live up to the moral expectations. This was the cognitive 
side. The conative side of blame consists of a retrospective desire that the 
blamer has. This desire is aimed at the wrongdoer such that the blamer 
wishes that the wrongdoer had decided otherwise, or avoided the act. Based 
on these two aspects, Sher claims we can better understand the moral 
relations between us.  
One of Sher’s theory’s proponents is Angela Smith, who describes Sher’s 
blame as follows:  
Blame should be understood as a set of dispositions to have certain 
attitudinal and behavioral reactions, and these dispositions should be 
understood as traceable to a single desire-belief pair that includes (1) 
a belief that the person in question has acted badly or has a bad 
character, and (2) a corresponding desire that the person not have 
acted badly or not have a bad character (Sher 2006, p.112). (Smith 
2013, 33.) 
 
Thomas M. Scanlon’s more recent writings have seen him modeling a theory 
of blame121 that has had a mixed reception. The intricacies of his theory are 
impossible to discuss satisfactorily here, but it is possible to briefly 
demonstrate how his conception of blame is unique: Scanlon’s blame is 
distinctly social; it always involves the act of evaluating fellow human beings 
and the alteration of expectations toward them based on the former. Thus, if 
person A offends B with an improper act, B can evaluate what has taken place 
and she can lower her further expectations toward A as a result. In the 
context of Scanlon’s theory, Coates and Tognazzini maintain that: “to blame 
someone is to recognize, and make modifications that express that one 
recognizes, that things cannot go on as before with that person. The 
relationship has been impaired [as a result of actions done by the other]” 
(Coates & Tognazzini 2013, 12). 
In Scanlon’s view in his “Interpreting Blame” (2013) a “person is 
blameworthy, […] if he does something that indicates intentions or 
attributes that are faulty by the standards of a relationship”. He continues: “A 
judgment of blameworthiness is a judgment that an action shows something 
about the agent that impairs, in various ways, his or her relations with 
others.” (Scanlon 2013, 88.) 
                                                
121 The Scanlonian interpretation of blame is discussed in his book Moral Dimensions: 
Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (2008) among other works, but here in most detail. In “Interpreting 
Blame” Scanlon’s brand of blame appears as “a class of responses to morally faulty actions” (Scanlon’s 
2013), which at least according to Susan Wolf is too “mild” an interpretation, especially as contrasted 
with her “Blame, Italian-style” presented in the article with the same title in the book discussing 
Scanlon’s philosophy, Reasons and Recognition (Wolf 2011). 
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Scanlon’s blame is thus distinctly a social concept by nature, involving 
multiple agents, and based essentially on relations (in an abstract sense) and 
the dynamic of modification of these relations (whereas Strawson’s blame 
could be abstractly conceived as being projected without necessary 
repercussions). Scanlon’s concept of a relationship is defined as “a set of 
intentions and expectations about our actions and attitudes toward one 
another”.122 (Scanlon 2013, 86.) 
While many have praised Scanlon’s intricate and fundamentally social 
account of blame, his conceptualization of the term has left others, especially 
the advocates of the emotional theories, wanting. For example, Coleen 
Macnamara has defended Scanlon’s view, while R. J. Wallace has dismissed 
his attempt by stating that Scanlon’s “dispassionate opprobrium” is not 
blame at all (Wallace 2011). 
Conative theories need a bit of explication: If Sher's example were to be 
followed, the event (in the example about the dog being run over) would 
bring about a strong desire in B toward a resolution that is different from the 
accident, based on the belief that A should not have driven over his or her 
dog. Scanlon in turn would say that A through her negligence would not have 
met B's expectation of not having her dog run over. This would thus provoke 
B to further alter her expectations of A about A’s behavior. 
From these examples it is easy to imagine how the broader theory of 
responsibility could be affected with a “strategic” change in the interpretation 
of blame. It is, for example. certain that Watson’s criticism (looked at in the 
next chapter), which states that Strawson’s conception of responsibility is 
flawed in that it excludes the most “evil” of human beings by disqualifying 
them from moral assessment by means of exemptions (Watson 1987). Going 
with a cognitive theory of blame could make sense in this case in that the 
individual’s wrong-doing is easier to judge to be harmful without any mixed 
emotional content concerning the agent. This would be the case in situations 
where extraordinary agents, such as people with memory-related illness or 
psychopaths, etc. are the actors. 
The proponents of the cognitive accounts of blame have been critical of 
the emotional counterparts. For example, Coates & Tognazzini (2014) note 
that Hieronymi’s theory advances the viewpoint that blame is something 
more important than just the emotional accompaniment of a judgment, and 
that an affection accompanied by said judgments would be little more than 
distractions (see Hieronymi 2004, 121). Similarly, as an advocate of a 
conative theory, Sher goes after the emotional theories: “Sher (2006) argues 
that emotional responses are unnecessary for blame. For example, Sher 
argues that we can blame a loved one without feeling negative emotional 
reactions.” (Coates & Tognazzini 2014.) Sher claims that the cognitive 
                                                
122 See also G. Williams 2013, 352: “Scanlon understands blame as essentially a response within a 
relationship, when that relationship has been impaired.”  
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judgments about doing wrong are accompanied by the conative desire 
concerning that how the person evaluated would not have acted or decided to 
act in the way in which he/she did. However, this belief-desire pair can bring 
about the negative emotions that are usually associated with blame, but it is 
the belief-desire part that takes precedence. Pamela Hieronymi responds to 
Sher in her 2008 paper “Sher’s Defense of Blame”, by claiming that Sher’s 
model, even while worthwhile in its description, gives insufficient evidence 
that “blame” might be constituted as such a pair. (Coates & Tognazzini 2014.) 
Scanlon’s theory has recently attracted some of the most polarized 
comments. Scanlon’s version of blame is too “dispassionate” compared to 
Strawsonian blame, at least if Wallace and Susan Wolf are to be believed (see 
Wallace 2011; also Wolf 2011). According to Wallace, the emotional response 
serves an important feature that is incorporated into blame: judgment 
changes meaning as a result (Coates & Tognazzini 2014). Sher asks in his 
article, which is criticizes Scanlon’s theory “Wrongdoing and Relationships: 
The Problem of the Stranger” (2013) how Scanlon’s relational theory of 
blame can take a stranger into account? If the wrongdoer is not known to the 
person offended, how can the expectations be altered? This is especially the 
case if there are no prior expectations without the framework of pre-existing 
mutual reactive attitudes, or Sher’s own retrospective desire for that matter 
— how can the Scanlonian blame-as-adjustments-to-relationships function? 
(see Sher 2013, 49-51.) Sher concludes the article by stating that the 
Scanlonian account (as well as Linda Radzik’s by extension) is untenable:  
[B]ecause the views [on relational approaches to blame] discussed 
here are among the best worked-out representatives of that approach 
and because each must either rely on implausible empirical claims or 
else retreat to a nonempirical and potentially question-begging 
account of the relevant relationships, I think it is safe to say that the 
prospects are not too bright. (Sher 2013, 65.) 
 
Some commentators still favor the emotional accounts: Victoria McGeer in 
her essential article “Civilizing Blame”123 in Coates & Tognazzini (2013) 
sketches “anger characteristically manifested in blame [is] a feature, 
moreover, that […] plays a crucial role in regulating behavior by way of 
making salient the demands that shared norms place on our actions and 
attitudes.” (McGeer 2013, 183.) By carefully presenting evidence about the 
effect of the psychology of people when acting, McGeer argues for the 
emotional side of blame as the more plausible, but also drafts a way forward 
by describing a way of accommodating these affective notions of the concept 
in the context of academic philosophical discussion. This is in accordance 
with an earlier comment on Scanlon’s theory by Susan Wolf in her article 
                                                
123 The article additionally contains actually interesting connections between Scanlon, Sher, 
Wallace, and to the empirically-minded moral psychological writings of Prinz (2011) et al. 
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“Blame, Italian Style” (Wolf 2011). Both commentators criticize the overly 
dispassionate Scanlonian take on blame, while making an attempt to 
emphasize the importance of the emotional response in the practice of 
blaming. 
If there’s one precise trend in the current debate, it is that for many 
writers the Strawsonian account is unable to satisfactorily explain blame, and 
alternatives must be sought. Angela Smith presents a defense of Sher’s and 
Scanlon’s work on the concept of blame in her article “Moral Blame and 
Moral Protest” (Smith 2013, 47). In her article “Taking Demands out of 
Blame” Coleen Macnamara (2013) also argues for Scanlon’s and Sher’s 
approaches, especially where Strawsonian blame is under the magnifying 
glass of Macnamara’s article. In part, Macnamara writes in response to 
Wallace that it is not always so that holding someone responsible would be 
retrospective blame of the other due to a particular misgiving. Rather blame 
(as well as responsibility as a result) extends to prospective cases as well. She 
gives the example of a pizza box, in which a demand written on the box works 
as a prospective form of holding the persons reading the demand 
responsible. She separates the evaluative and the deontic realms of morality, 
claiming that Wallace operates in the latter with his idea of holding someone 
responsible. In her view, it is important to recognize the connection between 
demands and the negative reactive emotions. (Macnamara 2013, 160-161.) 
Finally, Gary Watson gives an interesting inversion of terms in Watson 
(2013), where he writes about non-judgmentalism in his contribution to 
Coates and Tognazzini (2013), “Standing to Judgment”. This is related to “the 
standing to blame” discussion initiated in his earlier article (1987), but 
interesting as it is as a development, this train of thought on non-
judgmentalism will not be followed further here. 
The current debate on blame is interpreted here as follows: Scanlon’s 
theory is an admirable attempt to describe responsibility and blame as 
relationships between people. Indeed, this relational account of blame seems 
attractive precisely because the social is integral to responsibility. However, 
it is thought that what Scanlon describes as blame, with its reduced 
emotional content and its emphatic connection with relationships, is deemed 
problematic. Sher’s example of the stranger displays a similar problem 
within Scanlon’s framework as is the case with Strawson’s account, which 
compromises the moral status of less-than-ideal agents completely. For the 
reasons examined, Scanlon’s account of blame (and responsibility as its 
extensions) seems too limiting, in that it is very likely able to describe the 
situations that it is designed to describe without error, but moved to less 
appropriate circumstances will fail in execution because of unspecified 
details (as was the case in Sher 2013). 
Sher’s thinking is followed here, at least in the sense that responsibility is 
considered to be multi-faceted. Blame in Sher’s theory consists of the dual 
qualities of desires and beliefs. This applies to responsibility as well. 
Although Sher is convincing, it is thought that his account might be 
 93 
incomplete at present and that it should be developed a little more through 
the academic discussion. 
Strawson’s “default view” of blame is considered to be the content of the 
concept of blame from now on, but just for the sake of the argument. 
Strawson’s account is problematic, and some of its shortcomings are 
discussed in the following pages. Nevertheless, in the rest of this work blame 
is still considered to be primarily constituted by reactive emotions.  
There’s a lot more to the discussion related to blame, (including a set of 
technical details about the procedures related to blaming in Coates & 
Tognazzini (2014), and lamentably these are not looked at here in any more 
detail.124 Considering the theories mentioned above, it is too early to draw 
conclusions within the boundaries of this work about who or what theory is 
correct about blame. All of them touch on important issues, and it is easy to 
imagine that if one of them were nailed down as the right one, the larger 
picture of responsibility would accommodate to it as a result. Each of the 
participants has brought up interesting points about the complex ground that 
the concept of blame covers. There might yet be refinements and even 
syntheses based on work by current theorists, which might provide an even 
more compelling description of blame. Perhaps a further effort will combine 
the relative conceptual lightness of the Strawsonian account, the social 
aspects of Scanlon’s work and the accuracy of Sher’s theory. In any case, 
“blame” is a topic that will certainly be interesting to follow for the next 
couple of years.125 For the sake of the argument, however, the Strawsonian 
account (including Wallace’s refinements) is used here as a rule-of-thumb, 
but the compelling points made by the proponents of the other theories will 
be contrasted with the status quo when relevant. 
In the next section, centering on criticism, Herbert Fingarette will be 
looked at as a completely different take on the concept of responsibility.126 
Marion Smiley’s book presents a key problem in the current discussion of 
responsibility, while Bernard Williams’s studies on the subject sketch a 
framework that will be utilized further in this work. Finally, Gary Watson’s 
article in Schoeman 1987 is mentioned as a criticism of the Strawsonian 
default picture, and his work will be given attention in the last section, where 
many of his important points are addressed.127   
                                                
124 See Coates & Tognazinni 2014 for an introduction to themes such as blameworthiness in 
relation to blame as well as aforementioned procedures such as “proportionality”, “warrant”, etc. 
125 There have already been some developments in this discussion in the published volumes of 
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (Shoemaker (ed.) 2013, 2014 (with Tognazzini) & 2015). 
126 Herbert Fingarette’s Mind article "Responsibility" (1966), which originates from the same 
period as FR, serves here as an important contrast to the latter in that “responsibility” can be 
understood in many ways.  
127 Watson helps to distinguish (but does not go deeply into) the key interpretation relevant to this 
work: he notes chapter III.5 of the Nicomachean Ethics and, related to it, discusses historical 
responsibility, which is relevant in the case of the responsibility for character topic discussed more in 
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4.3 CRITICISM 
 
In this section, some of the most important alternative views on the nature of 
moral responsibility are looked at. First, Michael McKenna & Paul Russell’s 
Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P.F. Strawson’s “Freedom 
and Resentment” (2007) is discussed as a work that puts FR directly under 
the magnifying glass and offers very poignant criticism. After this, more 
general questions about moral responsibility are asked by Herbert Fingarette 
(1966), Marion Smiley (1992), Bernard Williams (1993 & 1997) and finally 
Gary Watson (1987 & 2004). 
The final section of “Critical Themes Concerning ‘Freedom & 
Resentment’” by McKenna & Russell (2007), contains a couple of noteworthy 
details about the background of and the discussion of the article. It seemed to 
be the case that at the time (mid-20th century) it was thought within the 
school of analytical philosophy that the free will problem could be resolved 
by conducting a thorough conceptual analysis of the terms “freedom”, 
“causation” and “responsibility”128 in order to discover the logical functions 
related to them. The rationale for this was the emphasis on philosophy of 
language, and the idea that these logical distinctions could be discovered 
through the conceptual analysis of language, bringing the debate about free 
will to an end. The outcome for this mind-set was that the debate kept 
perpetuating itself separate from reality of “ordinary moral life”. (McKenna & 
Russell 2007,9.)  
As an alternative to “pure” conceptual analysis, Strawson’s approach 
called for a naturalistic outlook starting with the basics of human psychology. 
This shift emphasized ordinary language at the expense of a formal one. 
According to McKenna & Russell, the “commitments in “Freedom and 
Resentment” manifest his own preference for “descriptive” over “revisionary” 
metaphysics. “ (McKenna & Russell 2007, 9-10.) 
The criticism that both Strawson’s naturalistic position and his descriptive 
take on metaphysics have inspired includes challenges from at least two 
different directions. Following Watson (1987),129 McKenna & Russell 
                                                                                                                                     
5.1.2 and 6.1, although in the article, Watson presents historical responsibility as an example of 
criticizing the libertarian position (Watson 1987, 279-280). This relation is further debated by various 
authors, and the discussion is followed here. 
128 Even though the method of this dissertation is itself a form of conceptual analysis, the 
difference here is the partly historical difference in the relations between truth, language and 
knowledge. As stated before, more than precision about any supposed “final” definitions of the 
concepts, the interest here is more hermeneutic than technical, to loosely follow the distinction 
popularized by critical theory and Jürgen Habermas. 
129 The same division applies to the debate on blame as discussed in the previous chapter (4.2). See 
Watson, who among other points, questions the relation between blame and moral responsibility 
(Watson 1987, 283). 
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question the essentiality of the reactive emotions as being constitutive of 
human nature, at least to the degree that Strawson implies, as they write:  
The reactive attitudes are not permanent, inescapable features of 
human nature, like other more basic emotions such as fear or love. 
Rather they should be viewed as cultural artifacts produced in 
particular historical and social conditions. Reactive attitudes, the 
critic maintains, involve a set of socially acquired dispositions and 
expectations and we can well imagine more radical shifts and 
transformations in human relationships and attitudes than Strawson 
allows for. (McKenna & Russell 2007, 10.)  
 
Furthermore, the Strawsonian conception of the emotion is questionable. In 
the light of recent advances in our knowledge of the emotions, Strawson’s 
separation of the emotional and the cognitive seems too extreme. McKenna & 
Russell ask: “Should moral sentiments or reactive attitudes be interpreted as 
mere feelings, without propositional content, or should they be regarded as 
necessarily involving beliefs of some relevant kind?”130 (McKenna & Russell 
2007, 11.)  
Another point of criticism is related to his objection to the 
consequentialist accounts in Strawson ([1962]/2008), which is so forceful 
that he regards consequentialism as completely out of the question 
(McKenna & Russell 2007, 10-11). This might be too strict a delineation since 
there have been new accounts that have incorporated consequentialist 
elements into responsibility131 that have more appeal than the original 
Schlickian, “economy of threats” type of consequentialism. The latter angle, 
which Strawson argues against, is what Garrath Williams discusses as 
“utilitarian instrumentalism”. The theories included within this group put 
responsibility-related questions in a sort of algebraic setting, in which 
responsibility is akin to "paying up" for certain transgressions, and managing 
these situations. (G. Williams 2010, 8.)  
Additionally, critics, such as John Martin Fischer, Mark Ravizza and 
Angela M. Smith have argued that Strawson does not take the gap between 
holding and being responsible into account, and this is detrimental to the 
theory sketched in FR (McKenna & Russell 2007, 12).132 
                                                
130 George Sher for example has proposed a desire-belief pair as the nature of blame. This will be 
discussed in 4.2. 
131 According to Eshleman, Fischer & Ravizza (1998) are working with one form of this. Victoria 
McGeer also makes a provocative case in her recent article “P. F. Strawson’s Consequentialism” that 
Strawson’s theory itself contains distinctly consequentialist aspects (McGeer 2014). 
132 The difficulties related to the gap are described in perhaps the most detailed manner by Angela 
M. Smith (2007), who describes the difference between the concepts originating from the various 
stances of the person being judged and that of the moral judge. Strawson’s theory is specifically in 
trouble regarding the stance of the moral judge (of holding responsible), as Strawson’s moral 
responsibility is defined in terms of affective, reactive sentiments. It would be inappropriate, Smith 
96 
The relation between the reactive attitudes and responsibility in general is 
another point of contention.133 Strawson seems to be of the mind that the 
reactive attitudes are generally a reliable measure of what is morally 
responsible action. We might get an improper attitude based on mistaken 
information about intentions or the state of mind of an agent, but according 
to Fischer & Ravizza there are reasons to believe that the attitudes and their 
objects might not have the correlation that Strawson’s theory requires. “It 
could be, for example, that an entire community has its reactive attitudes 
switched on or off in the wrong way and at the wrong times” as McKenna & 
Russell put it. (McKenna & Russell 2007, 12.)  
As stated before, Strawson’s essay was just that at the beginning. It did 
not attempt to carve out a fully articulated theory of responsibility. One 
omission in the article that some critics have taken issue with is the 
insufficient exploration of the relation between resentment and retribution in 
Strawson’s theory. (McKenna & Russell 2007, 13.)  
If Strawson is to be defended, as Eshleman implies, even though the free 
will vs. determinism problem is not solved by his re-focus, it is “dissolved” in 
that deterministic ontology ceases to be an obstruction to the practice of 
holding others responsible. Strawson originally lamented that the positions 
mentioned above “over-intellectualised” responsibility in that the agent 
would need to satisfy a set of justifiable, objective requirements related to the 
agents themselves or their freedom of choice in the metaphysical sense. 
Being responsible in the Strawsonian context is not dependent on any 
external justification. In other words, there is no need for a separate, 
objective judgment about moral responsibility; determinism might as well be 
assumed as it appears inconsequential to moral responsibility assessments in 
the naturalistic context.  
Eshleman concludes with remarks on how influential FR has been since 
his work is so ubiquitously cited in writing on moral responsibility. However, 
he also correctly assesses that the article has not received universal 
acceptance. Since the problem of determinism is still often associated with 
theories of responsibility, Strawson’s arguments cannot have convinced 
everyone. (Eshleman 2014.) Nevertheless, his pre-eminent stature among the 
philosophers of responsibility is the reason why he is selected as the starting-
point in this work. It would be difficult to do otherwise.  
As concluding remarks on criticism on Strawson, McKenna & Russell offer a 
summary as follows:  
Perhaps the most fundamental problem with Strawson’s theory in the 
eyes of his critics is that he has too little to say about the extent to 
which our reflections concerning the (historical) origins or sources of 
character and conduct can inhibit—if not altogether undermine—the 
                                                                                                                                     
claims, for a person in the position of moral judge to form his/her judgments based on emotions only. 
(See Smith 2007.)   
133 See chapter 4.3.1 on Fingarette’s article “Responsibility” (1966). 
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(normal) operation of our reactive attitudes. (McKenna & Russell 
2007, 13.)  
 
This sentiment is seconded here and, the comparison with the earlier 
historical forms of the concept is made as a proposed remedial action. This 
comparison begins in chapter 4.3.2 in the form of Marion Smiley’s criticism 
of the modern concept of responsibility, and continues with the account of 
Aristotle’s moral responsibility in chapter 5. In later chapters, the most 
important elements of these theories, such as blame and the forms of blame 
mitigation are compared. Before moving on to the actual historical 
comparison, a few noteworthy general criticisms are examined in the 
remaining sections.  
98 
4.3.1 HERBERT FINGARETTE: “RESPONSIBILITY” 
 
By writing for decades on the topic of responsibility, based on his experience 
in psychology, Herbert Fingarette had an opportunity to ask the right 
questions in his article “Responsibility” (Fingarette 1966). As a contemporary 
of Strawson, he could present a set of queries that contrasted the emerging 
consensus on what responsibility could be about. He wrote: “it has been 
argued that “moral responsibility” is a vacuous notion. This […] point of view, 
however, is usually a conclusion derived from analyses which are based on 
the presumption that only action or answerability or some combination of 
these are of the essence.” (Fingarette 1966, 58-59.) This exemplifies the 
stances that focus on the moment of action and disregard the history of prior 
events. 
The article argues against a tacit agreement on what moral responsibility 
refers to within the bounds of moral philosophy (Ibid. 58). Also noted in the 
article is the social element of blame: it is decisive what the others think, or 
how they react. While discussed in the Strawsonian context in terms of the 
reactive attitudes, Fingarette appears to have sought a broader spectrum of 
interaction. He discusses how:  
showing how a fuller understanding of ‘moral responsibility’ takes 
one into quite different regions. In moving into these new regions, we 
shall come much closer to the continental divide of morality, what 
Kant called ‘the extreme limit of moral inquiry’, the question why men 
should will the moral law. (Fingarette 1966, 59.) 
 
Fingarette begins by giving us the classic example of involving children134 
(Ibid. 60). His other example is even more striking: “What if we found some 
“malicious villain”, otherwise rational, who did not wish for or respect those 
noble qualities that Kant mentioned? Such a man would not be morally 
“blind”; our “malicious villain” would be very knowledgeable about moral 
issues.” (Ibid. 60.) This “malicious villain” refers to the psychopath. 
Fingarette’s article is followed here in that the examples of children and 
psychopathy are considered in the cases of the main theories examined here. 
These extreme instances of agency, when applied to a situation, can change 
the result of responsibility assessments, which would be unproblematic in 
normal situations. While it is true that any moral theory breaks in the case of 
those who function on a completely different set of principles described in 
the theory, such as that of the psychopath, this is not always clearly stated. 
Examination of a theory through an individual who is by definition out of 
                                                
134 According to Fingarette’s follower, Michael S. Pritchard, who writes in On Becoming 
Responsible that ”Fingarette claims that people are not morally accountable for what they do until they 
show signs of genuine acceptance of responsibility”; there is a certain level of maturity required for 
moral agency and moral responsibility as its extension (see Pritchard 1991, 45). 
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bounds of the entire system (of morality) might and should be pursued, in 
order to find out what responsibility can mean, and what the limits of the 
concept are.   
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4.3.2 MARION SMILEY: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE 
BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY 
 
Another illuminating account of the problems of responsibility is Marion 
Smiley’s Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community (Smiley 
1992). Smiley distinguishes three different concepts of responsibility that are 
useful to know, especially if the historical theories are compared with those 
that are in use today. The first is the classical concept of responsibility dating 
back to ancient Greece. The second is the Christian concept,135 which is not 
pursued here other than by the comparison with the third concept: the 
modern concept of responsibility. (Ibid. 73.)  
The crucial difference between the classical and the modern concept here 
is the location of praise or blame in the process of responsibility assessment. 
The modern conception, as Strawson exemplified, importantly views praise 
or blame as definitive of moral responsibility, but the interest in it stops 
there. Praise or blame as the reactive sentiment is the end state of 
responsibility assessment so far as the modern concept is concerned. 
Aristotle’s theory is such that the classical concept views praise and blame 
more as actual, social links between the agent and the society that he or she 
inhabits. Therefore, responsibility assessment in the classical concept does 
not stop when it is clear whether the agent receives blame or not, but rather 
asks further where the blame is directed and of what magnitude the emotion 
is. Whether an individual is responsible is clear only after the big picture is 
understood.  
By focusing her attention solely on the concept of moral responsibility 
rather than diverting attention toward the notions of free will and 
determinism, Smiley’s observations produce interesting results. She 
describes the differences between the classical concept and the modern 
concept thus. There is a jarring contrast between the way academic 
philosophers are content to discuss moral responsibility and the actual 
problems of the world (see ibid, 1-2). Her claim is that moral responsibility at 
least in the modern context is firmly rooted within social and political 
practice and not as some outside and superior ideal form. What Smiley wants 
to emphasize is that our practical judgments would be opened up in terms of 
moral responsibility, and that that understanding could help us in real 
situations involving the suffering of individuals and other cases of injustice. 
                                                
135 Smiley goes through the Christian concept of responsibility relatively briefly in her chapter 3, 
stating that while a unifying generalization of the Christian concept would be misleading because of the 
scholastic debates that took place during the middle ages, it is not impossible to draw conclusions 
about some of the common clauses that the medieval scholars agreed upon, one of these being God’s 
role as the supreme blamer. While not necessarily relevant in context of this dissertation, the Christian 
concept of responsibility may constitute a good entry point into topics discussed here, as Smiley makes 
the comparison between the concepts of sin and moral responsibility. The latter concept can be 
described from the Christian perspective as sin, without the authority of God. (See Smiley 1992, 58-71.) 
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(See ibid, 14.) She writes that “the very pervasiveness of the modern concept 
of moral responsibility makes it difficult to articulate.” (Ibid. 73.) She argues 
that the modern concept shares the ambiguity of its predecessors, the 
classical and Christian concepts of responsibility. Nevertheless, she also 
argues that these involve a “cluster of shared assumptions” that allow 
contemporary individuals to understand each other in communications 
related to moral responsibility. The trouble is however that even as the 
content of these assumptions is generally the same between everyone, the 
exact composition of these aggregate terms is not identical with everyone. 
This is why Smiley insists that the concepts of responsibility are difficult to 
present as one overarching concept. (Ibid.) 
According to Smiley the modern concept of moral responsibility is not 
supposed to compete with the previous definitions of responsibility as a 
concept per se. Rather, what Smiley demands from the modern conception is 
that it strive to describe something real.136 Moral responsibility would thus 
not only be more tangible than its secular counterparts, but also a distinct 
layer of morality, not reducible to the other historical definitions of moral 
responsibility. (Ibid. 73-74.)  
Smiley quotes Frankena,137 who wrote a basic introduction, Ethics (1973), 
to the questions on responsibility that were relevant for most of the last 
decade. She follows Frankena in the sense that he “captures the conflation of 
causation and blameworthiness that is characteristic of our modern concept 
of moral responsibility” (Smiley 1992, 74). Another source of inspiration is 
Aristotle’s theory: from her perspective the responsibility for action as 
described in NE III.1, including the notions of causation and voluntariness, 
are seen as one of the two primary conditions of blameworthiness. The other 
is that action is done in knowledge. (Ibid. 37-44.) Smiley’s contribution is 
most valued here for the effort to clarify the basic components and the 
differences between the three historical concepts of responsibility. After 
making these clarifications, she sets out to describe an alternative way of 
conceptualizing responsibility, which emphasizes a thing called contra-causal 
freedom.  
A few more words should be devoted to the conflation between causal 
responsibility and blameworthiness. As Smiley very clearly puts it in the 
conclusion of her book, the modern concept of moral responsibility brings 
together the notions of causal responsibility for harm and the fact that the 
                                                
136Smiley quotes J. Feinberg’s question in Doing and Deserving (1970, 30) of whether the 
defendant is really responsible. A separate idea of “real” theoretical responsibility that is distinct from 
practical, legal responsibility is typical of the accounts of moral philosophy. The concepts of “moral 
obligation”, “moral guilt” and“moral responsibility” are used to express this emphasis (Feinberg 1970, 
30). 
137 Frankena writes in Ethics about the distinct nature of causation and blameworthiness. 
(Frankena 1963, 56.) 
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agent ascribed that property is blameworthy. She argues further that neither 
of these notions is purely factual, but that they require the social dimension 
in order to make sense. (Smiley 1992, 255.)  
Without going much deeper into the other subject, the most important 
distinctions from Smiley are followed here and used in further passages. 
These are: 1. the distinction between the classical, Christian and modern 
concepts and 2. the conflation between causal responsibility and 
blameworthiness, which she says is typical of the modern concept. What is 
also emphasized below is 3. the abstraction of the community, i.e., where the 
origin of the moral sentiments of praise and blame in the case of the modern 
concept of responsibility is postulated instead of actually being required to 
take place.  
She concludes by stating that further use and understanding of moral 
responsibility judgments require the disputants to become conscious of the 
communal borders and everything that this entails in terms of expectations 
of each other as well as social roles and power relations within that society.138 
All in all, Smiley’s book is very interesting because of its helpful distinction in 
re-evaluating the nature and use of moral responsibility, and it is also a very 
brave take on the most common assumptions that the concept has accrued 
within the context of the philosophy of responsibility in the previous century. 
(Smiley 1992, 258.)  
                                                
138 This is something that is relevant in the case of the “standing to blame” topic in ch. 4.3.4 as well 
as below in the case of John Doris’s work, which is discussed in 6.1. 
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4.3.3 BERNARD WILLIAMS: SHAME AND NECESSITY & “MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND POLITICAL FREEDOM” 
 
As was noted in connection with Wallace’s rendition of Strawsonian 
responsibility, intention is a factor that cannot be disregarded when 
responsibility assessments are made. Bernard Williams, an esteemed 
philosopher who had discussed the specifics of theories related to 
responsibility had already been influential for decades. His works Shame and 
Necessity (1993) and “Moral Responsibility and Political Freedom” (1997) 
are important in that they offer a distinction that is useful to apply to the 
various theories of responsibility.    
The work of Bernard Williams on the concept of responsibility will be 
looked at after considering how the historical concepts of responsibility can 
help understand the concept. The classical and modern concepts discussed 
before do have something in common at least in structure. As for style, 
Williams is also refreshingly clear-headed about the problem concerning 
“freedom of the will”. He recounts in Shame and Necessity (1993) that:  
[t]he problem […] exists only for those who have metaphysical 
expectations. Just as there is a “problem of evil” only for those who 
expect the world to be good, there is a problem of free will only for 
those who think that the notion of the voluntary can be 
metaphysically deepened. In truth, though it may be extended or 
contracted in various ways, it can hardly be deepened at all. What 
threatens it is the attempt to make it profound, and the effect of 
trying to deepen it is to put it beyond all recognition. The Greeks were 
not involved in those attempts; this is one of the places at which we 
encounter their gift for being superficial out of profundity. (B. 
Williams 1993, 68.) 
 
This line of argument is continued in “Moral Responsibility and Political 
Freedom” (1997) with the following:  
Moral responsibility has a function, and there is much to be said for 
its doing the work of ascriptions of responsibility and dealing with 
our responses [in  form of praise and blame] to offences, so long as 
one does not take it too seriously.[139] But if one accepts the idea of 
moral responsibility, this is often taken to imply that moral 
responsibility is self-applying and does not need or permit any 
external justification or assessment; that it is profound, or can be 
made so; and that it is the ideal in terms of which institutions are to 
be judged and to which they should try to approximate. All of these 
further conceptions are false. If moral responsibility necessarily 
                                                
139 A supposition here is that the hard determinist position is motivated precisely by taking moral 
responsibility with absolute seriousness. 
104 
involved these conceptions, it would have to be abandoned. (B. 
Williams 1997, 102.)  
 
These points lead to Williams’ view of moral responsibility, which is 
interpreted here to be a step toward a more pragmatic account of the term.140 
He writes about the futility of trying to put together a unified theory of 
responsibility by comparing the modern conception of moral responsibility 
with that held by inhabitants of ancient Greece as well as providing a set of 
elements of responsibility to illustrate these ideas more clearly (See B. 
Williams 1993, 55). These ideas are examined below in greater detail.  
He compares our conception of responsibility with that of the Greeks and 
notes how the Greeks would use different conceptions for it, depending on 
the situation.141 What Williams’s is saying is that – ultimately –  there can be 
no universally acceptable definition or a concept of responsibility, as so much 
depends on particular circumstances. If considered in his own concept-pair 
of thick and thin concepts, he is of the mind that the latter is possible and 
useful, but attempts to arrive at the former will be met with insurmountable 
difficulties. As Williams's worries are shared here, his solution is also taken 
note of. He argues that all theories that discuss responsibility put an 
emphasis on one or more of the four following elements of responsibility:  
 
• cause,  
 
• intention, 
 
• state and 
 
• response. 
 
(Williams 1993, chapter 3, & 1997, 96.)  
 
Williams claims that these four elements, common to all attempts to classify 
responsibility, can be distinguished and found in those theories to varying 
degrees, to the extent that they are already in place in the texts of Homer. He 
justifies the uses of the elements instead, defining some version of an all-
purpose concept of responsibility as follows:  
There is not, and there never could be, just one appropriate way of 
adjusting these elements to one another – as we might put it, just one 
                                                
140 Smiley’s work (1992) can be read as a continuation of this trend. 
141 For an example, Williams refers to the Odyssey, where Telemachus opens the door to the 
armory, and lets the enemies of Ulysses arm themselves. The son claims responsibility for the event 
and by using the word aitia. Nevertheless in Aristotle’s case his responsibility-related thoughts based 
on the word telos are equally important. The difference between these concepts will be briefly explored 
in the next section. 
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correct conception of responsibility. Quite apart from the differences 
between our practices and those of the Greeks, we ourselves, in 
various circumstances, need different conceptions of it. All the 
conceptions of it are constructed by interpreting in different ways 
these four elements and varying the emphasis between them. The four 
elements are already in Homer, and they would have to be, since the 
need for them, and for ideas that bring them together in some pattern 
or another, follows simply from some universal banalities. 
Everywhere, human beings act, and their actions cause things to 
happen, and sometimes they intend those things, and sometimes they 
do not; everywhere, what is brought about is sometimes to be 
regretted or deplored, by the agent or by others who suffer from it or 
by both; Wherever all this is possible, there must be some interest in 
the agent’s intentions, if only to understand what has happened; […] 
Again it must be a possible question how the intentions and actions of 
an agent at a given time fit in with, or fail to fit in with, his intentions 
and actions at other times. Under any social circumstances at all, 
that is a question for other people who have to live with him. 
These really are universal materials. What we must not suppose is 
that they are always related to one another in the same way or, 
indeed, that there is one ideal way in which they should be related to 
one another. There are many ways of relating them, in particular of 
relating intention and state to response. (B. Williams 1993, 55-56.)  
 
Because these elements are rarely dealt with identically or even in equal 
measure between the theories, Williams remains  skeptical about a shared 
understanding of the theme between theorists. Nevertheless, from the 
viewpoint of this study, his elements of responsibility are, indeed, very 
useful. To summarize what has been the focus of the research on 
responsibility broadly, the cause and the intention parts have been it in the 
past, the response element is the popular topic now, but what is attempted 
here is to highlight the state element and how it appears in these different 
theories. 
Williams sums the elements up in his article “Moral Responsibility and 
Political Freedom” (B. Williams 1997) by writing that “[A]ny conception of 
responsibility involves four elements: cause, intention, state and response” 
(ibid. 96). In this case, cause refers to any concrete actions taken by agents 
and the causal responsibility related to them. This is essentially the same 
concept that Coates & Tognazzini alluded to in their “causal or explanatory 
responsibility” and its component acts. By itself, the element of cause has not 
held the interest of the recent moral philosophical inquiries. (Coates & 
Tognazzini 2014.) Williams maintains that there can be no responsibility 
without causes and that only a possible case of a responsibility related act 
without a cause would be some sort of "scapegoat" situation (B. Williams 
1993, 56). 
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Intention has attracted a lot more attention in many schools of thought. 
There is a difference, for example, in how intention is discussed in the 
continental circles than within the Anglo-analytical tradition. Intention in 
the Anglophone analytic ethics sense is more closely related to the acts. 
Williams explains the notion of the intention in Shame and Necessity (1993), 
in how it appeared in ancient Greece through the Homeric example of 
Telemachus leaving the door to the armory open, allowing Ulysses’ enemies 
access to the weapons. At the simplest level, it is the condition of the actor in 
which the act is done voluntarily. (See Williams 1993, 66.)  
Intentional action does not, at least according to Williams, indicate that 
the act is done in a normal state of mind. The element of state is a description 
of the effect the state of mind has on the act and the responsibility 
assessment. There have been examples as early as Homer of intentional acts 
that were not done in a normal state of mind. Williams gives the example of 
Agamemnon, where the king explains a situation in which the actor is not 
morally responsible (aitios), because of external influences (the gods) having 
an effect on his conduct. (Ibid. 52.) 
In the later article, Williams further elaborates the elements of intention 
and state. Together these elements constitute the voluntariness of the action, 
as it is discussed for example in Aristotle’s theory. When both of these 
requirements are true for agent A doing X, as Williams puts it “A does X 
intentionally in a normal state of mind.” (Williams 1997, 97.) According to 
him, intention describes the willing of what the agent himself or herself 
“means to do”, while state refers to the “state of mind” of the agent at the 
moment of intending and doing act X. It is not always easy to differentiate 
between these two elements. Williams acknowledges this issue: “There is 
great indeterminancy and vagueness about the agent’s psychological state 
and the soundness of associated [reasons …] lying between state and 
intention.” (Ibid. 101.) 
As for the final element of response, Williams describes it as something 
that “is expected, demanded, or required of the agent or is imposed on him.” 
He notes that in the criminal law context, response usually refers only to 
punishment, but that in the broader context of moral philosophy there are 
other responses related to responsibility. (Ibid. 1997, 98.) As the content of 
criminal law is not under examination here, response, in terms of moral 
responsibility related to conduct basically just refers to praise or blame, or to 
a set of reactive sentiments such as Strawson’s resentment, indignation and 
guilt. 
Williams did not take the explication into very great detail: What is drawn 
upon here is only two sources where the elements are mentioned. The first of 
these is a book that discusses – among other topics – ancient theories of 
responsibility and the second is a relatively brief article arguing in a more 
political arena. In any case, Williams’s explication seems to be a useful 
distinction that is slightly more complex than the often paired distinctions 
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that are usually employed, such as accountability/attributability and 
prospective/retrospective responsibilities, etc. 
In a similar vein, Fingarette began his article by criticizing his contemporary 
argument on moral responsibility for focussing merely on the elements of 
responsibility and not the entire concept (Fingarette 1966, 58). Of course, 
Bernard Williams wrote decades after Fingarette, so his distinctions were not 
the target of the article. Williams could be exonerated from Fingarette’s 
critique on the grounds that the distinctions Williams makes with his 
elements are taking the discussion of moral responsibility forwards, and that 
is more than the tacit acknowledgement of the concept at Fingarette’s time.  
A more extensive elaboration on forms of responsibility is attempted by 
John M. Fischer and Mark Ravizza in their Responsibility and Control 
(1998). While not directly used here, it is examined next as having some 
interesting connections to the other theories discussed here.142 
Williams is not alone in attempting to formulate this sort of taxonomy. 
Fisher & Ravizza present a similar idea. Their concept of reasons-
responsiveness describes the condition in which William’s state element is 
true. In such a case, the agent is viewed as an adult, fully capable member of 
the moral community. Fischer describes the condition of reasons-
responsiveness in the earlier article “Responsiveness and moral 
responsibility” in Schoeman (1987): “An agent is morally responsible for an 
action insofar as he is rationally accessible to certain kinds of attitudes and 
activities as a result of performing the action.” (Fischer 1987, 81.) Also, “a 
weakly responsive mechanism is all that is required for moral responsibility. 
[…] Moral responsibility requires some connection between reason and 
action, but the fit can be quite loose.” (Ibid, 89-90.) 
In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (1998) 
Fischer & Ravizza explicitly select the Strawsonian view of moral 
responsibility as the basis of their theory.143 The reason why this is so is their 
belief that Strawson’s theory accurately reflects the implicit cultural values 
held by them (see Fischer & Ravizza 1998, 8-10). They follow the assumption 
that responsibility requires an agent who is an applicable target of the 
reactive sentiments (see Fischer & Ravizza 1998, 241-242). They also discuss 
Aristotle’s primary influence on the theories of responsibility through the two 
excusing conditions of “ignorance” and “force” (Fischer & Ravizza 1998, 12). 
Fischer and Ravizza’s taxonomy for the levels of responsiveness corresponds 
with moral responsibility in terms of whether the act is deemed 
blameworthy. Causal responsibility is given, otherwise it would not make 
sense to evaluate the act correctly. The taxonomy begins with acts that are 
                                                
142 Some points from Fischer and Ravizza’s Responsibility and Control (1998) are taken into 
consideration, including the taxonomy of reasons-responsive responsibilities (Fischer & Ravizza 1998, 
82). Fischer and Ravizza, along with Gary Watson, are two of the few authors who discuss a facet of 
responsibility called historical responsibility. 
143 ”On the Strawsonian view we are adopting in this book…” (Fischer & Ravizza 1998, 8). 
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mere bodily movements.144 Some of these are unintentional, while others are 
intentional. (Fischer & Ravizza 1998, 83.) 
The taxonomy-tree in Fischer and Ravizza (1998) follows the intentional 
bodily movements, dividing them into reasons-responsive acts and 
unresponsive, intentional acts. As an example of these, the writers describe a 
skipper who is panicked in a storm. As a result of diminished reasons-
responsiveness due to external coercive factors, the skipper is not morally 
responsible for her actions. The writers place “insane persons” who can be 
determined to act out of intention at the same level of reasons-
responsiveness, but their “mental illness is so severe that he acts on a 
mechanism that is not at all responsive to reasons.” (Ibid. 82.) 
The actors on the “Responsive to reason” level of the taxonomy are 
divided into classes which distinguish moral and non-moral reasons. Those 
responsive only to non-moral reasons are either “babies” or “certain 
psychopaths” according to Fischer and Ravizza. This group is the same as 
Strawson’s second sub-group, or the group of “exempted” agents described 
by Watson and Wallace, examples which are examined later in greater detail. 
Finally, the most reasons-responsive group is divided into cases in which 
significant duress may or may not be present. For example, a calm skipper 
can remain reasons-responsive even under duress (ibid. 83). The command 
to abandon ship can be done rationally, and the skipper be appropriately 
held responsible for it. Compared to Williams’ elements, both intention and 
state elements are without fault in such cases. Depending on the outcome 
praise or blame might be relevant.  
The final point of interest in this case is the thoughts that Fischer and 
Ravizza spend on the nature of historicity of facts, and the effect of these on 
moral responsibility. They make an important distinction in the chapter 
devoted to examination of the historical qualities of responsibility. The 
division of phenomena into historical and non-historical, or “current time-
slice” phenomena is relevant. The historical phenomena are in some way 
dependent on their history, or events in the past that have affected them, 
while those that are non-historical are apparent without this historical 
knowledge; for example, we can perceive the color of an object without any 
knowledge about how it became so. A contrasting example Fischer and 
Ravizza give is a painting by Picasso, the genuineness of which cannot be 
determined on the “current time-slice” context. (Fischer & Ravizza 1998, 171-
172.)  
Fischer and Ravizza further compare Robert Nozick’s critique of 
distributive justice with that of historical phenomena and responsibility. Just 
as Nozick’s critique of justice demands that it is not enough to look at 
“current time-slice” situations in order to determine the justice of any given 
distribution of property, it is important in cases of moral responsibility to 
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take the historical phenomena into account as well. (See Fischer & Ravizza 
1998, 178-182.) The authors further extend the considerations of the 
historical component of responsibility145 in order to criticise Frankfurt’s 
theory which, they argue, adheres to the “current time-slice notion”. Fischer 
and Ravizza conclude with the statement that “Frankfurt is correct in 
thinking that taking responsibility is crucial to moral responsibility, but he is 
wrong to think that taking responsibility can be analyzed simply by reference 
to snapshot properties.” (Ibid. 199-200.) The proposed solution to the 
problem that the current time-slice theories face is that a historical 
component be included in the taking responsibility theme that the writers 
propose. 
The conclusion of their book reads: “we suggested that moral 
responsibility is in the class of genuinely historical phenomena”. They also 
take note of the possible objections of entitlement-based views and Kripkean 
soft facts. (Ibid. 201-206.) While Fischer & Ravizza have given thought to the 
taxonomy and illustrate finely in their book, and the general notion of 
historical component of responsibility is followed here, disagreements in 
other areas prevent further adherence to Fischer & Ravizza (1998): for 
instance, while the seemingly simple progression from bodily movements 
toward reasons-responsive, fully responsible acts in their taxonomy is 
helpful, it can be limiting when all possible cases requiring assessment of 
responsibility are considered. Relying solely on the taxonomy, for instance, 
all acts would require bodily movement as the origin of causal responsibility. 
It could also be imagined, say, that the taxonomy could be applied to speech-
acts as well, where a random utterance might replace bodily movement, or, if 
classified as outside of group of bodily movements, an act could be initiated 
with some form of electro-magnetic controller that reads the activity of a 
brain, for instance.146 
While Fischer and Ravizza’s theory is novel and offers many important 
insights, they will be referred only as needed from this point on. Williams’s 
elements, however, are considered essential and will be returned to in the 
analysis part, as they will serve as categories of explication of Strawsonian 
and Aristotelian concepts of character and excuses in responsibility. Gary 
Watson's input is looked at as a final but important source of criticism of the 
Strawsonian position. 
                                                
145 The historical component of responsibility (discussed in the next chapter) refers to the idea first 
mentioned in Watson’s article (1987) that the developmental history of the agent influential at the 
moment when responsibility for an act is assessed. Fischer & Ravizza’s term “current time-slice” refers 
to those accounts which deny or otherwise circumvent this effect.   
146 Another consideration is the format of Fischer and Ravizza’s theory: the locus of responsibility 
is different than the Strawsonian cases. For this reason, Fischer and Ravizza’s shift from an agent-
based approach to a mechanism-based one has been criticized by Wallace (1997), Gary Watson 
(2004/[2001]), and McKenna (2013). 
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4.3.4 GARY WATSON “RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LIMITS OF EVIL: 
VARIATIONS ON A STRAWSONIAN THEME” 
 
While Strawson's “Freedom and Resentment” (2008/[1962]) may be the 
most influential article concerning the philosophy of responsibility, Gary 
Watson’s commentary “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a 
Strawsonian Theme” (1987) can be read as a companion to it.147 As it is, it 
contains many features related to moral responsibility that are left out of the 
discussion by Strawson’s relatively brief article. The issues and definitions 
introduced in that paper elevate it to one of the most important 
commentaries on the subject.148 A few of these are highlighted here: 
historical responsibility is an especially important theme that Watson 
considers and that is left out of Strawson’s work. Moral address is another 
theme, which starts its own line of inquiry. In addition to these, the 
clarifications and distinctions that Watson makes are important in advancing 
the discussion about moral responsibility. 
In “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil” (1987) Watson describes 
Strawson’s theory as “the expressive theory of moral responsibility”. 
According to Watson, it is a compatibilist theory that is not consequentialist 
by nature. Someone being blamed usually means for Watson the attribution 
of a moral fault, shortcoming, vice or a character defect. In these cases, what 
is conceived as responsibility is the conditions of propriety in making moral 
judgments. In Strawson’s theory, these judgments are not sufficient by 
themselves for determining moral responsibility. What is left out of such a 
definition is the practice of holding responsible. As Watson puts it: “In a 
Strawsonian view, blaming is not merely fault-finding appraisal, […] but a 
range of responses to the agent on the basis of such appraisals. [n10] These 
non-propositional responses are constitutive of the practice of holding 
responsible. (Watson 1987, 261-262.)  
In his article Watson gives the example of Robert Harris, an individual 
who is “brutal, vicious, heartless, mean” (Ibid. 268-271, quote from 274). The 
actual story is vivid and lends credibility to Harris having the traits 
mentioned above. The key question that Watson asks is: “Can we be in a 
moral community with those who reject the basic terms of moral 
community”? (Ibid. 268). The implied worry is conceptualizing responsibility 
in a way that leaves out of the equation a significant proportion of agents who 
can still do wrong and be causally responsible for harm.  
                                                
147 “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme” was originally 
published in Schoeman 1987. Except for the most recent article (Watson 2014) the important 
contributions by Watson, including Watson 1987, are also in the compilation Agency and 
Answerability (Watson, 2004). 
148 Compare this with the brief bibliography of the first volume of the new series of Oxford Studies 
on Agency and Responsibility, in which Watson’s article is one of six mentioned (and two are 
Shoemaker’s own publications) (Shoemaker 2013, 11). 
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Watson, who has influenced the topic of history’s effect on responsibility in 
Fischer & Ravizza (1998), is even more explicit on the subject, as the 
following quote from “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil” shows: 
I have been exploring some ways in which the expressive theory 
might explain the relevance of certain historical considerations. 
Whatever the best explanation may be, the remarkable fact is that we 
are, for the most part, quite ignorant of these considerations. Why 
does our ignorance not give us more pause? If, for whatever reason, 
reactive attitudes are sensitive to historical considerations, as 
Strawson acknowledges, and we are largely ignorant of these 
matters, then it would seem that most of our reactive attitudes are 
hasty, perhaps even benighted, as skeptics have long maintained. 
(Watson 1987, 282-283.) 
 
Watson’s point is that, instead of just presenting the atrocities Watson 
provides the biographical history of Harris, which explains the state that the 
man is in through past events (Watson 1987, 272-274). He argues that the 
example gives our reactive sentiments a pause. This is all part of pointed 
criticism of Strawson’s theory. According to Watson, the examples as they are 
related do not necessarily lead to a deterministic account of the events, but 
he does note the effect that the additional information has on the reactive 
attitudes. Knowing what the formative factors for the wrong-doer were does 
not cancel out the initial recoil from the atrocities, mixing the emotions 
instead to produce “ambivalence”. “No wonder!” claims the author (ibid. 
275). Watson questions the need to group historical explanations with 
determinism, writing that “the ways in which reactive attitudes are affected 
by sympathy and moral are intelligible without appealing to any of the 
conceptions of responsibility that Strawson eschews. […]. Horrid 
backgrounds do not inevitably give rise to horrid people.” (Ibid. 277.) 
Assuming that determinism is true, Watson emphasizes the need to 
recognize the necessity of moral luck149. As evil, in Watson’s words, is caused 
in determined environments together by “nature and nurture”, the difference 
between those causing it and those who are not is dependent on moral luck. 
Were the situation otherwise, every individual exposed to similar 
circumstances would act in an identical way as a result. The acceptance of 
this fact, according to Watson, has an unalterable effect on our judgments of 
responsibility. In this way, determinism has an effect on our reactive 
attitudes, contrary to Strawson’s claims. (Ibid. 278.) 
The Harris example is meant to demonstrate, by telling the story of a 
morally unlucky individual, that because it is impossible to be responsible for 
one’s own formative circumstances, it must be the agent’s response to those 
circumstances that determines whether one becomes evil or not (ibid. 279). 
                                                
149 Watson talks of sympathy and moral luck in his “Reasons and Responsibility” (2004/[2001]) as 
well. He continues the debate that Fischer & Ravizza took part in in their Responsibility and Control. 
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Watson considers that this need for authority in the face of a decision may be 
a powerful argument against determinism; however, he sticks to the 
compatibilist context.150 On the other hand, he is asking about the feasibility 
of a type of consideration of responsibility usually reserved for 
incompatibilism. Giving partial consent to the libertarian term allows the 
type of historical content to influence the responsibility-related 
considerations, but by distancing himself from incompatibilist issues, he 
sketches out a form of responsibility that is both compatibilist, i.e., not 
dependent on the factuality of determinism, as with Strawson’s, and open to 
at least some sort of influence from the historical side, as Aristotle’s theory is 
if interpreted such that character matters for moral responsibility. 
Concerning the Harris example Watson asks:  
Are we […] to suppose that at some earlier stage Harris slipped 
heedlessly or recklessly into patterns of thought and action which he 
ought to have known would eventuate in an evil character? (This 
seems to have been Aristotle’s view in Nicomachean Ethics, Book 
III.5.) In that case, we would be tracing his present ways to the much 
less egregious faults of negligence. (Watson 1987, 280. The passage of 
Aristotle that Watson mentions is discussed in chapter 5.1.2.)  
 
Here Watson runs into a problem, which could explain his separation of 
excuses and exemptions. In Harris’s case, the requirements of treating him as 
a morally responsible agent are not met, and as a result, any attempt to do so 
is bound to fail. In the end, Watson concludes his commentary on Strawson’s 
theory of responsibility with consideration of the way character is related to 
responsibility:  
What we are responsible for are the particular things we consent to. 
We need not consider whether we are responsible for the genesis of 
the entity whose characteristics necessitate those acts of consent, for 
there is no such entity. In a way, of course, one is derivatively 
responsible for one’s self, since one’s moral self is constituted by the 
character of what one consents to, and one is responsible for what 
one consents to. (Watson 1987, 281).  
                                                
150 “We should be struck here by the a priori character of libertarian convictions. How is Harris’s 
consent to be construed, and why must it have occurred? What evidence is there that it occurred? Why 
couldn’t Harris just have become that way? What is the difference between his having acquiesced to 
what he became and his simply having become that way? The libertarian faces the following 
difficulty: If there is no such difference, then the view is vacuous, for consent was supposed to explain 
his becoming that way. If there is a difference, what evidence is there that it obtains in a particular 
case? Isn’t there room for considerable doubt about this, and shouldn’t libertarians, insofar as we are 
libertarians, be very doubtful about Harris’s responsibility.” (Watson 1987, 280. My emphasis.)  
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Watson considers the possibility that the libertarian position could be more 
plausible if the libertarians could agree with the idea that “we are responsible 
for what we consent to”. He states that: “These claims are far from self-
evident. But they hardly amount to a ‘panicky metaphysics’” again 
referencing Strawson. Ultimately Watson remains skeptical about the 
possibility of a libertarian theory of responsibility that was not 
incompatibilist, although the ideas he initiated in “Responsibility and the 
Limits of Evil” do find traction at least in the theories of Fischer & Ravizza 
later on. (Watson 1987, 282.) 
The division of different types of excuses into excuses and exemptions 
comes from the explication Watson undertakes based on Strawson’s original 
division of the special considerations into two different groups. Watson 
initially labels these two groups as type-1 and type-2 excuses but, as the 
examination advances, he starts to refer the type-2 excuses as having 
exempting conditions.151 
In the Harris example, the prisoner, who is according to Watson “an 
archetypal candidate for blame” (Watson 1987, 271), refuses dialogue and by 
doing so casts himself out of the moral community. By demonstrating 
understanding of morality, utilizing it in a perverse manner, Harris sets 
himself apart from society. Watson thinks that Harris’s behavior is different 
from how a child or even a psychopath would act. This complete removal of 
oneself from the boundaries of responsibility leads Watson to distinguish 
exemptions from excuses: “Hence, if we are to appeal to the constraints of 
moral address to explain certain […] type-2 pleas, we must not include 
among these constraints comembership in the moral community or the 
significant possibility of dialogue – unless, that is, evil is to be its own 
exemption.” (Ibid. 271.)  
The way that the type-2 exemptions inhibit or eliminate responsibility, as 
with a variety of agents extending from children to extreme examples such as 
Harris, is insufficiently explained in FR. Watson notes this and offers his 
suspicion on the problem with the comment that “what might be necessary to 
complete [Strawson’s theory] will undermine the theory” (Watson 1987, 
263). As a partial solution, Watson offers the interpretation of exemptions 
(type-2 excuses) and their conditions as indications of constraints on moral 
address152 (ibid.). 
Watson also comments on Strawson’s naturalistic turn by looking at the 
relation between the emotional and the rational in the reactive attitudes. 
Even as Strawson is adamant about the affective nature of the reactive 
attitudes, Watson points out that they “are not mere effusions of feeling, 
                                                
151 R. J. Wallace adopts the distinction later in his Responsibility and the Moral Emotions (1994). 
Wallace is discussed above, in chapter 4.1. 
152 See Garrath Williams’s description on the topic of moral address in his bibliography on "Moral 
Responsibility" (2010).  
 
114 
unaffected by facts[… in] that they neither require nor permit a ‘rational 
justification’ of some general sort. […] Reactive attitudes do have internal 
criteria, since they are reactions to the moral qualities exemplified by an 
individual’s attitudes and conduct” (Watson 1987, 259). Watson himself is in 
favor of a rational, judgment-based view of blame and responsibility, as he 
has actively asserted recently (see Watson 2013 in Coates & Tognazzini (ed.) 
2013). 
Watson includes an important footnote on how Strawson’s theory goes 
beyond the spectator theories of the 18th century British empiricists: 
“Contrary to some of Strawson’s discussion, responsibility does not concern 
only other-regarding attitudes. You can hold up yourself responsible for 
failing to live up to an ideal that has no particular bearing on the interests or 
feelings of others. It may be said that others cannot blame you for this 
failure; but that would be a moral claim.” (Watson 1987, 259, n4.) 
Coates & Tognazzini consider Watson’s Harris example in their Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy article “Blame”, written in 2014. They view the 
article from the perspective of the concept of moral luck153. In the article, 
Harris is described as a cruel murderer who is obviously an easy target for 
blame. As Strawson’s theory views blame in particular as the tell-tale signal 
of moral responsibility, the culpability of Harris seems inevitable. Yet, when 
Watson recounts the personal history of Harris, the author demonstrates that 
in order for Strawson’s reactive sentiments to be the constituents of moral 
responsibility, they are susceptible to alteration by circumstantial 
knowledge.154 Coates & Tognazzini claim that Watson’s example 
demonstrates considerations of moral luck in that it asks us to imagine a 
situation in which we are in Harris’s shoes instead. Given the circumstances, 
the empirical evidence seems to tell us that each one of us could commit the 
worst atrocities. The fact that we do not might merely be a question of lucky 
coincidence. 
Coates & Tognazzini point out that the “thought that one's moral self is 
such a fragile thing” causes discomfort. Becoming a wrong-doer as Harris is 
considered in the article to various degrees, the authors labeling this concern 
as “a worry about subjunctive hypocrisy”.155 Looking at the example through 
                                                
153 Moral luck is a concept that is popularized by Bernard Williams (see, for example, Williams 
1981). This is explored further in connection with moral responsibility in the various articles by Gary 
Watson (see Watson 2004). 
154Thus “we are unable to command an overall view of his life that permits the reactive attitudes to 
be sustained without ambivalence. That is because the biography forces us to see him as a victim, and 
so seeing him does not sit well with the reactive attitudes that are so strongly elicited by Harris’s 
character and conduct. […] Harris both satisfies and violates the criteria of victimhood.” (Watson 1987, 
275.) 
155 “Another problem with Strawson’s approach, according to Watson, is that by focusing on an 
agent’s current moral attitudes, it does not seem to show why ‘unfortunate formative circumstances’ 
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the idea of standing to blame, it appears that the only reason why we might 
blame Harris, or indeed any other criminal, is that we are better endowed 
with moral luck. Further on, if this difference in moral luck was 
acknowledged, would that fact make it more difficult to take that privilege? 
(Coates & Tognazzini 2014.) Watson’s critique provides many conclusions, 
including the insight that not every concern related to the reactive attitudes is 
important for moral responsibility. He then gives an example of a case in 
which moral standing has significance; there are instances where it is not 
appropriate for a person to blame another at all due to their different statuses 
in the moral community or due to the particular nature of their relationship 
with each another. (Watson 1987, 283.)  
At this point it would be impossible to overstate the importance of 
Watson’s work for the current state of the philosophy of responsibility. His 
important contributions include his challenges related to (1.) aretaic 
appraisal, which implies that Strawson’s theory disqualifying the most 
vicious persons from his system of responsibility is a flaw in his theory, (2.) 
as well as is its incomplete development of the aspect of historical 
responsibility. Additionally, (3.) Watson’s observations pave way for a lighter 
concept of moral character, that may be useful, if the thicker definitions of 
character prove to be unsuitable for moral theories.156 Continuing the theme 
of (4.) moral address, Watson’s critique of the emotion-based account of 
blame,157 leading to the questions of standing to blame in the relations 
between the agents in the Strawsonian system. (5) The aforementioned 
distinctions of accountability/attributability and the need to take both into 
account in order to fully understand moral responsibility is another 
important contribution (6) Finally, the division between excuses and 
exemptions has proven useful to subsequent philosophy of responsibility. 
                                                                                                                                     
are relevant to exempting conditions.” (Schoeman (ed.) 1987, 21-22. Also noted in McKenna & Russell 
2007.) 
156 See Schoeman’s summary of Watson’s article in Schoeman (ed.) 1987, 22-21. 
157 In his recent article in Coates & Tognazzini’s Blame (2013) called “Standing in Judgment” 
Watson contrasts nonjudgmentalism with judgmentalism, emphasizing Watson’s stance of blame 
being more judgment in nature than an emotion. 
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4.4 SUMMARY 
 
The most cited contemporary Strawsonian, R. Jay Wallace, and his version of 
theory of responsibility was described as part of the broader picture of the 
Strawsonian account of responsibility. How Wallace conceived responsibility, 
it was noted, was by following Strawson’s example closely with a couple of 
notable differences. The first of these was that, more explicitly than 
Strawson, Wallace’s responsibility was associated with the idea of holding 
one responsible, and even whether it is fair to hold one responsible. 
Arguably, this divorces Wallace’s theory from the actual interactions between 
human beings a step further, but his book Responsibility and the Moral 
Sentiments (Wallace 1994) can be read as the most carefully articulated 
theory expanding the Strawsonian position. The other difference had to do 
with Wallace’s explicit Kantian element, which leads him in the end to utilize 
the concept of reflective self-control. 
After Wallace’s work, attention was turned toward the contemporary 
debate on the concept of blame. Strawson is the definitive author here as 
well, as his reactive sentiments based view is the influential position to which 
the others refer. Alongside Strawson’s theory, two modifications to the 
default position were looked at, one by Scanlon and the other by Sher. 
Scanlon’s concept of blame is more clearly grounded in sociality than 
Strawson, as it focuses on the interpersonal relations between the agents. 
Blame implies an unfulfilled expectation of social conduct and the resultant 
adjustment of attitude toward the other. Scanlon’s view has attracted 
criticism since, including from Wallace, on the grounds that Scanlon’s theory 
dismisses the emotional side of blame. Sher’s blame on the other hand seems 
to intend a synthesis between the cognitive and the emotional aspects of 
blame, as within his theory, blame consists of belief-desire pairs. 
The last substantial section (4.3) focused on the most important 
arguments highlighting something that the Strawsonian position, as it is 
understood here, misses either by design, or by accident: a fellow 
philosopher at Strawson’s time, Herbert Fingarette, wrote in his 1966 article 
that responsibility as a word can refer to other content that is limited by the 
relatively constrained concept of moral responsibility. On the other hand, 
Marion Smiley’s book Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of 
Community (1992) explored other historical conceptions of responsibility 
leading her to suggest three alternative concepts: the classical, the Christian 
and the modern concept of responsibility. She claims that the modern 
concept has conflated the ideas of causal responsibility and blameworthiness. 
Working from a similar angle (and also directly influencing Smiley with 
his earlier work) Bernard Williams in Shame and Necessity (1993) and 
“Moral Responsibility and Political Freedom” (1997) sketched out four 
elements of responsibility which, he argues, were present in each attempt to 
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formulate theories of moral responsibility since the ancient Greeks did their 
work. 
Gary Watson’s article “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil” (1987) was 
examined for numerous pointed questions that show that the Strawsonian 
position is inadequate as far as it is used to define responsibility. As the 
following chapter is devoted to another strand of history and a different 
conception of responsibility, the themes of the chapter above will defer to the 
other perspective, but selected questions will be returned to the chapters 
devoted to the systematic presentation of the concepts (chapter 6) and their 
analysis (chapter 7) in part II. 
This concludes the substantive section on Strawson and the responses to 
his work. In the next chapter an altogether different theory of responsibility 
is examined. Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility is based on his work in 
ancient Greece, but recent scholarship has breathed new life into his ideas, 
many of which can be compared to those held by modern philosophers. As a 
point of contrast, the examination of this other theory is considered to be 
able to highlight important topics that are universal in human thought as 
well as to point out the possible omissions in the current, focused 
philosophical efforts. 
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5 ARISTOTELIAN RESPONSIBILITY
158
 
Aristotle (384 – 322 BC) was the first philosopher who, in a broad sense, 
formulated a theory of responsibility that is still worth examining. His 
account is based on his virtue ethics, which are described in detail in the 
following sections. Among other key concepts within the statement of this 
idea of moral responsibility, praise and blame were described as an 
appropriate response either to acts committed or to character traits. 
(Eshleman 2014, quoting EN 1109b30-35). 
Aristotle has provided inspiration in the debate on responsibility for 
contemporary scholars as well, since his conceptualization of the subject is 
still free of the problem of determinism. Side-stepping this difficult issue 
makes a number of related topics seem clearer and thus more appealing to 
apply to real life. As an obvious difference, the problem of determinism has 
occupied philosophical authors of the last century (see Eshleman 2014). As 
Aristotle did not concern himself with the problem as much as his modern 
counterparts, his writings are (depending on one’s viewpoint) refreshingly 
free from its burdens. Whether Aristotle’s theory can be considered viable 
when subjected to the problem is an issue that has attracted arguments for 
and against. There seems to be a chance that Aristotle’s work fits into the 
definition of compatibilist theory, and thus remains untouched by the 
problem. 
What is unique about Aristotle’s agency is also noteworthy: Aristotle’s 
choice that depends on a “desire resulting from deliberation, one that 
expresses the agent’s conception of what’s good” is an important 
distinguishing factor (Eshleman 2014, quoting EN 1111b5-1113b3). This 
conscious understanding of available courses of action in choice-making 
situations, the type of control wielded by the agent in question, separated 
from the epistemic conditions of responsibility, is related to Aristotle’s view 
on character and its effect on responsibility. Relations between Aristotelian 
conceptions of moral agency and character, as well as the problematic 
notions related to the responsibility of character are discussed in the 
following sections. 
The transition of Aristotle’s thoughts into our culture and age raises some 
issues. Some degree of interpretation is necessary as the ambiguity in 
Aristotle’s theory is at odds with the current debates on responsibility as they 
                                                
158 This chapter is an extended version of the author’s "Teot, luonne ja kansalaisuus - 
Nykyfilosofian tulkintoja Aristoteleen vastuukäsityksestä" in the Finnish-language publication 
Historiallinen aikakauskirja (02/2011). The article discussed three different interpretations of what 
“responsibility” can mean within Aristotle's works Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. Compared to the 
work presented here, this article provides a summary of the sources used here and a brief discussion of 
the questions that are discussed further below.  
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appear today, It is hoped that insights into the Aristotelian concept of 
responsibility can be gained through interpretation, following attempts by 
distinguished scholars.159  
Historically, the initial form of the discussions of responsibility is found in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE). Aristotle’s ideas influenced Christian 
philosophy extensively through the works of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas 
among others. As an ethicist, David Hume can be read as returning to the 
classical concept, but with the added ideas introduced by the empiricist 
methods. More recently, Strawson’s effort has also led to renewed interest in 
Aristotle’s concept of responsibility because it provides the modern 
interpretations.160 These recent contributions are examined below in the 
order that Aristototle’s theory is discussed in chapter 5.1, where it is 
explicated in three different interpretations: responsibility for action, 
responsibility for character and political responsibility. The discussion 
related to the most contested topic in Aristotle’s responsibility, whether the 
idea of responsibility for character is to be included in his theory of moral 
responsibility, is then discussed in chapter 5.2.   
                                                
159 Texts by scholars forming the basis for understanding Aristotle’s responsibility include (but are 
not limited to): Irwin 1980; Roberts 1987; Broadie 1991 & Meyer 1993. 
160 The differences between the classical concept of responsibility and that of modern authors were 
discussed in the previous chapter (4.3.2). 
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5.1 ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Aristotle is relevant in terms of moral responsibility. The academic 
discussion on the concept has been present in one form or another in 
Western philosophy since its very beginning. There has hardly been any 
continuous process of seeking a universally accepted definition. For this 
reason, the writings on responsibility by Aristotle are still as valid as any 
other more recent theories. The connection between the themes of 
knowledge and responsibility and whether one can be blamed for acts done 
in ignorance are questions which still recall Aristotle, and are no less credible 
because of it.  
In the more mainstream utilitarian and Kantian accounts of responsibility 
in ethics (and political philosophy) the concept has had an ancillary role to 
the larger wholes in the context of issues such as rights and duties. Rather, 
the topic has been revisited from time to time and from different viewpoints 
and, as we saw, the concept of responsibility has usually had a secondary role 
to another concept, for example, right or duty. Not until the 20th century has 
moral responsibility – as its own topic – received as much attention as it does 
now. In recent decades, research on Aristotle’s conception of responsibility 
has been a topic of moderate interest. The turn of the 1980’s and 1990’s 
particularly saw a lot of publications devoted to the subject. 
As Aristotle does not have any distinct word that could be directly translated 
as “responsibility”, some interpretation has to be used.161 Aitios/aitia 
generally is considered to be the ancient Greek equivalent, but since this 
word does not encompass every notion of the Aristotelian concept, it is 
difficult to draw direct comparisons between the contemporary theories and 
the ancient counterpart. This does not mean that this is impossible, nor that 
there might not have been any attempt to do this. This brings us to the 
question about interpretation needed for the Aristotelian notions to work in 
today’s context. As stated, Aristotle does not have a single word that would 
translate directly as “responsibility”. Instead concepts such as aitios implying 
guilt and telos signifying the ultimate goal of the action should be taken into 
account, as are many other elements. The different approaches considered 
here produce different points of emphasis in Aristotle’s context: these are (a) 
                                                
161 By looking at interpretations derived from Aristotle’s theory of responsibility, by a rough 
account three alternatives emerge: 1. to attempt to remain within the contemporary context with 
Aristotle; i.e., to try to engage with philosophy and concepts that the man himself could understand. 2. 
To take the scholarly route and try to learn from Aristotle and apply his teachings as appropriate to the 
current world, and 3. finally to take a Nussbaumian approach (see, for example, Nussbaum 1986) and 
build upon the Aristotelian foundations. This last strategy is commonly referred to as neo-
Aristotelianism. The strategy of interpretation followed here belongs to the 2nd category. It is noted 
however, that some of the sources used here are derived from the third group, and are as such 
respected as a source of new thought.  
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responsibility for action, (b) responsibility for character and (c) political 
responsibility. Actions are significant for the first interpretation, the actor for 
the second, while the third looks at the previous two in relation to society. 
Through these three interpretations of Aristotle’s responsibility, it is argued 
that the significant difference between the modern conception of 
responsibility, and the classical, Aristotelian responsibility is the inclusion of 
the character-based considerations in determining responsibility (see Smiley 
in the previous chapter 3.4.2.)  
These interpretations have originated from different disciplines. As a 
general guideline interpretation, (a) is used by mainstream theoretical 
traditions of normative ethics including consequentialist and Kant-
influenced, deontological theories. In addition to these theories, 
interpretation (b) is indebted to virtue ethics such as that of G. E. M. 
Anscombe.162 Interpretation (c) is derived from political theory, which is not 
part of moral responsibility as such directly, but in Aristotle’s context has 
relevance for the idea. Instead of selecting a single interpretation, three 
different viewpoints are looked at here in an attempt to describe how diverse 
the discussion on responsibility today is. As we saw in the methodology 
section (2.1.), whenever the disciplines referred to here include more than 
one, a naturalistic perspective would be the fall-back discipline. In this, T. H. 
Irwin’s 1980 article “Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle” forms the basis 
of discussing Aristotle’s responsibility.163 Other significant sources frequently 
used here are Roberts (1989), S. Broadie (1991)164 and B. Williams (1993). 
Susan Sauvé Meyer’s interpretation Meyer’s Aristotle on Moral 
Responsibility (Meyer 2011, see 161-167) is “roughly naturalist” in following 
Strawson’s conception of responsibility in general terms. This makes for an 
easy comparison, but it needs to be noted that the same risks of 
misinterpretation that Meyer notes apply here, In the same vein, Susanne 
                                                
162 See G. E. M. Anscombe (1958) “Modern Moral Philosophy” and particularly Anscombe (1977) 
“Thought and Action in Aristotle”, in J. Barnes, M. Schofield & R. Sorabji (eds.) Articles on Aristotle 2. 
Ethics and Politics, Surrey: Duckworth. 
163 Terence H. Irwin’s article “Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle” in Amelie Oksenberg Rorty’s 
Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (1980) summarizes Aristotle’s responsibility for action, which is the 
subject of chapter 5.1.1. Irwin’s text is perhaps the most rigorous article devoted to clarifying the exact 
formulations related to Aristotle’s theory of responsibility. Irwin’s scholarship of the ancient 
philosopher is accurate and interesting. Only the speculative additions to the original theory have come 
under scrutiny, and these extended parts, such as the “Complex Theory” have attracted more criticism, 
especially from Jean Roberts (1989). Additionally, Irwin draws interesting comparisons between the 
theories of responsibility of Aristotle and David Hume. 
164 The article “Responsibility for Action and Character” by Jean Roberts (1989) and the major 
work Ethics with Aristotle by Sarah Broadie (1991) are looked at on Aristotle’s responsibility for 
character. These sources are read in connection with Meyer’s book. Roberts's article originally 
discusses the relationship between Aristotle and his teacher Plato. One of the major emergent themes 
from this influential comparison is the fine details of the Aristotelian account of moral responsibility. 
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Bobzien has recently written a clear and helpful article in the Cambridge 
Companion to Nicomachean Ethics, which is also referred to here (Polansky 
(ed.) 2014).165 
Moral responsibility in Aristotle’s context is understood as including both 
responsibility for action and character-based concerns. Compared with the 
contemporary understanding of the concept, the specific treatment of 
character and its influence on responsibility sets Aristotle’s moral 
responsibility apart from them. For an example, Jean Roberts writes of these 
two distinct notions in her “Aristotle on Responsibility for Action and 
Character” (1989). Political responsibility however is a subject that is difficult 
to fit within the boundaries of the modern concept of moral responsibility, 
even as both social and political concerns are discussed in Politics.166 As for 
Aristotle’s moral responsibility, the most important source is Nicomachean 
Ethics167 and to a lesser extent Rhetoric168. The relevant passages on 
responsibility are mostly located in the third book of the Nicomachean 
Ethics. 
  
                                                
165 Susanne Bobzien’s article on Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility in The Cambridge 
Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as well as Javier Echeñique’s book (2012) on the same 
subject represent the most recent commentary on the subjects discussed below. These two examples 
demonstrate that the book is not closed in terms of interpreting Aristotle’s writings on moral 
responsibility: while the former would incline one to accept the comparisons that are made here, the 
latter argues that Aristotle’s moral responsibility is incompatible with the modern concept. This debate 
is a persistent fixture of the Aristotle scholarship, and it will be addressed in chapter 5.2.  
166 Aristotle’s Politics (Pol.) in Aristotle. 1984. The Collected Works of Aristotle. Ed. Jonathan 
Barnes. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
167 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE) in Aristotle 1984. The Collected Works of Aristotle. Ed. 
Jonathan Barnes. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
168 Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Rhet.) in Aristotle 1984. The Collected Works of Aristotle. Ed. Jonathan 
Barnes. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
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5.1.1 RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION 
 
In Aristotle’s case, the conception of responsibility for action is used here in 
the sense of the most common propositions, which take the form of 
sentences such as “s is responsible for X”, where s refers to the agent (or the 
actor) and X signifies any given act with moral relevance. In Aristotle’s 
works, the most relevant passage on the subject is book III of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Susanne Bobzien writes that, if anywhere, Aristotle’s 
theory of moral responsibility is located in NE III 1-5 (Bobzien 2014, 1).169 At 
the beginning of this passage he writes:  
Since excellence is concerned with passions and actions, and on 
voluntary passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on 
those that are involuntary forgiveness, and sometimes also pity, to 
distinguish the voluntary and the involuntary is presumably 
necessary for those who are studying excellence and useful also for 
legislators with a view to the assigning both of honours and of 
punishments. (NE III 1, 1109b30–1109b33.) 
 
The word itself, as we saw, lacks a direct counterpart in the ancient Greek 
language. Two aspects of the concept in ancient Greece can be distinguished 
in the writings of Aristotle, however. First, there is the more general idea of 
being blamed (aitia), which is also present in other traditional sources from 
ancient Greece.170 Second, Aristotle scholars have until recent years 
emphasized voluntariness over blameworthiness. Voluntariness or hekousion 
is the second of Aristotle’s two criteria for responsible action. Aristotle 
divides acts into voluntary and involuntary and, again, voluntary ones are 
divided into acts chosen and not chosen (Rhet. I 10, 1368b7–24). Each of the 
chosen acts is, he claims, done in full knowledge. The voluntariness of the act 
refers to the notion that action is not coerced and it is done in complete 
understanding (i.e., not in ignorance).171 
                                                
169 While the general consensus about Aristotle’s theory of responsibility is located within 
Nicomachean Ethics, it needs to be noted that Eudemian Ethics (EE) shares three chapters with the 
former. The description of the details related to moral responsibility are also found in EE, although in a 
form that emphasizes voluntariness more than the counterpart in NE. (EE II.6-11.) 
170 In his Shame and Necessity, Bernard Williams uses The Odyssey as an example of aitia type of 
responsibility. Ulysses has already returned from his journey and is confronted with his adversaries. 
Telemachus has had left the door of the armoury open, enabling the enemies to arm themselves with 
shields and spears. Telemachus confesses that he has indeed left the door open.170 In this situation he 
expresses that he and only he can be blamed. He expresses the intentionality of act and acceptance of 
possible punitive measures. (B. Williams 1993, 50–55.) For another take on aitia, see Susan S. Meyer’s 
Aristotle on Moral Responsibility (2011, 53, n1), according to which aitia refers to causal responsibility 
only and does not have moral connotations.  
171 The esteemed Finnish scholar and translator of the Nicomachean Ethics Simo Knuuttila has 
suggested this (Finnish edition of NE, p. 221 & 224–225). 
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An act done voluntarily and knowingly is naturally an act for which the actor 
is fully responsible. A coerced or otherwise involuntary act is in turn not to be 
blamed. An act done out of ignorance can be considered wrong in Aristotle’s 
theory when it is voluntary. This is a part of his response to Plato’s view that 
no one knowingly does wrong (see Roberts 1989, 23). 
Responsibility for Aristotle is thus connected with voluntary acts. 
Terence H. Irwin’s article “Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle” (Irwin 
1980) is used here in order to describe the basic conception of responsibility 
for action.172 Irwin describes Aristotle’s responsibility not as an attributable 
property, but negatively as the lack of the excuses of ignorance and coercion. 
He argues that Aristotle’s responsibility is “praised by philosophers who like 
to keep these things simple and unmetaphysical”. (Ibid. 117.)  
Irwin is in agreement that most writers on Aristotle’s responsibility focus 
on chapters 1-5 of book III of Nicomachean Ethics and declares that his 
scope is the same. Irwin gives the theory a name on a later occasion:173 his 
text distinguishes between the common interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of 
responsibility, which he dubs “the simple theory” from “the complex theory”, 
which contains Irwin’s own additions. He writes that Aristotle’s theory not 
only focuses on action and prominently contains study of voluntary action 
related to ethical and practical, jurisprudential174 functions as well as the 
responses of praise and blame, but also some specific writings on character. 
Those of the latter sort will be looked at below. (Irwin 1980.) 
The idea of Aristotle’s responsibility for action can be briefly summarized, 
adhering to Irwin’s formulation of Aristotle’s “simple theory”, as follows: “A 
is responsible (a proper candidate for praise and blame) for doing x if and 
only if A does x voluntarily” (T. H. Irwin 1980, 125). In this case, Aristotle’s 
view of responsibility appears as retrospective, i.e., to be determined at a 
later point of time in relation to the act. Irwin claims that this is because, 
somewhat surprisingly, Aristotle does not consider forethought in connection 
with responsibility (ibid. 119). Thus, if the condition of voluntariness is 
fulfilled, the act directs praise or blame back towards the actor, being the 
response indicative of that for which the actor is being held responsible. 
                                                
172  In the author’s view, his article provides the most extensive and precise presentation of 
Aristotle’s theory of responsibility so far. 
173 He discusses Aristotle’s theory of responsibility in his encyclopedia article in Encyclopedia of 
Ethics (Becker & Becker 2001) in a brief but clear way as an “account of voluntary action and 
conditions for moral responsibility” (Irwin 2001, 94). 
174 Irwin gives an example of the actual Athenian courts and their stance on voluntary action. 
Apparently the courts took voluntary action to be associated with forethought. This notion of 
forethought is however insufficiently discussed in Aristotle’s context, so that it remains without a clear 
definition. Despite this, according to Irwin, Aristotle seemed to include a possible connection with the 
theme, which is fascinating. This is an example of how Aristotle thought his theory was relevant in the 
social context of his time as well. (See Irwin 1989, 119-120.)  
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An early formulation of Aristotle’s responsibility, which is based mainly on 
Nicomachean Ethics175 but also on writings in Eudemian Ethics (Aristotle 
2011) and Magna Moralia,176 is described by Irwin as follows: “(5) A does x 
voluntarily if and only if he does x neither (a) by force nor (b) because of 
ignorance” (Irwin 1980, 121-123). Despite this, Irwin notes that this book 
contains a description of voluntariness177 on the basis that: “voluntary is what 
we do without being compelled” (ibid. 121). Just as voluntary action is a 
result of desire or of a conscious decision, involuntariness, Irwin claims, 
implies the contrary in the sense that these are lacking from the act (ibid. 
120). The two claims of (5) the requirement of action not being done out of 
ignorance or coercion, and that of (8) responsibility being dependent on 
voluntary acts; in other words, the absence of the excuses of ignorance and 
force as well as the combined status of being an apt candidate for praise and 
blame as well as acting voluntarily, together account for much of what is 
commonly understood about Aristotle’s responsibility. Aristotle’s model has 
since been adopted by philosophers for ages to come.178 
Discussing the specifics of agency, Irwin adds that: “(11) A is responsible 
for doing x if and only if (a) A is a normal adult, and (b) A does x voluntarily”. 
This adds the demand for sufficient maturity of the agent in Aristotle’s 
theory, which means that children and animals especially are excluded from 
considerations of moral responsibility. Irwin does however note that “to say 
more precisely, what a “normal adult” is, we should find some further feature 
distinguishing responsible agents from animals, the insane, and other 
voluntary non-responsible agents.” (Ibid. 125.) There is some disagreement 
on how the group of actually responsible agents is defined in Aristotle’s 
theory. Among other reasons for this, Irwin points out that in his context 
“Animals and children lack decision” (Ibid. 127). This relates to one of the 
most obvious reasons that Aristotle takes up the theme in NE III.5. Aristotle 
tries to set those agents that are fully mature and thus viable recipients of 
praise and blame apart from animals and children. Difficulties however arise 
from the fact that children gain the power of decision gradually, but these 
will be addressed later on.179  
                                                
175 NE book III contains the relevant ideas (NE III); see also the discussion on just acts, in which 
Aristotle states that if the agent’s action is voluntary, it is blamed (NE V.8).   
176 Magna Moralia  is discussed less, as its authenticity as a work of Aristotle is uncertain (see 
Irwin 1980, 146, n9). 
177 In Ethics with Aristotle (1991), Sarah Broadie also gives an excellent treatment of the idea of 
voluntariness as it appears in both Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics (see Broadie 1991, 124-178). 
178 The connection between responsibility and voluntariness is for example also present in 
Aquinas’s philosophy: “St. Thomas [Aquinas …] insists that voluntary is necessary and sufficient for 
responsibility” (Irwin 1980, 126). 
179 See Michael S. Pritchard’s On Becoming Responsible (1991) on this theme. The situation is 
similar to Dennett’s plateau metaphor. Aristotle’s writings on character, which are discussed in the 
next chapter, fleshes out this theme in one way or another.  
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Aristotle’s “simple theory” of responsibility represents the common 
understanding of his classic work, at least at the time of the publication of 
Irwin’s article (1980), but he doesn’t remain content with merely presenting 
the common understanding of the subject. He puts his own extended 
interpretation alongside it, which Irwin calls the “complex theory”. Irwin 
introduces the concept of decision in the theory of responsibility with the 
claim: “(12) A is responsible for doing x if and only if (a) A has effective 
decision-making capacities and (b) A does x voluntarily” (ibid. 129). In this 
context, Irwin then raises the ambiguity of whether the decision-based 
requirement is based on the actual act; i.e., that the agent would have applied 
his capacity to “decide to do x” as is the case in Irwin’s claim (14). On the 
other hand, the suggestion is made that it could be sufficient for the capacity 
to make prohairesis-decisions180 at the time of the act, which does not 
necessarily have anything to do with the act in question, as is the case in 
claim (13). (Ibid. 131.)  
Irwin thinks that the requirement for the decision (included in Irwin’s 
claim 14) is too strong. He adds that Aristotle does not hold deciding to be 
necessary, and thus settles for the possibility to put the decision in the hands 
of the agent. The expanded interpretation, including Irwin’s additional 
emphasis on the capacity to decide, or the “complex theory” reads as follows: 
“(15) A is responsible for doing x if and only if (a) A is capable of deciding 
effectively about x, and (b) A does x voluntarily” (Irwin 1980, 132). This 
limitation that the requirement for a decision brings to moral responsibility 
disqualifies animals, children and presumably also the mentally ill as 
responsible agents. The clarified definition, which is the final formulation of 
the “complex theory”: “(15) A is responsible for doing x if and only if (a) A is 
capable of deciding effectively about x, and (b) A does x voluntarily”. (Ibid.) 
In this way, it is enough for Irwin that the agent have the capacity for the 
decision to make her responsible for voluntary acts. 
All in all, Aristotle’s responsibility for action181 requires that the agent 
does X voluntarily, while lacking the excusing conditions of ignorance and 
force, and, according to Irwin, instead of just being a proper candidate for 
praise and blame, the agent has to have the capacity for a prohairesis-type182 
decision as well. The expanded interpretation, including Irwin’s additional 
emphasis on the capacity to make decisions, or the “complex theory”, reads 
as follows: “(15) A is responsible for doing x if and only if (a) A is capable of 
deciding effectively about x, and (b) A does x voluntarily”. (Irwin 1980, 132.)  
                                                
180 Irwin’s description of “decision” is quite brief in the case of this article. Roberts argues against 
Irwin’s interpretation (Roberts 1989, 35) Sarah Broadie puts a lot of effort into describing the concept 
as well (Broadie 1991, 78). See also Salkever (1992), who has additional useful descriptions for 
Aristotle’s key concepts. 
181 Thanks to Johanna Ahola-Launonen for an important question, which helped to clarify the 
relation between concepts of responsibility for action and moral agency in this context. 
182 The concept of prohairesis is examined in the next chapter (5.1.2). 
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Jean Roberts’ article in Ancient Philosophy, “Aristotle on Responsibility for 
Action and Character” (1989) subjects Irwin’s topics to closer examination. 
She agrees with Irwin’s initial premise and the outlines of the “simple theory” 
by noting that Aristotle’s “voluntary actions a[re] those for which the agent is 
liable to praise or blame. [Aristotle] then describes involuntary action. An 
action is involuntary if it comes about by force […] or because of ignorance”, 
thus essentially describing Irwin’s key points (Roberts 1989, 23). 
She also looks at Aristotle’s work in contrast with Plato183 in a historical 
context, but provides commentary on Irwin (1980) as well. Roberts argues 
that Irwin’s complex theory simplifies Aristotle’s conception of responsibility 
too much, and thus the claims that Irwin is making are not actually 
Aristotelian (Roberts 1989, 35, n11). This includes the notion of character, 
the effect of which is easily dismissed with Irwin’s interpretation. 
Roberts remarks that: “Character is thus not a matter of nature and is to 
that extent possibly voluntary.” (Ibid. 30.) While Irwin distinguishes action 
and character as distinct themes in book III of NE, Roberts follows his 
example but uses the concept of character in a different way: by the 
separation of the themes of responsibility for action and character, she 
questions the connection between the character and voluntary action as it is 
understood in modern terms.184 As a result, she argues against Irwin in 
claiming that his interpretation is not Aristotle’s proper view about moral 
responsibility, because “it is not, as Irwin acknowledges, what Aristotle says.” 
(Roberts 1989, 35.) 
Roberts refers to a venerable cast of philosophers including Furley (1967), 
Williams (1985), Gauthier & Jolif (1959), Joachim (1951), Stewart (1892) as 
well as W. D. Ross185 (1968) She quotes  Ross in that she, holds Aristotle to 
be an incompatibilist, but as one, who did not properly examine the problem 
                                                
183 Nancy Sherman also reminds us of the different theories of virtue held by Plato and Aristotle: 
Plato settled for the cardinal virtues of “wisdom, courage, moderation and justice” whereas Aristotle’s 
theory contains a significantly more detailed list of virtues. In Aristotle’s theory, the capacity for the 
development of the virtues is required in connection with character and rational choice and 
deliberation. As a whole, Sherman views the Aristotelian conception of virtue as somewhere between 
the Stoic and Kantian theories since in its context a full life to an extent requires material fortune in 
addition to virtuous conduct. (Sherman 2001, 504- 505.) 
184 Additionally, Roberts highlights a possible misconception, which might arise when looking at 
the contemporary theories and Aristotle’s responsibility side-by-side: if one takes for granted 
Aristotle’s idea that we are responsible for our characters, and being so, if that person sought an 
alternative theory for retribution in this context, she could interpret Aristotle to mean that the “vicious 
chose at an earlier time to perform the sorts of actions that they wanted to become bad” when they 
could have chosen the opposite (Roberts 1989, 27). A person with an unjust character would not, in 
Aristotle’s context, choose to act justly. 
185 Ross’s view however, according to Roberts, would be misrepresenting the Aristotle’s actual 
position, and she attempts to set the record straight by conducting an in-depth examination of 
Aristotle’s responsibility of character. 
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of determinism. (Roberts 1989, 28, 35, n13.) Her findings are that: (1.) 
Aristotle’s character is not of nature, but based on voluntary action, and thus 
(2.) by emphasizing character in connection with responsibility (in the form 
of voluntary acts) Aristotle is actually “making room for moral training and 
education”. (Roberts 1989, 31.) While the general attitude toward Aristotle 
here is that he is not bound by the division, the various interpretations have 
an effect on how his theory is perceived. For this reason, the teleological 
outlook, which is often interpreted as indicating an incompatibilist stance, is 
looked at at the end of this chapter, although very briefly. The status quo of 
the naturalist, compatibilist interpretation is then returned to with reference 
to authors including Susan S. Meyer (2011), Myles F. Burnyeat (1999) and 
Nancy Sherman (1999). 
Irwin argues that this view of Aristotle’s concept of responsibility for 
action is not sufficient. Looking at other sources such as the Eudemian Ethics 
and Magna Moralia, he concludes that in addition to voluntariness, Aristotle 
would agree that responsibility requires the additional condition of a capacity 
to decide. Decision (prohairesis) is a key feature of being an ordinary adult 
capable of moral action in Aristotle’s context. Irwin formulates this “complex 
theory” of Aristotle’s responsibility for action as follows: “A is responsible for 
doing x if and only if (a) A is capable of deciding effectively about x, and (b) A 
does x voluntarily” (Irwin 1980, 131). 
One way to approach the question would be to examine the acts through 
teleology. Ends have a strong role in Aristotle’s philosophy, so strong in fact 
that (interpreted to the extreme) the ends sometimes determine the means, 
or the acts completing them. The importance of the ends is connected with 
one of the most unintuitive principles from the contemporary perspective — 
the principle of teleology. It is familiar in everyday thinking, but it is difficult 
if not impossible to accommodate to science.186 Where causality is stressed 
nowadays and the order of instances advances in a linear temporal axis, 
Aristotle’s case is not always as straightforward.187 In his theory, the 
individual acts within the boundaries of nature, which means that the 
principles of nature affect her. The principle of teleology is one of these.  
The original principle can be found in Aristotle’s examination of nature, 
Physics: 
Therefore action for an end is present in things which come to be and 
are by nature.  
Further, where there is an end, all the preceding steps are for the sake 
of that. Now surely as in action, so in nature; and as in nature, so it is 
                                                
186 Compare with Stephen G. Salkever (1990) Finding the Mean, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 19–21.   
187 While Aristotle’s teleology is touched on here as a subject, it is not considered a significant 
enough matter, to warrant further exposition. For more in-depth looks at Aristotle’s teleology, see 
Falcon (2012) & Pavlopoulos (2003). 
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in each action, if nothing interferes. Now action is for the sake of an 
end; therefore the nature of things also is so. (Aristotle, Physics, II 8, 
199a8–199a12.)  
 
How much the principle of teleology affects responsibility is a matter of 
interpretation. What kind of effect nature has on acts is essential, because 
according to interpretation (a), responsibility for action, voluntary acts, made 
in full understanding, would not have this effect at all: the principle of 
teleology would not be of concern. On the other hand, what nature is exactly 
has several different interpretations. For example, J. L. Ackrill discusses the 
theme of Aristotle’s view of human nature in his article “Aristotle on 
Eudaimonia” in A. Oksenberg Rorty’s Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics. According 
to Ackrill, if being human included nature, the situation would again be more 
complex: Human nature is not precisely defined by Aristotle, leading to 
insufficient grounds for a thorough examination of interpretation (a) in 
relation to teleology. (See Ackrill 1980, 33.) 
The most direct way to distinguish whether the means explain the ends or 
the ends explain the means is related to four types of causes used by 
Aristotle: material, formal, effective and final. In the case of responsibility, 
effective and final causes determine whether the explanation is causal 
(former) or teleological (latter). Even though the four causes are distinct, 
they can be in effect simultaneously.   
In brief, responsibility according to interpretation (a) is based on the 
following: an act originates from the individual and is directed toward its 
end. When this end is actualised, or when a consequence of the act actualises 
this end, its effect on the society of which the individual is a part, incites 
feedback in form of praise or blame. If, for the sake of the argument, the 
principle of teleology is assumed to apply, the interaction between the traits 
of character of the agent with the acts chosen via deliberation would appear 
roughly as depicted in figure 2:  
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Figure 2 Virtues and the deliberation on action in Aristotle. 
In the figure, the deliberation leading to the chosen acts of the actor are 
guided by his or her character traits, virtues and vices.188 Prior to this, the 
effect of the environment through upbringing and education has shaped the 
catalogue of the actor’s virtues and vices. Therefore the indirect effect of the 
environment is felt in every choice that the actor makes. As Martha 
Nussbaum noted in The Fragility of Goodness (1986): “Aristotle actually 
writes ‘We deliberate not about ends, but about what is towards the end’” 
(Nussbaum 1986, 297). As the chosen act is committed it becomes apparent 
to anyone observing the act, and thus reveals the character traits of the actor 
to the public. These can then be evaluated as having had or not had enough 
influence that the actor himself or herself could be held responsible for the 
act. As the consequence, dictated as telos, in the incompatibilist context 
would be pre-determined; it would not have an effect on the assessment of 
responsibility. This concludes the short excursion into the teleological 
outlook of the general premises of the Aristotelian theory of responsibility for 
now. Following this comparison, attention is directed back to the naturalist, 
and compatibilist interpretations of Aristotle and his theory of responsibility. 
The main difference between the accounts is that instead of being pre-
determined, telos is determined by the agent’s character dispositions in 
terms of wanting (boulesis), meaning the process by which the end of the 
action is selected (Bobzien 2014, 14). 
Despite his heavy reliance on the principle of teleology, Aristotle would 
not have necessarily identified with incompatibilism. Supporting this claim, 
Susan S. Meyer argues just the opposite in Aristotle on Moral Responsibility 
(2011). Her scholarship suggests that in Aristotle’s case the causes can be 
                                                
188 Compare this with Bobzien’s description of “How deliberation and choice are related” in her 
article (Bobzien 2014, 11). 
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traced back to the origin of action, which in his context is the agent. This 
means that the chain of causality does not extend anywhere “before” the 
agent, and prevents a claim of universal determinism in his case. (Meyer 
2011, 156-158.) As for what follows, the basis of discussing Aristotle’s 
responsibility here is Meyer’s “roughly naturalist” interpretation of Aristotle’s 
responsibility. By following Strawson, this makes for an easy comparison, but 
the same risks of misinterpretation that Meyer notes apply as well as some 
anachronistic notions (ibid. 161-167). 
While action is determined in Aristotle either on the principle of 
teleology, or at least the premeditated set goals of wanting, development of 
human character does not follow a similarly straightforward pattern (Roberts 
1989, 30). Whether determined or not, i.e., regardless of the principle of 
teleology, Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility is incomplete without the 
notion of character. In talking about character, Aristotle is concerned with 
effective causes directed toward oneself. In that case, neither nature, 
teleology, nor wanting have an effect on responsibility. So how can human 
beings be responsible for their characters? How do acts directed at oneself 
have an effect on the selection of such acts or those coming after? These 
questions are discussed in the next section, but a few words will be first given 
to the concept that was of more particular interest in Strawson, which is 
blame. 
As blame is currently an active topic in the philosophy of responsibility, it 
is useful to look at history of this debate in Aristotle’s case. As with moral 
responsibility, Aristotle can be considered the originator of theories of blame 
as well. The concept of blame has a central role in Aristotle’s theory, since 
right from the beginning of book III of the Nicomachean Ethics voluntary 
action (done not out of coercion or ignorance) is considered to be a candidate 
for praise and blame (NE III 1, 1109b30–1109b33). Blame is thus present in 
Aristotle’s theory of responsibility from the outset: together with praise, 
blame signifies the approbation or disapprobation of conduct based on the 
virtues of the agent. Whether this conduct is judged appropriate or not is 
decided within the social sphere of the polis,189 which Aristotle discusses in 
NE as well as the Politics190 
In the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle describes praise and blame as follows: 
Since virtue and vice and the works that are their expressions are 
praised or blamed as the case may be (for blame and praise are not 
given on account of things that come about by necessity or chance or 
nature, but on account of things that we ourselves are responsible for, 
                                                
189 At least here, based on Irwin’s remark on how Aristotle intended his theories to have relevance 
in actual cases where responsibility assessments were needed, Aristotle’s moral responsibility is 
considered to be applicable in actual social contexts. 
190 The two works are considered to be two halves of a continuous study. This interpretation is 
based on the work of Simo Knuuttila and Juha Sihvola in the Finnish translations of the works, on 
which the original research was based. 
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since if someone else is responsible for something, it is he who gets the 
blame and praise), it is clear that virtue and vice have to do with 
matters where the man himself is the responsible source of his 
actions. (EE 1223a9-16.) 
 
According to Bobzien for Aristotle “virtues are the character dispositions that 
are praiseworthy (NE1103a8-10; cf. 1101b13-15, 30-1). He argues that what 
makes these dispositions virtues is that they are directed towards the 
intermediate in action (NE 1106b36-1107a1); and that this is also what makes 
them praiseworthy (NE 1109b24).” (Bobzien 2014.) The virtues are briefly 
described in the next section. 
In terms of Bernard Williams's “elements of responsibility”,191 Aristotle’s 
praise and blame represent the response element in his theory of moral 
responsibility. In this sense, essentially, responsibility for action refers to 
praise and blame as forms of feedback, following the act in question, 
assuming that the relevant conditions discussed above are met. It is 
specifically assumed that moral responsibility is conceived according to the 
natural sentiments, most particularly blame. However, Irwin has doubts 
about the idea of equating responsibility with just praise and blame. (Irwin 
1980 117.) Toward the end of his article, he writes: “To be responsible for an 
action is not to be the object of those attitudes – sometimes it may be 
pointless or inappropriate to praise or blame – but being responsible is being 
a reasonable candidate for these attitudes, the sort of agent doing the sort of 
action for which praise and blame are normally justified.”192 (Ibid. 134.) 
Nevertheless, blame in Aristotle appears as an integral part of his writings on 
responsibility and its related themes. 
Where would Aristotle’s blame be located in the classic tripartite 
distinction193 used in Coates & Tognazzini (2014)? Would Aristotle’s theory 
be classified as a cognitive theory? At least the idea that the conduct of the 
citizen is judged by the virtues would fall into this group. Aristotle’s blame 
could also be interpreted to be conative, given that action in his works is 
aimed at telos-type goals and that the mechanics of actualization or the 
failure of actualization of such goals could be used as descriptions of 
conatively directed desires or at least a close analogy.  
                                                
191 The elements of responsibility were first discussed in chapter 4.3.3. 
192 In this sense, Irwin pre-empts the talk about “standing to blame” that is discussed in chapter 
4.2. 
193 It would seem that the classic tripartite division has provoked some criticism based on recent 
studies of neurological nature. For example, Klaus Scherer questions the utility of making this 
distinction by noting among other points that cognition is rarely devoid of affect. Yet the division 
seems so deep within the Western history of philosophy that picking it apart would be too difficult in 
this relatively short thesis. At least Aristotle can be straightforward placed within the current selection, 
as he was taught by Plato, who is originally credited with the tripartite division. (See Republic, book 
435bd.) 
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5.1.2 CHARACTER, VIRTUES, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Instead of direct acts and their consequences, the focus of responsibility for 
character is on the properties of character that the actor possesses, as well as 
the previous voluntary acts that have produced these properties. In 
Aristotle’s context, these properties of character are related to the effective 
cause, instead of the principle of teleology.194  
If the beginning of NE book III (as well as the EE195) only was consulted, it 
would be sufficient to summarize the basics of Aristotle’s theory of 
responsibility along the lines of Irwin’s simple theory. However, as the critics 
point out, once Aristotle included book III.5 in the Nicomachean Ethics, the 
big picture became less tidy with the comment that it would be “irrational to 
suppose that a man who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust or a man 
who acts self-indulgently to be self-indulgent”. 
The full passage, which includes the effect of character within moral 
responsibility, is:   
[F]or it is activities exercised on particular objects that make the 
corresponding character. This is plain from the case of people 
training for any contest or action; they practise the activity the whole 
time. Now not to know that it is from the exercise of activities on 
particular objects that states of character are produced is the mark of 
a thoroughly senseless person. Again, it is irrational to suppose that a 
man who acts unjustly does not wish to be unjust or a man who acts 
self-indulgently to be self-indulgent. But if without being ignorant a 
man does the things which will make him unjust, he will be unjust 
voluntarily. (NE III 5, 1114a 8–14.) 
 
In this observation, Aristotle introduces a new set of considerations into the 
theory, on which there is considerable devergence of opinion.196 Throughout 
the act, then, the unjust or self-indulgent man probably acts as his character 
dictates. At the moment the act takes place, it is thus possible that the unjust 
or self-indulgent act is done voluntarily and in full knowledge. Here Aristotle 
is criticising Plato’s view that nobody does wrong knowingly. One can do 
wrong, and can be held responsible for the act and be blamed for it, even if 
the actor has full knowledge of the situation (see Roberts 1989, 32-33). 
According to Aristotle, the actor is simultaneously responsible for his 
actions directly and indirectly through his character as well.  As per 
responsibility for action, the feedback of society is aimed at action that is 
taking place not what the actor has done in the past. In the case of 
                                                
194 See G. E. M. Anscombe 1977, 68–69 for comparison. 
195 According to Irwin, considerations of responsibility for character are not included in the 
Eudemian Ethics, but claims related to the topic are made in 1225b11-17 and 1223a5-14 (Irwin 1980, 
154). 
196 See Fischer & Ravizza 1998, 12, n17 for comparison. 
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responsibility for character, the viewpoint shifts to the virtues or excellences 
of the actor.197 Taking into account both the actions as well as the moral 
characteristics of the agent indicates a prospective, forward-looking 
dimension of responsibility (Sarah Broadie 1991, 124-125). What are these 
virtues and excellences, and how does the interaction between them and the 
acts happen in Aristotle’s theory?   
Aristotle includes virtues (or excellences198) within his conception of the 
soul (NE  II 5, 1105b20–1106a12). Virtues are, depending on the 
interpretation, a means to the good life or an end in themselves (See NE X 6, 
1176a30–1176b8). They are states of character that each have their 
corresponding two vices (kakia). One of these means lack of the virtue or 
excellence and other its excess. For example, courage is the golden mean 
where cowardice is the lack of it, whereas rashness is its excess. Through 
practice, the virtues or the excellences tend to approach their golden means. 
In determining responsibility, virtue or excellence appears as a guiding 
property of character in the Aristotelian account. It decisively affects the 
selection process of the act to be committed from all possible alternatives 
leading to the same end. The behavior of the individual is determined by 
causes of action originating from himself, from his own ethical practice. 
Nevertheless no one can become virtuous in a vacuum. Could the origin of 
virtues or excellences be the society? To answer this, Aristotle’s distinction 
between intellectual virtues and those of the character must be considered. 
Aristotle writes on these different types of virtue:   
Excellence, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, 
intellectual excellence in the main owes both its birth and its growth 
to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while 
moral excellence comes about as a result of habit, whence also its 
name [ēthikē] is one that is formed by a slight variation from the 
word for 'habit' [ethos]. From this it is also plain that none of the 
moral excellences arises in us by nature; (NE II 1, 1103a15–21.) 
 
As Roberts’s critique (1989) points out, character appears to be a major 
feature in Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility. Its inclusion is also the 
main difference between Aristotle’s account and the contemporary theories. 
(See Roberts 1989, 28.) 199 
Whereas Irwin focused on the action and the conditions of responsibility, 
character is present in what Bobzien calls “Aristotle’s theory of what makes 
us responsible for our actions and character” and the reasons for its 
prominence include setting the deliberation of action within the teleological 
                                                
197 Compared to this, responsibility for action was focused on the act leading to a certain end and 
the praise and blame given by the society based on the result (see 5.1.1).  
198 The words virtue and excellence are treated here synonymously. 
199 “This is a difficulty for anyone trying to to find a hint of a modern notion of moral responsibility 
here.” (Roberts 1989,28). 
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context, in which character has sway over the possible choices. (See Bobzien 
2014, 2.)   
This section provides a broad sketch about how the character is related to 
moral responsibility in Aristotle’s theory. For simplicity’s sake, the term 
“responsibility for character” is referred to as that part of moral 
responsibility concerned with the questions of character. Character consists 
of the character virtues as well as their complementary vices for each agent. 
Aristotle’s essentialist metaphysics mean that the same type of virtue that 
could be shared between individuals was identical in different people. A short 
summary of what the virtues are is discussed next, and it is then explained 
how in Aristotle these virtues are connected to the decision-making 
capacities of human beings. In this case, the relevant concept is prohairesis.  
Finally, some concluding remarks are offered on how the considerations 
related to character appear in Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility, as 
discussed in the Nicomachean Ethics III.1-5. 
Therefore excellence also is in our own power, and so too vice. For 
where it is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act, and 
vice versa; so that, if to act, where this is noble, is in our power, not to 
act, which will be base, will also be in our power, and if not to act, 
where this is noble, is in our power, to act, which will be base, will 
also be in our power. (NE 1113b3-7). 
 
In the encyclopedia article on Aristotle (2001), Irwin claims that within 
Aristotle’s theory “[r]ational deliberation [intellectual virtue/practical 
reason] and decision [prohairesis] are the source of responsibility for 
character no less than for action” (Irwin 2001, 95). In order to frame his 
argument, Irwin includes two relevant passages. “Virtue and Character“ 
(Irwin 2001, 92-93) and “Voluntary Action and Responsibility” (ibid. 94-95). 
The following are true in Aristotle’s theory concerning the virtues of 
character: 1. Virtue is a state (hexis), which is a distinct form, but involves 
both capacities (dynamis) and feelings (pathe). 2. Virtues are to be followed 
as the means to good life, but they should also be consciously followed for 
their own sake in order for the agent’s life to be good. 3. The virtues are 
generally a mean between two vices, but the correct conduct depends on the 
situation. For example, “extreme anger” can be called for in some 
circumstances. 4. Moral education is needed in order to align the non-
rational part of the soul with practical reason as well as to have better control 
over the emotions generally. 5. A prohairesis-type informed decision and the 
capability to use it is required for wisdom and the good life. (Irwin 2001, 92-
93.) 
Myles F. Burnyeat’s article “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good” (1999) 
starts by asking “Can virtue be taught?”200 Burnyeat’s article argues that a 
                                                
200 In Burnyeat’s article, “Aristotle on Learning to be Good” (1999) it is asked whether being 
complete in terms of virtues negates the condition of akrasia. According to him this is so. On a related 
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person who is complete in terms of virtues or is otherwise a perfectly formed 
moral individual cannot be akratic, as the two conditions are mutually 
exclusive. (Burnyeat 1999, 224.) In advancing his argument, Burnyeat aptly 
describes how the practice of the virtues came to form the character of the 
person. He describes Aristotle’s work as a continuation of Plato’s pioneering 
work in moral psychology. Plato and Aristotle agree on one thing, that 
Socrates was right about education, since moral development should be seen 
in terms of the conception of virtue. (Burnyeat 1999, 205.) Virtue is thus the 
key concept within the moral theories of the three Socratic-period 
philosophers. 
Nancy Sherman equates virtues and excellences in her entry on 
“excellence” in Becker & Becker’s Encyclopedia of Ethics (2001). She calls for 
a couple of distinctions to clearly understand the Aristotelian use of the 
concept. For one, Aristotle’s definition of virtue is broader than the usual 
reference to moral virtues that is used today. Including these, Aristotle’s 
virtue encompasses “any stable state or disposition of a thing which makes 
that thing do its work well”. (Sherman 2001, 504.) 
In the entry on “excellence”, Sherman also raises concerns over the point 
in moral developmen, beyond which the agent moves from non-cognitive 
habituation to full self-authored agency.201 Any definition of such a point is 
arbitrary and is bound to be controversial. (Sherman 2001, 505.) The point 
from which childhood changes to adulthood, implying full moral 
responsibility, is never clear-cut, as Sherman notes that “Aristotle says 
ethical immaturity can occur at any chronological age” (Sherman 1999a, 
237). Following this, it is reasonable in Aristotle’s context that young people 
are supposed to be educated in order to be responsive to rational arguments. 
Another conjecture from this premise is that rational persuasion cannot have 
an effect on adults who are “corrupted by a life of pleasure”. This could be the 
way that Aristotle discusses the cases now referred to as psychopaths. 
(Sherman 1999a, 237 – 238.) 
Nancy Sherman’s article “The Habituation of Character” (1999a) 
discusses how the concepts of virtue, moral education and the development 
of moral agency among children appears in Aristotle’s work as well as 
discussing the relation between virtues, their education and the development 
of moral agency in their case. Sherman writes about how the development of 
character and the attainment of full moral status through this process of 
maturation are fully dependent on the environment in Aristotle’s moral 
theory. This means that character, which is integral to moral responsibility, is 
social in origin, and therefore no one can become virtuous in a vacuum in his 
theory. We learn our habits from others and by practice we gain our virtues, 
                                                                                                                                     
note, thanks to Malin Grahn-Wilder for bringing the intricacies of education of virtues in Aristotle to 
my attention. 
201 Dennett’s “Plateau” being the obvious example.  
 137 
as Sherman writes: “Aristotle’s account extends well beyond the truism […] 
“We learn by doing””. (Sherman 1999a, 257.) 
Children are not to be considered responsible in Aristotle’s context; that 
much is certain. He does not however underestimate their cognitive 
capacities. 
Susan Meyer’s Aristotle on Moral Responsibility describes a feature of the 
modern theories of responsibility in which the responsibility for character is 
responsibility for the necessary condition of an action, and goes further in 
holding responsibility for character the foundation of contemporary moral 
responsibility in general.202 Voluntary action happens through reflection and 
deliberation. Deliberation and the chosen act based on it (prohairesis) is an 
essential mechanism of Aristotelian ethics. Virtuous action, as it is 
understood, is also governed by prohairesis choice. (Meyer 1993, 122; see 
also p. 130.) 
The key concept of prohairesis, which is based on knowledge and the 
virtues and which is what children lack, thus distinguishing their moral 
status from that of adults, is also discussed by Sherman. The child is not 
responsible because his “desire obeys the reason of the authoritative part as a 
child listens to his father” (see NE 1102b31-1103a3). 
Through education, morality can be more persuaded than forced to take 
hold of the student, and thus it can affect the choices requiring moral 
deliberation. Sherman discusses Aristotle’s attempts to divide the soul into 
rational and non-rational. She notes directly afterwards however that 
Aristotle questions such undertakings in De Anima (Sherman 1999a, 235). 
Sherman is interested in the type of desire that is based on the rational: the 
rational wish or boulesis, which is distinct from appetites and emotions. As in 
Eudemian Ethics, where Aristotle asks “how and by what sources does virtue 
arise?” he states that “character [êthos] is a quality of the non-rational part of 
the soul (Sherman 1999a, 236). Wanting and wishing is directed at the 
natural needs and as such are less the subject of choice. Prohairesis as the 
rational counterpart of boulesis is more important in terms of moral 
responsibility. According to Aristotle, the child is incapable of making 
prohairesis choices. (Sherman 1999a, 244). 
Summarizing Sherman, Aristotle maintains that children have tools for 
making voluntary decisions and judgments, and that the task of parents is to 
persuade the child into a certain understanding about whatever situation he 
is in, such as behaving in one way is correct in one situation but wrong in 
another. The point is that the parent cannot make the actual decision for the 
child. The goal of the educator is not to manipulate, but prepare the child for 
eventual full moral maturity. In Aristotle’s case, this means developing the 
means to make prohairesis choices. (Sherman 1999a, 242.) 
She describes how virtuous actions have their own external ends in 
Aristotle’s theory, so that in practicing these actions, the practice itself 
                                                
202 Meyer herself is critical of this idea. (See Meyer 2011.) 
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becomes virtuous: “For full virtues Aristotle requires not merely that actions 
be “chosen” [prohairesis] in the above sense, but that they be chosen for their 
own sakes.” This is possible through the way that virtuous action has ends 
that are external. It is thus not enough to just choose actions that lead to 
these ends, but to be fully virtuous one should also act in order to promote 
those ends as well. Doing so successfully enables the actions to be valued by 
the external ends in the process.203 The actions become the ends in 
themselves. (Sherman 1999a, 244-245.) 
Following Richard Sorabji (1980), Sherman describes the learning 
process of a virtue,204 with first imitating the desired course of action, and 
through gradual refinement the action approaches its ideal: “in the cases of 
virtue, the practice of actions will obviously be more complex virtuous action, 
as we have said, will combine a judgment of circumstances, reactive emotions 
and some level of decision about how to act. Here too the learner will follow 
the examples of emulated models and may have in mind general precepts 
and rules of thumb” (Sherman 1999a, 248). Early learning might be 
motivated by the pleasures of acting in a certain way and conversely of pain 
when punished for doing wrong. Later the action becomes its own end, at 
which point the moral habituation is completed. (Ibid. 256-257.) 
Sorabji writes that even though the individual can affect his character 
virtues by training them, the practice by itself is not enough to make the 
character virtuous (Sorabji 1980, 211). According to Aristotle, individuals 
belonging to a species, including humans as representatives of their species, 
tend to gravitate toward realising the characteristics of their species. Here 
Aristotle is following Plato’s thought by bringing up the option that the 
individual could form or acquire habit-virtues through upbringing and/or 
education, meaning a sort of blueprint for virtue (Sorabji 1980, 211–212). By 
initially practicing the habit-virtue, the character virtues become determined 
by individual action and in this way as states of the character they could 
affect the selection of acts directed at their ends.205 Even if the activity of the 
actor is needed, the origin of the virtues according to Aristotle lies in the 
society to which the actor belongs (see Broadie (1991) 170).  
According to Aristotle education and the city state are essential in the 
generation of the intellectual virtues [or excellences]. Aristotle also includes 
                                                
203 Here Sherman refers to Eugene Garver’s “Aristotle’s genealogy of Morals” (1984). 
204 Nancy Sherman’s “The Habituation of Character” (1999) concentrates on the character virtues: 
she discusses the nature of virtue, and whether they originate from nature or are taught. Sherman’s 
article can be read as continuation of some of the themes of Richard Sorabji’s article "Aristotle on the 
Role of Intellect in Virtue" (1980), as it is mentioned as the second major source cited in her 
bibliography. Sorabji discussed how the virtues are formed in Aristotle’s theory. Basically, mimicking 
an outside example to become a habit is a model for behavior that if consistently followed, forming an 
actual virtue as a result.  
205 Seconding this point, Burnyeat notes Aristotle’s Evenus quote: “I say that habit’s but long 
practice, friend, And this becomes men’s nature in the end.” (Burnyeat 1999, 224.) 
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practical reason (phronēsis) in the group of intellectual virtues. Practical 
reason is defined by education and experience and will help the individual to 
achieve the golden mean of his character virtues or excellences. (Sorabji 
1980, 210.) By providing education, the society gives the individual the 
means to attain his ideal state more efficiently. Practical reason thus has an 
important role in how well the character virtues or excellences are adopted, 
but it does not directly determine their substance.   
Practical reason contains the process of deliberation and reflection, which 
leads to the selection of the act that fulfils the end. (Broadie 1991, 179). The 
virtue-guided selection of possible acts is called prohairesis by Aristotle.206 
The word is difficult to translate, but its meaning is close, as Salkever writes, 
to a choice made with full awareness of alternative possibilities (Salkever 
1990, 69). The concept is so central to the Nicomachean Ethics that it is seen 
as the defining trait of human action (NE VI 2, 1139b5–6). The resulting 
choice made after deliberation reveals the virtues or vices of the actor to the 
society around him. Praise and blame are given based on these same virtues 
and vices.207 It is important to note that since in Aristotle’s theory only adult 
human beings are capable of deliberated, voluntary acts, the definitive 
threshold of responsibility for character resides at the difference between 
mature actors and those that are not (e.g., animals and children) (NE III 2, 
1111b4–9). 
If we accept that the premise that responsibility for action and 
responsibility for character describes different aspects of Aristotle’s 
conception of moral responsibility, the resulting understanding can expand 
the usual picture of Aristotle’s responsibility only as the relation between the 
actor and praise or blame following the act. Responsibility for character 
implies that the act has counterparts which fulfil the same end. The act, 
chosen from among alternative possible acts, is selected with the assistance 
of virtues of character. Because the actor can affect his own virtues with 
practice, the whole account of responsibility for the act is determined at once 
by the teleological explanation of the end and the indirect, causal effect(s) of 
the actor’s character virtues. 
 
  
                                                
206 In Eudemian Ethics prohairesis is introduced book in II.8. 
207 In EE, this point is made more clearly: “Since virtue and vice and the works that their 
expressions are praised or blamed as the case may be (for blame and praise are not given on account of 
things that come about by necessity or chance or nature, but on account of things that we ourselves are 
responsible for, since if someone else is responsible for something, it is he who gets the blame or 
praise), it is clear that virtue and vice have to do with matters where the man himself is the responsible 
source of his actions.” (EE II.6 1223a10-15.) 
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5.1.3 THE POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CITIZEN 
 
Even looking solely at Aristotle’s writings on moral responsibility, the 
individual cannot be completely separated from the society surrounding him. 
The voluntariness of acts and character virtues are not the only factors 
determining responsibility in Aristotle’s theory. In addition to these, it is 
significant how the action of the citizen relates to the political action of the 
state. As Delba Winthrop describes it, political responsibility is formed from 
action, which is defined by civic virtues related to the ends of political action 
of the state that the citizen inhabits.208 (Winthrop 1975, 417–418.) In moral 
philosophy, this viewpoint is much less explored than that of moral 
responsibility and its properties. For example, in political theory the Politics 
is used more often as a source. Ignoring the Politics is not necessarily the 
correct move to make if an encompassing picture of Aristotle’s moral theory 
is wanted. The Nicomachean Ethics concludes by remarking that the subject 
of the Politics is to be discussed next. In the Politics, Aristotle continues the 
explication of the requirements for the good life. The aim of political science, 
the city state, proves to be an essential agent in realising the good life. Both 
ethics and political science are part of the same whole, “practical sciences”. 
The separation of the two schools was amplified later in the process of 
editing Aristotle’s writings. Before this, the texts of both books were most 
likely lecture notes of the school of Lykeion.209  
Before looking at virtuous action of the citizen, it is appropriate to clarify 
precisely what state and citizen mean: the state is part of nature in Aristotle’s 
theory. (See Nichols 1992, 15–17.) For this reason, the principle of teleology 
affects the state as well, and it has its own ends. Virtuous action by an 
individual citizen directs the political action of the state towards its political 
end (see Winthrop 1975, 407). 
Aristotle defines “citizen” through the state in the Politics: “But a state is 
composite, like any other whole made up of many parts—these are the 
citizens, who compose it.” (Pol. III 1, 1274b39–1275a1.) The relationship 
between the whole and its parts describes Aristotle’s essentialist view of the 
individual.210 Even if the traits of the individual cannot be used as such to 
separate the particular or the person, they are enough to distinguish the 
person from other forms of life. These traits may be identical between several 
                                                
208 Delba Winthrop’s 1975 article “Aristotle and Political Responsibility” discusses the 
responsibilities of the citizen and their relationship with the political action of the state, while Mary P. 
Nichols’ Citizens and Statesmen (1992) complements Winthrop’s view by looking at the various 
relations between different parts of society and how responsibility functions in these complex social 
settings. Nichols is a political theorist rather than a philosopher, but her work on Aristotle’s Politics is 
useful and excellent, and is used a summary and a commentary on the most important subjects in that 
work.  
209 See Juha Sihvola’s notes of Politikka (Aristotle 1991), 221–222. 
210 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, X 10, 1075a11–26 for comparison. 
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people. The city state was the world the citizen of ancient Greece inhabited, 
as well as a determining factor which gave meaning to the citizen himself. 
Citizenship as an essentialist trait was equated by Aristotle with “being a 
political person”. (See Winthrop 1975, 410 & 413.) 
Since good citizenship is implicitly determined by the consistent relation 
between personal character virtues of the citizen and by his civic virtues, 
Aristotle thus differentiates the virtues of a good man, which were examined 
above, and virtues of a good citizen. The former are not necessarily in line 
with the latter (Pol. III 4, 1276b34–35). The virtues of the citizen are 
determined by how the actor realises action appropriate to his role within the 
society. Each role has its own set of civic virtues: the ruler has the virtues of a 
ruler, the soldier the virtues of a soldier, the farmer the virtues of a farmer, 
etc. 
Aristotle can be interpreted to mean that political responsibility is 
equated with good citizenship. In this case, however, the action of the state is 
emphasized: the state is like a choir of which the citizen is a member 
(Winthrop 1975, 418). Based on this, one could assume that action of a good 
state would require that each citizen act according to his roles as far as 
possible (see Pol. 253). 
It is good to keep in mind that the ideas expressed in Politics are 
impossible to apply to the contemporary setting (Nichols 1992, 169). In 
Aristotle’s society, only the Hellenic class with ownership status had 
citizenship (see Pol. 243). In addition to inequality between the sexes, slavery 
was a given. Aristotle, in spite of efforts to discuss free men and slaves, and 
their minds and bodies systematically, did not criticize this situation 
outright. By this point at the latest, as he happened to extend his incomplete 
conception of human nature to slaves as well, his view became indefensible 
(see Pol. I 5, 1254a21–23). As a result, he had to discuss natural slavery, and 
so his prejudices against ”barbarians” were infused into his political theory 
(See B. Williams 1993, 110–115). 
The virtues of the citizen did not, Aristotle thought, depend on personal 
virtues. What followed from this was that a good citizen was not necessarily a 
good person. An exception to this rule was the rulers, who Aristotle thought 
to have the pre-requisite virtues of a good person, in order to excel in their 
role (see NE I 4, 1095b4–7). The ruler is required to have a developed faculty 
of practical reason, whereas this ability for deliberation is not essential for an 
ordinary citizen. Additionally, the ruler is required to understand the 
subjects’ position, as Aristotle writes “he who has never learned to obey 
cannot be a good commander” (Pol. III 4, 1277b7–16). Only the mastery of 
his own profession is required of a regular citizen. 
Aristotle’s theory states that when acting according to the virtues of the 
ruler, i.e., when the ruler is in fact good, he advances the political action of 
the state toward its political end. Political responsibility is realised in his 
case, because his action is concurrent with the political action of the state. As 
an interpretation of Aristotle, political responsibility means that the action of 
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the individual advances the action of the state of which he is a part toward its 
end. 
As in the ideal case of the citizen advancing the end of the state, ideally 
the state aims to further the well-being of its citizens (NE I 7, 1097a15–
1098b9 & I 13, 1102a5–10). In this sort of state, the citizens’ action as an 
individual would further the state’s objective to serve its inhabitants best. 
This is how the acts of the citizen related to state’s action determine the 
overall civic political responsibility. As Aristotle writes: 
We maintain that the true forms of government are three, and that 
the best must be that which is administered by the best, and in which 
there is one man, or a whole family, or many persons, excelling all 
the others together in excellence, and both rulers and subjects are 
fitted, the one to rule, the others to be ruled, in such a manner as to 
attain the most desirable life. We showed at the commencement of 
our inquiry that the excellence of the good man is necessarily the 
same as the excellence of the citizen of the perfect state.211 (Politics III 
18, 1288a32–39.) 
 
Governments include units ruled by one, many or several. Additionally, 
Aristotle divides these into governments directed towards the end of the well-
being of its citizens and those directed at the end of procuring benefits for its 
rulers. Ideally then, the best political aim of a state is eudaimonia, which 
translates into flourishing or happiness. There can be more than one ruler 
and ideal governments are called monarchies, aristocracies and polities 
according to their number, whereas degraded ones are called tyrannies, 
oligarchies and democracies.   
Democracy was seen by Aristotle as the worst government, governed by 
many, probably because he shared his teacher Plato’s opinion. Plato was 
shocked in his time by the execution of Socrates, a verdict determined by 
democratic decision. According to Plato, governments degrade from better 
government to worse in the following order: aristocracy, timocracy, 
oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. (Plato, 2007, VIII, 544d–562b & IX, 
587c). The division into democracy and polity is made by Aristotle, and is 
                                                
211 It is worth considering how this important quote has been translated: the translation by 
Jonathan Barnes from the 1984 edition is used here: “We showed at the commencement of our inquiry 
that the excellence of the good man is necessarily the same as the excellence of the citizen of the perfect 
state.” In contrast, Barker and Stalley translate Aristotle in the 1998 Oxford edition as “We have also 
shown, at the beginning of our inquiry, that the goodness of the good man, and that of the citizen of the 
best city, must be one and the same.” Benjamin Jowett’s version in the Random House 1943 edition 
however reads “We showed at the commencement of our inquiry [n76] that the virtue of the good man 
is necessarily the same as the virtue of the citizen of the perfect state.” Virtue, excellence and goodness 
have been used throughout the years as synonymous with each other. 
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determined by the main beneficiary of the government, be it the rulers or the 
citizens.  
How then does responsible action differ between the governments? In 
good governments, the responsible acts of the individual tend to manifest 
themselves as politically responsible action as well, meaning that 
interpretations of responsibility for action, responsibility for character and 
political responsibility are most closely aligned within monarchies, 
aristocracies and polities; the benevolent government types.  
In states with degraded governments, the situation is more difficult to 
describe (see Nichols 1992, 87). In these cases, the virtuous action of the 
individual may very well advance the well-being of its citizens, but from the 
view-point of the state it can conflict with the ends of the state’s political 
action. In this way it is possible to identify situations through Aristotle’s 
theory wherein actions interpreted by just moral responsibility would seem 
praiseworthy, but would seem blameworthy when the action of the state is 
included in the big picture. 
Whether the state of the government is tyranny, monarchy or democracy, 
it affects the whole as virtues affect individuals. Tyranny and other degraded 
forms of government are analogous with vices and lead to weakened state 
action in that the acts of the citizens are not directed at their own well-being. 
This means that the acts of states with degraded governments do not achieve 
their ideal end, the well-being of its inhabitants, and that an individual acting 
virtuously otherwise might be considered blameworthy if they were acting 
against the state’s political end. Read this way, Aristotle feels almost modern, 
and is of great interest as such. As a down-side reading Aristotle thus takes 
rapid steps toward speculation and beyond the boundaries of our present 
inquiry. Therefore for now it suffices to point out that it is important to 
recognize the extended circumstances applying to Aristotle’s theory, and that 
the matter will not be pursued further here.212 
  
                                                
212 More detail on this can be found in the previous article on the subject by the author (Kaila 
2014).  
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5.2 DISCUSSION: RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHARACTER 
IN NE III.5 – MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OR MORAL 
EDUCATION? 
 
Taking stock of Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility, it seems clear that 
there are multiple interpretations of what is inherent to this concept: the 
most common, shared understanding of its basics can be summed up in 
terms of the “simple theory presented in Irwin’s article (1980).213 The “simple 
theory” interpretation, however, leaves out the effects of character discussed 
in NE III.5.  
Character, as it was discussed in Aristotle’s context, consists of virtues, 
which have an effect on people’s moral choices, which means that Aristotle 
considers character important for moral responsibility. There is, however, 
some disagreement on the last point, which is discussed further in this 
chapter. For example, some authors argue against this (Irwin, Meyer, and 
Curren) in that by talking about character in NE III.5, Aristotle did not mean 
that past events could decisively alter responsibilities, or that character is not 
an inseparable component of Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility. but 
that it is discussed because it is important for moral education (Meyer 2011, 
145) and Athenian legal thought (Curren 1989, 259) instead. 
One interpretation (see Schoeman 1987, 6 & Pritchard 1991, chapter 2) 
considered be plausible here, is that Aristotle may not have distinguished 
between ethics and moral development, and thus saw no problem 
incorporating the notions of moral education and development into his 
theory of moral responsibility as well as the more extensive political 
connotations of the concept. Nevertheless, the important conclusion of the 
naturalistic interpretation, which is ultimately preferred here, is that blame is 
the key element of responsibility and as such the dynamics of the social 
relationships between agents are also relevant in Aristotle’s context. (EE II.7 
1223a9-13.) 
Both of Irwin’s theories involve an agent doing an act based upon the 
response that constitutes responsibility. For example, if A drives under the 
influence of alcohol and injures B, A is blamed for the deed and thus 
considered responsible. The main difference between the simple and 
complex interpretations is the added condition of “capable decision”. 
Therefore where in the case of the simple theory the mere voluntariness of 
consuming alcohol sufficed under the complex theory, for A to be responsible 
for the act A would additionally require the capacity to decide whether to 
consume alcohol before driving or not. In most cases, the situations certainly 
do not differ, but Irwin’s complex theory provides additional detail for 
Aristotle’s theory of responsibility for action, which is missing from the 
common one. 
                                                
213 See also later publications by Roberts (1989), Broadie (1991), and Meyer (2011). 
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In his seminal article, Irwin (1980) (1.) disagrees with Aristotle that mere 
voluntariness is sufficient for responsibility. As stated in his complex theory, 
he expects the capacity for decisions from the agent as well. Irwin also writes 
that (2.) Aristotle emphasizes that, once acquired, character is lasting and not 
easy to change, character is composed not only of beliefs but also emotions as 
“the result[s] of training nonrational desires”; and noted that: (3.) “Aristotle’s 
discussion of responsibility for character begins by considering how 
character is formed by decision and action on it”. Finally, Irwin claims that 
(4.) his complex theory helps to explain the problems of Aristotle’s topic of 
responsibility for character or “why Aristotle speaks in these two ways”. He 
claims that Aristotle seems to think that by deciding the agent can become 
responsible for more than just the act. (Irwin 1980, 140-141).  
The “responsibility for character” aspect of Aristotle’s theory is discussed 
by Irwin in “Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle” (1980) as well. Irwin 
interprets the thoughts on responsibility for character present in NE III.5 
(i.e., “the complex theory”) as not representing a contradiction in terms with 
the rest of Aristotle’s account of moral responsibility. Irwin demonstrates 
this by using Hume’s theory, which itself is directly influenced by Aristotle’s 
theory, as a point of comparison.214 According to Irwin, Aristotle’s appended 
theory succeeds where Hume’s theory fails in that Hume claims that only in-
character acts are blameworthy, and all out-of-character acts are excused.215 
This is averted in Aristotle’s theory as, again following Irwin’s interpretation, 
a capacity for making reasoned decisions is required as a pre-requisite for 
being held responsible.  
The difference between the two classic thinkers is in how they conceive 
the mental states of the agent, which have an effect on the act and 
accountability concerning the act. Both of them agree that the condition of 
causal responsibility has to be true in order for the agent to be a valid 
recipient of praise and blame. According to Irwin, however, Hume 
understands this condition in two separate ways: in terms of his or her 
character and some elements of his person that are durable. (Irwin 1980, 
134-135.)  
                                                
214 While Hume’s theory of responsibility is not described in great detail in here, it is used as an 
example of a theory that uses both concepts of excuse and character in its discussion of blame 
mitigation. Blame mitigation as a term is discussed in the analysis section in chapter 7. Hume’s theory 
is also an important precedent to Strawson’s naturalism, as Hume shares the outlook of naturalism 
(see Wilson 2003).  
215 “It is worth comparing Aristotle’s doctrine with another […] [of] Hume’s attempt[s]. Hume 
agrees with Aristotle’s condition (1a) in insisting that someone is open to praise or blame only if he is 
himself the cause of his actions.” […] “But Hume understands this requirement in two nonequivalent 
ways: responsible action must proceed (a) from person’s character and (b) from something durable in 
him.” (Irwin 1980, 134-135.) See also “animals and children satisfy the second condition but not the 
first” (Irwin 1980, 135). See also Bayles (1976) for a comprehensive account of Hume’s excuses. 
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As Aristotle mentions, the reason why children and animals are exempted 
from responsibility is that prohairesis choice is unavailable to them, and thus 
their characters are considered incomplete (See NE III.2 1111b8-9). Hume 
claims however that the durable qualities of the mind and the character are 
identical with each other. Irwin claims that Hume is wrong in equating the 
two, and as a result is incapable of correctly evaluating the situations in 
which the agent is acting out-of-character. Irwin writes that Hume’s theory, 
compared with Aristotle, fails in cases demonstrated in the article. A person 
previously known to be honest embezzles some money. Because the act of 
embezzlement is done out-of-character, this act cannot be used as basis for 
holding the agent responsible in the context of Hume’s theory. In Aristotle’s 
case, using the complex theory the agent would clearly be responsible for the 
act, as he would have had the capability to decide to act fraudulently in any 
case. (Irwin 1980, 135.)  
Irwin also writes: “The first condition is too restrictive. Hume may be 
right to say – and Aristotle agrees – that someone will be blamed less for 
what he does ‘hastily and unpremeditatedly’ than for what proceeds from his 
character. But he is wrong to identify every durable element in a person with 
his character.” (Irwin 1980, 135.) Aristotle’s deliberation and decision 
provide a better grounding for judgments than Hume’s idea of the durability 
of the principles of mind does. Aristotle has a larger variety of constant 
features of the mind, which Hume does not distinguish; he equates every 
durable element of the mind with character. Irwin gives an example in which 
the agent clearly does wrong, but in a way that the action does not originate 
from the character. Hume’s theory cannot hold him responsible, while 
Aristotle’s appended with Irwin’s “complex theory” can. (Ibid.) 
The classic example of compulsion is the ship’s captain abandoning his 
cargo in a storm.216 The example puts the mental state of the captain under 
the magnifying glass. The situation is interesting because it assumes that the 
captain is fully causally responsible in losing the cargo, as well as is acting 
voluntarily on the level of action. Thus, in terms of blameworthiness the only 
redeeming factor can come through the impersonal coercion that the 
environment causes. Resulting from this, the stressed state of mind of the 
captain can also come into question in how it affects the ultimate decision. 
According to Irwin, his formulation of Aristotle’s “complex theory” can solve 
a lot of problems associated with the situation. By focusing on the diminished 
capabilities of the agent, which, assuming that the captain is not able to save 
the cargo, can lead to the conclusion that the captain is indeed not 
blameworthy on account of the loss. (See Irwin 1980, 137.) 
Irwin concludes that “on this theory [the complex theory] of 
responsibility, someone can be responsible for an action without being 
                                                
216 Fischer & Ravizza follow up with this example. They describe the situation as an intentional, but 
non-responsive act. (Fisher & Ravizza 1998, 83.) 
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responsible for his character or for the traits of personality that cause him to 
deliberate and act as he does” (ibid. 139). 
Children are a group that receives special treatment right from NE book 
III onwards.217 Aristotle’s reasoning on why children are discussed relates 
directly to the question of character in moral responsibility. Whether only 
adults can be held morally responsible is the probable origin of this 
clarification.218 Irwin discusses Aristotle’s treatment of the moral 
responsibility of children: “And indeed Aristotle seems to be thinking of 
adults rather than children when he argues that we are responsible for our 
characters. […] Only an adult could be expected to know that his actions will 
form his states of character.” (Ibid. 1980, 140.)  
In endnote 43, Irwin also writes that experience and judgment are 
required from students of politics, both of which children lack (NE 1095a2-
11). Those who are lectured on political science must have a good upbringing 
in Aristotle’s theory (NE 1095b4-6). People become good naturally, through 
practice or by education; however, to become virtuous is unlikely for the 
impulsive children without guidance, to secure which Aristotle suggest laws 
(1179b21-34).  
In this way, according to Irwin, “Aristotle thinks it is possible to be so 
badly brought up that he is incapable of becoming good even if he wants to 
be” (Irwin 1980, 154). However, Sarah Broadie (1991) is against this, arguing 
that Aristotle is well aware of children and considers cases with undeveloped 
characters, such as those of children. Just because they lack the capability for 
deliberation, including prohairesis, does not mean that they would not strive 
to be and do good. Just at the end of the responsibility assessments, blame 
on children can be withdrawn, but not without consideration of their capacity 
for moral thought. (Broadie 1991, 169-170.)   
Marion Smiley in Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of 
Community (1992) notes that while action can be committed by adults, 
children and animals alike, the last two groups are excluded from 
responsibility on the basis of their lacking status in terms of voluntariness. 
She criticizes Irwin’s interpretation of Aristotle’s responsibility in that Irwin 
confuses Aristotle’s concept of responsibility with that of Kant. Voluntariness 
is something for Aristotle that is mediated by political and social norms, not 
something that depends on “rational control” or free will. (Smiley 1992, 50.) 
                                                
217 NE III.2 1111b8-9. See also Bobzien’s notes about children (Bobzien 2014, 20). 
218 Sarah Broadie writes in  Ethics with Aristotle (1991): 
“It is sometimes suggested that what motivates NE book III.5 is the following reasoning: (1) a 
person of formed character is not free to act otherwise than in accordance with it; (2) one cannot be 
held answerable for doing X when one is not free not to, except on the condition that (3) one freely and 
knowingly entered into the situation in which one is not free not to do it. With this in mind, it is 
suggested, Aristotle makes the acquisition of character ‘depend on us.’ For then the fully formed agent 
cannot escape responsibility for his actions.” (Broadie 1991, 170.) 
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Aristotle’s advantage, Smiley continues, comes from how the practice of 
blaming children and animals (as well as the mentally impaired) is 
independent of the status of the voluntariness of the actor. If voluntariness is 
held as an absolute prerequisite for blame, we lose the details of different 
levels of voluntariness, and how it is related to the ultimate sanctioning. 
According to Smiley, Nussbaum’s description of the “mysterious shift” 
between childhood and maturity is something Aristotle’s theory is better 
equipped to deal with precisely because of the separateness of voluntariness 
and blameworthiness (Smiley 1992, 51.) 
Susan S. Meyer considers Aristotle’s theory of responsibility and its 
relationship with the concept of character in her book Aristotle on Moral 
Responsibility (2011). Meyer, whose conception of responsibility is adopted 
from Strawson, writes that Aristotle’s responsibility for character is not a part 
of his view of moral responsibility, but of his ideas of moral education. She 
does however note that the modern writers often consider Aristotle’s 
responsibility for character essential to moral responsibility. (Meyer 2011, 
145.) 
The initial idea of Aristotle on Moral Responsibility (Meyer 2011) is to 
describe the part of Aristotle’s work that corresponds to the Strawsonian 
conception of moral responsibility and argue for a coherent Aristotelian 
concept of moral responsibility. Meyer (2011) is thus optimal in identifying 
the similarities and the differences between the different conceptions. She 
relies on the passages devoted to exploring the notions of voluntariness and 
responsibility for character. Her inquiry goes to considerable lengths in 
examining the relationship between voluntariness and responsibility, even so 
far as responsibility not being a direct concern of moral agency. Her main 
target is Roberts' article (1989), as she objects to Roberts’s stance as one 
where the voluntariness aspect gets neglected, while the particular effects of 
character are agreed upon (see Meyer 2011, 14).  
Meyer describes accounts of moral responsibility in terms of the scope of 
their definition: moral responsibility in Meyer's narrow construal is the 
“concern of criminal law […] It concerns the conditions in which an agent 
merits praise and blame, or reward or punishment, for an action. An agent 
merits blame or punishment for an action if and only if she is morally 
responsible for it […] On this narrow construal, moral responsibility is a 
relation between an agent and her action”. (Meyer 2011, 17-18.) The narrow 
construal thus concerns only the retributive side of the concept. Compared to 
this, Meyer, presents moral responsibility at its broadest construal as “issues 
of central importance to our conception of morality and to our conception of 
ourselves as moral agents”. (Ibid. 18.) Meyer’s special interest is aimed at 
“agents who are subject to the demands of morality”, while she makes the 
usual exceptions of “non-human animals, small children, and the mentally 
defective”. She states that while concern about these groups is important, “we 
don’t consider these claims to be reciprocal”, which corresponds to 
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Strawson's distinction between the objective attitudes and reactive attitudes 
(ibid. 18).  
Meyer writes about these statements that recall Aristotle’s emphases on 
virtues and rationality. They fit Eshleman’s categories in chapter 3, and her 
work can be said to be influenced by the Strawsonian tradition.219 Going 
through the criteria reveals an idea of responsibility, at least in stating the 
scale between the narrow and broad construal (ibid. 17-18): there is an 
agent220 (ibid. 28), there are conditions, which determine whether the agent 
can be held responsible for an action in terms of the exceptions on p. 18, as 
well as the statement that voluntariness not a sufficient condition of 
responsibility (ibid. 28-29). Finally, there are the virtues, which act as objects 
of responsibility ascriptions (ibid. 19-24).  
The focus on virtues lets Meyer concentrate on responsibility for 
character.221 Throughout the work she is interested in the relationship 
between the notions of responsibility for action and character. 222 She makes 
the effort to emphasize the role of moral education as a separate but related 
area with moral responsibility in general. She takes the risk of attempting to 
include the former within the latter clear, and is skeptical about such 
projects. She writes in the introduction: 
Aristotle clearly has the concerns of the moral educator in mind when 
writing his ethical treatises and he thinks praising and blaming play 
an important formative role in moral education. But he nonetheless 
conceives the goal of moral education to be to produce a fully 
autonomous individual who merits praise or blame. The only agents 
who merit praise or blame are those who are properly subject to the 
demands, expectations, and evaluations of morality. The first task of 
a theory of moral responsibility is to identify the features that 
properly subject an agent to these demands, expectations and 
evaluations. An agent who has these features is a morally responsible 
agent. Aristotle’s account of moral character (the condition common 
to virtue and vice of character) accomplishes this first task of a theory 
of moral responsibility. (Meyer 2011, 3-4.)  
 
                                                
219 Meyer refers directly to FR (Meyer 2011, 17-19, endnote 1 & 2.) 
220 Meyer discusses Aristotle’s moral agency in the sixth chapter of her book: “the agent is not 
simply a causal factor in production of the action, but the causal factor to which primary causal 
responsibility is attributable” (Meyer 2011,149). 
221 For example, Jean Roberts’ article (1989) is cited in the introduction (Meyer 2011, 2, endnotes 4 
& 5.)  
222 E.g., “The state of character concerning a given range of activity disposes the agent to display or 
engage in that activity in a certain way in certain circumstances. The justice or injustice (e.g., flight or 
fear) depends essentially on these additional conditions “What, when, how, etc.” in Aristotle’s formula 
[…] Hence the thing for which one is blamed or praised is not, for example, getting angry, but rather 
getting angry in these circumstances to this degree, etc” (Meyer 2011, 163, NE references excluded). 
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Meyer continues that Aristotle’s theory also leaves room for the exceptional 
cases, as while he “explicitly recognizes that not all voluntary agents are 
morally responsible for their voluntary actions, he nonetheless thinks that 
agents with moral character are morally responsible for their voluntary 
actions”. (Meyer 2011, 4.) 
The emphasis on the voluntary is not uncritical in Aristotle according to 
Meyer. There are examples where Aristotle considers alternatives to the most 
commonly used schemas.223 Meyer applies Strawson’s view on compatibilism 
to Aristotle too, as she states that the question of determinism is not a 
concern nor is definitive with the topic of moral responsibility (ibid. 4). 
According to Meyer, moral character means that a “set of dispositions 
together determine the full range of agent’s sentiments and interests” (ibid. 
31). With a reference to Roberts (1989), she describes responsibility for 
character as a prospective type of responsibility (Meyer 2011, 40-41). 
Aristotle, according to Meyer, “thinks the qualified sort of responsibility 
for character […] we have is significant for our moral education, not for our 
moral responsibility.” (Ibid. 145.) This is coherent with her main argument 
that Aristotle’s responsibility cannot be interpreted solely on the basis of 
voluntariness. Responsibility for character might not be required for 
responsibility for action, as Meyer notes: “Aristotle nowhere indicates that he 
thinks responsibility for character is significant because it is a necessary 
condition for responsibility for action, or because it is necessary for the 
praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of states of characters […] in this 
context [arguing against the Socratic asymmetry thesis] he thinks the 
qualified sort of responsibility for character […] we have is significant for our 
moral education, not for our moral responsibility (n28)” (Meyer 2011, 145. 
See also Roberts 1989, 30-31 and Broadie 1991, 166-74.)  
In an endnote Meyer compares Robert’s and Broadie’s position to her 
own: “Roberts [1989, 30-31], like Broadie [1991, pp. 166-74], agrees that the 
point of Aristotle’s argument for responsibility for character is to establish 
that nature leaves room for habituation and education. But she takes this to 
indicate that Aristotle is not concerned with moral responsibility in the 
chapters in which he discusses voluntariness” (ibid. 148, n28). She interprets 
Robert’s position as agreeing with that of Bernard Williams’s Ethics and 
Limits of Philosophy (1985). (Meyer 2011, 148, n28 & n29.) 
Following a quote from NE (1114a4 - 13), Meyer situates the character’s 
effect on moral responsibility most clearly thus: “Modern accounts of moral 
responsibility often take responsibility for character to provide the ultimate 
basis of moral responsibility.” (Meyer, 2011, 122) She cites Williams 1985, 
Roberts 1989 and Broadie 1991 as sources for this statement. 
Meyer likens moral character to the immovable mover or voluntary 
actions of the moral agent within Aristotle's theory (Meyer 2011, 154-155). 
Her interpretation of Aristotle’s moral agency “may be roughly described as 
                                                
223 One such example is the diachronic model of action mentioned briefly in the Metaphysics.  
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'naturalism'”, as natural processes are not up to us (ibid. 160, see also 188). 
She notes that the current theories would accept the idea of agency as an 
alternative to explanations related to character, i.e., the causal features of 
moral agency would be exceptions or interruptions (ibid. 161).224 Since 
character is the non-accidental cause of a desire, and as non-accidental 
causes exist in nature in Aristotle, this is not sufficient for determining a 
responsibility relation (Meyer 2011, 160). 225   
Randall R. Curren, whose 1989 article “The Contribution of Nicomachean 
Ethics iii 5 to Aristotle’s Theory of Responsibility” discusses the influence 
that the titular chapter has had on interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of 
responsibility.226 While Curren claims that Aristotle’s conception of 
responsibility is not compatible with the modern counterparts including the 
Strawsonian conception (see Curren 1989, 261-262), he demonstrates that 
chapter III.5 has a significant effect on moral philosophy and jurisprudence 
that has appeared since. (See Curren 1989, 274-275.) Included in this 
evaluation are the specifics of character and their relation with responsibility. 
On responsibility for character, Curren writes: “So for Aristotle an agent 
may be responsible for something without having decided to bring it about or 
having foreseen its coming about, provided its source and cause is the agent’s 
character acting through the mediation of the agents intellect.” Ultimately 
Curren rejects the attempts to include concerns of character within the scope 
of moral responsibility (Curren 1989, 266). His article has some interesting 
conclusions as a result. According to Aristotle, even if we cannot choose our 
ends, III.5 implies that we can “contribute to” them through voluntary action. 
(Curren 1989, 274-275.) 
The way that Curren ties blameworthiness to voluntariness as Irwin does 
is equally subject to Smiley’s criticism. A bigger problem for Curren’s article 
itself is unfortunately that it is compromised by the heavy reliance on Magna 
Moralia, the authenticity of which has been questioned. The reason why 
                                                
224 As is the case with the Strawsonian theories examined in the chapters above. 
225 According to Meyer, Aristotle holds that “only causal claims worth taking seriously concern 
non-accidental causal relations, and explicitly includes his discussion of voluntariness within the scope 
of this claim" (EE 1221b4-6, in Meyer 2011, 157). “While rocks, floods, viruses, non-human animals, 
children, and adult humans can be causally responsible for results, we suppose that only adult humans 
are morally responsible for the results they cause.” Meyer continues: “While [Aristotle] clearly thinks 
that entities other than morally responsible agents can be non-accidental causes of outcomes, he thinks 
that only certain entities can be non-accidentally the cause of morally significant outcomes.“ (Meyer 
2011, 162.) 
226 Randall R. Curren’s article “The Contribution of Nicomachean Ethics iii 5 to Aristotle’s Theory 
of Responsibility.” published in History of Philosophy Quarterly (1989) is included as it specifically 
discusses the meaning of chapter iii.5 of the Nicomachean Ethics to Aristotle’s theory of moral 
responsibility. Curren is among the skeptical writers who would like to keep the themes of NE III.5 
separate from Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility, as he considers the chapter is related to 
Athenian legal thought instead.  
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Magna Moralia and the Eudemian Ethics to lesser extent are emphasized is 
the hope of showing that Aristotle’s theory of responsibility is not solely 
reliant on the concept of voluntariness as defined in Nicomachean Ethics, as 
the discussion is centered around involuntariness in that context (see Curren 
1989, 262). 
Burnyeat sums up the thoughts on moral education in Nicomachean 
Ethics clearly. He notes that identifying the workings of moral reasoning 
alone as moral philosophy is not sufficient. What is often left out of these 
theories, including those about responsibility, is the subject of the moral 
development of a person.227 One of the questions that Burnyeat aims to 
answer is whether a person who has the optimal set of virtues can be 
akratic228 at the same time. Aristotle’s picture of moral development is hardly 
perfect – as Burnyeat acknowledges – but it is ground-breaking and rarely 
superseded as an account of its kind (Burnyeat 1999, 221). 
Further, according to Burnyeat: “What is exemplary in Aristotle is his 
grasp of the truth that morality comes in a sequence of stages with both 
cognitive and emotional dimensions.” (Burnyeat 1999, 221). For example, the 
rapid responses of the spirit that are described in NE VII.6 (1149a26-b3) 
contain the concept of “evaluative responses”, which are close to the reactive 
sentiments described by Strawson. Michael S. Pritchard is of the same mind 
as he describes Aristotle’s view on the developing responsibility in chapter 2 
of his book On Becoming Responsible (1991). 
 
Two interpretations of Aristotle’s moral responsibility 
 
Aristotle’s concept of moral responsibility can be found in NE book III, and 
can be interpreted as part of his moral theory that encompasses the nature of 
individuals and their psychology and politics as well. While a complete 
reading of all the relevant works (NE, EE, Politics, Rhetoric) would present 
all the considerations needed to represent the wealth of Aristotle’s effort in 
its entirety, the specific concept of moral responsibility seems to have 
meaning even when discussed independently of the extended notions of 
political responsibility. The majority of writers are in agreement on this. The 
critical difference of opinion is related to the effect of character on moral 
responsibility. At least two major options of interpretation are being debated 
among the scholars:  
 
  
                                                
227  The actual theories of developmental psychology have not had a lasting impact on moral 
philosophy at least during the 20th century. Burnyeat’s assessment is close to those of Fingarette (1966) 
and Pritchard (1991) in this matter.  
228 Being akratic or weak-of-will means that the person fails to achieve his ultimate goal because of 
his nature (telos), even when the actualization of it is something that he consciously wants. 
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Option 1.  
 
Aristotle’s moral responsibility consists of:  
• a) responsibility for action (A does X voluntarily (in knowledge, 
uncoerced, is the recipient of blame, etc.) 
• and b) responsibility for character (partially self-trained virtues and 
vices direct prohairesis) 
•  thus A’s blameworthiness is determined by both a) and b). 
 
Option 2.  
 
Aristotle’s moral responsibility consists of:  
• a) responsibility for action (A does X voluntarily (in knowledge, 
uncoerced, is the recipient of blame, etc.) only! 
• Therefore while questions of character (partially self-trained virtues 
and vices directing prohairesis) are important before the agent is a 
fully capable adult human being, they do not affect the 
blameworthiness of A’s action directly or indirectly. 
 
The psychologically minded Schoeman and Pritchard make claims that 
would adhere to the statements in option 1. At least Irwin, Meyer and Curren 
would go for option 2. The contrasting example of Hume’s responsibility 
(discussed by P. Foot 1966, Irwin 1980 and P. Russell 1995, chapter 7), which 
takes option 1 literally, would be at odds with option 2. If considerations of 
character are to be taken into account, they cannot be definite, which is 
worrisome for proponents of the first option, since the uncertain nature of 
character is built into the concept of moral responsibility as well in that case.   
If we accept Meyer’s claim that responsibility for character is not 
significant for moral responsibility, and we opted for option 2, then how 
would it affect the special cases mentioned in the examples? If the agent is a 
child, for example, should not the relevant character-based concerns be a 
part of moral responsibility, because without this it would be more difficult to 
determine that she is not evaluated under the same terms? Conversely, 
should not the basic qualifications for the status of moral agency be evident 
within the rules of the theory? Since in Aristotle’s case these qualifications 
are presented in terms of character, could it be said that these are only 
relevant to the topic of moral education and not that of moral responsibility? 
This all depends of course on the definition and scope of the concept of moral 
responsibility one has.  
The stance taken here follows Meyer in the sense of how she discusses 
Aristotelian responsibility clearly in terms of responsibility for action and 
responsibility for character, but on that whether she is right about the 
exclusion of responsibility for character from Aristotle’s big picture of moral 
responsibility, her conclusions about this matter are not followed. Smiley’s 
recommendation to view blameworthiness as distinct from the prerequisite 
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of voluntariness is considered worthwhile. Going back to the Strawsonian 
context, if it is indeed impossible to hold any deep notions of moral 
responsibility as Bernard Williams claimed, it would certainly seem so. 
However, with the inclusion of the ideas of historical responsibility the issue 
becomes complicated once again, as Gary Watson showed. In any case, 
further investigation between the concepts of moral responsibility and 
character is warranted. This investigation is undertaken in the latter part of 
this dissertation.   
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5.3 SUMMARY 
 
The idea of moral responsibility found in Aristotle seems to include two 
viewpoints. The first, responsibility for action, focuses on voluntary acts 
(done in knowledge and uncoerced) and on the response to these, or praise 
and blame. The second, responsibility for character, is based on choices 
influenced by the character of the individual as well as the states of character 
defining the individual, which in turn is defined by voluntary acts preceding 
the morally evaluated act in question. Whether the second viewpoint is 
accepted has been debated. No matter what the conclusion is, these two 
interpretations show that the big picture of Aristotle’s moral responsibility is 
something more complex than just causal responsibility for the act and its 
consequences. 
The idea of political responsibility, which can be found separately in 
Aristotle’s works, implies that the compound action of its citizens forms the 
political action of the state. The ideal end of this action is the well-being of its 
citizens. If the state is optimally organized, the action committed by the 
citizens produces their own well-being. When considered together, moral and 
political responsibility imply interaction between the state and its citizens, 
both the ability to work together to attain happiness for oneself and one’s 
fellow citizens through the instrument of the state, and the inability to do so.  
Aristotle’s moral and political theory thus provides an example of 
something that modern theories that are more inclined to liberalism and 
individualism do not possess:229 responsibility cannot be assigned just by 
looking at the actor himself, but necessarily some responsibility redounds in 
all cases to the society to which the individual belongs. In Aristotle’s case, the 
political is present in his more pragmatic version of the theory in a very real 
way, but as a way of doing ethics the comparison between the theories and 
the reality quickly becomes an impossible task. For this reason, neither the 
line of thought involving actual political implications, nor the precise concept 
of political responsibility are discussed beyond this point, except of course for 
the ways that responsibility is generally relevant to the social nature of 
humanity. 
  
                                                
229 Compare with this with Smiley 1992, 34-36 and Nichols 1992, 1-12. 
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End of Part I “What does responsibility mean here?” 
 
Now that the first research question of (Q1) “How is responsibility 
understood by philosophers today?” has been answered, first, by introducing 
the concept through the popular article “Freedom and Resentment” 
(2008/[1962]) by Peter F. Strawson, and discussing the theoretical 
framework that has been formed under its influence, and second, by 
describing its Aristotelian counterpart and the relevant issues related to it, a 
brief summary of the first half of the dissertation is in order. 
By no means has it been claimed that a complete account of theories of 
moral responsibility or indeed that a straight-forward definition of the 
concept itself has been constructed. The theory of moral responsibility based 
on Strawson’s article alone has left a lot of questions unanswered. The idea 
that his relatively brief text on the subject has resulted in a complex theory 
that could address every situation can be set aside. Nevertheless the debate 
provoked by this particular, influential attempt to end one of longest 
arguments in the history of moral philosophy (i.e., the problem of 
determinism) is sufficient in that we can at least speak of “a position”.  
To flesh out this position further, the foremost current Strawsonian 
theorist of responsibility has been discussed: R. Jay Wallace’s Responsibility 
and the Moral Sentiments (1994) does a reasonably good job of putting all 
the pieces of the Strawsonian puzzle together, but he does (inevitably 
perhaps) introduce new flaws into this position.230 The problem that was 
thought to be the most difficult was the conflict between demands that 
Wallace dealt with regarding questions of responsibility without a separate, 
metaphysical level (a trait which Strawson introduced to the debate on 
responsibility) and his (Kantian-flavored) reliance on the particular “morality 
system”, which Paul Russell pointed out in his critique (2013). For example, 
we asked whether or not the excuses as “blameworthiness inhibitors” were 
not part of a separate layer of (cognitive) knowledge that would supervene 
the reactive sentiments. 
Next, the challenges to the Strawsonian concept of blame, including those 
mounted by Hieronymi, Scanlon and Sher, were discussed. It was noted that 
the academic debate on blame would continue, and that it would certainly 
have an effect on future of moral responsibility as well. As for Strawsonian 
theories in general, it was finally settled that blame is a significant 
component of responsibility and that the composite moral responsibility in 
Strawsonian terms is thus dependent on the reactive attitudes (including 
moral sentiments such as resentment, indignation and guilt) that the 
members of the moral community display toward each other. 
As the criticisms of Strawson and his followers have claimed, there were 
weak spots in his sketch of the concept. Developmental psychology dealing 
                                                
230 At this point, we note that an alternative interpretation of the Strawsonian position on moral 
responsibility could be made.  
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with moral development and other factors leading to situations in which the 
agent is considered extraordinary by some measure were seen to be 
insufficiently approachable with the Strawsonian mind-set. Wallace’s 1994 
exemptions, named after Watson’s important contribution (1987) are the 
apparent blind spots of the theory. When the mutually reactive “webs of 
human attitudes and feelings” collapse or cease to exist, whenever such 
extraordinary agents are discussed, it is clear that a more comprehensive 
account of the subject is called for. Furthermore, the general tendency to 
distance itself from “how we actually treat each other” troubles the 
Strawsonian position as well. Smiley and others criticized the Strawsonian 
theory for giving up too much of its social relevance.  
As a result of the heuristic comparison, based on FR and the texts of 
Watson (1987) and Wallace (1994), it can be said that the Strawsonian 
theories in general: 
a) view reactive attitudes and sentiments as constitutive of moral 
responsibility, 
b) consider affective blame important as a distinctive sign of holding 
someone responsible and 
c) accept excuses in certain situations as over-riding elements of 
responsibility resulting in modified or eliminated blame. 
Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility is a valuable counterpoint to the 
Strawsonian position. It was interpreted here from the same broadly 
naturalistic perspective as the Strawsonian theories were and, by making this 
comparison, it was acknowledged that the Strawsonian approach to the 
concept influences the current academic discussion on Aristotle’s 
responsibility. Susan S. Meyer’s book Aristotle on Moral Responsibility 
(2011) in particular was referenced as it examines the Aristotelian content of 
the topic from a Strawsonian vantage-point. Articles by Terence Irwin (1980) 
and Jean Roberts (1989), Sarah Broadie’s book (1991), Garrath Williams's 
bibliography (2010) and most recently Bobzien’s article (2014) reinforced the 
basic idea that Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility is situated primarily 
within book III of Nicomachean Ethics, and needs to be read specifically with 
the knowledge that chapter III.5 contains Aristotle’s account of character’s 
relation to moral responsibility. 
The backbone of Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility is formed by his 
theory of responsibility for action (from NE III.1 onwards). The most in-
depth study of this subject can be found in T. H. Irwin’s “Reason and 
Responsibility in Aristotle” (1980). Irwin summed up Aristotle’s theory as “A 
is responsible (a candidate for praise and blame) if and only if X is done in 
knowledge and without coercion” (Irwin 1980, 125). Without going deeper 
into Irwin’s additional interpretation (that the “complex theory” of Aristotle’s 
responsibility requires the capacity to decide rationally on the act) it can be 
accepted as sufficient. 
The character-element has, however, proved to be controversial. In what 
way did Aristotle mean that the agent is responsible for his character as well 
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as his actions in NE III.5? Some authors, including Irwin and Meyer, 
objected to the inclusion of the notion of responsibility for character in 
Aristotle’s theory. Meyer called these character-related notions in Aristotle 
more important to his theory of moral education than that of moral 
responsibility, Others such as Roberts (1989) and Curren (1989) questioned 
the entire theory of responsibility or at least as it is understood today, based 
on the imprecise concept.  
Aristotle himself seemed to think that by influencing one’s own character, 
the agent could be responsible prospectively for the act, or alternately be 
excused from blame. On the other hand, a person whose character is known 
in advance could not be held responsible if he was expected to act otherwise. 
As for a similar heuristic conclusion on Aristotle, as was done with Strawson 
above, most commentators on Aristotle’s theory of responsibility think the 
following are true:  
a) In terms of sources, the core of Aristotle’s theory of responsibility is 
located in Nicomachean Ethics book III.1-5; 
b) it is based on Aristotle’s theory of action and voluntariness; 
c) it contains or is at least related to the notes on character in book III.5, 
d) which describe the reasons for exempting actors from responsibility 
within its context. 
Incongruity between the ways that character is dealt with either in 
classical or modern theories of responsibility provoked the formulation of 
research question Q2 “How should character be understood in the context of 
the philosophy of responsibility?” As neither Strawson nor Aristotle provide a 
clear and distinctly articulated definition of responsibility, the scholars and 
researchers working on this have had to debate the subject constantly. The 
“responsibility for action only” side has, possibly for practical reasons, 
remained the most usual way to talk about the concept but, despite this, few 
theorists would wish to limit our view of responsibility to the “ledger-view” 
that would result from referring solely to this aspect of the term. 
As a sort of aporetic conclusion to the dissertation process aiming to 
answer Q1, we turn to the contribution to the subject matter by Bernard 
Williams (1993 & 1997) and his sentiment that no single theory of 
responsibility could be formulated that could satisfy the expectations that 
philosophers have on the subject. Williams does not however abandon it as 
something impossible to conceptualize. Instead he suggests four elements of 
responsibility (cause, intention, state and response). Regarding the 
previously noted difficulty of incorporating the notion of character into the 
modern interpretations of the Aristotelian theory, or alternatively as the 
“blind spot” in the Strawsonian counterpart, these complex subject matters 
are relatively easily classified within Williams's “state” element of 
responsibility. This element serves as a crucial point of comparison in 
chapter 7, but before this explication is properly conducted, this study 
deviates slightly in the next part. Instead of the historical presentation of the 
relevant works and the criticism examined so far, a more systematic 
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exposition of the concepts of character and excuses will make the final 
analysis of these concepts in the theories of the philosophers discussed above 
more appealing. 
 
  
160 
PART II: CHARACTER AND EXCUSES IN 
THEORIES OF RESPONSIBILITY 
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The main difference between the Strawsonian and Aristotelian conceptions 
of responsibility that was noted in chapter 5 relates to the role of character in 
influencing responsibility. While Aristotle’s writings on responsibility 
seemingly include considerations on the effect of character on the praise- and 
blameworthiness of the actions, Strawson’s article is not interested in 
character, only mentioning it briefly, and dealing with the special 
considerations instead. In this chapter, closer attention is paid to the key 
concepts that are first discussed in terms of Aristotle’s responsibility for 
character. It is demonstrated that the excuses deal with essentially the same 
element, in responsibility theories. 231 
In the previous century, the attention of moral responsibility theorists 
shifted away from character-based accounts as the mainstream of analytic 
ethics in the English-speaking areas strove for more accurate representation 
in logic and language (after the logical positivists and Wittgenstein). 
Recently, however, this tendency has seen another shift arising from the re-
surfacing of the virtue ethics of G. E. M. Anscombe (1958) and A. MacIntyre 
(1981), among others. The sentimentalist work of Strawson, which initiated a 
development that positively affected a “naturalistic turn” in ethics after the 
turn of the millennium (with the help of advances in empirical sciences), has 
been enough to re-ignite an interest in the area, which has been discussed 
under the topic of “character”. There is no clear, unanimous understanding 
of the topic, which is thus an active field of study. Here the concept of 
character is first discussed using Marcia Homiak’s Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy article on the subject (Homiak 2015).232 The contrasting concept 
of excuse is examined because of its similar function mainly among the 
Strawsonian theorists on blame. The excuses are used to point out 
exceptional cases of responsibility assessment, where the agent can be found 
extraordinary because of some fact about her moral status or some external 
circumstance. For example, the agent could be a child, or her reasoning could 
be incapacitated due to an acute illness, and so on. 
As observed in chapter 5.1.2, responsibility for character implies that the 
act has alternatives that fulfil the same end and that the agent has a choice. 
The act, which is chosen among the alternative, possible acts, is selected with 
the assistance of character virtues. The ability of the actor to affect his own 
virtues through practice, responsibility interpreted in this thicker way, 
entails that the act is determined simultaneously by the end result and the 
                                                
231 The word “element” mentioned here refers to Bernard Williams’s state element of moral 
responsibility, as discussed in chapter 4.3.3. 
232 Marcia Homiak’s Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on the topic of “Moral Character” 
(2015) is a great source for the current discussion on character. In addition to a historical overview, 
Homiak takes into account the critical points that modern psychology has offered against this concept. 
She examines some of the points made by the critics (most particularly the proponents of psychological 
situationism) and argues against their points in order.  
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indirect, causal effects through the actor’s character virtues. Thus there is a 
parallel between the character-inclusive account of Aristotle’s responsibility 
and the common incompatibilist arguments. This question of whether the 
example of historical responsibility invariably leads to an incompatibilist 
account is questioned here, as it was first in Watson (1987) as he doubted 
that it was the case in his Harris example. As for Aristotle, Susan S. Meyer 
argues that Aristotle’s account is in fact compatible with modern 
compatibilist theories of responsibility. (See Meyer 2011, xxi-xii.)  
Having now concluded the two large substance sections of part I , part II 
will concentrate on the systematic analysis of character and excuses in the 
context of the theories of moral responsibility. The following two sections 
(6.1 and 6.2) are devoted to describing the main concepts of character and 
excuse and they are analyzed together in chapter 7 in the context of 
Aristotelian and Strawsonian theories. Where the previous chapters focused 
on certain theorists and their particular works, the examination that follows 
concentrates on the specific concepts of interest. This systematic exposition 
of these concepts in the next chapter (6) advances such that a variety of 
stances on a concept is first surveyed and, immediately following a critical 
discussion, a definition is selected for that concept. In the case of “character”, 
Marcia Homiak’s Stanford Encyclopedia article on the subject is used as a 
reference, whereas “excuse” will be dealt with as a topic receiving refinement 
throughout the latter half of the previous century. Starting from Austin’s 
article (1956/57), the discussion advances to Strawson ([1962]) and finally 
his followers. Once the discussion about the concepts has been concluded, we 
will examine two examples throughout this work that highlight the 
phenomenon of blame mitigation.  
Chapter seven will contain the analysis, which will contrast the key 
concepts already presented, and answer the research questions. By utilizing 
the distinctions of elements of responsibility made by Bernard Williams, a 
common framework for the two historically separated types of theory of 
responsibility is made available. Because this systematic assessment of the 
concepts arises from the sources examined in part I, there is bound to be 
some overlap. While unnecessary repetition is avoided, some reminders are 
offered since the matter related to these concepts is considered to be 
essential.  
Chapter eight will contain the concluding remarks of this study, including 
a summary of the main argument by stating the thesis in compact form (8.1), 
as well as a broader critical discussion on the overarching topic (8.2).  
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6 CONCEPTS OF CHARACTER AND 
EXCUSE 
 
Starting with Aristotelian theory, the means of blame mitigation are 
conceived in terms of character. Compared to the role of emotions or 
passions, the states of character enjoy a more stable status within the 
psychological realm as now understood. Virtues and vices as guiding 
principles of the mind have a decisive effect on the selection of the action (in 
the Nicomachean Ethics and the work it has inspired) and thus contribute to 
the result for which the agent is potentially blamed. Whether this trait was 
self-caused; for example, gained through training, or whether the upbringing 
of the agent brought its formation about, all this helps to determine the 
deeper aspects of the determination of responsibility of the agent (including 
blameworthiness). 
Whether this has an effect on the act of condemnation is related to the 
character in that an incomplete character, lacking the necessary maturity 
may be grounds for pardoning a wrong-doing. In more complex scenarios, 
for example, an agent, publicly known for being vicious, can be appointed an 
obligation to do something important. When meeting this obligation 
predictably fails, the blameworthiness of the agent can be questioned, and 
those responsible for selecting the agent for the task could fall under 
suspicion. 
 
• Aristotle’s responsibility for character 
 
Once Aristotle’s responsibility for character and its components are 
sufficiently dealt with, the Strawsonian excuses are compared to them. The 
similarities and the differences, as well as the arguments that speak for and 
against the use of excuses instead of deeper constructs such as the character, 
are discussed next. 
 
• Doris’s Rejection of Character and the consequent debate 
 
As the broadly analytic Anglophone ethics of the 21st century have embraced 
the naturalistic turn and are fiercely debating the effect of empirical evidence 
on certain philosophical issues, such as blame, John Doris takes a 
multidisciplinary approach in his Lack of Character (2002).233 Doris rejects 
                                                
233 John Doris’s book Lack of Character (2002) is a very important book on the discussion about 
the concept of moral character. It is used here as an example of criticism of the use of character in 
responsibility assessments. Even Doris does ultimately accept character in a way that allows its 
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almost all uses for character in ethical discussion related to moral 
responsibility. (Doris 2002, 1; see also 131.) Characterological accounts 
according to him serve for little but to clump together complex issues and 
confuse further. Relying on social psychological studies, Doris argues that 
moral responsibility cases are invariably situational by nature, and cannot 
have external structures of morality (including the idea of character) 
informing them. 
Despite this, Doris does allow for an everyday-language use for the 
concept of character (Doris 2002, 131), arguing that it is natural to use the 
word to describe the sort of immediate assessments of personalities of others 
when we interact with each other. This allowance leads to further questions 
about whether one could append the theory with such notions as Sher’s or 
Scanlon’s ideas on social interaction. These speculations will be kept brief, 
however, as the analysis of the main problems will form the substance of 
chapter 7. 
 
• Four Definitions of Excuses  
 
Austin started the recent trend of calling excuses as a tool of moral 
philosophy. His article “A Plea for Excuses” (1956/57) constitutes the 
starting-point of the debate here. Peter Strawson’s “Freedom and 
Resentment” (2008/[1962]) can be read as taking part in this debate by 
discussing pleas or special considerations (to the reactive sentiments) in, 
wherein he listed the conditions that could affect the responses. (See chapter 
3.1.3. and Strawson 2008, 7-10.) His notes on the inhibiting effect of traits 
originally related to agency have since been discussed by Watson (1987) and 
Wallace (1994), who have called the moderate and total modifications of 
reactive sentiments excuses and exemptions respectively. 
Having contrasted the two alternatives of mitigating blame in the theories 
of responsibility, Holly M Smith’s short article on “excuses” in Encyclopedia 
of Ethics (2001) is referred to for a general description, the character and the 
excuses; it can be asked what kind of reception these get in the theories of 
responsibility that were discussed here. Four examples regarding their 
acceptance or rejection are looked at as a cross-reference. One or the other is 
usually foregrounded. According to her, excuse as she understands it refers 
to the total variety of modification of the reactive sentiments. As a 
description of the moderate modification of the reactive attitudes she uses 
the term mitigating circumstances. In the end, it is advocated that Watson’s 
and Wallace’s way of using the concepts should be used here. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
pragmatic use. What is important about Doris is that he usefully criticizes character-centered 
approaches to ethics, and points out the fallacy of using the psychological models of ancient Greece. 
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• Kelly’s critique of the excuses 
 
Erin I. Kelly has written an article in the recent book on “Blame” by Coates 
and Tognazzini (2013), in which she discusses the imprecise nature of 
excluding agents from moral responsibility assessments based on excuses 
related to the level of moral capability of those agents. Her own amendments 
to the use of the concept of excuse are looked at after the general 
presentation of the concept. 
 
• Examples 
 
Finally, the ways that the concepts are utilized in the theories of moral 
responsibility discussed above are demonstrated using examples of situations 
in which an extraordinary agent (or an extraordinary condition of one) 
affects the outcomes responsibility assessments. The examples discussed in 
chapter 6.3 include cases where the agent is a child and one where the agent 
belongs to the group referred to as psychopaths. Looking at these examples 
demonstrates the points at which uses of the two concepts intersect. 
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6.1 MORAL CHARACTER 
 
Moral character, used as a description of the relatively permanent 
psychological features of the human mind, has a long history. The word 
character originates from philosophy of the Socratic philosophers as well as 
the Stoics. The author of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on 
“Moral Character”, Marcia Homiak (2015) describes the manifold events in 
the history of the concept. Starting as a derived word from ancient Greek 
charaktêr, which meant the impression made on a coin, has evolved toward 
the description of a distinct quality or individuality, and has come to be used 
almost synonymously with “personality”. (Homiak 2015.) 
Although Aristotle’s theory of moral character is the most frequently 
cited, the concept does not necessarily relate specifically to his teachings. 
Different varieties of character theory have appeared in at least the works of 
David Hume and Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill and Karl 
Marx. In the current philosophical discussion, moral character has made a 
comeback following Anscombe’s article “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958). 
The notion that philosophers should discuss a concept such as character has 
also come under attack from social psychology. Additionally, epistemological 
concerns have affected the way character is being discussed more recently. 
According to Homiak there are at least two basic meanings for character. The 
first is based on how the term was understood by the ancient Greeks 
(Homiak 2015). Generally speaking, this philosophical view of character 
discusses virtue on many levels; on the one hand whether it is based on the 
cognitive, affective aspects of mind or both, on the other in pragmatic and 
political terms how virtue should be educated and what virtues are required 
from rulers. More recently, an alternative way to understand character has 
been popularized, mainly by modern psychology. This modern conception of 
character is roughly equivalent to the concept of personality. (Ibid.) 
It is argued here that the current criticism of character has more to do 
with the latter understanding then the former. What follows is a summary on 
Aristotle’s views on moral character that are relevant in the context of moral 
responsibility. The Aristotelian notion of character, introduced in chapter 
5.1.2, is described in Homiak’s article as being embedded in the linguistic 
history of the use of the word “character”. Aristotle’s moral excellences were 
more accurately described in the original texts as excellences of the character 
(êthikai aretai). Therefore, when we talk about moral virtue in his sense, we 
are not referring merely to individuality but the assemblage of admirable 
traits that constitute the sort of person we are evaluating. (Ibid.) 
According to Aristotle’s theory, the actions of a moral agent are guided by 
character traits such as virtues and vices.234 They are a combination of 
                                                
234 “Excellence” is a common term used synonymously with virtue as was discussed by H. Smith 
(2001). See also ch. 5.1.2. 
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natural abilities and dispositions that define the human personality. Thus, 
character is an umbrella term for a wide variety of psychological features that 
have been notoriously difficult for philosophers to accommodate, especially 
in the theories inclined toward normativity. 
Book III of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics contains his writings on the 
subject of moral responsibility. As the subject was explained in the previous 
chapter (5), his writings can be discussed in terms of responsibility for 
action, as well as responsibility for character. In addition, Aristotle’s political 
responsibility can be interpreted as belonging to the same whole, but 
whether the notions dealt with in Politics can be considered as part of moral 
responsibility can be problematic.235 It was stated that when considered 
together, responsibility for action and responsibility for character could be 
considered the components of Aristotle’s “big picture” of moral responsibility 
(see Meyer 1993, 122).   
Just as Aristotle’s ethical theory is interwoven with his political theory, 
the particular concept of character involves extensions to the political realm. 
Homiak writes that Aristotle sees achieving the rational capacity in full as 
requiring broader social relations. By definition, people are naturally political 
and we need a political community to realize that capacity. (Homiak 2015.) 
The core statement on responsibility for action occurs at the beginning of 
book III in Nicomachean Ethics (NE III 1, 1109b30–1109b33), but perhaps a 
more descriptive account is found in the supposedly earlier work, the 
Eudemian Ethics (EE 1223a9-16). Aristotle’s ideas on responsibility for 
character are in book III.5. Although most scholars focus on his idea of 
voluntariness, which is a key condition for his conception of responsibility for 
action236, book III of the Nicomachean Ethics also contains his thoughts on 
the alternative: “[I]t is irrational to suppose that a man who acts unjustly 
does not wish to be unjust or a man who acts self-indulgently to be self-
indulgent.” (NE III.5., 1114a 8–14.) The unjust or self-indulgent man acts as 
his character dictates throughout the act. 
Virtues do not appear out of nowhere, but form an integral part of how 
societies function and how habits and customs pass from one generation to 
another. Homiak discusses how the education of character happens in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, taking both the emotional responses and the rational 
                                                
235 In the book’s context, responsibility can extend through character into the political sphere, but 
as no further idea other than the agents “membership of human communities” exists in the 
Strawsonian context, comparing these two strands of thought would be difficult (Strawson 2008, 17). 
For this reason, comparison between the political responsibilities of the two theories is not pursued 
here further. While the previous chapter ruled out the topic of political responsibility, we saw that this 
aspect would be referred to when relevant. Otherwise, primarily in Aristotle’s case the two sides of 
moral responsibility (for action and for character) are regarded as the main topics of interest. 
236 T. H. Irwin (1980) is used here on another occasion to sketch out Aristotle’s responsibility for 
action. His central summation of Aristotle's theory of action follows: “A is responsible (a proper 
candidate for praise and blame) for doing x if and only if A does x voluntarily” (Irwin 1980, 125.)  
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assessments into account, in that the former require the right kind of 
character development. Education leads to correct attunement toward what 
we take pleasure or pain from. Phronêsis, or practical wisdom, is the faculty 
that directs action to avoid acts associated with vices and toward pursuit of 
those considered virtuous. (Homiak 2015.) 
The classic description of virtues and their situation between two 
corresponding vices can be found in Eudemian Ethics book II.3. In 
Aristotle’s moral theory, the golden mean, which signifies a mean between 
the two extremes of vices related to a virtue, is the ideal for the virtues in 
most cases. The central point between the complete lack and excess of the 
virtue is the desired place. For example, for courage, the lack of the virtue 
would be called cowardice and where bravery goes too far, foolhardiness 
would be the vice. (EE II.3. 1221a.) 
As discussed by Richard Sorabji (1980), Myles F. Burnyeat (1999) and 
Nancy Sherman (1999), Aristotle’s virtues are constituted by examples from 
habituation and education. From early childhood to young adulthood, the 
agent is receptive to outside influences in adopting patterns of behavior that 
create the stable, fully-formed virtues. Practical reason (phronēsis) has an 
important role in how well the character virtues are adopted, but it does not 
determine their content (see Sorabji 1980, 210). Character virtues are formed 
instead by practice. An agent’s character can certainly be affected by training; 
however, it is not in itself enough to create a virtuous character (Sorabji 
1980, 211). Aristotle follows Plato’s notion that the individual could form 
habitual virtues through upbringing (Sorabji 1980, 211–212). By initially 
practicing the habit virtue, the character virtues become what the action of 
the individual determines and thus become virtues proper. The origin of 
character virtues resides in the society as well (see Broadie 1991, 170).  
Education and the city state are essential in generating the intellectual 
virtues. Practical reason (phronēsis) is an intellectual virtue. Practical reason 
incorporates the act of deliberation and reflection, leading ultimately to the 
selection of the act that fulfils the end, called prohairesis (Broadie 1991, 
179).237 The concept is so crucial in Nicomachean Ethics that it is considered 
the defining trait of human action (NE VI.2., 1139b5–6). The deliberated 
choice reveals the virtues or vices of the actor to the society. In this case, 
praise or blame is given on account of these states of character.  
Virtues affect actions because in determining responsibility, the virtues 
(or excellences)238 appear as a guiding property of character. They decisively 
affect selection of the act. The act is selected from all possible alternative 
                                                
237 The word was discussed in chapter 4, meaning “a choice made with full awareness of alternate 
possibilities” (Salkever 1990, 69).  
238 According to Aristotle, the soul consists of three different things: 1. passions (pathos) 2. 
faculties (dynamis) and 3. states of character (hexeis). The states of character are essentially virtues 
(arête) and their accompanying vices (kakia) and his ethical theory of the golden mean discusses their 
relations. (See NE II, 5.) 
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choices leading to the same end. The behavior of the actor is determined by 
causes originating from herself. Nevertheless, no one can become virtuous in 
a vacuum, since the virtues originate in society. To demonstrate this, 
Aristotle makes a distinction between intellectual virtues and character 
virtues. (NE II.1, 1103a15–21.) 
Like examples used on other occasions, Aristotle alludes to the cases of 
animals, children and the mentally ill. His theory postulates that only adult 
human beings are capable of deliberated, voluntary acts, which (2b) excludes 
actors belonging to the groups mentioned (see NE III.2, 1111b4–9). 
The effect of character on the act in Aristotle can be also described as 
follows: the concept of character in Nicomachean Ethics as it relates to moral 
responsibility signifies the habituated conduct provided by the agent’s 
upbringing and education within her society. Its constitutive elements, the 
virtues, describe the state of that person’s character and illustrate how that 
person is likely to act in different situations. They can be interpreted as a part 
of the decisive mental faculties that either select the act from among the 
possible courses of action, or if there is only one course, enforce its 
commission or omit it. As was noted before, such claims for voluntariness 
and historicity are part and parcel of the incompatibilist “double argument” 
for free will. Watson’s example questioned this relation, and Fischer & 
Ravizza provide a theory that lets these two ideas co-exist: as Eshleman 
noted, the theory of these authors falls into the categories of “merit-based” 
and “compatibilism”, which is breaking the norm that merit-based 
responsibility is typical of the incompatibilists (Eshleman 2014/[2001]).  
Discussion of Aristotle’s excuses normally mentions the main 
requirements for moral responsibility in his theory of action. These were 
discussed in connection with Irwin’s simple theory (5.1.1), and include the 
two excuses related to voluntariness: ignorance and coercion. (Broadie 1991, 
142-148.) Originating as a criticism of Plato’s claim that no one knowingly 
does wrong, Aristotle grouped acts for which the actor or the agent could be 
responsible into two categories (NE III.1.). First, the act can be done in full 
knowledge and, second, it can be done voluntarily. These two conditions 
allow for multiple situations in which the act is deemed to be wrong. 
Voluntariness and character affect each other. At the moment the act 
takes place, it’s possible that the unjust or self-indulgent act is done 
voluntarily and in full knowledge. One can do wrong, and can be held 
responsible for the act and be blamed for it, even if the actor is acting 
voluntarily, and in full knowledge of the situation. (Roberts 1989, 32-33.) 
According to Aristotle, the actor is simultaneously responsible for his actions 
directly and indirectly through his character. 
In Aristotle’s theory of responsibility, the excuses referred to (ignorance 
and coercion) are not necessarily related to character. Instead, in terms of 
responsibility both the considerations related to these excuses and the 
questions related to character are relevant in considering all related factors , 
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whether the agent is blameworthy or not. Which factors are required to 
determine a sufficient level of moral responsibility is being debated. 
 
Skepticism of character 
 
Philosophical theories relying on moral character have recently had a rude 
awakening in the wake of John Doris’s and Gilbert Harman’s work, which 
has set out to heavily criticize the use of character as having no basis in 
human psychology and social psychology.239 Homiak criticizes the attack by 
social psychologists as falsely focusing on “local” traits that do not include 
the complete behavioral patterns that moral philosophy is otherwise capable 
of discerning. (Homiak 2015.) 
Another commentator, Mark Alfano (2013a), has summarized the current 
debate as well as listing its participants240 calling the topic “Scepticism of 
Character”. Alfano clarifies the situation of the debate by distinguishing three 
reactions to the attack: 
Skepticism about character draws on research in the social sciences 
(especially social psychology in the situationist paradigm) to argue 
that both folk psychological and neo-Aristotelian conceptions of 
character as a robust disposition to act on reasons is empirically 
inadequate. In John Doris's formulation, traditional character-based 
ethical views tend to be globalist in that they are committed to cross-
situational consistency of character, temporal stability of traits, and 
evaluative integration of virtues within individuals. Psychological 
research suggests, however, that while traits are stable, they tend to 
have low cross-situational consistency. This means that someone who 
is stably disposed not to lie to his friends may nevertheless be quite 
prone to stealing from his relatives or cheating on his wife. Talk of 
broadly individuated virtues such as honesty might therefore seem 
empirically inadequate. Virtue ethicists have replied in a variety of 
ways. The three primary responses are (the dodge) virtue ethics is 
primarily a normative theory, so we should be untroubled if most 
people are not virtuous; (the retreat) the commitments of virtue 
                                                
239 Thanks to Markus Neuvonen for bringing my attention to the topic of skepticism of character. 
240 Alfano writes on philpapers.org on “Scepticism about Character” (2013b): “John Doris's original 
paper on this topic is Doris 1998, which was quickly superseded by Doris 2002. Almost at the same 
time, Gilbert Harman developed his own variant of skepticism about character in Harman 1999, 2000, 
2003, and 2009.  Advocates of the dodge include Badhwar 2009 and Kupperman 2009. Advocates of 
the retreat include Hurka 2006, Merritt 2000, and Miller 2009.  Advocates of the counterattack 
include Kamtekar 2004, Russell 2009, and Sreenivasan 2002. Other related research, such as 
Sarkissian 2010 and Alfano 2013, has attempted to move past the question of empirical adequacy by 
focusing on ways in which situations can be modified or framed to promote moral conduct.” (Alfano’s 
bibliography on philpapers.org based on Alfano 2013a.) 
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ethics can be weakened in such a way that it becomes empirically 
adequate; and (the counterattack) the evidence from social 
psychology does not in fact challenge the virtue ethical conception of 
character. (Alfano’s bibliography on philpapers.org based on Alfano 
2013.) 
 
As the modern debate on responsibility resumed with Strawson, a return to 
the classical sentimentalism was anticipated but not actually achieved until 
the turn of the millennium. While virtue ethics correctly highlighted where 
the default conception of responsibility was lacking, there have been opinions 
voiced that virtue ethics failed to describe character properly in modern 
terms. The antiquated psychology of Aristotle has served as a tool providing 
an alternative way to conceptualize both responsibility and character, but it 
has often been at odds with the discoveries of modern neuroscience and 
other psychological experiments. Doris’s Lack of Character (2002), relying 
on Strawson and Wallace, attacks the conception of character as a 
philosophical, permanently established feature.241  
John M. Doris’ Lack of Character (2002) is a fairly recent work of great 
interest for study of the conceptual relations between responsibility242 and 
character. He highlights the problem that over-emphasizing character means 
essentially diluting any opportunity for responsibility assessments taking 
place immediately after the act in question. In this way, he fits quite 
comfortably into the Strawsonian mindset in supporting reactive attitudes as 
having more weight instead of the possible historical events and 
circumstances that led to the act.243 Doris writes quoting Wallace, but in a 
way also relating to Bernard Williams’s idea that a theory of moral 
responsibility should not be characterological, as he thinks that character is 
ineffective in describing actual psychology and that everyday assessments of 
responsibility do not have consistent connections with any idea of character. 
(Doris 2002, 130.) 
He concludes that: 
Thinking in terms of character, insofar as it accurately "summarizes" 
previous behavioral trends, may serve an epistemological role in 
responsibility assessment; it highlights behavioral anomalies that 
may fall under exempting or excusing conditions. But this summary 
use of characterological discourse need not invoke the conception of 
character I have argued against, since it makes no commitment to 
                                                
241 Gilbert Harman (2000) wrote almost at same time as Doris, whose first publication is from 
1999. At a more general level, these studies at the meeting point between moral psychology and more 
empirical disciplines have resulted in interesting discussions on many subjects (see Prinz 2007, 
Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) 2008, et al.). 
242 Doris has a Strawsonian conception of responsibility. He also refers to Watson’s and Wolf’s 
work. (Doris 2002, 128-131.)  
243 An “acharacterological account of responsibility need not be apsychological" Doris 2002, 129 
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robust and evaluatively consistent dispositional structures (Doris 
2002, 131).  
 
This highlights the strength of Doris’s position. According to him, character 
can be useful as an everyday summary of psychologically relevant past 
events. This instrument of character can help people to quickly evaluate each 
other’s behavior. Noted, in this way Doris does admit that this limited use of 
character may serve an epistemological role, so that it seems even he, who is 
most explicitly against the concept of character will not leave it completely 
out of the theories of responsibility. In his theory, the concept of character is 
relevant to the assessment of responsibility as a cognitive tool. 
Recalling Marion Smiley’s book (1992), Doris echoes the distinction 
between causal responsibility and blameworthiness, as he thinks that causal 
responsibility in the form of “consequentialism” is not enough, but that 
“psychological state” must also be considered as well in all responsibility 
assessments. Yet blameworthiness as determined by the psychological 
connection is insufficient by itself as excuses may be considered (e.g., as in 
the case of a 5-year old child). (See Doris 2002, 129.) 
Doris gravitates toward Wallace's views (1994), as he supports Wallace’s 
ahistoricity. In Lack of Character Doris notes the complications by 
mentioning examples concerning children and "the deranged", but doesn’t 
tackle the subject, as he writes: "we shall be on the right track if we say that 
responsibility assessment consists in establishing the presence of causal and 
psychological connections and the absence of excusing and exempting 
conditions." (Doris 2002, 130.) 
The problem with Doris’s adoption of the Strawsonian schema is that the 
“characterological” accounts, which Doris is arguing against, are trying to 
describe and take these “excusing and exempting conditions” into account, 
Therefore, if Doris requires the absence of the latter in order for 
responsibility assessments to be possible, he limits the theory as much as 
Wallace did with the “blameworthiness inhibitors”. “Yoking responsibility to 
character” and falsity of the condition “absence of excusing and exempting 
conditions” are essentially two sides of the same coin, and describe the 
paradox of responsibility quite well: you can always dilute responsibility for 
action too far if you consider every historical aspect leading to the act. At one 
end of pure causality is excessive abstraction, at the other end of extreme 
historical effect is hard determinism. 
Another problem with Doris is that his Aristotle scholarship is selective at 
best. While he does refer specifically to Nicomachean Ethics book III.1 (NE 
1109b30-5; 1111a22-5), he doesn't mention book III.5. at all, which is curious, 
because that’s where Aristotle’s characterological “amendment” to his 
“theory of responsibility” is. Doris advocates, however, T. H. Irwin's attempt 
to formulate an Aristotelian account centered on deliberative capabilities, an 
approach he sees as related to his own. (Doris 2002, 212, n7.) 
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Basically then, Doris is emphasizing the responsibility for the action side of 
Aristotle's theory while not going into responsibility for character or at least 
he doesn’t do so in depth. Taking Aristotle’s character responsibility in NE 
book III.5 into account would be contradictory to Doris’s claim that “the 
progenitor of character ethics is himself not obviously committed to a 
characterological account of responsibility”. While this is true as Aristotle is 
not "committed" to any account of responsibility, the character responsibility 
bit in III.5 can be included in his account of the subject if so interpreted. 
In short, Doris might be unaware of Aristotle's complete account of 
responsibility. To be fair, he admits that “I don't much consider the 
extraordinary scholarship Aristotle inspires” (Doris 2002, 28). This means 
that while his main targets are the characterological accounts of 
responsibility (virtue ethics included), which began with Aristotle, he hasn't 
studied Aristotle himself as much. The ideal case then would be to reconcile 
Doris’s most important contributions, augmented with the more recent 
moral psychological advances with a deeper understanding of the intricacies 
of Aristotle’s (and Hume’s for example) theories. Thus, it can be argued that 
Doris’s account in terms of philosophical character is incomplete. For 
example, he does note with interest Bernard Williams's elements of 
character, but finds intention (the 2. element) problematic and thus omits it 
(Doris 2002, 211, n5).  
Homiak points out the weakness of the situationist challenge, which she 
believes lies in misunderstanding the component concept of “trait” between 
the two disciplines:  
[T]he character traits criticized by situationists have little to do with 
the conception of character associated with the ancient and modern 
moralists. The objectors say that the situationists rely on an 
understanding of character traits as isolated and often non-reflective 
dispositions to behave in stereotypical ways. They wrongly assume 
that traits can be determined from a single type of behavior 
stereotypically associated with that trait. […] In short, the objectors 
say that the situationists rely on a simplified view of character. They 
assume that behavior is often sufficient to indicate the presence of a 
trait of character, and they ignore the other psychological aspects of 
character (both cognitive and affective) that, for most of the 
philosophers discussed in this entry, form a more or less consistent 
and integrated set of beliefs and desires. (Homiak 2015.) 
 
A brief reflection on how character in philosophy is different from character 
in psychology — essentially the former is more complex than the latter. The 
former also incorporates the latter but does not limit itself to it. The 
philosophical notion of character contains the psychological traits of the 
person, but also includes their past decisions and acts, at least those that are 
directed toward the agent him/herself. 
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What is the situation of character as understood by current psychology? 
In psychology, there is a long drawn out battle between situationism and 
personality theories that reflects many features of the determinism vs. free 
will debate. Could the statements produced by the neuropsychologists / 
experimental philosophers contribute toward the responsibility debate 
through an updated vision of human intellectual processes? 
What is meant by moral character here is the Aristotelian view of 
character, consisting of virtues and vices. In relation to moral responsibility, 
these character traits have a persistent effect on the behavior of the agent and 
thus are important to moral responsibility in the form of blameworthiness. 
The result is that considerations related to the character of the agent may 
mitigate the response to the wrong-doing committed by the agent. For 
example, a child who has an underdeveloped character can be deemed not 
blameworthy for that reason. On the other hand, the ability of the agent to 
influence his or her own behavior through manipulating his or her character 
through training opens the door for moral responsibility to include notions of 
historical responsibility within responsibility assessments. 
The recent attack on character starting with the work of John Doris 
(2002) appears to partially miss its mark in having to do mostly with the 
contemporary concept of character, which is synonymous with personality. 
As such the criticism, while very welcome in reinvigorating talk on character, 
is aimed more at the psychological conception. Therefore recalling Alfano’s 
strategies(2013), criticism of character is here largely “dodged”, but it is 
noted that the general momentum of the current debate should not be 
wasted, and that even more viable theories, relying on current empirical 
knowledge of the underpinnings of character should be pursued. Just as 
Doris concedes that character is needed as a cognitive tool in everyday 
situations, it is necessary to go one step further and keep the moral 
excellences as basic vocabulary for the reasons that Watson referred to as 
aretaic appraisal (see chapter 4.3.4). 244   
This concludes the summary of what is referred to as character here, and 
it will now be followed by an enquiry into what the definitions excuse are, 
and which of these is followed here. 
  
                                                
244 For example, if it were conceded that the results of Milgram’s tests would compel us to exchange 
our notions of character for specific descriptors of psychological functions in education. In this case, 
the imagined encouragement toward justice, courage or any other appraisable goal would become too 
complex for kids especially to understand. If teachers encouraged pupils with certain temperaments to 
hold back or try harder, the reason and explanation of the encouragement in situationist terms would 
require infinite justifications. 
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6.2 MORAL EXCUSES: FROM STRAWSON’S SPECIAL 
CONSIDERATIONS TO WATSON’S EXEMPTIONS 
  
This chapter describes four different renditions of the same theme. First, J. 
L. Austin’s “A Plea for Excuses”, the article in which the study of excuses is 
described as its own “ramiculated branch” of philosophy.245 Second, the 
examination moves to FR, which has already been discussed, but is 
considered so essential as to demand further scrutiny. According to 
Strawson, the reactive attitudes are subject to possible alterations in the form 
of certain special considerations or pleas. These considerations can modify 
the initial reaction experienced by a morally qualified person. How precisely 
this takes place will be discussed below.  
The Strawsonian use of special conditions and pleas has not been 
employed as a practice by his followers, but the extensions of these words 
explored by various writers. Gary Watson has distinguished between excuses 
and exemptions in his article “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil” (Watson 
1987), a practice followed here as well. These concepts are also used by R. Jay 
Wallace (in Wallace 1994), citing Watson’s article on this issue. It is stated at 
the end of this chapter that Watson’s and Wallace’s version is the preferred 
one.  
Finally, Holly M. Smith’s distinction between mitigating circumstances 
and excuses (H. Smith 2001, 506-507) is discussed as an alternative way of 
labeling the two main varieties of special conditions. Smith’s mitigating 
circumstances and excuses appear to be directly comparable with Watson’s 
and Wallace’s use of the excuses and exemptions. The meaning of “excuse” is 
the notable difference between the interpretations in that where Watson and 
Wallace use the word to mean the partial suspension of the reactive attitudes, 
Smith means the their total elimination, which is referred to as “exemptions” 
by the previous authors.  
The origin of the use of excuse as a philosophical instrument in the 
current debate can be traced back at least to J. L. Austin, who writes in his “A 
Plea for Excuses” (1956/57) about the difference between justifications and 
excuses, claiming that what is distinctive about the excuse is that it concerns 
an act that has led to wrong-doing or harm. Excusing a well-meaning, 
                                                
245 Austin’s major article on excuses, “A Plea for Excuses” (1956/7), can be read as a forerunner to 
the particular subject of the philosophy of responsibility. By sharing the academic circle and being the 
senior scholar to Strawson, his influence is on the latter author is undeniable. Being situated deeper in 
the more language-based discipline of the ordinary language philosophy, there is some trouble in 
comparing the ideas with the way of doing philosophy that prevails today. The same is true in 
Strawson’s case as well. Nevertheless, the discussions about the relevant concepts and similarities with 
the struggles of the earlier attempts to tackle the same subjects are always of interest. Hence Austin is 
mentioned here as a reference point. 
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benevolent act with universally acknowledged good consequences would be 
pointless. Excuses according to Austin are not a concept, or even a theme in 
philosophy, but “the name of a whole branch, even a ramiculated branch, of 
philosophy, or at least of one fashion of philosophy.” (Austin 1956/57, 1.) 
This implies that the study of the subject had become a small sub-discipline 
of philosophical study. The short description of Austin’s excuse reads as 
follows:  
In general, the situation is one where someone is accused of having 
done something, or (if that will keep it any clearer) where someone is 
said to have done something which is bad, wrong, inept, unwelcome, 
or in some other of the numerous possible ways untoward. 
Thereupon he, or someone on his behalf, will try to defend his conduct 
or to get him out of it. (Austin 1956-57, 2.)  
 
Excuses thus, as conceptualized by Austin, are closely related to 
responsibility: 246 he writes that for A to commit any X presents the agent 
with the possibility to accept responsibility for the act. In addition to merely 
accepting responsibility, the agent can also agree that the act was bad or 
disagree with it. In this way, Austin keeps accepting responsibility and 
viewing one’s action as bad separate. In other words, it is possible for the 
agent to accept responsibility for the act, but simultaneously deny that the act 
was bad in itself. (Austin 1956/57, 3.) 
Excuses as a group of statements are initially distinguished from 
justifications in Austin’s article. The concepts are close enough that they are 
often confused with each other. While these might have some overlap, one 
trait of the excuses seems clear: an excuse seems to imply wrong-doing in a 
way that a justification does not necessarily do. There can thus be said to be a 
connection between an excuse and the mitigation of blame (Ibid. 3). 
As Austin describes, doing an action in philosophy is “a highly abstract 
expression” and for this reason excuse can function as a stand-in for 
practically any verb. This does not mean, however, that “not every excuse is 
apt with every verb”. The first problem in classifying excuses, Austin argues, 
is related to the question “What action is free?” He continues by giving the 
example of Aristotle, who has been criticized for his apparent lack of 
recognition of “the real problem” of determinism and free will on many 
occasions. Related to this, Austin states that these attitudes toward Aristotle’s 
work and the charge of neglecting the problem of determinism have led 
Austin to the question of the nature of the excuses. (Ibid. 6). 
As for the connection between the concepts of moral responsibility and 
the excuses, Austin thinks that responsibility would serve better than 
                                                
246 As a specific list of which conditions qualify for excuses, Austin mentions, examples of: mistake, 
culpable negligence, accident, inadvertence and “automatical” actions as such that call for an excuse 
(see Austin 1956/57, 21-24). 
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freedom in discussing the problem of determinism; thus Austin essentially 
frames the development that Strawson’s paper put really in motion. 
Nevertheless, avoiding enthusiasm about the word, Austin does note the 
limitations of the concept of responsibility: “But in fact “responsibility” too 
seems not really apt in all cases. I do not exactly evade responsibility when I 
plead clumsiness or tactlessness, nor, often, when I plead that I only did it in 
the circumstance of no choice”. (Ibid. 7.)  
Austin states that, being under a constraint does not rule out accepting 
responsibility. This implies a difference between accepting responsibility and 
being held responsible, which is not apparent in Austin’s case. We may 
summarize, by saying that that Austin believes that the clarification of 
responsibility can be helped by investigating the excuses (ibid). He provides a 
number of reasons why the rubric of excuses is worth exploring. Without 
going deeply into these here,247 Austin emphasizes the need for philosophers 
to treat words as clear, carefully-defined tools. After all, he did follow the 
ideals of early 20th century analytical philosophy. (See ibid. 7-9.)  
As pointed out in chapter 3.1.3, Strawson’s type-1 and type-2 pleas were of 
especial interest to this work. 248 Strawson does not actually use the concept 
of excuse, but his discussion about the special considerations and pleas fits 
the bill (FR, 7-8). 249 While Strawson does not quote Austin directly, he did 
work in the same academic environment as Austin.250 His text is clearly 
influenced by Austin’s work. For example, the pleas that Strawson lists seem 
similar to those in Austin’s article. 
Where character was discussed in the Aristotelian context, the 
Strawsonian context seems to deal with the same subject (of some property 
                                                
247 This is mainly because Austin is doing a particular kind of linguistic philosophy, which it is not 
possible to explain here in style or quality. 
248 Strawson himself does not use the “type-1” and “type-2” distinctions. These are used by Gary 
Watson in his “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil” (1987, 260) in order to clarify Strawson’s 
concepts. 
249 As was mentioned above, Strawson does not systematically use the word “excuse” in FR 
However, the sections where he does speak about special considerations or pleas are clearly set apart 
and the followers of Strawson (namely Watson, Wallace, Wolf and Darwall) consistently refer to these 
topics using “excuse”. Thus, it is fairly clear what an excuse generally is in these authors. (See FR, 7-11.) 
As for the specific meaning, there are a couple of interpretations (Watson’s and Wallace’s as well as 
Holly Smith’s), which are looked at later, and one of these interpretations is advocated here.  
250 Strawson also followed Austin in that both belong to the so-called ordinary language school of 
Oxford philosophers. This way of doing philosophy followed Wittgenstein’s second phase and the work 
of the Vienna Circle and lasted in Oxford roughly from 1945 to 1970. The main philosophical leanings 
of this group were linguistic and the way its members pursued philosophy was to prefer the “use” of the 
words over their “meaning”. Critics of ordinary language claimed that the discipline deliberately 
conflated semantics with pragmatics, and ultimately the project shut down. As one of the ordinary 
language philosophers, Strawson can be read as having influenced contemporary philosophy in being 
more focused on concepts than language. (See Parker-Ryan 2012.) 
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related to the agent’s status affecting the response to her wrong-doing) in 
terms discussed by Strawson and referred here to as excuses and exemptions 
after Watson (1987) and Wallace (1994).The former coined the distinction 
between excuses and exemptions (Watson 1987, 259-261), and Wallace 
adopted his terms (Wallace 1994, 118). Wallace also refers to Austin’s 
distinction between justifications and excuses, an excuse implying that the 
act that the response is related to was wrong regardless of whether the agent 
is blameworthy or not (see Austin (1956-57, 23-24); Wallace 1994, 119-120). 
In the most common case, blame boils down to the sentiment of 
resentment, directed at a wrong-doer. In Coates & Tognazzini’s introductory 
article to their anthology Blame (2013), the Strawsonian approach to blame 
is clearly defined: “to blame is to target [the object] with one of the reactive 
sentiments” (Coates & Tognazzini 2013, 13). The Strawsonian account 
expands from this simple premise, and all is well when the agent and the 
situation follow the norm. But as one wants to utilize reactive sentiments in a 
broader variety of considerations, a problem arises: What about the 
exceptions to the norm? According to Strawson, the cases that deviate from 
the usual or the “normal” agents are situations in which the original and 
spontaneous, reactive sentiments may be subject to alteration.251  
Strawson lists two groups, one with two sub-groups, so that altogether 
there are three distinct categories of situation in which excuses are applied in 
order to curtail the natural reactive sentiment that, without the property in 
question, would otherwise lead to blame. In actuality, the agent is rarely 
identical between each case. Here we consider these special situations in 
which reactive sentiments are modified or “mollified” or removed altogether, 
because of certain properties related to the agent. (FR, 7.) 
Strawson writes on the special considerations: 
To the first group belong all those which might give occasion for the 
employment of such expressions as ‘He didn’t mean to’, ‘He hadn’t 
realized’, ‘He didn’t know’; and also all those which might give 
occasion for the use of the phrase ‘He couldn’t help it’, when this is 
supported by such phrases as ‘He was pushed’, ‘He had to do it’, ‘It 
was the only way’, ‘They left him no alternative’, etc. […] they have 
something still more important in common. None of them invites us 
to suspend towards the agent, either at the time of his action or in 
general, our ordinary reactive attitudes. They do not invite us to view 
the agent as one in respect of whom these attitudes are in any way 
inappropriate. They invite us to view the injury as one in respect of 
which a particular one of these attitudes is inappropriate. They do 
not invite us to see the agent as other than a fully responsible agent. 
                                                
251 “It is one thing to ask about the general causes of these reactive attitudes […] it is another to ask 
about the variations to which they are subject, the particular conditions in which they do or do not 
seem natural or reasonable or appropriate” (Strawson 2008, 9). 
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They invite us to see the injury as one for which he was not fully, or at 
all, responsible. (FR, 7-8. My emphasis.) 
 
The first group of excusing conditions is classified by being somehow 
unintentional or such that an outside influence forces the agent to take a 
certain course of action. It could be labeled “unintended consequences and 
coerced acts” for example. Strawson lists a number of expressions that have 
been employed in these situations: “He didn’t mean to”, “He hadn’t realized” 
and “He didn’t know”, and so on exemplify the cases in which the agent 
causes something unintended, while “He was pushed”, “He had to do it” “it 
was the only way” or “They left him no alternative” are situations which 
involve some external coercion. Common to these examples is the possibility 
that the agent is a fully developed, functional human being. The agent, while 
causally responsible, may be subject to mitigated blame, as being in full 
knowledge and capability; she would have done otherwise, but if this is done 
it is not because of the quality or state of the agent herself. (Ibid. 7-8.) 
Strawson continues on the second group of special considerations: 
The second group of considerations is very different. […] we may 
think of such statements as ‘He wasn’t himself’, ‘He has been under 
very great strain recently’, ‘He was acting under post-hypnotic 
suggestion’; in connection with the second, we may think of ‘He’s only 
a child’, ‘He’s a hopeless schizophrenic’, ‘His mind has been 
systematically perverted’, ‘That’s purely compulsive behaviour on his 
part’. Such pleas as these do, as pleas of my first general group do 
not, invite us to suspend our ordinary reactive attitudes towards the 
agent, either at the time of his action or all the time. […] They invite 
us to view the agent himself in a different light from the light in which 
we should normally view one who has acted as he has acted. I shall 
not linger over the first subgroup of cases. […] The second and more 
important subgroup of cases allows that the circumstances were 
normal, but presents the agent as psychologically abnormal — or as 
morally undeveloped. The agent was himself; but he is warped or 
deranged, neurotic or just a child. When we see someone in such a 
light as this, all our reactive attitudes tend to be profoundly modified. 
(FR, 8-9.My emphasis.) 
 
The second group contains two sub-groups: as stated in the third chapter, the 
first subgroup, which was of less philosophical interest than the second, and 
the second subgroup that in turn sees the agent himself/herself as 
“abnormal” or psychologically disturbed. What is very puzzling is that this 
group also includes children. Common to these statements in the second 
group is that they describe situations that call the normal rules by which we 
evaluate each other into question. The reactive sentiments that would 
ordinarily be directed toward the agent are reconsidered on basis of some 
additional information about the agent in question. (Ibid. 8.) 
180 
Thus, as for the excusing conditions, Strawson lists three possible 
alternatives: (1) unintended consequence or coerced acts, which are 
exemplified by “He didn’t mean to”, etc. The second group is divided into two 
subgroups, the latter more interesting: (2a) altered state through 
circumstances being described as situations in which, the agent is, for 
internal or external reasons, acting in an out-of-the-ordinary fashion and, 
finally, (2b) some altered state through psychological abnormalities. It is 
noteworthy that Strawson includes children within this last group, but he 
remains careful to refer to them as their own separate group, with 
insufficient development being the greatest cause for exempting them. 
As discussed in 3.1.3, the fourth part of FR introduces three types of 
special excusing considerations that can modify, mollify, or even cancel out 
the reactive sentiments (FR, 7-10). The reactive sentiments, which were 
thought by Strawson to be the constitutive manifestations of the 
responsibility relations in moral communities were the direct response to an 
act in the examples that led to injury or comparable harm. 
Reactive sentiments or emotions, feelings or attitudes refer to a set of 
emotions that arise spontaneously when an act is observed, and through 
these emotions a sort of basis for moral judgments is formed.252 Strawson 
writes of what qualify as reactive sentiments: “resentment and gratitude [as 
a] usefully opposed pair. But, of course, there is a whole continuum of 
reactive attitudes and feeling stretching on both sides of these and – the most 
comfortable area – in between them”. (FR, 7.) 
The excuses affect the reactive emotions by ameliorating the initial 
sentiments or even completely negating them in certain circumstances. There 
are two ways that this might happen: the first is that the person’s behavior 
may be excused, for instance, if it is determined that the act committed was 
as an accident. In the other case, the participant attitude may be given up 
entirely by being switched to the objective standpoint. The individual in 
question is then no longer viewed as a fully competent member of the moral 
community.253 
The other popular subject for examples is those individuals who are 
impaired psychologically for any reason. 254 The psychopath is a unique case 
which fits into this group, wherein the person might fully understand what 
moral requirements the community expects, but sees no reason to follow 
them and does not care to. Even worse, the psychopath might use these 
expectations in cruel feats of manipulation.  
Strawson describes the example in which someone treads on his hand, 
arguing that how we react to the act carries a lot of meaning: if the act was 
                                                
252 Strawson harks back to the moral sense theories and their followers, the classical 
sentimentalists, the most renowned being David Hume and Adam Smith (see Strawson 2008, 25-26). 
253 The word exemption is used in connection with these forms of “full pardon” below following 
Watson (1987) and Wallace (1994). 
254  See P. F. Strawson 1962: 6–10; Watson 1987: 259–260; R. Jay Wallace: chs. 5–6. 
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done on purpose we are likely to get angrier than if it was an accident. 
Strawson briefly notes that forgiveness255 has received less attention than the 
more negative reactive emotions of resentment, indignation and guilt. (See 
Strawson 2008, 6.) 
While Austin drew up a picture of excuses as a complete field of study in 
philosophy, there are writers who attempt to define the word as a singular 
concept. While Strawson did not actually use the concept of excuse, this word 
did apply to “special considerations” or “pleas” (FR, 7-8). As stated before,256 
Gary Watson made the comparison between the different groups of 
Strawson’s special considerations and labeled the type-1 pleas excuses, as 
distinct from cases with type-2 pleas or the exemptions. This distinction was 
so appealing that Wallace adopted it in his Responsibility and the Moral 
Sentiments (1994). Wallace’s description of these groups is discussed in this 
section for clarity’s sake. 
Wallace, whose account of responsibility is here considered to be the 
contemporary variant of the Strawsonian theory of responsibility (with 
Wallace’s own, Kant-inclined additions). As was noted in chapter 4.1, 
Wallace is discussed here as his use of blame is more articulated than is 
offered in Strawson’s essay and because the connection between the concepts 
of blame and responsibility is clearer in it. (See Coates & Tognazzini 2013, 13-
15.) 
As implied above, both Strawson and Wallace are part of J. L. Austin’s 
legacy. Wallace cites Austin: “[T]here is a connection between doing x 
intentionally and being morally responsible… [So] doing x intentionally is 
ordinarily a condition for responsibility for x, such that if s has not done x 
intentionally, then it is unfair to hold s morally responsible for x.” (Wallace 
1994, 122.) Responding to this, Wallace asks: “Why would it be unfair to hold 
s responsible for x if s has not intentionally done x in the first place?” (Ibid.) 
Arguing against the incompatibilists, Wallace calls for an account of excuses 
that includes a description of how normativity functions in their case. Thus 
intention is an important part of action considered morally responsible in 
Wallace’s context. 
Conversely, Wallace is not interested in praise at all, focusing on blame 
and other negative emotions, as he thinks that they are more constitutive in 
how the responsibility-relations form. He writes that “praise does not seem 
to have the central, defining role that blame and moral sanction occupy in 
our practice of assigning moral responsibility” (Wallace 1994, 61). 257 In the 
following footnote, he extends this to apply to the existing social practice as 
well, although it is not clear what this practice is. He thinks that the most 
important emotions are expressed in connection with moral situations, and 
                                                
255 For example, Garrath Williams has returned to the subject of forgiveness in responsibility in his 
latest article Sharing Responsibility and Holding Responsible (G. Williams 2013). 
256 See chs. 4.1.2 and 4.3.4. 
257 Compare this with Coates & Tognazzini 2013, 4-5. 
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that they require responsibility assessment. The emotions included are 
resentment, indignation and guilt (ibid. 67).258 The most significant, if less 
obvious cut that Wallace makes is that he almost exclusively talks about 
holding someone responsible.259 He separates other aspects of responsibility 
into the Kantian idea of conditions of autonomy and expands Strawson’s two 
categories of excusing conditions into a slightly different ordering of excuses 
and a new category of exemptions. (Ibid. chapters 5 & 6 respectively.) The 
excuses are divided into four categories (Wallace 1994, 120-147), while the 
exemptions list six problematic types of states for moral agents to be in (ibid. 
166-180).260  
Wallace notes that Strawson’s account of excuses addresses the issue that 
while intention is important for holding someone responsible it is not 
sufficient to simply check whether one intended an act and be done with it. 
He continues:  
excusing conditions […] seem to operate locally: they make it 
inappropriate to hold an agent responsible for a particular action, 
but they do not make it inappropriate to view the agent as morally 
responsible in general. Strawson then proceeds to account for the 
force of the excusing conditions, so understood, in terms of the 
reactive attitudes. Given the connection between responsibility and 
the reactive attitudes, a condition will make it inappropriate to hold 
an agent responsible for a given action if the condition will make it 
inappropriate to respond to the action with one of the reactive 
emotions. (Ibid. 124-125.) 
 
Wallace’s own expanded account, or his typology of excuses in the chapter 
“Blameworthiness and Excuses”, includes the following four types of excuse: 
a) inadvertance, mistake or accident, b) unintentional bodily movement, c) 
physical constraint and d) coercion, necessity and duress (ibid. 136-147). 
How do inadvertence, mistakes and accidents differ from one another? At 
least in Wallace’s case, inadvertence means deciding to do x, a course of 
action that leads to doing something unwanted in the process. In the 
example, Wallace is getting something from the fridge and then steps on s’s 
                                                
258 Also, in his recent article, “Rightness and Responsibility”, (which discusses rightness from the 
internalist position; another topic not discussed here), included in Coates & Tognazzini 2013, he still 
uses the trio of resentment, indignation and guilt as the relevant moral sentiments. 
259 Wallace 1994, 16. For an example of why exactly this is problematic see Angela Smith’s On 
Being and Holding Responsible (2004). Note also that: “Another dichotomy that that has attracted 
critical comment concerns the gap between holding and being responsible. Critics such as John Martin 
Fischer and Mark Ravizza, have argued that Strawson [too] is insufficiently sensitive to this gap and 
that this vitiates much of his strategy in “Freedom and Resentment”.” (McKenna & Russell 2007, 12). 
260 The list of these categories was recounted in chapter 4.1.2. Excuses were related to accidents, 
involuntary bodily movements, physical constraint and coercion, and the exempted groups included 
children, the mentally ill, addicts, psychopaths, the hypnotized and the stressed. 
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hand. A mistake, in turn, means that x is something that is done to the other 
on purpose, but is mistakenly aimed at the wrong object. A nearby thief could 
need his hand stepped on, but s’s hand gets trampled by mistake. An accident 
means that the agent might be aware of the wrong-doing, but for other 
reasons he ends up doing it anyway. Wallace’s example of the last case is 
stepping on s’s hand because he is trying to put out the flames of a fire, not 
intending to cause harm. (Ibid. 136-137).  
Another type of action that might be considered to be excused is those 
where the agent causes something, not actually by doing anything, but by the 
unintended movements of one’s own body. These movements could be 
caused by acute illness, or some outside force. Wallace mentions tickling, and 
other more serious situations (ibid. 140-141). Both a) and b) are not sufficient 
excuses, according to Wallace, if they are the product of gross negligence on 
the part of the agent herself. Physical constraint can be either external, such 
as someone grabbing the agent or knocking him out, or internal as in being 
paralyzed. So, in other words the case of physical constraint means simply 
that the agent is unable to address what is required, because he or she is 
prevented or stopped for one reason or another (ibid. 141). Coercion in 
Wallace’s case differs from Frankfurt’s theory, as the former limits coerced 
acts to those that are not done intentionally.261 
As for the section comparable to Strawson’s category 2b or altered 
psychology, Wallace addresses them as a separate group, which he develops 
in chapter 6 “Accountability and Exemptions” (following Watson’s definition 
of exemption): those actions that are intentional, but done by someone who 
cannot be held responsible warrant a separate category of exemption. Cases 
where someone acts intentionally but is not blamed form a group apart from 
excuses according to Wallace. He writes that in cases:  
in which the agent s intentionally does something of a certain kind 
(say, x-rather-than-y), and yet, […] we would allegedly not hold s 
responsible for doing x-rather-than-y. The best way to make sense of 
this description, it seems to me, is to suppose that s’s condition at the 
time of the action is such that it would not be appropriate to treat s as 
a morally accountable agent at all. […] For only when an exempting 
condition is present will an agent who has done something 
intentionally be morally responsible for nothing that he has done 
(however carefully described). (Wallace 1994, 146-147.)  
 
Within this exempted group of agents he includes, children, as Strawson did, 
as well as addicts and psychopaths, among others (ibid. 166-180; see also 
chapter 4.1.2). 
                                                
261 Frankfurt’s theory of responsibility is not looked at here. It contains the idea that the agent 
identifies with her own actions and the idea that the agent is not responsible for actions that do not 
have alternatives (see McKenna 2009). 
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Whereas Watson and Wallace elected to us the word “excuse” where blame is 
modified to a certain degree but not eliminated completely in Strawson’s 
system, Holly M. Smith’s definition of “excuses” in Encyclopedia of Ethics 
(Becker & Becker (eds.) 2001) provides a general description of the excuse as 
a philosophical concept. According to Smith “An excuse is a condition 
pertaining to an agent that precludes his or her blameworthiness for 
wrongful action”, and in her case the word signifies complete elimination of 
blame for that action (Smith 2001, 506). It shares the distinction from 
justifications with Austin (1956/7) and additionally distinguishes the word 
“excuse” from “mitigating circumstances”. According to Smith, a mitigating 
circumstance “reduces but does not entirely eliminate blameworthiness”. 
(Smith 2001, 506.) Here the definition of excuse differs from 
Watson’s/Wallace’s version, which is the definition used further. Conversely, 
Smith describes the complete elimination of blameworthiness in the case of 
her excuse rather as Watson and Wallace talk about exemptions.  
She states that the most interesting philosophical question associated 
with the topic of the excuse is “why [do] some conditions excuse an agent 
while others do not” (Smith 2001, 547). The theories addressing this 
question, of which Smith gives an example, include Aristotle’s theory of 
action (see chapter 4.1.1). David Hume, whose theory of responsibility is also 
very important, has a particular concept of character. In connection with 
Hume’s character, Smith refers to the “Hume-Brandt proposal” that an agent 
must have an intact character in order be properly responsible for her acts. If 
the character is somehow incomplete or lacking, the agent simply has an 
excuse. This view, according to Smith (in addition to many of Hume’s 
commentators,262) finds the Hume-Brandt thesis and its variants 
problematic (Smith 2001). 
Smith’s example for this problem involves a garbage collector who 
dutifully dumps a baby in with the garbage and argues that if the Hume-
Brandt thesis263 is true, then the garbage man is not blameworthy in that the 
act did not follow from his character. Ignorance of the baby is unrelated to 
the character of the garbage man, and he would thus have an excuse (Smith 
2001, 507). One could counter the argument, in that, were this the case, 
wouldn’t negligence leading to the dumping of the baby show that the 
garbage collector’s character inevitably had a rather serious flaw? For that 
matter, if he did receive an excuse (accidents will happen!), it might not be so 
strong that it would overrule any legal decisions, for example.  
Smith mentions lists of excuses, usually including “ignorance, 
immaturity, insanity, automatism, duress, necessity, coercion, compulsion, 
mental subnormality, mistake and accident.” (Smith 2001, 507.) For the rest 
                                                
262 The commentator’s criticizing Hume’s character include Russell (1995) and Kinnaman (2005). 
263 “Brandt assumes that most or all traits of character will be motivational states.” (Smith 2001, 
507.) 
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of this dissertation, Watson’s and Wallace’s version is followed, rather than 
Holly Smith’s, in that when “excuse” is mentioned it will be in the sense 
Smith uses “mitigating circumstance” and “exemption” as she would use the 
word “excuse”. (See Smith 2001, 506-7.) 
What have been discussed in this section so far were essentially four 
modes of speaking about excuses: 
 
• Austin’s “ramiculated branch” of philosophy  
 
Since Austin’s way of using excuse was linked to the discipline of philosophy 
of language/linguistics, a more precise concept was sought.  
 
• Strawson’s special considerations and pleas 
 
Strawson used the terms special considerations and pleas to describe 
excuses. The type-1 pleas were such that, had the circumstances been normal, 
the agency of the person would not come into question. However, as the 
circumstances were out of the ordinary, or the agent was acting out of 
ignorance or under coercion, he or she is excused from responsibility. In the 
case of the second category, or the type-2 pleas, it is evident from the outset 
that the agent is not qualified for evaluation under the same moral agency 
criteria as any adult with normal mental capacities would be. Therefore, the 
cases which fall into this category are such that, the moral status of the agent 
renders any reactive sentiment completely eliminated considering these 
facts. 
 
• Watson’s and Wallace’s excuses and exemptions 
 
The distinction between the partial excuses and the complete exemptions 
were made initially in Watson’s “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil” (1987) 
and has since been picked up, by R. Jay Wallace, among others. Essentially 
these terms are very close in meaning, so whichever set of concepts is 
selected is ultimately a matter of taste. Of the alternatives, Watson’s and 
Wallace’s version is used here because of its relative simplicity and the ability 
to recognize the terms as close to each other.264 Strawson’s original 
definitions have often been criticized as being difficult and ambiguous, and 
the same criticism could be leveled at the distinctions between type-1 / type-
2 pleas. Just the fact that the terms require explanation more than the others 
makes the original terms difficult to prefer. 
 
                                                
264 E.g., John Doris in his Lack of Character (2002) also follows Watson's and Wallace's definition: 
“Responsibility attributions may be abjured in cases of deliberate behavior where the actor is in 
excusing or exempting condition.” (Doris 2002,129.) 
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• Holly Smith’s mitigating circumstances and excuses 
 
Holly Smith described phenomena related to Strawson’s pleas using the 
terms mitigating circumstances as well as excuses. In her case, excuse is 
used in the variety of instances where it is considered that the type of agency 
(or character) calls for total suspension of the reactive attitudes. In this 
sense, Smith’s mitigating circumstances have the same meaning as 
Strawson’s type 1-pleas. The term excuse corresponds with Strawson’s type-2 
pleas according to Smith’s definitions. 
As for Smith’s selected concepts there is one additional reason why they 
are not used here, and that is the reservation on the word mitigation. 
Mitigation is referred to as the mechanism or the function of the character 
and excuses in the rest of the dissertation, meaning the way that the concept 
discussed can lessen the effect of the emotions related to wrong-doing and 
harm. Blame, as discussed elsewhere, is regarded as the distinctive element 
of moral responsibility, and one that is directly related to the latter. Thus, if 
an excuse is valid, blame is mitigated and furthermore the agent is 
considered responsible for the act as he or she would be otherwise (i.e., 
without the excuse).  
 
 Limited modification of 
reactive attitudes 
Complete suspension of reactive 
attitudes 
Strawson “Type-1” pleas or 
special considerations 
“expected to modify or 
mollify” the reactive 
attitudes. 
(FR, 7).  
“Type-2” pleas or special 
considerations of an “agent […] 
psychologically abnormal – or 
[…] morally underdeveloped”, 
which are “expected to modify 
or mollify [reactive attitudes] or 
remove [them] altogether” (FR, 
9). 
Smith mitigating circumstances excuses 
Watson, Wallace excuses exemptions 
Table 1. Three definitions of moderate and complete modifications of reactive attitudes. 
While Watson's and Wallace's definition is referred to henceforth as a rule-
of-thumb, the concept of the excuse is not taken to be completely 
problematic.   
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Criticism of excuses 
 
In an instance of questioning the current tendency to utilize the excuse, Erin 
Kelly in her article “What is an Excuse?” (2013) argues that being 
blameworthy is not always a required condition for wrong-doing from a 
Scanlonian position (see Kelly 2013, 246).265 Kelly challenges Strawson and 
Wallace, claiming that “persons might be excused […] from being suitable 
subjects of blame, despite their violating the requirements of morality and 
acting wrongly.” (Ibid. 249.) Kelly emphasizes the cases that fall into the 
groups that are excused but that could be blamed for wrong-doing 
nevertheless. Kelly’s examination describes the “blind spots” of the 
Strawsonian moral theories that, when amended, could overcome some of 
their obvious deficiencies.   
She discusses moral capability (supposedly in the vein of Holly Smith): “A 
morally capable person is capable of understanding morality’s requirements 
and so of regulating her behavior. Not only can she recognize that other 
persons are sentient, concerned about their future, have meaningful 
relationships, et cetera, but she also has a sensibility that moves her to care 
about these facts.” (Ibid. 250-251, see also Kelly and McPherson 2010.) 
By recounting the discussion on Strawson’s and Wallace’s distinction 
between excuses and exemptions, Kelly alludes to Wallace’s statement that 
an “agent is exempted from accountability because that person lacks in a 
broader way, what Wallace refers to as “powers of reflective self-control”. 
These are the agent’s powers, generally speaking, to understand moral 
reasons and to thus regulate her behavior. According to Kelly: “Appealing to 
this model of defective moral agency does not do justice to the full range of 
cases [that Kelly has described at that point]”. (Kelly 2013, 254-255; see 
Wallace 1994, p. 157.) 
Kelly proposes that “a reasonable assessment of when blameworthiness is 
mitigated or averted cannot depend on fine discriminations about capacity 
[required for moral capability],” arguing that it is too crude a scale to 
measure various defects of conduct as well as psychological pathologies. 
Instead, she claims, we usually follow our expectations of people being 
motivated. Excuses work by being able to intervene in these expectations of 
                                                
265 Erin I. Kelly 2013 has written a recent article called “What is an Excuse?” (2013) in the Blame 
compilation by Coates and Tognazzini (2013), which discusses the concept of excuse in Strawson’s and 
Wallace’s theories. This skepticism toward the strict delineation of who exactly qualifies for moral 
assessments through the instrument of excuses, was expressed first by Gary Watson, and is discussed 
in chapter 4.3.4. Further on, how the concept of excuse relates to the idea of character is looked at in a 
broader comparison in chapter 6. 
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the way that the agent is treated separately from his or her intentions related 
to the act (Kelly 2013, 255-256).266  
Kelly follows Scanlon by grouping wrong-doers’ morally criticisable, 
retributive and non-retributive attitudes together as blaming responses, thus 
making it a broad definition of blame. She also notes standing to blame, by 
considering blameworthiness less positional to it. The case of child “soldiers” 
is given as an example, as there the agents appear to be less blameworthy 
than their adult counterparts.267 (Ibid. 246.) 
Comparison between criminal wrong-doing, which contains evaluation of 
character and the circumstances in the actual sentencing process lead Kelly 
to advocate the use of a dedicated set of norms that can be consulted in 
determining “the moral quality of a person’s action” and whether the agent is 
blameworthy. (Ibid. 249.)  
She continues: 
In challenging Strawson and Wallace’s picture, I am drawing on the 
intuition that persons might be excused, in whole or in part, from 
being suitable subjects of blame, despite their violating the 
requirements of morality and acting wrongly. I will now take up 
some moral reasons we might have to maintain that an agent who is 
excused from blame can nevertheless have acted wrongly – the 
judgment Strawson and Wallace resist. (Kelly 2013. 249.) 
 
The article advances through Strawson’s excuses and pauses to consider the 
type-2 excusing conditions (see ch. 3.1.3) as “a range of cases in which […] we 
draw a clear distinction between our moral appraisal and our varying 
attitudes toward the agent” (Kelly 2013, 248). Kelly claims that despite the 
conclusion arrived at regarding the agent based on moral appraisal of the 
action, we are able to hold them responsible by considering them 
blameworthy. In other words, where the agent is ordinarily exempted in the 
Strawson/Wallace model, there is actually a “scalar nature of excuses”, which 
acts at various levels of mitigation.268 (Ibid. 249.) This seems intuitive and 
natural to accept; for example, if a 5-year old breaks a set of dishes for the 
fun of it, the parent can get upset and feel resentment. The latter does 
understand the role of the child and can act appropriately to discourage 
further misbehavior without the blame being as personal as it would had an 
                                                
266 In terms of Bernard Williams’s elements of responsibility (see ch. 4.3.3), what Kelly is referring 
to could be conceived as belonging to the state element.  
267 It is unknown however whether Kelly considers the case of the child soldiers as 
standing to blame or of agency. If the child soldiers were facing incarceration by an adult 
regime, then it would be so, but merely comparing adult soldiers to child would seem more 
as a question of agency and the properties of moral capabilities, (which Kelly describes at 
length further on in the article.) (Kelly 2013, 246.) 
268 Of the reactive attitudes, compassion is most closely associated with mitigating blame according 
to Kelly (Kelly 2013, 245, n1). 
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adult done the same. In the parent’s case, it would be true as Kelly states: “A 
morally capable person is capable of understanding morality’s requirements 
and so of regulating her behavior.” (Ibid. 250.) 
Kelly claims that the excuses are indicative of the agent’s limitations in 
terms of moral capacity. These are to be considered when determining said 
agent’s blameworthiness. Wallace’s way of exempting agents who lack the 
“powers of reflective self-control” is unable to address the full spectrum of 
cases in which moral judgments are made, such as responsibility assessments 
(Kelly 2013, 255). This point is fully endorsed here, with concerns about 
Wallace’s use of the encompassing explanation of “lack of self-control”.269 
Kelly uses the concept “incapacity thesis” to describe the demarcated classes 
of intentional but blameworthy action in Strawson’s and Wallace’s theories. 
Instances relevant to the incapacity thesis contain acts that can be judged 
bad, but are done by agents who should not be blamed for them. (Kelly 2013, 
254.) 
Kelly proposes that a reasonable assessment of when blameworthiness is 
mitigated or averted cannot depend on fine discriminations of capacity, 
proposing instead that “excuses function by undermining what normally are 
reasonable expectations about how a person should be motivated”. Following 
Kelly’s model would mean that excuses and blameworthiness (not blame, 
that is) would be understood as a mutually exclusive pair of concepts (ibid. 
256-259). 
Kelly concludes by referring to the difficulty that we are not required to 
“step in the shoes” of the wrong-doer in order to understand that viewpoint’s 
condition fully, which would be the requirement for forgiveness and other 
types of understanding that would be fair in that situation. (Ibid. 262.) 
Overall, Kelly’s article contains intuitions that are applauded here, but the 
new concepts (such as the incapacity thesis) that she offers do not seem very 
practical, at least compared with the definitions of excuses and exemptions 
dealt with above. Kelly’s pointed criticism seems directed at the right areas of 
the Strawsonian theories. At this point it would be a mistake to claim that the 
concepts of character and excuse share a dichotomous relationship. The next 
section briefly describes two examples in which both character and excuses 
are relevant for moral responsibility. 
  
                                                
269 See the “Criticism”-section in ch. 4.1.3. 
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6.3 EXAMPLES  
 
Examples show that both sets of concepts, those based on character and 
those relying on excuses can be used to describe the same sorts of situations 
dealing with agency, especially those in which the agency is somehow 
compromised. A comparison between the theories as applied to these 
examples is made here, children first, and then the psychopath. There are of 
course only circumstantial similarities between these examples, and most 
authors are careful to keep them separated. They are looked at here simply 
because they are the most intuitive and obvious examples of conditions 
denying an individual full moral agency. The most obvious example, the 
moral status of children, can be described differently from the other, but with 
the same conclusion that the child is less likely to be considered 
blameworthy.  
In the case of character, as with Aristotle’s theory of responsibility 
(especially NE III.5) the character of the child is deemed undeveloped, and 
therefore lacking a capacity for moral decisions (as was the case with Irwin’s 
complex theory, discussed in chapter 5.1.1), so that the child cannot be held 
responsible as an adult would in the same situation. From the viewpoint of a 
theory relying on the concept of the excuse, the child would be excused in the 
same way for whatever reason thought to be relevant that establishes (or 
disproves) the basic status as a responsible moral agent. The difference 
between the two is the emphasis on the historical phenomena in the case of 
character, as the subject was discussed in Fischer and Ravizza (1998, see 
chapter 4.3.3). Another group of agents for whom the moral agency of the 
person is fundamentally questioned from Strawson (2008/[1962]) onwards 
is psychopaths.270 Finally, one of the most recent sources that is of interest 
along with Watson’s paper (2011), is Victoria McGeer’s dialogue starting with 
“Lessons from Autism” in Sinnott-Armstrong’s book Moral Psychology vol. 
3. The Neuro-science of Morality (2008). McGeer discusses the relation 
between empathy and its lack in moral responsibility.  
 
Children 
 
Examples of children, as Eshleman writes, relate to the situation wherein the 
child is initially exempted from reactive attitudes and thus does not qualify 
for responsibility-assessments, but increasingly does through development 
gained by age. (Eshleman 2014.) The following examples detail a couple of 
groups that are nearly universally exempted from moral responsibility. 
                                                
270 These other examples have been discussed in chapters 3.1.3 & 4.1.2. See also ch. 4.3.1, where 
early work by Fingarette (1966) discusses the psychopath based on an even earlier example supplied by 
Kant. 
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The groups with exemptions are often associated with corresponding 
philosophical examples. One of these examples deals with the 
underdeveloped position of children. Children are the natural common group 
that both Strawson and Aristotle exclude from normal objects of 
responsibility assessment. The children example is discussed in 
Nicomachean Ethics III.5, in which children and animals can act voluntarily 
but not deliberately. The acts children commit can be sudden and voluntary 
but, according to Aristotle, they are not prohairetically chosen, and thus do 
not require a capacity for deliberation. (NE III. 5, 1111b8-10, see also ch. 
5.1.2.)  
As discussed above, in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, the development 
and habituation of the virtues is discussed in a multitude of ways. The basic 
idea is that children, being morally underdeveloped, lack the requisite virtues 
to qualify them as full-fledged moral agents. While growing up, the young 
acquire the necessary virtues of character that allow them to be viewed as 
adults by the moral community. Aristotle holds that being blamed equates to 
being morally responsible (being blameworthy equates to the fairness of 
being held responsible), and while he discusses blame and praise together, 
the latter being seldom discussed in modern theories, there may be 
formulations of inverted thought-experiments in which the exempted status 
of the agent affects the response. Perhaps in some cases the inverted example 
can have inverse effects; for example, if a person who is responsible for a 
great deed and is praised for it is discovered later to have acted fraudulently 
this can negate that praise; a child might receive even greater adulation, 
since it was obvious that no one could expect the deed from him or her. 
Broadie summarizes the inclusive attitude taken by Aristotle in Ethics 
with Aristotle (1991): 
When Aristotle says that praise and censure apply to actions which 
issue from virtue and vice (developed conditions of the character), he 
is not, I think, forgetting the voluntary actions of the immature. 
Rather, the statement is about the terms in which we praise and fault. 
[…] Aristotle’s theory of moral training assumes that under normal 
conditions, and with unspoilt agents, communications of this kind 
tend to be effective; he has a natural formal bent towards human 
excellence and happiness, but initially depends on others to supply a 
content. (Broadie 1991, 127-128.) 
 
Despite this, children are clearly exempted from moral responsibility 
ascriptions as a result of Aristotle’s tendency to view them as categorically 
separate from humanity. Broadie writes: “In Aristotle’s ontology, a child or 
childlike member of the species is not a complete human substance; it could 
no more ethically exist apart from guardian or guide than a foetus physically 
could from the mother-animal.” (See Broadie 1991, 64.) 
In FR Strawson considers children very briefly, but he does note them as 
significant among the groups of agents listed under the type-2 special 
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conditions that serve to completely eliminate the reactive attitudes associated 
with the action taken by these persons. In connection with the second sub-
group of type-2 conditions, Strawson says that the reactive sentiments 
(including blame) of both children and the mentally deranged are modified 
or mollified.271 Garrath Williams also notes that in terms of Strawson's 
reactive attitudes “our relations with children occupy a crucial in-between 
place” (G. Williams 2010). 
Strawson discusses the undeveloped foundation of the morality of young 
children in the following way:  
Thus parents and others concerned with the care and upbringing of 
young children cannot have to their charges either kinds of attitude in 
a pure or unqualified form. They are dealing with creatures who are 
potentially and increasingly capable both of holding, and being 
objects of, the full range of human and moral attitudes, but are not 
yet truly capable of either. The treatment of such creatures must 
therefore represent a kind of compromise, constantly shifting in one 
direction, between objectivity of attitude and developed human 
attitudes. […] The punishment of a child is both like and unlike the 
punishment of an adult. (FR, 20-21).  
 
Emphasizing his conclusion, Strawson gives an example concerning 
upbringing: children are increasingly capable with age in the sense of being 
full members of the moral community, but until they are that, they cannot be 
fully considered as such. This leads to a suspension of the reactive attitudes 
as described above. 
As for the commentators on Strawson, in “Responsibility” (1966) Herbert 
Fingarette discusses children prominently, as he seeks to evaluate our 
understanding of responsibility using the example of a five-year-old child 
causing a fire. The example helps to distinguish the causal responsibility of 
the act of playing with matches with the actual event of the fire from 
blameworthiness associated with the act. Although Fingarette is not specific 
about the formation of the judgments related to this situation, he does imply 
that we do not consider five-year-old children blameworthy. More recently, 
Pritchard’s Becoming Morally Responsible (1991) is devoted to exploring the 
development of personality toward morally responsible agency. This rare 
example of informing ethics with developmental psychology is interesting in 
terms of children and the boundaries of the concept. Additionally, as 
discussed, Wallace’s discussion of the children in Responsibility and the 
Moral Sentiments (1994) is found in the sixth chapter, where they are treated 
as the first exempted group of agents (Wallace 1994, 166-167). Wallace 
concludes that not having developed reflective self-control, children are 
exempted from blameworthiness. 
  
                                                
271 “The agent was himself; but he is warped or deranged, neurotic or just a child” (FR, 9). 
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Psychopaths 
 
While in Aristotle’s case anything said about psychopaths is unavoidably 
speculation, we may pursue some interesting angles by applying Aristotle's 
theory to the problem. There is a current, active debate on the moral 
responsibility (and criminal responsibility272) of psychopaths, which is 
epitomized by a paradoxical stance toward them. Perhaps the most relevant 
outlook for the present purposes, is that by Gary Watson who in “The 
Trouble with Psychopaths” (2011) describes the problem that philosophy has 
with the psychopath. The missing component required for the moral analysis 
of the acts of a person afflicted with this condition, is identical with that 
whose absence causes the aberrant behavior.273 The component in question is 
essentially empathy (see Watson 2011, 323-324), according to which 
psychopaths should be treated as an external group distinct from normal 
moral agents. 
As Bobzien (2014) relates, Aristotle has a distinction of agency that could 
help to distinguish psychopathic agents who can be held blameworthy from 
those who cannot. Bobzien lists types of agency in her article “Choice and 
Moral Responsibility” (2014) 1. “The Virtuous Agent” 2. “The Strong-Willed 
Agent” 3. “The Weak-Willed Agent” 4. “The Vicious Agent” and 5. “Agents 
with Not Yet Fully Developed Character”. Where the theory of Aristotle could 
recognize cases as blameworthy, psychopaths would belong to the two last 
groups of agents. An agent acting in a vicious manner who is still an adult 
(and not a child or childlike as in the previous example) would be 
blameworthy in Aristotle’s theoretical context. (Bobzien 2014, 101-105.)  
What is interesting is that Aristotle conceives an adult who has not gained 
sufficient character traits as a full member of moral community, yet he still 
holds such an individual morally responsible. Bobzien claims that given these 
conditions Aristotle's theory reserves the option to hold an adult but 
incomplete agent morally responsible: there are four conditions for this: 1. 
The moral dispositions known as virtues have not formed yet to form a full 
character. 2. The agent is capable of practical reason, i.e., to pick the golden 
mean. 2. He/she has appetitive wanting (boulesis), which is distinct from 
choosing deliberatively. 4. He/she acts voluntarily, having knowledge of 
alternatives; if the chosen act is based on the vices, then these conditions are 
applicable. (Bobzien 2014, 104-105.) Obviously these points are not enough 
for a complete picture of “Aristotelian psychopathy”, but this topic might be 
interesting enough to warrant further research.  
Meanwhile, referring to the psychopath, problems arise with the 
Strawsonian default model of responsibility with those agents who recognize 
the criteria of “qualifying as a responsible person” even when they could in 
                                                
272 See Brink & Nelkin (2013) as well as Godman & Jefferson (2014). 
273 “The trouble with psychopaths is that they at once meet the malice test but fail the moral 
competence requirement.” (Watson 2011, 309.) 
194 
fact have a radically different set of morals. (See G. Williams 2010, Watson 
2011.) Strawson doesn’t devote much thought to the examples he lists. He 
does however touch upon the subject of someone who is described as a 
“moral idiot” (FR, 13 ). More broadly, psychopathy has been a major theme 
in Watson’s articles as evidenced by “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil” 
(1987) and “The Trouble with Psychopaths” (2011). On his account, the key 
challenge with philosophers discussing the position of the psychopath is that 
this aberrant behavior arises from deficient mental qualities – the same 
qualities also fundamental to the requirements of treating each other as 
moral agents. In Pritchard’s book Becoming Morally Responsible (1991), 
chapter 3 is considered by a few influential writers as important. These 
commentators maintain that his book is very relevant in the discussion 
regarding the morality of the psychopath. In Responsibility and the Moral 
Sentiments (1994) Wallace equated psychopathy with a lack of reflective self-
control. Likewise he wrote of children that by being morally undeveloped 
children lack the requirements for reflective self-control. According to 
Wallace “Such agents are for instance nonmembers of our moral community, 
insofar as they do not accept the moral requirements that we accept and hold 
people to, and they may be incorrigible in their immorality as well.” (Wallace 
1994, 178.) 
A more recent commentary by Victoria McGeer includes psychopathy in a 
very interesting moral psychological assessment of the condition of autism 
and other forms of extraordinary mental states in her article “Lessons from 
Autism“ (in Sinnott-Armstrong 2008). While both autists and psychopaths 
“seem to lack empathy in some sense of that word, and yet [of these two 
groups, only the] psychopathic individuals are well known for their lack of 
moral concern […] What accounts for this difference?” By answering this 
question McGeer seeks to shed new light on the nature of moral agency. 
(McGeer 2008a, 228.)274 
The two examples of children and the psychopath clearly point out the 
similarities between the two varieties of mitigating blame. Different reasons 
can lead to alterations in moral judgments. In practice, the outcome is the 
same, no matter which concept is used to explain blame mitigation. For 
instance, a child is pardoned from breaking things no matter whether it is 
just excused by his or her undeveloped moral agency, or a more intricate 
analysis of formative events in his or her character history. While the 
                                                
274 Victoria McGeer’s article (2008a) is doubly interesting as it is directly followed by a comment 
by one of the authors that McGeer herself is debating with, Jeannette Kennett, which in turn is 
followed by McGeer’s response. According to Kennett, McGeer assumes that empathy is a necessary 
requirement for morality, and while it might be the most popular “route to morality”, Kennett stresses 
that “it is not the only one” (Kennett 2008, 260). McGeer’s reply restates her stance that “we are 
reasoning creatures with a certain range of affectively determined concerns. Take away either the 
affective component or the reasoning component and you take away our capacity for moral agency.” 
(McGeer 2008b, 283.) 
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explication of this state of the agent’s mind have been very brief here, they 
are considered as their own special, separate groups in the preceding chapter 
(7), which compares the theories in which such extraordinary agents may 
influence the moral responsibility assessments.   
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6.4 SUMMARY 
 
As Ferdinand Schoeman hinted in his introduction to Responsibility, 
Character and the Emotions (1987) character and the excuses share a 
connection (see Schoeman 1987, 9). If Bernard Williams is correct in 
claiming that every theory of responsibility must include the four elements of 
responsibility, including blame as a response; and if the current debate on 
blame is considered germane then blame is a key element of responsibility 
relations. From this assumption – and it is considered reasonable to accept 
this assumption here 275 – it follows that every theory of responsibility 
contains means of discussing the appropriateness of blame in the cases of 
differences of quality between the agents. When this appropriateness is 
questioned, the initial reactive sentiments and resulting blame can be re-
evaluated, based on which, for lack of a better term, the blame can be 
mitigated. This sort of blame mitigation, is thus present in one form or 
another in the theories of responsibility; either as conceived in terms of the 
broad descriptions and conditions related to character, or with the more 
specific and immediate excuses. 
In general, character is something that has been discussed in connection 
with responsibility, but has received less attention since the last century. As 
the methods and accuracy of psychological scientific methods have advanced, 
the area covered by this concept has been both clarified and reduced. 
Nevertheless, philosophical theories of responsibility have continuously 
referred to character as one way of reducing, mitigating or even overriding 
blame. As other theories have been content to provide lists of excuses for this 
same function, a comparison of how these ideas fit together follows in the 
next chapter.  
As an agent commits an act, responsibility can be defined as consisting of 
the response that the surrounding moral community gives to that act. Now if 
the agent is extraordinary, excuses that may or may not be based on 
character can apply. In the case of such an excuse, the blame is mitigated or 
cancelled out. In everyday interaction, there are no action logs, or lists of 
conduct to be checked. The views criticizing "the ledger view" of 
responsibility are followed in this sense. Character could be described as sort 
of time-molded stamp276 that can be applied to the moment of the action and 
direct the course of action. Thus the state of character of the person consists 
of dispositions and thought patterns that set the probabilities (see McIntyre 
1990) that a particular action is chosen. 277  While character is however never 
                                                
275 See chapters 4.1.2; 4.2; 4.3.3 & 5.1.1. 
276 The original Greek word charaktêr, which means the imprint on a coin (Homiak 2015). 
277 Jane McIntyre’s article “Character: A Humean Account” (1990), published in History of 
Philosophy Quarterly, comprehensively discusses the peculiar way that Hume uses the concept of 
character in his work. She argues that it is possible to accept Hume’s controversial idea that all 
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a sufficient cause for blame or exemption, it is a necessary element278 when 
moral responsibility is considered, just as a child’s undeveloped character is 
also a reason for exemption.  
Character, considered as a distinct concept, is a vaguely defined thing 
with a strongly subjective element. What a character is from the perspective 
of the agent and how it is interpreted from the viewpoint of the community is 
different, but the two conceptions can be brought closer together where more 
information is available. How this information is increased depends on the 
situation: the various parties could converse and get to know each other 
better, or some relevant background histories of the agent could be 
uncovered by searching documents, etc. 
Two alternatives for mitigating blame in theories of responsibility were 
examined here: character and excuses. Neither of these was without 
problems: the idea of character, originating with Aristotle, expresses the 
effect of history, of previous events, and the various causes related to the act 
being evaluated. Suffice it to say, since accounting for every event prior to the 
wrong-doing is impossible, and without the intention of excusing every single 
act, some other criteria are needed to determine the blameworthiness of the 
agent. Additionally, it seems that the two different concepts are not identical 
as, for example, there are excuses that are not related to character (at least 
when the condition of being related to character is not enforced, like 
Strawson’s type-1 excuses). This corresponds with the caution at the 
beginning of the comparison about not treating the two concepts as being in 
a dichotomy with each other. 
Character, as stated above, implies that the actor has a choice, and that 
her character traits such as virtues can affect this choice. If the character of 
the agent is incomplete, as it would be in the case of a five-year-old child, or 
if its functioning is otherwise disturbed or suspended such that the acts are 
somehow done out of character, the agent is not blamed.  
Excuses on the other hand do not imply that the act has alternatives, 
although it is possible that there are. Excuses imply that the act committed is 
wrong, but that for some reason the agent is not blameworthy. The excusing 
conditions, as described by Strawson, provide a handy instrument to 
circumvent the excessive historical plotting needed if moral responsibility is 
conceived in terms of character. If the agent, her moral status, or a trait of 
this status warrants an excuse, the agent is not blamed, or if she is, according 
                                                                                                                                     
responsible action must originate from the character, if interpreted in a certain way. The article is very 
helpful in gathering Hume’s fragmentary writings on the subject of character, and in selecting what is 
essential for moral responsibility. The article seems to be the formative work of the current interest in 
Hume’s character. In a 2015 Hume Society conference panel, McIntyre made comments that followed 
up on issues in the 1990 article, and that have since attracted comment from other scholars. While 
regretfully not germane to the entire dissertation, some of these additions are noted here anyway, with 
the kind permission of the author.  
278 Bernard Williams's state element (Williams 1993 & 1997). 
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to Wallace, it would not be fair. But without additional external description 
these excuses can appear arbitrary and baseless and as a result, as is the 
point of “the ledger-view” of responsibility, without the relevant cultural 
context it would be more of a metaphysical concept than actual practice. Both 
lead ultimately to the same conclusion that the agent is not blamed, or that 
the blame that would be directed toward the actor in normal circumstance 
would in this case be withheld. 
Reasoned this way, character and excuses could be viewed as different 
means to the same goal, which is aggregated here as blame mitigation. 279 The 
cross-referencing of these two “means of blame mitigation” might not be the 
most pressing activity in the current philosophy of moral responsibility, but 
some attempts have been made or are being made currently. Nevertheless, 
this exercise has shed light into some corners of the topic that have seldom 
been thoroughly scrutinized.280  
In conclusion, setting up character and excuses against each other would 
be a false dichotomy. Instead, what could be useful would be to sample 
comparable examples of how different theories treat the subject matter in 
relation to the terms and the relation between these concepts explained by 
this comparison. The theories which are partial to character-based 
explanations would not automatically prevent excuse-based approaches. The 
following combinations of attitudes toward the concept are conceivable: 
a) The first group embraces character, and rejects the excuses. This is a 
relatively rare option to choose between the theories, as it tends to lean 
toward the incompatibilist accounts.281  
                                                
279 Thanks to Säde Hormio for influential criticism leading to the selection of blame mitigation as 
the point of contrast used here. 
280 As mentioned in chapter 5, Irwin compared Hume’s theory of responsibility with that of 
Aristotle (Irwin 1980, 134-135). Hume’s stance on the concepts of excuses and character were viewed 
as a sort of compromise, both concepts of character and excuse co-existing within the limits of his 
theory of responsibility. Surprisingly few have followed suit, the supposed reason being the fear of 
being branded as an incompatibilist. As Watson’s 1987 examination of the concept showed, there is 
more to the idea of historical responsibility than is usually admitted. Even if this aspect is not decisive 
in responsibility assessments, it certainly has an effect on our reactive emotions. By following Bernard 
Williams’s elements of responsibility, the practice of blame mitigation could be restated in a more 
elegant form. This could in turn provide further instruments for the ever-problematic explication of 
responsibility. For now, however, thorough examination of Hume’s responsibility is saved for a future 
occasion.  
281 One example of these is the book Against Moral Responsibility (2011) by the hard determinist 
Bruce Waller. Waller argues that Strawson and his followers fail to distinguish between character faults 
and blame faults. One of the examples he uses is Watson’s Harris example as he argues for the weight 
of character concerns being above the concerns of blameworthiness in determining responsibility. 
(Waller 2011, 153-159.) This has to be considered, however, within the limits of Waller’s main 
argument that moral responsibility and its related practices are “utterly eliminated” (ibid. 7). One 
interesting term that Waller uses is excuse-extensionism (presumably after Smilansky (2000)): Waller 
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b) The other “either-or” option most frequent in the post-Strawson scene is 
that the excuses should be embraced and the character considerations 
rejected. Wallace is the most pre-eminent of these “excusers” as he rules out 
the character-related concerns as a “sort of deep responsibility for one’s 
actions” and being part of “the condition of autonomy“ by stating that they 
should not be confused with being an actual element of moral responsibility. 
(Wallace 1994, 52-56). 
The remaining two options are c) attempting to include both character 
and excuses as complementary means of blame mitigation. These are few, 
but Hume is the obvious theorist who should be examined further on this. 
How significant is this exactly? Going back to Hume might be useful as his 
conception of responsibility did have both character and excuses in its 
repertoire. Character acts as the essential basis of moral responsibility in his 
theory as well as excuses.282  
The final group is d) rejecting both. This could be conceived through 
looking at other research that has been done. An example is offered here: 
Kelly (2013) criticizes excuses as insufficient to determine blameworthiness 
and moral agency as an extension. She does this without forming a new 
theory as such. She does however follow Scanlon in terms of blame, which 
needs to be taken into account, if one wants to stay in the Strawsonian 
context. (Kelly 2013, 246-247.) 
  
                                                                                                                                     
thinks the moral responsibility abolionist position may contain a fundamental error. According to this 
concept, there are valid compatibilist excuses; that much is given. The position however tends to lead 
to erroneous elimination of moral responsibility through at least initially well-meaning extension of the 
excuses. (Waller 2011, 212.) Daniel Dennett rebuts Waller’s criticisms in his review of Against Moral 
Responsibility (2011). He praises Waller’s scholarship on the subject, but claims that he misinterprets 
responsibility (in order to emphasize the current bad state of affairs within the U.S. system currently), 
and that by abolishing moral responsibility as a system he makes insufficient distinction between the 
original and the replacing concept of take-charge responsibility, which he is producing. According to 
Dennett, this is essentially the same concept as his moral responsibility. (Dennett 2011.) 
By focusing on the retributive side of the concept at the expense of moral responsibility as making 
moral judgments, Waller’s stance is hard to accept as a basis for his argument, and as a result it is 
difficult to concede his conclusion of abolishing moral responsibility as such.  Approached with 
different starting premises, the work might be more appealing. 
282 According to Jane McIntyre (1990) Hume considers character as the necessary basis for 
excuses. Paul Russell (1995) and Ted Kinnaman (2005) do however criticize him for this. Paul Russell 
argues (from a Strawsonian perspective) that Hume did in fact make an error in this case. (Russell 
1995, 95-105.) 
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7 ANALYSIS 
 
A clear explanation of how the concept of blame is central to accounts of both 
Strawsonian and Aristotelian responsibility needs further examination. In 
the previous chapter, the concepts of character and excuses were discussed, 
and it was concluded that both of these could function as forms of blame 
mitigation, or in other words that they could be the mechanisms for re-
assesseing how the initial reactive attitudes related to action could be based 
on additional information. In this chapter, Bernard Williams’s explication of 
the elements of responsibility (Williams 1993 & 1997; discussed in chapter 
4.3.3) is brought back in the form of the framework of analysis, with the help 
of which it is examined how character and excuses could both signify the 
means to mitigate blame. These concepts, as parts of the two different 
accounts of moral responsibility discussed above, can be analyzed side-by-
side with the help of these elements. The elements of responsibility are 
presented with the help of tables, in which the relevant concepts that appear 
in the theories of responsibility are compared with each other. The 
interaction of these different elements is described up front in terms of 
simple propositional logic in order to clarify the relations between the 
concepts. The three different theories of moral responsibility analyzed are: 
Aristotle’s, Strawson’s and Wallace’s.  
To reitarate, further detail of the “fabric” of responsibility can be adduced 
by utilizing Bernard Williams’s distinction into four elements of 
responsibility. He argues that all theories that discuss responsibility stress 
one or more of the four following elements of responsibility: 1. cause, 2. 
intention, 3. state and 4. response.283 Williams claims that these four 
elements, common to all attempts to classify responsibility, can be 
distinguished in those theories to varying degrees. Cause refers to causal 
responsibility, while the difference “between intention and state is one 
between what an agent means to do […] and what state of mind he is in when 
he means to do it and does it” (Williams 1997, 97). Because these are rarely 
dealt with identically between the different theories, ultimately there can be 
no universally acceptable definition or concept of responsibility, as so much 
depends on particular circumstances.284  
Here Williams’s elements are used as a framework for the thought 
experiment that whenever the appropriateness of blaming is questioned, 
these elements are tested: the first element is true if the agent is causally 
responsible (CR(sx)) for the act and false if not. The second is true if he or 
                                                
283 Williams (1993), chapter 3 & 1997, 96. 
284 “There is not, and there never could be, just one appropriate way of adjusting these elements to 
one another – as we might put it, just one correct conception of responsibility.” (Williams 1993, 55.) 
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she intended (I(s t(x)x)) to do the act and false if he or she did not. The third 
element of the state (S(s t(x))) is problematic. If true, it implies that there is 
nothing out of ordinary about the state of mind of the agent. If false on the 
other hand, it means that there are some active considerations that affect the 
evaluation of the acts done by the agent. If all three of these elements of 
responsibility are true, the agent can be considered morally responsible 
(MR(sx)) for the act. Moral responsibility in turn finally implies that the 
response element (B(sx)) is true as the blame could be assigned to the actor 
because of the previous elements permitting it to be so. Of course, where 
blame is mitigated (as it is in most examples given here), this element is 
false. 
The four elements of responsibility are used here in connection with a 
simple true/false condition of whether they matter for the excuse. We see 
below how the analysis is conducted: if the cause element is true, it means 
that s is causally responsible for doing x. 285 In this case, the first condition is 
true in every one of the examples, because the interest is whether s is morally 
responsible, and whether the resulting blame is mitigated or not. If the cause 
element is false, the concerns about responsibility would refer to some kind 
of “scapegoat” situation or to events that have not happened; in other words, 
metaphysical guilt.286 Since being a scapegoat effectively eliminates the 
possibility of moral responsibility and since the latter cases are relevant only 
in terms of imagination and motivation, the nonexistent events are of less 
concern. As the Strawsonian approach emphasizes action, the former are not 
looked at here. In order to produce the comparison between the theories, 
there are really only two claims that describe the relations between the 
functions:  
 
1. CR(sx) ∧ I(s t(x)x) ∧ S(s t(x)) → MR(sx) 
 
2. MR(sx) → B(sx), where:   
• MR(sx): s is morally responsible for x;  
• CR(sx): s is causally responsible for x;  
• I(s t(x)x): S intended x (at the time of x or shortly before);  
• S(s t(x)): S's state of mind is that of a morally capable adult human (at 
the time of x or shortly before) and  
• B(sx): S is blameworthy for x.  
 
In normal cases, where the morally responsible agent is blameworthy, he or 
she is also considered to be morally responsible in the broader sense. As 
                                                
285 As discussed in ch. 4.2 “causal or explanatory blame" was all but dismissed by Coates and 
Tognazzini (2014).  
286 The concept of metaphysical guilt, where each condition but causal responsibility is true, has 
been considered at least by Larry May in his book Sharing Responsibility (1993), but, again, this is a 
topic for another occasion. 
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stated by Williams, this responsibility is an aggregate condition of different 
concerns: the agent is causally responsible for the act, he or she intended it 
and finally, the state of mind of the agent was in the fully operational 
condition of an adult human being (or of sufficient maturity dependent on 
the situation).  
Just to describe a normal situation, where A does x to s and is causally 
and morally responsible and therefore blameworthy, you can think of a well-
to-do gentleman thief who plans a heist in a jewelry shop and commits it just 
for fun and personal gain. As the thief breaks into the shop, Williams’s cause 
element is true, because he breaks the window of the shop. The intention 
element is true, because of the conscious planning and the commitment to 
carry the crime through. The state element is also true because the 
hypothetical burglar is in good spirits and has no severe mental problems 
whatsoever (think Ocean’s Eleven). He’s not even in need of the money. The 
previous conditions all being true, since there is no reason for blame 
mitigation, the condition for the response element is true as well. As all four 
elements are true, the wrong-doing is clear, and no alleviating concerns are 
present, the blame is directed at the perpetrator as a result. In such a 
situation, moral responsibility blameworthiness would not be mitigated. The 
agent is considered a morally responsible adult human being. In terms of 
Williams' elements, a normal responsibility assessment would be:  
 
1. CR(sx) : true ∧ I(s t(x)x) : true ∧ S(s t(x)) : true → MR(sx) : true 
 
2. MR(sx) : true → B(sx) : true 
 
In contrast, the most interesting of possible alternatives discussed here is the 
one in which the agent's state of mind is not that of a morally capable adult 
human. Here the state element would be false. In terms of the elements of 
responsibility, this example would appear as:  
 
1. CR(sx) : true ∧ I(s t(x)x) : true ∧ S(s t(x)) : false → MR(sx) : false 
 
2. MR(sx) : false → B(sx) : false 
 
In this second situation, the state of mind of the agent can have an effect on 
the responsibility assessment for the act regardless of the relationship 
between the agent and the act.287 This implies that there are conditions 
related only to the agent or the status of the agent that can affect the final 
responsibility assessment. For simplicity’s sake, further references to the 
above functions are represented by tables showing the relevant outcomes by 
just referring to the truth value of the corresponding element of 
responsibility. 
                                                
287 Kelly (2011) might argue against this. 
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7.1 ARISTOTLE’S CHARACTER-BASED BLAME 
MITIGATION 
  
Williams’s elements within Aristotle’s theory appear in terms of the following 
topics: 
 
Williams  Aristotle 
Elements of responsibility (Williams 
1993, 55 & 1997): 
Content of said element: 
Cause  Efficient cause (aitia / aition) 
Intention Action (X) is voluntary, meaning it is  
     a1) done in knowledge 
     a2) not coerced.
 288
 
State The agent has a sufficiently formed 
character, i.e., is an adult capable of 
decision (prohairesis) (NE III.5.) 
Response Praise or blame (NE III.1. & EE II.6) 
Table 2. Bernard Williams’ elements of responsibility in Aristotle’s theory of responsibility.  
In table 2, aitia, which is mentioned as a term employed by Aristotle to 
describe notions related to responsibility, refers to efficient cause. This is in 
contrast with Aristotle’s other causes, which include the material, formal, 
and final causes, and which can be additional extensions of the direct 
translation. As discussed in chapter 5.1.2, the teleological cause may have a 
distinct effect on the action and the responsibility relations related to the act. 
Williams's cause element is represented best by Aristotle’s idea of the 
efficient cause, as it exemplifies the situations in which someone (s) is 
directly causally responsible for an act (x) or an event. As for the intention 
element, the Aristotelian excuses (chapter 6.1) describe intentionality fairly 
well. Intentional acts are done in knowledge and uncoerced. How the state is 
discussed in NE III 1-5 is less explicit. However, seeking the elements shows 
quite clearly that NE III.5 deals with cases where the state of mind of the 
actor is not up to par in moral agency. Finally, regarding the response 
element, Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility offers its analogue at the 
beginning of book III.1. Book II.6 of the Eudemian Ethics is also quite clear 
                                                
288 See, for example, Irwin’s “simple theory” (1980) & Roberts (1989). 
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on the stance, which puts praising and blaming in direct connection with 
responsible action. 
The alternatives, where blame is mitigated in connection with the relevant 
elements of responsibility are shown in table 3 below. If the element is 
marked as “true”, it means that in these cases the corresponding element is 
effective in that situation. Correspondingly, if the element of responsibility is 
marked “false”, this means that as a requirement for the agent to be morally 
responsible that element is incomplete or untrue, preventing the agent in 
question to be held blameworthy for act X. 
 
Aristotle Williams  
Action-based excuses: Elements of responsibility: 
a) Involuntariness 1. Cause: true 
2. Intention: false 
3. State: true 
4. Response (praise/blame): false (as in 
not blameworthy, not morally 
responsible) 
   a1) Coercion 
   a2) Ignorance 
Character-based excuses: 
b) the agent’s character belongs in one 
of the following groups: animals, 
children 
1. Cause: true 
2. Intention: true or false 
3. State: false (due to lack of decision 
capabilities) 
4.Response (praise/blame): false 
Table 3. Aristotle’s action-based and character-based excuses compared to Williams’s 
elements.  
Thus, Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility discussed in terms of 
Williams' elements would imply that the interesting extraordinary cases of 
excused action would be those that fail the condition of intention and those 
that fail the state element. In the former case, the agent cannot be held 
blameworthy because that act x was done either out of coercion or ignorance. 
In the latter, the agent fails the blameworthiness qualification because of 
his or her character. In other words, by being a morally underdeveloped 
child, mentally ill or indeed by not being a member of the humankind in the 
first place, as with animals in Aristotle’s theory. As he thought children were 
part of a different substance altogether than adult human beings, a different 
method of measure is needed in the various age groups. In his theory, it is 
not possible to evaluate the moral responsibility of a child without the 
blameworthiness of the guardians of that child. Furthermore, the 
requirements for practical reason, prohairesis-type choosing and a set of 
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virtues are required for adulthood. Animals and people with lacking decision-
making capabilities from any reason are considered separate from the group 
of blameworthy individuals (see chapter 6.1). 
7.2 STRAWSON’S AND WALLACE’S EXCUSE-BASED 
BLAME MITIGATION 
  
This section shows how Williams’s elements appear within the Strawsonian 
theories in FR and the way Wallace (1994) expands Strawson’s categories is 
demonstrated and analyzed. In table 4, the elements of responsibility are 
shown as they appear in Strawson’s context: 
Williams  Strawson 
Elements of responsibility (Williams 
1993, 55 & 1997): 
Content of said element: 
Cause  Causal responsibility 
Intention Action of the agent is not accidental or 
caused by circumstances (FR, 7-8.) 
State The agent is considered as part of the 
moral community i.e., held to be a fully 
capable adult (FR, 9-11.) 
Response Reactive sentiments (FR, 4-7.) 
Table 4. Bernard Williams’s elements of responsibility in Strawson’s theory of 
responsibility.  
Causal responsibility is, as Eshleman (2001/[2014]) noted, not as significant 
in the modern theories of responsibility such as Strawson’s. Nevertheless, the 
causally-initiated event is considered to be the prerequisite for proper 
responsibility assessment to take place. Intention however is inherent in 
Strawson’s examples by way of negative definition. His pleas or special 
circumstances (as described in chapter 3.1.3) assume that the action is 
caused by an unintended accident or unusual circumstance, and thus the 
agent is not as blameworthy as he or she would be without these interfering 
factors. It seems that the cases that are described in the first category of 
Strawson’s excuses “unintended consequence and coerced acts”, are those 
where the cause and the state elements are true, but the intention is not, and 
thus the response or the blame might be mitigated. 
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These excuses are also devoid of intention, but a diminished state of mind 
might also be a factor. In any case, the blame is mitigated as a result of 
temporarily suspended reactive attitudes. Strawson’s second sub-group of 
excusing conditions is called here the group of “Abnormal psychology”. 
Williams’s intention element might be true or false in these cases, but 
Strawson considers the state element as the more significant in viewing the 
agent in a different “light” because of the observed state of the agent as that 
condition effectively eliminates blameworthiness entirely. Strawson’s special 
circumstances in relation to Williams's categories are described in table 5 
below: 
 
Strawson Williams  
Excusing conditions (X): Elements of responsibility (in case of X): 
1. Unintended or coerced acts 
(agent normal, less blameworthy) 
1. Cause: true 
2. Intention: false 
3. State: true 
4. Response (blame): false 
2a. Abnormal circumstances 
(reactive attitudes suspended) 
1. Cause: true 
2. Intention: false 
3. State: true or false 
4.Response (blame): false 
2b. Abnormal psychology 
(reactive attitudes modified or 
eliminated) 
1. Cause: true 
2. Intention: true or false 
3. State: false 
4.Response (blame): false 
Table 5. Strawson’s excusing conditions compared to Williams’s elements.  
In a similar cross-referencing of Williams's elements of responsibility with 
Aristotle’s theory, Strawson’s theory most clearly contains the analogues of 
the type-1 excuses where something is lacking in terms of intention. Equally 
clear is the second sub-group of “abnormal” or extraordinary psychology289. 
In these cases, the state element has a negating effect on the reactive 
instances of resentment or gratitude that is derived from act X. 
Being the only category devoted to completely external influence, the first 
sub-group of Strawson’s type-2 excuses (2a) is difficult to compare with the 
other excuses. This one is characterized by abnormal circumstances. While it 
                                                
289 Since “abnormal” for Strawson includes children, the word might be too strong at least when 
considered from outside. This problem of Strawson’s theory is discussed by Kelly (2013). among 
others. 
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may be true that the agent’s moral capacities cannot be questioned initially, 
the variety of ways in which the circumstances can have an effect on the 
mental capabilities of the agent suggest the possibility that both the intention 
and state of mind of the agent are compromised in these situations. 
Nevertheless, the end result in terms of response is the same in each case: 
regardless of the type of excuse, the agent is less appropriate as a recipient of 
praise or blame.  
Wallace’s categories do not fall as easily into the  clear divisions of 
Williams’s conditions as those of Strawson, but one thing shared between the 
types of excuses from a) to d) is that the condition of the cause being true and 
the condition of intention being false. The only exceptions to this are excuses 
a) and b), which were not sufficient reasons for blame mitigation by 
themselves, because the possibility of negligence by the agent leading to the 
act x. Thus, if an inadvertence, mistake, accident or unintended bodily 
movement is the result of the agent’s own negligence, the response is true, 
i.e., blame is not mitigated. In excuses c) and d) the state element could be 
either true or false, but the end result is the same. The lack of intention is 
enough to question the appropriateness of blame, which is mitigated 
regardless the state of mind of the agent. Table 6 is devoted to describing the 
elements of responsibility in Wallace’s context:  
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Wallace Williams  
Types of excuse: Elements of responsibility: 
a) Inadvertance, mistake or accident 1. Cause: true 
2. Intention: false 
3. State: true 
4.Response (blame): false / true if 
negligent 
b) Unintended bodily movement 
c) Physical constraint 1. Cause: true 
2. Intention: false 
3. State: true or false (inconsequential
290
) 
4.Response (blame): false d) Coercion, necessity and duress 
Exempting conditions: 
e) The agent is a member of one of the 
following groups: children, the 
mentally ill, addicts, the hypnotized, 
psychopaths or the heavily stressed 
1. Cause: true 
2. Intention: true or false 
3. State: false 
4.Response (blame): false 
Table 6. Wallace’s excuses and exemptions compared to Williams’s elements.  
The differences between Strawson’s and Wallace’s categories are slight: 
Wallace’s a) and d) are essentially the same as Strawson’s category 1. 
Wallace’s new categories b) “unintended bodily movement” and c) “physical 
constraint” could fall into either of Strawson’s groups, depending on the 
reason why the excusing condition is present. 
Wallace’s elaboration of the Strawsonian excuses produces fairly 
straightforward analogues of Strawson’s examples, with a couple of 
additional clarifications: in the case of those basic situations that Strawson 
would have thought of as examples of special conditions or pleas from the 
first group, Wallace argues that if, in theses cases, the cause of the 
unintended or inadvertent act stems from negligence, the excuse might be 
invalid (see Wallace 1994, 142). Otherwise, further explication of the 
categories of excuses yields little alteration to Strawson’s counterparts. The 
case of inadvertent negligence is interesting, as the elements are not directly 
comparable with the general statements that were drafted at the beginning of 
                                                
290 Although in the case of coercion Saba Bazargan (2014), as a consequentialist, would argue that 
there are degrees of coercion that might result in shared liability between the coercer and a wrong-
doing coercee. In these cases, the wrong-doer might be eligilible to compensate some of the harm 
caused. Generally, according to Bazargan, the majority of the accountability falls on the shoulders of 
the initial coercer. (See Bazargan 2014, 12.) 
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the analysis. There the intention element toward the act in question would 
suggest that, as the negligent action causes unintended events , 
blameworthiness should be questioned. However, this again is a situation 
requiring a longer observation period, to the point where a crucial detail or 
an act is intentionally omitted or taken, leading to the negligent behavior. A 
prime example is drinking and driving, where the conscious, uncoerced 
decision to start drinking in the past would still qualify the condition of 
intentionality for moral responsibility for the later events, where such 
deliberation no longer occurs. 
Concerning the examples dealing with uncertain cases subject to the 
effects of circumstances, it can similarly be asked whether the state element 
is or is not relevant. As always, the unintentional nature of these cases 
related to unusual circumstances is sufficient by itself to allow doubts about 
blameworthiness. As a result, the exact nature of the agent’s state of mind 
ultimately remains secondary, or even inconsequential by definition.  
An interesting example of these cases with a formidable effect on the 
circumstances occurs where the state element of the agent actively works 
against a failed intention element. One such example could be an unafraid 
fire-fighter who is seen running away from a burning house because he or 
she had seen someone in danger on the other side of the road. Alternatively, 
a well-known billionaire benefactor who is recognized as a magnanimous 
philanthrope fails to contribute toward an essential cause because of an error 
in bank statement service. In these cases, the circumstance forces an 
otherwise intentional, morally praiseworthy act to appear as something 
deserving blame. 
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7.3 FINDINGS 
  
Strawsonian theories avoid character-related concerns with the help of 
excuses and exemptions (type-2 pleas or special considerations). 
Strawsonian theories do not go into detailed expositions of the character 
traits and their developmental stages, but classify the type of his or her 
agency, meaning that the quality of agency as a child exempts him or her 
from responsibility assessments. This derives from the broader scope of 
morality, which in Strawsonian terms is constituted of the relations between 
individuals with similar capacities for reason and appraisal. 
Wallace’s theory in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Wallace 
1994) is a straightforward extension of Strawson’s basic template of moral 
responsibility. This is particularly apparent in his treatment of the excuses 
and exemptions, which are a direct elaboration of the special conditions or 
pleas presented in FR (Strawson 2008/[1962], 7-10). 
Both character and excuses may indicate instances of blame mitigation. 
In other words, in order to take a wide variety of situations into account the 
theories of responsibility have incorporated “fail-safes” where the quality of 
the agent tends (for one reason or another) to invalidate an otherwise valid 
formalization of an agent acting in a blameworthy manner.  
Another way of stating this would be that the cases discussed above which 
lack the state element, and where the initial responsibility assessment is 
cancelled based on the these qualities of the agent seemed to indicate a 
noteworthy feature of the responsibility relations, which the theories seeking 
to describe moral responsibility should actively acknowledge. The morally 
sufficient status of the agent should, at least at the most basic level, be 
verified, so that the theories avoid situations in which an agent – incapable 
by nature – is unjustly held accountable for wrong-doing. What is interpreted 
here as missing from most theories of responsibility is a clause about the 
exemptions that should be a check on whether the moral capabilities of the 
agent are of a sufficient level. 
Excuses are a larger group than the group equivalent to the character, as 
they take the circumstances unrelated to character into account as well.291 
This was the case in Strawson’s first sub-group of type-2 pleas (see chapter 
3.1.3). In Aristotle, the circumstances are sometimes relevant through the 
character, as with educated virtues (chapter 5.1.2). Otherwise, they are 
discussed in the voluntary action topic, which is not necessarily related to 
character. Both have to be taken into account of course in the wider context 
of responsibility.   
An illuminating example of the relationships between the theories can be 
achieved by cross-referencing the action based-excuses with the character-
                                                
291 Some authors, such as Michael S. Moore (1990), have even viewed excuses as a higher order 
category than character-based excuses. 
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based excuses,292 allowing Aristotle’s as well as Strawson’s and Wallace’s 
examples of blame mitigation to be compared side-by-side. In all three 
theories, the category of character-based excuses has the most dramatic 
effect on the responsibility assessment. Table 7, below, shows this: 
 
Aristotle Strawson Wallace 
Action-based excuses: Excusing conditions: Types of excuse: 
a) Involuntariness 1. Unintended or coerced 
acts 
(agent normal, less 
blameworthy) 
 
 
a) Inadvertance, mistake or 
accident 
     a1) Coercion b) Unintended bodily 
movement 
     a2) Ignorance 2a. Abnormal 
circumstances 
(reactive attitudes 
suspended) 
 
c) Physical constraint 
d) Coercion, necessity and 
duress 
Character-based 
excuses: 
b) the agent’s character 
belongs in one of the 
following groups: 
animals, children 
2b. Abnormal psychology 
(reactive attitudes modified 
or eliminated) 
Exempting conditions: 
e) the agent is a member of 
one of the following groups: 
children, the mentally ill, 
addicts, the hypnotized, 
psychopaths or the heavily 
stressed 
Table 7. Aristotle’s, Strawson’s and Wallace’s groups of excuses compared 
Common to each theory of responsibility are the two broad types of blame 
mitigation: (1.) the moderate excusing conditions related to slights in action 
or the circumstances, or (2.) the complete exemption-provoking conditions 
related to the extraordinary type of agency in question. In the former cases, 
the initial evaluations of wrong-doing are mitigated to some degree and the 
                                                
292 The cross-referencing of the action-based excuses with the character-based excuses is similar to 
the explication in Michael S. Moore’s article “Choice, Character and Excuse” (1990). The difference is 
that Moore’s perspective relies more on to the philosophy of law and while organized in a similar 
fashion, it is not directly related to the comparison done here, but is very interesting nevertheless. 
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resulting reaction to that event is significantly ameliorated from the 
uninformed starting position. In the latter, the entire practice of 
responsibility assessment is halted and cancelled by judgment about the 
moral level of agency of the agent in question. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Two alternative concepts of responsibility that were discussed were from 
Peter F. Strawson’s and Aristotle’s theories of moral responsibility. The 
elements of responsibility in these theories representing state and response 
respectively were special considerations (type-1 and type-2 excuses) and 
reactive sentiments (including blame) as well as character and praise and, 
more prominently, blame.293 
It seems that there is a relation in each theory between the intention 
element and the response element as well as the state element and the 
response element. The relation between the state and the response elements 
is that if an agent has an excuse or an exemption in the Strawsonian context, 
the reactive sentiments related to her action are modified or eliminated. This 
was made clearer in R. Jay Wallace’s extension of Strawson’s theory. If a 
person does not have the character of an ordinary adult human, i.e. does not 
satisfy the conditions of moral agency the person is not considered morally 
responsible (subject to praise or blame) in Aristotle’s theory.294 
Bernard Williams's explication (1993 & 1997) helped to show how factors 
related to causality (obviously) as well as to intention and state of mind of the 
agent (as well) can change the resulting blameworthiness. Thus the state of 
mind is debated in various theories in different terms above as with character 
in Aristotelian contexts or with the excuses in the Strawsonian ones. If there 
are interventions to both of these conditions, the initial, reactive evaluation 
of blameworthiness of the agent can be altered. The central claim here is that 
the concepts of character and excuses share the connection of being related 
to the state element of responsibility or that they function as shorthand for 
the empirical details which might otherwise cause problems for an overly 
generalized theory of moral responsibility. 
  
                                                
293 The debate is ongoing about whether Aristotle’s theory is compatible with Strawson’s theory of 
moral responsibility. As stated, Irwin (1980), Roberts (1989) and Meyer (2011) are discussed in the 
text. Echenique (2012) and Bobzien (2014) are the latest who hold opposing views on the subject. 
According to Echenique, Aristotle’s blame is not exactly the same as the Strawsonian concept. Bobzien 
on the other hand emphasizes the collective understanding of the research community that what 
Aristotle is talking about in NE III is recognized as a theory of moral responsibility. 
294 The possible exclusions to these are discussed by Strawson’s critics, such as Kelly (2013). 
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8 CONCLUDING STATEMENTS 
 
Finally, after the analysis has been concluded, the results are presented 
briefly in the form of an argument leading to the actual thesis (8.1) as well as 
in more detail within the discussion section (8.2). 
 
8.1 THE ARGUMENT OF THIS WORK 
 
Eshleman’s structure for theories of moral responsibility is followed here as a 
guideline.295 Accordingly, the idea or concept of moral responsibility was 
defined in Strawson’s case by showing how the reactive sentiments function 
and of how moral responsibility should consist of attitudes between the 
members of the moral community (see FR, 23). The criteria for qualifying as 
a moral agent were defined positively with the participant attitudes and also 
negatively via the exempted groups, being a member of which invalidated an 
agent’s, responsibility ascription (ibid. 7-11). The conditions under which 
moral responsibility would be properly applied, i.e., when an agent is 
responsible for something, was discussed in terms of blameworthiness and 
the afore-mentioned membership in the moral community in Strawson’s 
theory (and other Strawsonian theories) (see ibid. 23). The objects of 
responsibility ascriptions in Strawson’s case were actions (see ibid. 16). 
Aristotle defined the idea or concept of responsibility negatively through 
the lack of excusing conditions of ignorance and coercion, as well as 
positively where the agent was a proper candidate for praise and blame (NE 
III.1, 1109b30-35 & 1110b18-20; see also Irwin 1980, 125). The main 
qualification as a moral agent was being an adult human being with sufficient 
capacity for making reasoned choices (ibid). Conditions for which moral 
responsibility would be properly applied related inversely to exclusions of 
conditions related to being an animal or a child or insane (see NE III.2, 
1111b8-10). These were discussed in terms of the development of character. 
Accordingly, the objects of responsibility ascriptions were actions as well as 
character traits (NE III.1, 1109b30-33 & III.5, 1114a6-13; see also Meyer 2011, 
122). If we accept that the basic understanding of moral responsibility is in 
accordance with the Strawsonian reactive sentiments based view of moral 
responsibility and if Williams's elements are taken to be constitutive of 
                                                
295 The basic requirements for theories of moral responsibility included (1) the concept, (2) criteria 
for moral agency, (3) conditions under which responsibility applies to a moral agent and (4) objects of 
responsibility ascriptions (see Eshleman 2013 & chapter 3.1). 
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responsibility assessments, meaning that the elements of response (i.e., 
praise or blame) are recognized as the most apparent manifestation of the 
responsibility relations, it follows that blame is essential to responsibility. It 
needs to be noted that the picture of responsibility is incomplete, mainly 
because of the reluctance of the authors examined here to incorporate the 
concept of praise into their analysis. Therefore, for the sake of the argument, 
the praise-related responsibility assessments are not considered further here. 
(Compare with Coates & Tognazzini 2013, 4-5.) 
 
The overall argument 
 
A) Theories of Responsibility: 
 
1. Agent s can be attributed with responsibility and there are ways in which 
these relations are determined (3.1). 
 
2. Moral responsibility is primarily understood here in terms of Strawsonian 
sentimentalism: it is constituted from the reactive sentiments, including 
notions of blame, meaning affective resentment directed at a wrong-doer 
(3.1.1). 
 
3. While it seems that there can be no single theory of responsibility 
(following Williams 1993), despite this, accounts of responsibility discussed 
here contain the Williamsian elements, including most importantly cause, 
intention, state and response (especially blame) (4.3.3).  
 
4. As a result of 2 and 3, blame is considered to be an essential social 
component of moral responsibility (3.1, 3.1.2, 5.1.1). 
 
B) Character and Excuses in Theories of Responsibility: 
 
5. If argument A on theories of responsibility is valid, s can represent any 
human being doing act X (3.1). 
 
6. In the situation where X is a defined action, and where the moral status of 
agent s is altered to the extent that blaming the agent is clearly inappropriate, 
the theory of moral responsibility is in need of a principle of blame 
mitigation. Otherwise, the truth of the statement is dependent on the 
capabilities of the agent. (See 3.1.2, 5.1.2.) 
 
7. We can find examples of such principles of blame mitigation in the 
theories of moral responsibility examined above: Strawson uses special 
considerations and pleas (3.1.3), which Watson and Wallace interpret as 
excuses and exemptions (4.1.2, 4.3.4, 6.2), while in the Aristotelian context 
the cases of children and the insane are discussed in terms of character and 
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various stages of its development, as well as the excusing conditions of 
ignorance and coercion. (5.1.2, 6.1).  
 
Conclusion 
 
8. Character and excuses (including exemptions) fulfill the function of blame 
mitigation in the context of theories of responsibility. This function is needed 
where responsibility ascription would result in improper outcomes based on 
the moral status of the agent. These principles, as regulatory components of 
theories of moral responsibility, have a decisive effect on moral responsibility 
assessments in general as a result. 
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8.2 DISCUSSION 
 
Theories of responsibility rarely work with identical concepts or definitions 
of moral responsibility, a problem corroborated by this research. During the 
initial research effort, a more particular problem presented itself, of what is 
the role of character in these theories. By tackling this particularly 
underdeveloped but increasingly popular area related to responsibility, this 
second question was selected as as the main point of this dissertation. This 
shift of attention was reflected in the two research questions and the two 
corresponding parts of the thesis. The first research question (Q1) was solved 
at least in part by an aporetic conclusion, best worded in Bernard Williams’s 
work on the subject (1993 & 1997; see also chapters 2.2 & 4.3.3). It has been 
found necessary to discuss the first question in order to address the second 
properly, as well as to analyze the topic of the latter question.  
The second question was raised through the simple observation that the 
concept of character has received considerably less attention in and 
immediately after the seminal paper on the modern, Strawsonian conception 
of responsibility, FR than it has in connection with the classical texts of 
Aristotle related to the subject. The theories of responsibility have considered 
character in different ways throughout the history of Western philosophy, 
and the ancient Greeks especially saw questions of responsibility for 
character as an organic part of the interaction between members of society, 
whereas in modernity the same questions have arisen in a more abstract 
form. 
The relatively recent practice of excluding character from concerns in the 
theories of responsibility was articulated by comparing the Strawsonian 
theories with the Aristotelian. For practical reasons, a heuristic approach was 
selected in that only the theories related directly to the Strawsonian, broadly 
naturalistic ethics and Aristotle’s broadly naturalistic interpretations of 
responsibility were considered.296 
Throughout this comparison it was held that the conceptual tools of the 
excuses are used in the Strawsonian cases, whereas in Aristotle’s case the 
nature of character is discussed in their place. Strawson and his followers 
noted character as a cultural factor, or even a qualifier for assessments of 
moral responsibility altogether, but they did exclude it from the theory of 
responsibility proper. As a counter-example, McKenna and Russell (2007) 
noted that the most significant reason for criticism of the default 
Strawsonian view has been its insufficient treatment of character. In 
Strawson's case it also is apparent that, while he did eventually help bring 
about the naturalistic turn, his effort could not ultimately separate the topic 
of moral responsibility from questions regarding free will and the problem of 
                                                
296 An example of the latter is Susan S. Meyer’s Aristotle on Moral Responsibility (2011). 
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determinism from subsequent philosophical discussions as he might have 
hoped. 
Examination of Aristotle's character virtues provided an alternative 
viewpoint, one concerned with a bigger picture than just the action evaluated 
at a given moment. The Nicomachean Ethics and Politics provide a political 
theory that has been divided into the two topics by later editorial work. 
Viewed together, the books present a theory in which questions of 
responsibility extend from the personal to the political in the form of 
habituation and education in virtues as well as the relationship between the 
goals of the actions of the individual and the political ends of the state.  
The common denominator between the different theoretical families, 
blame, was used to group the initially unrelated concepts of character and 
excuse as “forms of blame mitigation”297. A comparison of the two major 
theories was then conducted (after the more concept-centered systematic 
presentation), the theories being incorporated into Bernard Williams's 
suggested framework of elements of responsibility. The comparison showed 
that the elements of intention and state were those providing interesting 
distinctions between the theories. While lack of intention seemed to call for 
re-evaluation of the initial moral responsibility assessments, Williams’s state 
element was often decisive, where the type of agency had a completely 
eliminative effect on the final response. The latter seemed able to encompass 
both the Strawsonian type-2 pleas or exemptions and Aristotle’s notions of 
responsibility for character. 
As for the question (Q2) about how character should be understood in the 
context of theories of responsibility, if the argument about the comparability 
of the various theories of moral responsibility is accepted, it follows that if 
agent s can be any kind of human being doing X, situations can be conceived 
wherein it would be wholly inappropriate to blame s for X. For example, if an 
Alzheimer patient who has repeatedly been denied healthcare leaves the 
kettle on, causing a fire, it would be inappropriate to hold her entirely 
blameworthy for the damage done despite the causal responsibility being 
his/hers. If the moral status of the agent is such that expecting flawless 
behavior under normal circumstances is unrealistic, it can be deemed that 
the agent is not blameworthy. In cases such as this, it should be asked how 
the theories of responsibility take extraordinary agents into account. The 
Strawsonian theories consider them under the special considerations and 
thus excuse or exempt them from moral responsibility (see chapters 3.1.2, 
4.1.2 and 6.2), whereas in the Aristotelian theories character traits determine 
the moral status of the agent and thus, for example, the young child can be 
treated differently as still lacking virtues or excellences that are essential for 
an adult. (5.1.2). Interpreted this way, the concepts of character and excuse 
                                                
297 In addition to Strawson’s and Wallace’s precedents, an important influence on this idea was 
Schoeman (1987).  
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(in this case including exemptions) are understood as forms of blame 
mitigation. 
In rare cases, character is held to be fundamental in such a way that its 
presence eliminates the need for a concept of moral responsibility.298 
Otherwise, more moderate outlooks can criticize the use of excuses. It seems 
that while most contemporary theories leave the character-based discussions 
on responsibility out, they do include type-2 excuses (i.e., exemptions) as 
descriptors of extraordinary agents (6.2). 
 Developmental factors and past events mean that philosophical character 
is “thicker” than psychological character. New entries into empirical-based 
moral psychology have arrived at conflicting positions with virtue ethics that 
are influenced by the Aristotelian and other ancient psychological models. 
Through direct comparisons, the empirically-minded theorists such as Haidt, 
Prinz, as well as Harman, Doris and Vranas, (Homiak (2015/[2003]) have 
dismissed the philosophical accounts of character as unrealistic collections of 
habits and dispositions, almost as horoscopes. 
That said the philosophical understanding of character might be too 
imprecise as a distinct concept to form part of responsibility assessments, 
which in turn demand precision (see B. Williams 1997). Imprecise, “deep” 
aspects–such as those championed by Susan Wolf– and by extension 
responsibility have led the accounts adopting them into a sort of intellectual 
paralysis of unclarity on whether the agent can be blamed at all. If the 
environment is considered to be a significant factor in the action of the 
individual, it might be impossible, now or ever, to blame him. This of course 
is the point of contention that the hard determinists are after (see Waller 
2012). 
For this reason the use of character has been associated with 
incompatibilist accounts of free will and responsibility. The tendency to 
consider formative events or the past leading to the act in question seems to 
accompany the argument about determination. This is not the case always 
however: Watson displays the effect of the “historical” dimension of 
responsibility in his Strawsonian account (see Watson 1987). Watson does 
not however advance incompatibilist arguments, as his objective is the 
sentimentalist formulation of Strawson’s conception of responsibility. By 
showing that knowledge of character and the formative events of past life 
affect our moral evaluations (see ibid.), Watson criticizes Strawson’s claim 
that responsibility relations could be construed entirely on affective or 
emotional grounds.  
Futhermore Schoeman (1987) advances character-based ideas in order to 
question the ledger-view type, overly mechanical attempts at construing 
responsibility. Finally Fischer and Ravizza’s 1998 theory focusing on reasons-
responsiveness, works as an example of a theory that (in Eshleman’s terms) 
is merit-based and compatibilist (see Eshleman 2014/[2001]). In terms of 
                                                
298 See Waller 2011. 
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character, this means that “taking responsibility is a genuine historical 
notion and its structure is similar to other important historical recursively 
defined notions” (Fischer & Ravizza 1998, 238). While this might seem to 
have features familiar in incompatibilist theories, Fischer and Ravizza state 
that “it is highly attractive to think that taking responsibility is compatible 
with causal determinism” (ibid. 239). 
As based on comparison made here, Aristotle’s responsibility is “more 
profound” or “thicker” (in Williams's 1997 terms) than the currently popular 
Strawsonian theories are. The difference in the role that character plays in 
Aristotle’s theory explains part of this. The analysis of theories of 
responsibility through Williams’s categories can help to explain why there 
are difficulties: the reactive sentiments based approach emphasizes the 
intention and response elements of responsibility, but they seem to gloss 
over the effect of the state element through the use of the excuses (and the 
effect is exceedingly binary in Wallace’s exemptions especially). In modern 
theories of responsibility, blame mitigation related to the state element has 
been problematic to pinpoint and to describe, possibly owing to the 
separation of psychology as its own discipline. In the Strawsonian approach, 
the cases affected by it are simply excised with the instrument of the excuse, 
limiting the approach to those that deal with a common adult moral agent. 
Difficulties with this are related to the cultural definitions of what qualifies as 
such a moral agent. An Aristotelian character-based approach would produce 
a similar outcome, in which the differing situation is deemed out-of-context 
for evaluation, but at least his theoretical context would allow for in-depth 
explanation of why the agent in question is treated differently. Nevertheless, 
the problems related to the nature of character would require significant 
restoration of the core concepts in order for the virtues or some similar 
functions to be viable. 
The authors discussed here who took a positive view of character included 
Aristotle, who incorporated virtues as states of character (hexeis) as central 
elements of the Aristotelian soul that could guide action. Character was 
included in Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility as it was important 
where responsibility assessments were needed (5.1.2). Indirectly, Smiley’s 
historical, pragmatic view allowed room for character-based concerns (4.3.2). 
A recent source of criticism, the modern psychological theories hailing 
from situationist disciplines, criticize the Aristotelian notion of character as 
being insubstantial: all generalizations about the psyche fail given the 
particular circumstances that force the agent to act apart from them. The 
most out-spoken opponent of the conception of character and its use in 
philosophy was John Doris in his multi-disciplinary work Lack of Character 
(2002). The main driver of his argument was based on observations that 
character is a vague concept and should not be employed as a basis for ethical 
systems. Doris did, however, allow for the narrow definition for character as 
a proxy for the everyday psychological evaluations we make of each other to 
exist (6.1.2). Perhaps, in this sense, Doris can be read in reverse, since his 
220 
claim is that character shouldn’t be used and we should focus instead on the 
empirical details. But when the statements about responsibility are made 
from a normative perspective, there might be a motive to provide general 
statements. In these cases, character could be interpreted as a way to take 
into account the cases in which the generalized statement "A is morally 
responsible for X" clearly fails because of empirical details about A. In other 
words, character could be read as shorthand for the empirical details in 
contexts where these generalizations about moral responsibility are sought. 
Nevertheless, the Aristotelian concept of character is thicker than the 
psychologists assume: Aristotelian character contains multiple, layered 
notions of the common psychological patterns of the agent, but also carries 
the implications of their origin, be it from habituation, education or self-
enforced training (see NE 1179b20-31). In terms of philosophy, the 
situationist critique of the Aristotelian character partially misses its mark. 
The authors who were both for and against character in different contexts 
included Bernard Williams, who wrote that if character is interpreted in 
terms of an element of responsibility – i.e., the state element of 
responsibility, the concept has a crucial role in determining the full picture of 
responsibility. However, as Williams's more general criticism delineated, 
moral responsibility itself should not and could not be “profound”. Therefore 
Aristotle’s idea about moral education or development forming part of his 
responsibility of character would be in conflict with Williams's demand (4.3.3 
& 7). 
Another author who saw both positive and negative sides of the concept 
was Jean Roberts, whose article on Aristotle suggested that Aristotle’s 
account of responsibility for character was an ill fit with modern accounts of 
moral responsibility299. On the other hand, she argued that, in Aristotle’s 
context, character is relevant since the agent and her moral education are not 
simply determined by nature (5.1.2). 
The criticisms of the more recent philosophers would strongly suggest 
that character-based responsibility is inconsistent in itself. Yet even Doris, as 
the most ardent critic of character-based philosophy is of the mind that there 
is a pragmatic use for the concept of character within theories of moral 
responsibility (Doris 2002). Russell (1995), who says Hume is mistaken in 
emphasising character in responsibility analyses, leaves open the sort of 
historical responsibility based concerns which would be relevant in 
determining the lack of a fully functional, adult mind in terms of the concept 
of character. 
As Bernard Williams (1997) allowed for a narrow concept of moral 
responsibility to be included as moral theory, perhaps in a similar way, a 
                                                
299 Fischer and Ravizza listed a group of authors who were in agreement and disagreement with 
Roberts. The other author mentioned was Curren (1989). On the other hand, those authors who 
thought Aristotle and the modern accounts could be reconciled included T. H. Irwin (1980) and S. S. 
Meyer (1993). (Fischer & Ravizza 1998, 12, n17.) 
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limited functionality for character could be left in the conceptual space 
between full agency and responsible action. At least one generalization seems 
to arise from this exercise: All theories compared here contain a category of 
excuses, which relates to the moral qualification of the agent for the 
responsibility assessments. The concept of character in Aristotle’s (and 
Hume’s) theory contributes to these categories. The more recent Strawsonian 
theories lack this descriptor, but deal with the theme nevertheless through 
type-2 pleas/special considerations or with the Watsonian/Wallacean 
exemptions. 
By taking note of character, theories of responsibility seem to go further 
than mechanical responsibility ascription "moment-to-moment" or in terms 
of Fischer & Ravizza (1998) the "current time-slice" basis. This implies not 
only that the psychology of the agent matters, but leaves open the potential 
for social circumstances to have an effect on responsibility assessments 
historically. As many writers noted, character is – just like responsibility – a 
social concept. There is no point in employing it on a single individual living 
in a vacuum. 
Following Strawson’s example, many have adopted his description of 
special considerations or pleas as the basis for an alternative way of 
discussing blame and blame mitigation related reactions (see 3.1.3). Watson 
and Wallace continued to refine the categories into the clearer definitions of 
excuses and exemptions (6.2).300 Erin Kelly (2013) was referenced as a 
philosopher who questions the use excuses in moral theories. 
In summary, what was discussed here first was the question of what 
moral responsibility means in today’s philosophy (Q1). After explication of 
two major theoretical areas of Strawsonian and Aristotelian accounts of 
responsibility (noting the difficulty of defining them as such), an 
understanding of the general subject of moral responsibility was established. 
The position of Bernard Williams and Susan S. Meyer was defended, in that 
there can be no single, unified theory of moral responsibility. Rather there 
are discrete elements of responsibility,301 and the description of the relation 
between two of these forms the central thesis of this work.  
Williams's elements enabled comparisons between the two very different 
accounts. The analysis conducted in the seventh chapter displayed a relation 
between the state- and response elements of both theories. The state element 
(in the form of Strawsonian exemptions or of similar conclusions derived 
from Aristotle’s character) can in all observed cases have an eliminative or a 
mitigating effect on the response element described in that theory. Examples 
included Strawson’s special conditions with a “modifying or mollifying” effect 
on the reactive sentiments, whereas in the Aristotelian picture the 
                                                
300 Or mitigating circumstances and excuses if Holly Smith’s (2001) definition would have been 
followed instead (6.2). 
301 Described by Bernard Williams as including: cause, intention, state and response. For more 
detail on Williams’s argument see chapter 4.3.3. 
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virtues/vices and the information about the state of character that the act 
displays to the moral community could similarly lessen the blame (as well as 
praise) resulting from knowledgeable and uncoerced acts committed by an 
individual. 
Thus, the chapters that have been discussed in connection with each other 
have focused on the state element (Strawson’s special conditions in 3.1.2 and 
Aristotle’s character-based concerns in 5.1.2) and the response element 
(blame in both, Strawson’s reactive sentiments, Aristotle’s feedback from the 
moral community). The claim here, i.e.. the thesis, is that in all cases 
discussed here, the concerns related to the state element of responsibility 
have had an eliminative or mitigating effect on the response element in the 
theory in question.302 In other words, the state of the agent (state of mind, 
character) and the concerns related to it can mitigate or eliminate blame in 
cases where moral responsibility is being assessed. 
As for the answer to the second research question (Q2) “How should 
character be understood in the context of the philosophy of responsibility?”, 
an answer can be suggested. First, the premise that the theories of 
responsibility are connected by the notion of blame as the default response to 
wrong-doing had to be accepted. Given this, an answer could be derived from 
the application of Bernard Williams’ elements of responsibility: character has 
a definite function within the theories of responsibility and is relevant in 
cases of extraordinary agency. Naturally occurring instances of blaming can 
be questioned based on the character in cases of responsibility assessments 
when the agent is either insufficiently developed in terms of moral capability, 
or is otherwise prevented from being evaluated as a fully accountable human 
being.  
Character is, according to the commentators, a given pre-requisite (Meyer 
2011) or a superficial element in terms of the theories of responsibility for 
action (Irwin 1980, Roberts 1989), but as a way of bringing an evaluation of 
the state of the agent into the equation it seems justified. For the idea of 
moral responsibility, if made clear in all that it implies, the state of the 
agency must be tested, or at least declared intact. Otherwise if the 
responsibility assessment is done according to any pre-conceived formula, an 
agent who is extraordinary in the terms of the state element, compromises 
the act of assigning moral responsibility. Thus, such checks should be 
incorporated into the theories of moral responsibility. 
What all this implies is that in ascertaining the validity of the 
responsibility assessments made in each theory here, the agency, or more 
precisely, the requirements for that agency are evaluated together with the 
actual responsibility assessment. Discussions of the examples of children and 
the psychopath have had the following in common: 1) An agent and his or her 
capability to be held morally responsible is being evaluated. 2) A quality of 
                                                
302 A similar relation is most likely true between the intention element and the response element, 
but as the state element is crucial here, this other generalization is left for later attempts. 
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said agent has a decisive effect on the responsibility assessment related to 
possible or actual action being committed by said agent. 3) The response in 
the form of blame is eliminated or at least requires re-evaluation as a result 
of the quality referred to in 2. In this way, the common area of moral 
responsibility with extraordinary agents is being discussed in the same 
format, although with the different conceptual tools related either to the 
character (and virtues) in the Aristotelian context, or to the special 
conditions / excuses in the Strawsonian one. Schoeman’s question “How do 
the theories of character and excuses inform one another?” (Schoeman 1987, 
8-9) could be answered by comparing how the two theories discuss the cases 
in which the agent is extraordinary and cannot be held responsible as would 
a fully responsible, adult moral agent.  
One obvious point of difference is the inclusion of moral development 
that is inherent in the Aristotelian system through the virtues. Virtues, as we 
saw, were originally habituated or otherwise picked up during upbringing 
and education. These same virtues in Aristotle’s theory have a crucial effect 
at the time of action, where the important acts are deliberated on, chosen and 
committed. The way that virtues are conceptualized today could be different, 
be it in the form of schemas or scripts, etc. The point of difference 
nevertheless is that a similar faculty does not exist in the naturalized 
Strawsonian context. Although character is mentioned in FR, it is not 
developed in relation to the theory of responsibility that follows from the 
text.  
It is argued here that character represents an elaborate or even the most 
elaborate attempt so far to describe the means of taking historical events into 
account in assessing moral responsibility. Therefore, even without 
attempting to re-instate a specific system of character-based ethics, the 
concept warrants further consideration, especially within the compatibilist 
camp of moral responsibility theories. Gary Watson's ideas (2004/[1996]) 
are followed here in that in addition to straightforward accountability for 
causal responsbility, moral responsibility is considered to contain an element 
of "aretaic" appraisal within the act of holding one another morally 
responsible, in cases wherein we enact our ideas about what sort of 
behaviour we look for in each other, or how we expect to behave in each set of 
circumstances. As character-inclusive theories have attempted to incorporate 
this appraisal into the theories of moral responsibility, considerations of 
character have a property that affects our ascriptions of responsibility, at 
least in their context.303 The actual exemptions describe the flip-side of this 
mechanism: whenever it is deemed within our societies that the agent 
perfoming an act otherwise condemnable proves exempt, this same appraisal 
sets this actor apart from the group of people appropriately blamed for it. In 
this way, the conceptual wholes of character and excuses are related. 
                                                
303 I remain grateful to my pre-examiner Jussi Suikkanen. His questions have helped to clarify 
these points. 
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Character additionally needs to be noted in terms of agency. To have a 
theory of responsibility that would include the inherent limits to the criteria 
full-fledged moral agency calls for is a requirement, and character should 
function in this way in the context of theories of responsibility. The worst-
case alternative would be that without a clear idea about the agent, assigning 
responsibility would work only randomly, determined by the qualities of the 
agent. Without any evaluation of this agent, any theory of responsibility 
would equate to injustice. If this were to be combined with theories of 
responsibility centering on action, a modern version of Aristotelian, big-
picture evaluation of responsibility could be achieved. 
At the least, a test for the “membership of the moral community” should 
be included in the responsibility assessments in the form of a rudimentary 
check. If the agent is somehow extraordinary, in terms of the state element (a 
child or a person who is insane, a psychopath, etc.) it should be immediately 
clear that further assessment would be impossible. A more detailed, ad hoc 
evaluations should accompany each responsibility assessment, or the 
situation would resemble the paradoxical state in which one strives for 
definitive judgment on one’s responsibility in relation to action and loses the 
“depth” or profundity of the concept in the process. Otherwise the core idea 
of responsibility is diluted ad infinitum by having to take every factor of the 
environment into account. These extremes of overly narrow judgment that is 
not really moral responsibility as such, and the overly broad, over-
determined state of perfect explanation overthrowing any attempt are 
possibly the only options that we have, but it is hoped that by removing 
misconceptions about moral responsibility, potentially systematically 
harmful “solutions” to the problem of moral responsibility can be avoided. 
The special conditions or the excuses and exemptions in the Strawsonian 
context amount to little more than a list of the anomalous agencies, those to 
which the rules do not apply as they would in perfectly normal cases. It 
seems that if historical responsibility is to be considered at all, the lack of 
markers of learning or memory that the virtues represent put the 
Strawsonian theory in the awkward position of needing to evaluate and 
qualify the level of moral agency before being able to evaluate the practices 
and acts being done. This might be overstating the issues of applicability in 
the Strawsonian approach in general, but the contrast is there. 
On the other hand, reversing the question, the theoretization of the 
excuses is being currently advanced in the Strawsonian context and could as 
such invigorate the topic of responsibility for Aristotelian virtue ethics as 
well. A good example of this is Kelly’s paper (2013). The distinctions between 
the types of agency, and the different levels of blame mitigation between the 
various types of special consideration could bring much needed detail to the 
Aristotelian theory, which is only broadly concerned with the voluntariness 
of the action, including ignorance and coercion as the few excuses discussed 
in relation to Aristotle’s work. How, for example, would a responsibility 
assessment sound that could accommodate reasons for exemptions for 
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specific afflictions or mental conditions that are not discussed in Aristotle, as 
well as allowing for considerations of moral development akin to the tools 
that the virtues represent? Unfortunately such a project would be too large to 
be pursued within the limitations of this dissertation. 
Given all this, a cautionary note on generalizing about the use of the 
concept of character should be sounded here, very much in spirit of Doris 
(2002). Reincorporating character into modern theories of responsibility 
would not be a simple task and the reinstatement process would have to 
happen prudently in that concerns brought by the new scientific advances in 
data on the mind should not be contradicted. There is significant overlap 
here with psychological sciences that by many measures are much better able 
to assemble the facts and truths about the behavior of human beings than the 
methods of moral philosophy are. Any current ethical theory relying on the 
concept of character would do well to study these more empirically inclined 
sciences with care. 
It is also worth noting here that the retributive elements of (criminal) 
responsibility were not in question here. The character-based and excuse-
based theories might arrive at precisely the same conclusion. A criminal who 
is afflicted by the condition of psychopathy (verifiable by some reliable test), 
can be found guilty and be legally responsible in the same way under both 
approaches. The only difference is the increased ability of the character-
based theory to open up the black box of agency and in this instance inquire 
about the causes and the circumstances of the wrong-doing. There are 
philosophers who want their views of responsibility to carry a lawyer-like 
procession and efficiency. For balance it is hoped that the depth of humanity 
and history will have some say. Perhaps this is part of “the profound” that 
Williams was referring to. In that case, it is hoped that clarity could be 
brought to the matter instead of further complication.304  
                                                
304 Some of the points of criticism that could be raised based on what has been discussed within 
this dissertation are anticipated. It is naturally difficult to guess the most pressing concerns of a work 
during writing, but at least the following difficulties are noted here: First of all, the most obvious 
criticism that the completed work can face could be due to a crucial omitted source. Recognized 
omissions are acknowledged in footnote 12 in the beginning of chapter 2. A more serious flaw would be 
a flaw in argumentation, and as the argument presented in the previous section relies on certain 
interpretation of two notoriously imprecise and ambiguous terms – responsibility and character – it 
needs to be stated with care, that the validity of said argument can be questioned, if a radically 
different interpretation on one of the two key concepts is made. The specific subject areas of 
Strawsonian and Aristotelian philosophy, as well as the individual concepts of responsibility, character 
and excuses are by themselves too broad, granted, but as this study has been committed in form of a 
heuristic, the resulting generalization is within the scope of a single thesis or a claim such as: in the 
studied theories the identical subject area of blame mitigation is referred to with two different 
concepts: that of character in Aristotle’s case and that of excuses in the Strawsonian discipline. 
Furthermore Aristotle and Strawson are seldom discussed head-to-head, with the notable exceptions of 
Meyer (2011) and Echeñique (2013). Therefore the comparison works as grounds for a unique 
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perspective, which speaks for the validity of this work. Another possible way of disagreeing with the 
premises here is to have different interpretations of distinct concepts that have been under 
examination above. Whether the selection done here has been wise or sufficient is up to the reader. 
Pointing toward an example, the debates about the minutiae of the concept of responsibility and its 
elements (e.g. blame, see chapter 4.2.) are currently going on, and any input to these debates is 
welcome. According to other authors, than those that have been examined here, the crucial 
combinations of the relevant concepts and the relations between them could have been significantly 
different. Treating excuses for example as higher order to character, as Moore (1990) does, could make 
it difficult to do a comparison like that which has been done above. Here moral responsibility and 
theories concerning it is treated in higher hierarchical order than the concepts of character and 
excuses, which are considered here to be on equal footing. Finally, regarding skepticism of moral 
responsibility, the most direct opposition to the entire idea has been advanced in the form of hard 
determinism. Pereboom (see 2001) might be the most recognized figure related to the subject, as is 
Waller’s fairly recent work (2011). Because the hard determinist position demands that the practice of 
blaming should be ceased, at least in the sense that the sentiment would not lead to social sanctioning 
and because blame is integral to the practices related with moral responsibility, which following the 
broadly naturalist outset that was chosen as the common ground for this multi-disciplinary effort, 
allows for it and presents viable descriptions of the actual, social interaction between the human 
beings, the former position is deemed incompatible with the results arrived at here. For this reason the 
principles or the position of hard determinism cannot be accepted from the perspective of the 
argument. However, it is not wished that dialogue should end. On the contrary any comments from the 
different viewpoints are welcome. A more moderate form of skepticism is, however, called for: 
Following Williams (1993), even as there can be no overarching theory, any account of moral 
responsibility cannot be complete without all of its elements, including those related to character. 
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9 CONCLUSION 
 
The concept of responsibility and its discussion in the Anglophone 
philosophical world was anchored here on Peter Strawson’s article “Freedom 
and Resentment” (2008/[1962]). The discussion on moral responsibility, as 
observed in that article, was shifted away from the fact-value debates favored 
by the logical positivists toward a more sentimentalist view emphasing 
naturalistic moral psychology instead of linguistics. 
The work of the preeminent contemporary Strawsonian theorist R. Jay 
Wallace (1994) was examined in order to formulate a heuristic idea of how 
Strawson’s views have developed further in our own era. The conclusion of 
the initial examination was that even if Strawson’s work had considerably 
advanced how interesting a concept responsibility is, and his progress toward 
the sentimentalist outlook made the discussion relevant again, on the 
downside the free will vs. determinism debate still hindered the debate 
considerably, especially concerning the applicability of the theories of 
responsibility. 
So far, it has been exceedingly difficult to pinpoint moral responsibility as 
a precise concept in the history of philosophy. While the naturalism-based 
viewpoints have made the topic accessible by letting the writers concentrate 
on the reactive sentiments and common concepts such as praise and blame 
as the distinguishing qualities of responsibility relations constituting the idea 
of moral responsibility, critical examinations of the subject cannot be ignored 
altogether. A frequent criticism of Strawson and his followers was the 
insufficiency of their accounts of events in history that had an effect on the 
responsibility assessments of a particular moment.  
Criticisms of moral responsibility by Bernard Williams (1993 & 1997) 
were addressed, the most poignant message from him being that there could 
never be a unified theory of responsibility, because the concept contains four 
distinct elements: cause, intention, state and response. These elements 
appear in different configurations whenever moral responsibility is 
discussed. Moral responsibility includes, in addition to mere retrospective 
responsibility for action, other notions worth considering: being responsible 
and what it means was a problem that occupied writings such as those of 
Herbert Fingarette (1966) and Gary Watson (1987). The latter touched on the 
theme of historical responsibility by looking at acts which were not done 
precisely in connection with responsibility assessments, but earlier, in 
formative ways (see Watson 1987 & chapter 3.4.4). Marion Smiley (1992) 
presented even more of an objective assessment of responsibility by making a 
historical comparison of the modern (Strawsonian) and classical 
(Aristotelian) accounts of responsibility, which were the two main theories 
compared in this study.  
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Aristotle’s conception of responsibility, which was considered in chapter 5, 
was given three interpretations. The first of these, responsibility for action, 
was mostly informed by Terence H. Irwin (1980), who presented Aristotle’s 
theory in the form of the “simple theory” (“A is responsible (a candidate for 
praise or blame) if A does X voluntarily”).305 Historical responsibility in his 
theory led Irwin to formulate a “complex theory”, which included 
consideration of capacity to make prohairesis-type informed decisions. 
Political responsibility was briefly looked at, but was ultimately not 
included.306 Among others, Jean Roberts (1989) did not accept the unifying 
theory and, along with Susan Meyer (2011), she considered Aristotle’s 
responsibility for character as a separate, albeit questionable theme. Meyer 
claimed that the character-based writings found in book III.5 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics were not part of Aristotle’s moral responsibility, being 
part of another argument with more to do with moral education.  
The definition of responsibility as preparedness for blame and sanction 
has been refuted on many occasions since. In this connection, the key 
problem that this work has been insufficient in scope to solve, is that by 
following Williams’s 1993 theses, philosophical accounts of responsibility are 
incapable of tackling the “deep” intentions associated with the concept. This 
means that talk about responsibility must be kept sufficiently “narrow” in 
terms of definitions. The resulting narrow yet functional theoretizations 
(such as Wallace’s) have not met with universal acceptance307, nor have the 
theories that seek the deeper elements (by Wolf, Smiley, etc.) succeeded in 
incorporating all that is necessary in a manner that could be agreed upon. 
Taking into account Bernard Williams's claim (1997) that moral 
responsibility cannot be “profound”, as well as Watson’s 1987 example of 
historical effect on the reactive sentiments; as well as the unease of the 
aforementioned Aristotle scholars on the topic of responsibility for character 
(5.2), it was deemed that character in theories of responsibility was worth a 
closer, systematic look. 
The second part of the dissertation consisted of the systematic 
examination of the various definitions and uses of the concepts of character 
and excuses as well as their analysis. The first definition was discussed in the 
                                                
305 Whether or not Irwin’s addition to Aristotle’s theory of responsibility in the form of his 
“complex theory” was correct or not, it is considered here that in responsibility for action his “simple 
theory” was adequate, and has frequently been referred to since. (Irwin 1980, 125, chapter 3.1.1.) 
306 Political responsibility as understood by Delba Winthrop (1975) and others was taken into 
account as a connected relevant theme. However, as the core functioning of interpersonal 
responsibility, as understood by proponents of the naturalistic interpretation (which was chosen as the 
primary discipline, in order for the multi-disciplinary study to be possible), did not include political 
responsibility, at least directly, it was decided not to examine the third category of Aristotle’s 
responsibility further. 
307 Compare, for example, with Paul Russell’s critique of Wallace presented in his article 
“Responsibility, Naturalism, and the Morality System” (2013).  
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case of Strawson and his followers in only a limited way, noting how their 
concept was usually all but dismissed and the topic was relegated with the 
help of the excuses. 
Character, as it appeared in Aristotle’s theory was fleshed out further with 
the help of texts by authors such as Broadie (1991) and Burnyeat (1999), 
among others. The concept was included by default in the considerations of 
responsibility for action, and had an effect on whether the act could be 
considered blameworthy or not depending on the state of the character of the 
agent. This was found to be especially interesting where the agent was 
considered extraordinary, as in not a fully developed adult human being. The 
basic formulation of “s is responsible for X” was found alterable in terms of 
the response element, blame, by substitution of different types of agents. If s 
was an infant, for example, or a mentally incapacitated adult, the outcome of 
the responsibility assessment would be different than where s was an 
ordinary adult human being. Character, while advocated by some authors 
like McIntyre, has received more dismissal and criticism, as from John Doris, 
who viewed the concept as both outdated psychology and as a misleading 
umbrella-term. Doris’s psychologism was discussed critically as well. 
In the corresponding modern, Strawsonian theories (at least as 
interpreted by Watson and Wallace) the similar arguments concerning the 
relation between state of the agent and response to the act were not 
discussed in terms of character. Instead, these propositions in Strawson’s 
article were discussed in terms of pleas or special considerations and later by 
his followers in terms of excuses (called exemptions in the most severe 
instances).  
The contrast between character and excuses was used to highlight how the 
theories of responsibility deal with with extraordinary agents. Strawson 
equated the response to acts by children in the same dismissal categories as 
persons with serious personality-altering disabilities, etc. Similarly, Wallace 
posited unintuitive concepts as “blameworthiness inhibitors” in order to 
explain why the moral responsibility of some people was treated differently. 
This contrast was explored by looking at theories of responsibility. The 
modern, default way of discussing blame mitigation seemed to be centered 
on excuses, while character has been avoided as a concept, at least by the 
philosophers in the compatibilist camp. As for the argument of the 
dissertation, it seemed clear at this point that the concerns of character were 
an element of theories of responsibility from Kant onward right up to the 
modern philosophers, and one reason that might explain why contemporary 
philosophers are so reluctant to discuss character is that psychology has 
become its own science and these questions could be regarded as belonging 
in that empirical setting. Nevertheless, the evidence seemed to support a 
need for re-evaluation of character in philosophical theories of responsibility. 
The naturalistic approach has deliberately blurred the boundaries between 
philosophy and psychology since Quine. After this, different criticisms were 
addressed. 
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The final question was posed in terms of whether character as a concept has a 
role in modern theories of responsibility, and the question was analyzed by 
comparing the Williamsian elements of responsibility. The question of 
whether Aristotle’s and Strawson’s theories of responsibility are compatible 
was answered by means of comparing the categories of excused and 
exempted agents. The state element was taken to signify settings similar to 
them and those discussed in terms of the Aristotelian topic of responsibility 
for character in Nicomachean Ethics III.5. While some writers viewed 
character in theories of responsibility as borderline “occult qualities”, 
following Hume, even the most ardent critics (especially Doris 2002) 
recognized the pragmatic everyday use of the concept as a simplifying tool of 
evaluation. This permits a role for character in modern theories of 
responsibility as well, and this use is twofold:  
 
1. Character as a philosophical concept allows condensation of the effect of 
historical responsibility of the agent into easily understandable terms in 
cases requiring responsibility assessment. By way of prospective assessment, 
it allows the simple device of anticipating the probable course of action taken 
by the agent in advance, and with this a more realistic account of interaction 
between the agents, such as is relevant in the current debate on “standing to 
blame” (see chapter 4.3.4). 
 
2. In addition to this, character can in any social circumstance function as a 
simple summary of the mental state of the agent at the time of the act. If 
incorporated into theories of responsibility, this would avoid the need for 
convoluted conditions for how the theory should take various types of 
extraordinary agents into account (chapters 5.1.2 & 6.1). 
 
Excuses, while a broader category, can incorporate the same functions: 
 
3. Excuses can mitigate blame moderately or completely, at which point they 
are called exemptions (chapter 6.2).  
 
4. Excuses can incorporate the points 1 and 2 as character-based excuses (see 
table 6 in chapter 7.3). However, this is seldom acknowledged within the 
existing theories and even there it is done relatively superficially in contrast 
to the myriad factors needed in character formation in the theories favouring 
the latter concept.308  
Any theory leaving 1 and 2 out of its scope can arrive at a situation in which 
the grounds for excusing are insufficiently defined. While Strawson did mean 
his theory to take into account the social context or “the web of human 
                                                
308 For ways that Aristotle’s character has an effect on excuses (see Broadie 1991, 159-174). 
Concerning Hume, the Hume-Brandt thesis, discussed by Holly M. Smith also combines the notions of 
character with the excuses (see 2001, 507). 
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attitudes and feelings” and despite the departure from the norm being 
significant from his contemporary perspective, it seems that the difference 
between his and Aristotle’s theory is a step away from the pragmatic reality. 
Aristotle meant “his account to be relevant to ordinary judgments about 
responsibility.” (Irwin 1980, 120.) His theory, as interpreted by the 
contemporary scholars is, more so than Strawson’s, a theory of moral 
responsibility meant to be applied. Strawson did not sufficiently follow up 
the initial masterstroke of “Freedom and Resentment”, but the work of his 
followers, as evidenced by contributions up to the recent series of Oxford 
Studies in Agency and Responsibility (Shoemaker (ed.) 2013, 2014 (with 
Tognazzini, eds.) & 2015) show that the potential has always been there for a 
complete and intricate theory, perhaps so far best realized by Wallace in his 
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (1994). 
Looking at the notion of character in the context of philosophy of 
responsibility at least showed that there is room for expansion in the 
narrower attempts, i.e., those relying on excuses, in defining the content and 
limits of moral responsibility. Even without demands to bring back 
Aristotle’s complex, yet outdated ideas about character (as described by Irwin 
1980, Roberts 1989 and Meyer 2011), the considerations related to that 
theory (see Fingarette 1966, Watson 1987 & Fischer and Ravizza 1998) 
describe facets of responsibility, and indeed a form of moral agency, that 
proponents of the currently popular Strawsonian theories (Wallace (1994) at 
the forefront) could pay more attention to. As an example, the notion of 
historical responsibility (as discussed in Watson (1987) and Fischer & 
Ravizza (1998)) seems a good candidate for this, as are the recent initiatives 
on the topic of “standing to blame” (see Bell 2013). As a result, the way is 
open to the constant evolution of contending accounts of blame and other 
related topics. Whatever direction the philosophy of responsibility does take 
in the near future, it is certain that the debate is going to be heated, lively, 
and captivating.  
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